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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
Cartel enforcement is challenging, particularly for developing countries with young 
competition enforcement regimes as cartels are illicit in nature and competition 
authorities are faced with connected firms that sometimes enjoy close links with 
policy makers. So, why should developing countries be concerned with effective 
cartel enforcement? This thesis answers the question by explaining it from 
international perspective – international cartel enforcement via regional trade 
agreements between developed and developing countries. This work argues that in 
order to encourage the utilisation of competition related provisions in regional TAs 
there are prerequisites to be satisfied. One of the prerequisites is there has to be 
incentives for the regional TA signatories to cooperate in international cartel 
enforcement by invoking the competition related provisions under regional trade 
agreements. Incentives arise out of the existence of credible competition 
enforcement regimes and the strength of trade relationship between the regional 
trade agreement partners. Without domestic competition law in place, there is no 
legal basis for cooperation. Even if there is a competition law in place, the absence 
of a credible competition enforcement regime would not incentivise a developed 
country with an advanced competition jurisdiction to invoke competition related 
provisions in a regional trade agreement to address cross border competition 
infringements. Therefore, it is important for trade reliant developing countries to have 
a credible competition enforcement regime in place, lest international cartels 
continue to thrive and adversely impact the domestic market of developing countries 
and international trade. This includes ensuring that effective cartel enforcement 
exists in their jurisdiction. In this regard, this work focuses on Malaysia to illustrate 
how it can be done. Malaysia, a middle income developing country which had fairly 
recently adopted a competition law with the enactment of the Competition Act 2010. 
Although the law is already in place, Malaysia is yet to formulate a coherent and 
formal cartel enforcement policy for the country. The policy is important for effective 
cartel enforcement because it complements the law and provides clarity and 
transparency in regard to legislative implementation. In determining an appropriate 
cartel enforcement policy for Malaysia, the discussion encompasses the following 
aspects: an appropriate cartel enforcement policy for Malaysia; exemptions of 
horizontal agreements; limitations of the Competition Act 2010 in light of tougher 
cartel enforcement. These are the pivotal aspects in cartel enforcement which ought 
to be focused on to facilitate Malaysia in formulating its cartel enforcement policy. At 
the end of the discussion, this work suggests the form and contents of Malaysia’s 
cartel enforcement policy which account for Malaysia’s limitations as a middle 
income developing country with a young competition jurisdiction. The work also finds 
that there is insufficient empirical evidence available on market concentration in 
Malaysia and therefore recommends the necessary studies which ought to be 
undertaken in order to facilitate the competition authorities to formulate an accurate 
competition enforcement policy. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1. SETTING THE SCENE 
 
Although competition law is essentially focused on the regulation of domestic markets, 
there are also international dimensions in competition - those which involve cross 
border issues such as international cartels1. The international dimension is particularly 
significant for countries which are trade reliant due to the interaction between trade and 
competition. International cartel activities expand across at least two or more 
jurisdictions whereby the cartel agreement may be executed in a foreign market and 
one or all of the cartel member firms may not have office in the country in question at 
all. However, the domestic market is the one which bears the brunt of the negative 
impact of the cartel’s anti-competitive agreement and there may not be any evidence 
available in the domestic jurisdiction because decisions and communications pertaining 
to the cartel infringement were executed in foreign jurisdictions. On the other hand, anti-
competitive conducts of domestic cartels such as export cartels and domestic firms 
                                            
1
 International cartels may be categorised into three types, namely, 1) hard core cartels - made up of 
private producers of at least two countries who engages in price control and allocation of markets shares 
worldwide; 2) private export cartels - independent of the state and engages in price fixing or market 
allocation in export markets but not in their domestic market; and 3) state run export cartels. See Evenett, 
S.J. et al, ‘International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990’s’, The World Economy Vol.24 Issue 
9 (2001) 1221-1245, p.1222 
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which have entered into international cartel agreement may negatively impact foreign 
markets or both domestic and foreign markets2.  
 
Cross border competition issues such as international cartel enforcement are not easily 
addressed due to their multijurisdictional nature and because of the slow progress in 
reaching a coherent solution on the best modality and instrument in solving issues 
regarding international cartel enforcement3.  This is because multijurisdictional 
enforcement involves differences in the standards of legislation, which in turn are 
interpretations of the respective jurisdictions’ values and interests. These include level 
of development, economic and trade interests and socio-economic ideology of the 
countries. Arguably, multijurisdictional enforcement is best addressed via a multilateral 
legislative framework under a supranational entity, such as the proposal for a 
multilateral competition framework put forth by the EU under the WTO. However, since 
the idea was opposed by developing countries and unsupported by the US4, countries 
are resorting to other alternative instruments to address cross border competition issues 
such as international cartel enforcement5. These include bilateral competition 
cooperation agreements; utilising competition related provisions in regional trade 
agreements (regional TAs) and regional competition agreements.  
 
                                            
2
 For a detailed discussion on export cartels, see: Martyniszyn, M., ‘Export Cartels: Is it Legal to Target 
Your Neighbour? Analysis in Light of Recent Case Law’, Journal of International Economic Law, 1 – 42 
(2012), Oxford University Press 
3
 See: discussion in Chapter 2 of this thesis 
4
 Bhattacharjea, A., ‘The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on Competition Policy : A Developing  Country 
Perspective’, Journal of International Economic Law, (2006) 9(2), 293-323, p. 293 
5
 See discussion in Chapter 2 of this thesis 
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Why should international trade reliant countries be concerned about international cartel 
enforcement? From the perspective of developed countries, coherent international 
cartel enforcement protects their investments in developing countries. Therefore, it is in 
the interests of such developed countries with mature competition jurisdiction such as 
the US, the EU, Japan and Australia to assist developing countries who are their 
strategic trading partners to establish and enhance the latter’s cartel enforcement 
competency. For developing countries, it would be in their interest to engage in 
cooperation in international cartel enforcement in order to protect their vulnerable 
markets from the exploitation of international cartels to the detriment of their domestic 
producers and consumers6.  In both instances, coherent international cartel 
enforcement would also facilitate the dismantling of private barriers to entry which have 
replaced barriers to entry set up by states (such as include tariffs; import quotas and 
licensing), in light of trade liberalisation . 
 
Regional TAs, regional competition agreements and bilateral competition agreements 
would not work if developing countries do not view international cartel enforcement as a 
priority; there are inconsistencies in cross border competition enforcement; and there 
are lack of incentives and legal commitment in cooperation7. Incentives are elements or 
considerations which drive countries to enter into such accords which facilitate 
cooperation in international cartel enforcement but more importantly to carry out or 
                                            
6
 See:  Levenstein, M.C. and Suslow, V.Y., ‘Contemporary International Cartels and Developing 
Countries: Economic Effects and Implications for Competition Policy’, Antitrust Law Journal Vol.71 No.3 
(2004) 801-852  
7
 See detailed discussion in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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implement their obligations under specific accords. As such, incentives concern 
interests and benefits to the countries involved. In order for incentives to exist, there 
must not only be strong or strategic trade relations between the countries involved but 
also each jurisdiction must accept the principles of competition policy; and adopt the 
necessary laws and institutions, in order for international enforcement to be possible. 
Otherwise, it would not be beneficial for the jurisdiction with more advanced or 
established competition law regime to solely or predominantly bear the obligation to 
carry out cross border enforcement works under the accord; unless the trade and 
investment benefits to the country with the advanced competition jurisdiction far 
outweigh the costs of enforcement works. This view is supported by Dabbah’s argument 
that a likely consequence  of developing countries’ lack of credibility in enforcing 
competition issues with extra-territorial content may jeopardise their chances of entering 
into bilateral cooperation agreements with developed countries who may view the 
former as not worthy partners in this respect8. In other words, there is less incentive (if 
at all) for developed countries with effective competition enforcement regime to enter 
into accords such as regional TAs with such developing countries. Therefore, in order to 
facilitate international cartel enforcement, it is necessary to focus on establishing and 
strengthening the credibility and competency of competition law enforcement in 
developing countries.  
 
                                            
8
 Dabbah, M., ‘Competition Law and Policy in  Developing Countries: A Critical Assessment of the 
Challenges to Establishing an Effective Competition Law Regime’, World Competition 33, No. 3 (2010) 
457-475, p. 473 
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Why should cartels be prohibited by developing countries? Cartels are formed to restrict 
competition and enable cartelists to profiteer. Hard core cartel infringements such as 
price fixing, market allocation and bid-rigging lead to inefficient allocation of resources 
and facilitate rent seeking activities to the detriment of consumers because they affect 
consumer access and the choices of goods and services available in the market. This in 
turn affects growth and development. Economic development essentially refers to 
improvement in the standard of living of the population. It encompasses the processes 
and policies implemented by each country to improve the economic, political and social 
well-being of the people9. Economic development is not just improvements in the 
standard of living in the material sense but also an improvement of the state of mind10. 
Thus, in the context of competition policy, improvements in the standard of living would 
include not only increase in income but also in the choices of goods and services 
available in the market. Therefore, when cartels fix prices; or create barriers to entry; or 
restrict sharing of technology, resources could not be utilised or distributed efficiently to 
facilitate better access to and wider range of goods and services to consumers11. 
International cartels which are mostly based in developed countries have also  
detrimentally affected the markets of developing countries. These include the vitamin 
cartel which resulted in overcharges borne by developing countries estimated at 
                                            
9
 O’ Sullivan, A. and Sheffrin, S.M, Economics Principles in Action, Pearson Prentice Hall (2003), p.471 
10
 Sen argued that development should not just aim for economic growth but it has to be more focused on 
enhancing the quality of life not just in terms of commodities consumption but the capability or freedom 
one has in terms of choice of “functionings”. Todaro, M.P. and Smith, S.C., Economic Development, 
Tenth Edition (2009), Pearson Education, pp.16-19 
11
 See examples of harmful effects of price fixing and market allocation on the standard of living of the 
people in developing countries as explained by  Chowdhury in Chowdhury, M.,’The Political Economy of 
Law Reform in Developing Countries’,  Sixth ASCOLA Conference – New Competition Jurisdictions: 
Shaping Policies and Building Institutions (July 2011), King’s College London, pp.5-6 
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USD1.71 billion12; estimation based on 1997 data that developing countries imported 
USD54.7 billion of good from nineteen (19) industries with price fixing conspiracies 
during the 1990’s13 - which represented 5.2 per cent of total imports and 1.2 per cent of 
gross domestic product of developing countries14. These also illustrate that international 
cartels transfer wealth from developing countries to countries where cartels are based, 
which mostly are located in developed countries. 
 
Thus, there is a need for cartels to be prohibited by developing countries. However, 
more importantly, in view of the above, there is also a need for developing countries 
with competition legislation to adopt cartel enforcement policies which account for their 
limitations and facilitate their developmental needs. Inappropriate or unsuitable policy 
and legislation would lead to ineffective enforcement due to operational issues arising 
out of differences between the standards and substance of the legislation and the 
jurisdiction’s resources, lack of experience; and socio-economic ideology which is not 
receptive of competition. In discussing this notion, this work focuses on Malaysia, a 
middle income developing country which has recently adopted a competition law after 
nearly 20 years15 of consultations with the industry, consumer associations and 
                                            
12
 Yu, Y., ‘The Impact of Private International Cartels on Developing  Countries’, Honors Thesis, Stanford 
University (May 2003), pp. 9-11 at http://economics.stanford.edu/files/Theses/Theses_2003/Yu.pdf  
13
 Levenstein, M., et al, ‘International price Fixing Cartels and Developing Countries: A Discussion of 
Effects and Policy Remedies’, Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts 
Amherst, Working Paper Series No.53 (2003), abstract,  at 
http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1040&context=peri_workingpapers  
14
 Ibid 
15
 Malaysia had targeted to table a Draft Competition Bill in 1995 which indicates that efforts to introduce 
competition law in Malaysia were initiated from the early 1990’s. See Aminah, A. R. and Sinnasamy, S., 
‘Competition Regulation Within the APEC Region: Commonality and Divergence Competition Policy in 
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government agencies; road shows; and participation in various awareness programmes 
and international forums on competition policy. Malaysia finally enacted its competition 
legislation in 2010, namely the Competition Act 2010 and the Competition Commission 
Act 2010. Malaysia has announced that the Competition Act 2010 will be gradually 
enforced16. Malaysia’s cautious attitude to competition law and policy is not unfounded 
considering the fact that there is yet to be any conclusion to the debate on whether 
competition fosters development17; young competition jurisdictions and developing 
countries face many issues and challenges in implementing competition law18; and the 
concept of competition is novel to developing countries due to lack of competition 
culture19.  
 
Although the competition law has been enacted in Malaysia, formal policies of 
implementation such as a cartel enforcement policy are yet to be formulated by 
                                                                                                                                            
Malaysia’ in Green, C.J. and Rosenthal D.E. (eds), Competition Regulation in the Pacific Rim, Oceana 
Publications Inc. (1996), p.318 
16
 As outlined by the Minister of Domestic Trade, Co-operatives and Consumerism in his speech to the 
Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives), Malaysian Parliament on 20 April 2010, Hansard Report 
(Malay version), pp.151-152  
17
 For a summary of literature discussion on this, see Voigt, S.,  ‘The Effects of Competition Policy on 
Development – Cross-Country Evidence Using Four New Indicators’, Journal of Developmental Studies, 
Vol. 45, No.8, (September 2009) 1225-1248, pp.1227-1231 
18
 See: International Competition Network (ICN), ‘Lessons to be Learnt From the Experiences of Young 
Competition Agencies’, Competition Policy Implementation Working Group Report (Subgroup 2),  ICN, 
Cape Town, South Africa (May 2006) at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/library.aspx?search=&group=13&type=0&workshop=0 ; 
Gal, M.S., ‘The Ecology of Antitrust Pre-conditions for Competition Law Enforcement in Developing 
Countries’, in Competition, Competitiveness and Development: Lessons from Developing Countries, 
United Nations Publication (2004), UNCTAD/ DITC/CLP/2004/1, pp.20-38 at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20041ch1_en.pdf  
19
 For issues and challenges faced by young competition agencies which include those of developing 
countries, see International Competition Network (ICN), ‘Lessons to be Learnt From the Experiences of 
Young Competition Agencies’, Competition Policy Implementation Working Group Report (Subgroup 2),  
ICN, Cape Town, South Africa (May 2006), p.48 at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/library.aspx?search=&group=13&type=0&workshop=0 
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Malaysia. Adoption of an appropriate cartel enforcement policy is paramount to prevent 
disjunctions between the objectives of the law and its legislative provisions and their 
implementation. Such a situation would lead to ineffective cartel enforcement which in 
turn would not facilitate international cooperation in international cartel enforcement. 
 
1.2. WHY MALAYSIA? 
 
It is appropriate to focus on Malaysia because firstly, this work discusses the 
importance of cartel enforcement from the perspective of developing countries where 
international trade significantly contributes to the economy. Malaysia is a middle income 
developing country which relies on international trade as one of the engines of 
economic growth20. A middle income developing country is chosen because the more 
advanced the level of development, the higher the potential for competition law 
enforcement21.  Secondly, despite the fact that Malaysia’s decision to adopt its 
competition law is entirely based on its own economic development aspirations22 (unlike 
                                            
20
 Yusoff, M.B., ‘Malaysia Bilateral Trade Relations and Economic Growth’, International Journal of 
Business and Society Vol. 6 No.2 (2005) 55-68; Minister of International Trade and Industry, Malaysia, 
‘Malaysia’s Trading Nation Status Remains. Net Trade Influences Cyclical Economic Development and 
Long Term Growth Potential’, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Malaysia (MITI) (May 2012), 
MITI’s website at http://www.miti.gov.my/cms/content.jsp?id=com.tms.cms.article.Article_b1bdb34f-
c0a8156f-67ec67ec-23d4494c accessed on 11/1/ 2013  
21
 Waked, D.I., ‘Antitrust Enforcement in Developing Countries: Reasons for Enforcement & Non-
Enforcement Using Resource-Based Evidence’, 5
th
 Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper 
(2010), p.15 at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1638874 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1638874 . See 
also Mateus, A.M., Competition Law and Development: What Competition Law Regime?’, (October  2010) 
at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1699643 who found that countries with higher GDP per capita are able to 
enforce a more effective competition regime. 
22
 The Minister of Domestic Trade, Co-operatives and Consumerism in his speech to the Dewan Rakyat 
(House of Representatives), Malaysian Parliament on 20 April 2010, Hansard Report (Malay version), 
pp.145-147 
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most developing countries which adopted competition law because of external 
pressures23), as a young competition jurisdiction, Malaysia is vulnerable to the 
operational and implementation challenges in enforcing competition law. These 
particularly include cartel enforcement which involves anti-competitive activities that are 
hard to detect due to the illicit nature of cartels and the inexperience of the competition 
agencies24; lack of competition culture in Malaysia; and limited resources in the 
implementation of competition law. Lack of competition culture in Malaysia may be 
inferred from the fact that advocacy and awareness programmes have been prioritised 
even before the adoption of the Competition Act 2010 and they continue to be prioritised 
by the Malaysian Competition Commission (MyCC) to date25. Limitations in resources is 
one of the main challenges usually faced by new competition agencies particularly in 
developing countries where public funds is limited as compared to developed 
countries26 and competition enforcement activities would have to compete with 
developmental and economic growth programmes in securing resources. Malaysia is no 
different and in this regard, its competition authorities would have to prove their worth 
                                            
23
 External pressures include as a condition attached to financial bailout schemes by the IMF and the 
World Bank and as a precondition to or one of the terms of regional trade agreements.  See Marcos, F., 
‘Do Developing Countries Need Competition Laws and Policy?’, (September 2006), p.3 at SSRN 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=930562 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.930562  
24
 Lavoie, C., ‘South Africa’s Corporate Leniency Policy: A Five Year Review’, World Competition Vol. 
33(1) (2010), 141-162, p.143 
25
 Advocacy and awareness programmes which have been held by the MyCC include: APEC Training 
Course on Competition Policy - Effective Mechanism Against Cartel Offences, 10-12 October 2011, 
Penang, Malaysia; The Competition Act 2010 – Impact, Issues and Challenges, 13 October 2011, 
Science University of Malaysia, Penang; Seminar on Competition Law and Consumer Welfare, 3 
November 2011, Kuala Lumpur; briefings/dialogue sessions with stakeholders. See MyCC website at 
http://www.mycc.gov.my/234_179_179/Web/WebEvent/Events/Upcoming-Events.html  accessed on 
28/12/2011 
26
 International Competition Network (ICN), ‘Lessons to be Learnt From the Experiences of Young 
Competition Agencies’, Competition Policy Implementation Working Group Report (Subgroup 2),  ICN, 
Cape Town, South Africa (May 2006), p.22 at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/library.aspx?search=&group=13&type=0&workshop=0  
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first by utilising the limited resources available.   Therefore, a study which proposes an 
appropriate cartel enforcement policy for Malaysia is indeed relevant to the country. 
 
Moreover, studies on cartel enforcement from the perspective of developing countries 
are lacking and works such as this is indeed relevant contribution to scholarship. This is 
because it is not easy to convince developing countries that cartel enforcement is 
beneficial to developing countries. Deterring anti-competitive cartel activities sometimes 
does not sit well with developmental concerns of developing countries due to the 
argument that in certain circumstances cooperation between firms and limiting 
competition between the few players in the industry are pertinent in achieving long term 
productivity objectives27. In other words, competition should foster economic 
development and when there is conflict between competition policy and other policies 
such as industrial policy, some have argued that competition policy should be made 
subservient for the sake of long term growth and development28; and such a policy 
which have proved successful for Japan and South Korea ought to be a model for 
developing countries29.  Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, it also does not help the 
case for cartel enforcement when the debate on the link between competition and 
                                            
27
 See: Singh, A., ’Competition and Competition Policy in Emerging Markets: International and 
Developmental Dimensions’, G-24 Discussion Paper Series, UNCTAD (2002) 
28
 See: Singh, A. and Dhumale, R., ‘Competition Policy, Development and Developing Countries’, South 
Centre Working Papers 7 (November 1999) at 
http://southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=315%3Acompetition-policy-
development-and-developing-countries-&catid=56%3Aother-issues-related-to-trade-
negotiations&Itemid=67&lang=en 
29
 See: Singh, A. and Dhumale, R., ‘Competition Policy, Development and Developing Countries’, South 
Centre Working Papers 7 (November 1999) at 
http://southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=315%3Acompetition-policy-
development-and-developing-countries-&catid=56%3Aother-issues-related-to-trade-
negotiations&Itemid=67&lang=en 
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development is yet to settle and that there is yet to be conclusive evidence that 
competition fosters development30. How can the citizens of a developing country be 
convinced that more resources and effort should be allocated to cartel enforcement 
when it has to compete with programmes which directly contribute to improvements in 
the standard of living and development such as poverty eradication, job creation, health 
and food security. Thus, it is hard to “sell” the benefits of competition policy which are 
often long term and hard to accurately quantify. The discussion in this thesis illustrates 
that by implementing an appropriate cartel enforcement policy, it is possible to address 
such concerns.  
 
From the Malaysian perspective, cartel enforcement is relevant because: there has 
been evidence of market concentration in Malaysia31; anti-competitive conducts have 
been detected in Malaysia32; there is evidence of rent seeking activities such as through 
political patronage33; and the implementation of competition law in Malaysia need to 
account for non-competition considerations which are entrenched in the Federal 
Constitution and feature significantly in Malaysia’s socio-economic ideology.  
                                            
30
 For a summary of literature discussion on this, see Voigt, S.,  ‘The Effects of Competition Policy on 
Development – Cross-Country Evidence Using Four New Indicators’, Journal of Developmental Studies, 
Vol. 45, No.8, (September 2009) 1225-1248, pp.1227-1231 
31
 See: Muhammad Ridhuan, B. and Suhaila, A.J., ‘Industrial Structure and Concentration in the 
Malaysian Manufacturing Industry’, International Journal of Management and Strategy 13 (Special Issue) 
(2006) 83-101 
32
 Such as collusion in the Pangkor – Lumut Ferry case as cited by Lee, C.,‘Competition Policy in 
Malaysia’, (2004), Working Paper Series, Paper No.68, Centre on Regulation and Competition, University 
of Manchester, p.5-6   
33
 See: Gomez, E.T. and Jomo, K.S., Malaysia’s Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profit, 
Cambridge University Press (1999); Jomo, K.S., ‘Industrialisation and Industrial Policy in Malaysia’, in 
Jomo, K.S. (ed.), Malaysian Industrial Policy, National University of Singapore (NUS) Press Singapore 
(2007)   
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Malaysia is an open state led economy where the government role in economic decision 
making continues to be lessened34 and based on international standards, Malaysia’s 
economy is already open35. However, several studies on the manufacturing industry had 
found evidence of market concentration. An empirical study on the manufacturing 
industry in 200636 discovered that: due to Malaysia’s relatively small economy, 
economies of scale is the cause for market concentration in Malaysia; foreign firms 
owned or controlled significant share of the local industry and they have an upper hand 
in the market as compared to local firms because of their technology, marketing skills 
and R & D development which may deter entry of local firms into the market or lead to 
their winding up or bankruptcy that in turn would increase market concentration; market 
concentration of the Malaysian manufacturing industry is rather high as compared with 
most other countries; however, competition in certain sectors of the industry had 
increased over time. The findings of this study have been consistent with other seminal 
empirical studies on the Malaysian manufacturing industry37.  Additionally, the findings 
                                            
34
 See: Beeson, M., ‘Mahathir and the Markets: Globalisation and the Pursuit of Economic Autonomy in 
Malaysia’, Pacific Affairs Vol. 73 No. 3 335-351 (Fall 2000), p.340; and The World Bank, Malaysia 
Overview, (2012) at http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/malaysia/overview  Examples of liberalisation 
include: the banking sector continues to be liberalised since 2009; 17 services subsectors were 
liberalised from January 2012. Malaysia has also embarked on privatisation of nationalised firms and 
sectors since the early 1980’s.  
35
 The World Bank, Malaysia Overview (2013) at http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/malaysia/overview 
accessed on 8/4/2013 
36
 Muhammad Ridhuan, B. and Suhaila, A.J., ‘Industrial Structure and Concentration in the Malaysian 
Manufacturing Industry’, International Journal of Management and Strategy 13 (Special Issue) (2006) 83-
101  
37
 Seminal works on market concentration in the manufacturing industry include: Rugayah M., ‘The 
Measurement of Market Concentration and Profitability in Malaysian Manufacturing’, The Malaysian Economic 
Review (1992) 23(1): 1-11 Yusuf, Z. A. and Phang H. E., ‘ Industrial Market Structure in Malaysia 1979-1990: A 
Profile’,  Bank Negara Malaysia, Discussion Paper No. 21 (1993); Nor Ghani M. N., Z. Osman, A. Z. Abdullah, and 
Jun C. Y., ‘Trends in the Malaysian Industrial Market Structures’, Jurnal Ekonomi Malaysia (2000) 34: 3-20 ; Nor 
Ghani M. N., A. Z. Abdullah and S. D. Applanaidu, ‘ Advertising Intensity, Concentration and Profitability in Malaysian 
Manufacturing Revisited: A Simultaneous Equation Approach’,  International Journal of Management Studies (2004) 
11(2): 45-53  
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of a 2004 empirical study by Nasser Katib on the market structure and performance in 
the Malaysian banking industry suggests that market concentration determines 
profitability in the Malaysian banking  industry38. However, the empirical findings found 
that market structure was not consistently correlated with profitability of price due to the 
constant industrial monitoring conducted by Bank Negara Malaysia (the Central Bank of 
Malaysia), which ensured competition in the market39. The study also found that the 
market share of the three (3) largest banks is forty five (45) per cent. This is based on 
the share of total bank deposits in the market in 1995. Although this study was based on 
dated data, it should be noted that the industrial consolidation exercise in the Malaysian 
banking sector which has been ongoing since the onset of the new millennium in order 
to create six (6) domestic financial groups in the industry have led to even higher market  
concentration level40.  Anecdotal evidence based on media reports also indicates that 
there may be market concentration in the cement industry41. The said findings from 
empirical studies and anecdotal indications give rise to the possibility that there may be 
market concentration in other industries in Malaysia, particularly those with markets with 
oligopolistic tendencies.  
                                            
38
 Nasser Katib, M., ‘Market Structure and Performance in the Malaysian Banking Industry: A Robust 
Estimation’, 8th Capital Markets Conference, Indian Institute of Capital Markets Paper (2004) at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=872266 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.872266   
39
 Nasser Katib, M., ‘Market Structure and Performance in the Malaysian Banking Industry: A Robust 
Estimation’, 8th Capital Markets Conference, Indian Institute of Capital Markets Paper (2004), p.13 at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=872266 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.872266   
40
 The mergers of Malaysian banks have been on the advice on the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank 
Negara Malaysia) as a response to market liberalisation. See The Star Malaysia, Bank Negara Explains 
Rationale for Bank Mergers, (11 August 1999) at 
http://mir.com.my/lb/econ_plan/contents/press_release/110899merge.htm accessed on 5/1/2013   
41
 See: The Star newspaper report, Probe Warranted if Cement Makers have Pact to Raise Prices, 
(3/8/2012) at http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2012/8/3/business/11786336&sec=business 
accessed 13/1/2013 
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There have also been findings and also anecdotal evidence of anti-competitive cartel 
activities in Malaysia.  These include: collusion in the Pangkor – Lumut Ferry case42;  
price fixing by the Cameron Highlands Floriculturist Association - where the MyCC is 
reported to be about to deliver its first decision43; and possible market allocation and 
abuse of dominance by Malaysia Airlines and Air Asia which resulted in Air Asia ceasing 
its low cost operations in several routes to the detriment of consumers44.  Furthermore, 
several firms have also submitted application for exemptions with the MyCC45.  
 
As with most East Asian nations, there is close interconnections between politics and 
economy46. However, the uniqueness of Malaysia lies in the fact that the government 
exploits the market forces to create more “authentic” capitalists47 not only to balance the 
inter-ethnic wealth distribution but also to develop and enhance national champions and 
Malaysian owned or controlled businesses. However, despite the relative openness of 
the economy; continuous efforts to liberalise markets; and government exploitation of 
                                            
42
 Lee,C., ‘Competition Policy in Malaysia’, (2004), Working Paper Series, Paper No.68, Centre on 
Regulation and Competition, University of Manchester, p.5-6 
43
 MLTIC website at  http://mycompetitionlaw.info/news/mycc-to-deliver-its-first-decision-under-
competition-act-277.html accessed on 7/8/2012 
44
 The Star Online, MyCC to Investigate if AirAsia-MAS Share Swap has Made Airfares Go Up, (4 
January 2012) at 
http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2012/1/4/business/10199177&sec=business accessed on 
7/8/2012; Channel News Asia, AirAsia and Rival Malaysia Airlines Cancel Share Swap, (2 May 2012) at 
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific_business/view/1198610/1/.html  accessed on 
7/8/2012. 
45
 The Star Online, Malaysia, Four Parties Apply for Exemption from Competition Act, (26 April 2012) at 
http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2012/4/26/business/11176730&sec=business  
46
 Beeson, M., ‘Mahathir and the Markets: Globalisation and the Pursuit of Economic Autonomy in 
Malaysia’, Pacific Affairs Vol. 73 No. 3 335-351 (Fall 2000), p.339.  
47
 Beeson, M., ‘Mahathir and the Markets: Globalisation and the Pursuit of Economic Autonomy in 
Malaysia’, Pacific Affairs Vol. 73 No. 3 335-351 (Fall 2000), p.339. Although this work is dated and is 
focused on the administration of the former Malaysian Prime Minister, the focus on market forces 
exploitation in the creation of capitalists in government intervention in the economy persists. 
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market forces, government involvement in economic activities particularly through 
Government Linked Companies (GLCs)48; and inappropriate implementation of some 
policies such as “Malaysia Incorporated Policy” and “Bumiputera Commercial and 
Industrial Community (BCIC)” has resulted in political patronage which leads to rent 
seeking49. This is because creation of the “authentic capitalists” (which include 
individuals and bodies corporate) by the government is not always based on sound 
economic justifications but more often than not it is based on arbitrary and discretionary 
factors such as political affiliation and close relations with decision makers50. Thus, not 
all of these created capitalists have been able to “authenticate” themselves in riding the 
waves of market forces. These include, for instance, the failure of some heavy 
industries projects such as PERWAJA in the steel industry; and the lack of 
competitiveness of PROTON, Malaysia’s national car maker which resulted in 
protectionism policy continually being implemented by the government in the automotive 
industry albeit with gradual liberalisation51. 
 
Evidence of market concentration; evidence of anti-competitive practises in the 
Malaysian markets; and rent seeking activities through political patronage give rise to 
competition concerns. Additionally, Malaysia’s cartel enforcement policy has to account 
                                            
48
 GLCs are companies with primarily commercial objectives despite the Malaysian government holding 
direct controlling stakes -  Wei, I. K.T. and Hooi, H.L., ‘Capital Structure of Government Linked 
Companies in Malaysia’, Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting and Finance Vol.7, No.2 
(2011) 137-156, p.138 at http://web.usm.my/journal/aamjaf/vol%207-2-2011/7-2-6.pdf 
49
 For examples of political patronage and rent seeking in Malaysia see: Gomez, E.T. and Jomo, K.S., 
Malaysia’s Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profit, Cambridge University Press (1999) 
50
 See Jomo, K.S., ‘Industrialisation and Industrial Policy in Malaysia’, in Jomo, K.S. (ed.), Malaysian 
Industrial Policy, National University of Singapore (NUS) Press Singapore (2007)  
51
 See: Malaysia’s National Automotive Policy at Prime Minister’s Office, Malaysia website at 
http://www.pmo.gov.my/?menu=page&page=1701  
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for bumiputera rights52 and its related policies such as the BCIC because Bumiputera 
rights are entrenched in the Federal Constitution, which is the supreme law of the land. 
This element may be labelled as a public interest of Malaysia because it is very much 
related to issues of socio-economic development and fairer distribution of economic 
wealth which is closely linked with the country’s unity and politics. However, such public 
interest elements need to be systematically assessed and weighed against competition 
considerations in the implementation of the country’s cartel enforcement.  
 
Nevertheless, this work is not promoting for the Malaysian market to be immediately 
subject to total laissez faire from the get go of implementation of its competition law, but 
this work argues that cartel enforcement in Malaysia should account for its limitations 
and developmental and socio-economic needs without jeopardising the competition 
agenda. Moreover, it is never too early for a developing country with a new competition 
jurisdiction like Malaysia to identify the foreseeable issues related to cartel enforcement 
in order to anticipate and be sufficiently prepared to deal with them more efficiently. It is 
also prudent to ensure that all pre-conditions for effective cartel enforcement are in 
place without waiting a few years or even decades down the line to address the issues 
when the jurisdiction has reached “sufficient level of maturity” and anti-competitive 
behaviours have become ingrained in the competition environment and thus, more 
complex to be dealt with. In short, there is a need for cartel enforcement in Malaysia 
and being sufficiently prepared to deal with anti-competitive cartel issues may facilitate 
                                            
52
 See: explanation on bumiputera rights below. 
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new competition jurisdictions to “catch-up” with older and more mature competition 
jurisdictions and exit the doldrums of nascent competition jurisdictions earlier – hence 
contributing to the enhancement of market environment which facilitates international 
cartel enforcement. 
 
1.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
  
This thesis answers two (2) overarching research questions; namely: “why should 
developing countries be concerned with effective cartel enforcement?”; “what is an 
appropriate cartel enforcement policy for Malaysia?” The first overarching research 
question is answered by discussing the incoherence in international cartel enforcement 
and the harmful impact on developing countries. This highlights the relevance and 
importance of competition law to developing countries especially economies which 
significantly rely on trade for income and growth. The need for developing countries to 
equip themselves with credible cartel enforcement regime is explained in terms of 
incentives between developed and developing countries signatories in regional TAs.  
This leads to the second overarching research question which is answered by focusing 
on Malaysia. It is appropriate for Malaysia to be selected as a case study in answering 
the research question the findings in relation to the first overarching research question 
need to be assessed based on a jurisdiction with an economy where trade is significant 
and at a level of development where: competition policy and law could facilitate growth 
and development; and where competition law enforcement is possible.  
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The other research questions of this thesis are; 1) are regional trade agreements a 
viable alternative for developing countries in addressing international cartel enforcement 
issues?; 2)  what are the factors which have caused the under-utilisation of regional 
trade agreements in facilitation of international cartel enforcement?; 3) what are the 
steps to be undertaken to enable and encourage active participation of developing 
countries such as Malaysia in cross-border cooperation in international cartel 
enforcement; 4) how to determine an appropriate cartel enforcement policy for 
Malaysia?; 5) what are the general principles in developing an appropriate cartel 
enforcement policy for Malaysia?; 6) what are the lessons to be learned from South 
Africa in regard to cartel enforcement?; 7) what are the factors which influence proper 
implementation of exemptions in developing countries?; 8) could EU style exemption 
mechanism be adapted and applied in Malaysia?; 9) could EU style exemptions 
mechanism be workable in Malaysia?; and if so, 10) what are the necessary elements 
to be included in the implementation framework for the granting of exemptions in 
Malaysia?; 11) how could tougher cartel enforcement bring about the problem of tacit 
collusion through mergers of firms?; 12) would the current provisions of the Competition 
Act 2010 be adequate to address tacit collusion?; and 13) how best to address tacit 
collusion which becomes more feasible due to mergers in light of tougher cartel 
enforcement in Malaysia? These and the minor research questions are discussed in 
detail in the respective chapters.  
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1.4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS 
 
In so far as the research methodology adopted in answering the aforementioned two 
over-arching research questions, the discussion is approached from a legal policy 
viewpoint and is mainly focused on cartel enforcement from the perspective of an upper 
middle income developing country, namely Malaysia. The thesis discussion commences 
in Chapter 2 by looking at one of the main unresolved issues in regard to cartel 
enforcement and developing countries; which is international cartel enforcement. This is 
done by analysing cartel enforcement from an international perspective in order to 
illustrate the importance of establishing effective cartel enforcement in the domestic 
jurisdiction of developing countries first before international cartel enforcement could be 
facilitated. In this regard, the discussion does not only refer to currently available 
literature but also the author’s own analysis of the content of 59 regional TAs texts53 
between developed and developed countries which are in force and have been notified 
to the WTO as of May 2012. The regional TAs analysed are only those with significant54 
competition related provisions. In the context of this work, regional TAs include bilateral 
and multilateral trade agreement involving individual countries or regional groups or 
development and trade bloc. This work focuses on regional TAs between partners at 
                                            
53
 The number of regional TAs between developed and developing countries which have been notified to 
the WTO with significant competition related provisions and are in force and available on the WTO 
website as of May 2012. See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm  
54
 Only agreements with a dedicated Chapter or Sub-Chapter on competition related provisions. 
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dissimilar levels of development55 because the main point of contention argued by 
developing countries against the EU’s proposal for a multilateral agreement on 
competition under the WTO was that they do not account for the needs of developing 
countries56.   
 
Since one of the main premise of this work is that there has to be effective cartel 
enforcement in the jurisdictions of developing countries before cross-border cooperation 
in international cartel enforcement could be facilitated, this work looks at the domestic 
aspect of cartel enforcement in Malaysia in Chapter 3 after initially discussing facilitation 
of cross-border cooperation in international cartel enforcement in Chapter 2. In this 
regard, the meaning of effective cartel enforcement in the Malaysian context is clarified 
and the general principles in formulating an appropriate cartel enforcement policy for 
Malaysia are identified. Malaysia’s cartel enforcement policy should be tailor made to 
Malaysia’s competition; socio-economic; and development whilst referring to a suitable 
competition law jurisdiction for insights. In this regard, based on the recommendation by 
Fox pertaining to the virtues of South African competition jurisprudence in regard to 
developing countries57, the achievements of the South African competition regime in 
cartel enforcement and also some similarities shared between Malaysia and South 
                                            
55
 Specifically, the focus of the discussion is on regional TAs between developed and middle income 
developing countries as per the World Bank Classification as of July 2012 at 
http://muse.jhu.edu/about/order/wdi2012.pdf 
56
 Bhattacharjea, A., ‘The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on Competition Policy : A Developing  
Country Perspective’, Journal of International Economic Law, (2006) 9(2), 293-323, p. 296-298 
57
Fox, E.M., ‘In Search of a Competition Law Fit for Developing Countries’, New York University Law and 
Economics Research Paper No.11-04 (2011) at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1761619 
or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1761619   
               YASMEEN YASIM  
PGR LAW 4363795 
UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA 
 
 
21 
 
Africa, the discussion mainly refers to the South African competition jurisprudence and 
experience for insights. The general principles for developing an appropriate cartel 
enforcement in Malaysia are identified by discussing the limitations faced or would likely 
be faced by the MyCC in cartel enforcement. This discussion is interwoven with insights 
from the South African competition law enforcement experience.   
 
Ensuring effective cartel enforcement also includes implementing an appropriate 
exemption mechanism for anti-competitive horizontal agreement to ensure the 
achievement of Malaysia’s competition objectives without jeopardising development. 
The discussion in Chapter 4 focuses on the EU exemption mechanism because 
Malaysia has adopted EU style exemptions legislative provisions. Some references are 
also made to: the Japanese exemption mechanism because of its experience in 
granting cartel exemptions throughout the years since 1950’s when it was still a 
developing country to date: and also the South African exemption mechanism because 
of its similar development status with Malaysia and the receptive nature of its 
competition law to inclusive development58.  However, references are more focused on 
the EU experience in the granting of exemptions due to the similarity of legal provisions. 
 
Although Malaysia is still in the nascent stage of competition law enforcement and 
tougher cartel enforcement is yet to be implemented, the foreseeable outcomes of 
tougher cartel enforcement is explained in Chapter 5 by referring to the findings of 
                                            
58
 See: discussion in Chapter 4 of this thesis 
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relevant research in the literature and empirical evidence available thus far. Hence, the 
discussion in this chapter is essentially a theoretical discussion on the anticipated 
impact of tougher cartel enforcement and the limitations of the current competition 
legislative framework in dealing with tacit collusion, which is identified as one of the 
anticipated outcomes of tougher cartel enforcement in Malaysia. The focus of the 
discussion   in Chapter 5 is not on whether Malaysia needs to include competition 
dimension in the country’s merger control regime but it discusses the adequacy of the 
Competition Act 2010 in dealing with collusion. In answering the research questions in 
Chapter 5, significant reference is made to EU jurisprudence. This is because the 
provisions on anti-competitive agreements (Section 4) and abuse of dominance 
(Section 10) under the Competition Act 2010 are modelled on their EU equivalent; 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, respectively. References are also made to: literature on the 
theories and concepts of tacit collusion; empirical economic studies on the Malaysian 
manufacturing and banking industries; and available literature on the links between 
tougher cartel enforcement and mergers; and the impact of change in market structure 
on factors which enable tacit collusion. Chapter 6 summarises the discussions in this 
thesis and proposes appropriate policy recommendations in terms of the way forward 
for Malaysia in cartel enforcement before the thesis discussion concludes.  
 
It has to be highlighted that due to the very recent implementation of cartel enforcement 
in Malaysia (and a gradual one at that), it is not possible to focus on actual cases of 
cartel enforcement in Malaysia. However, this work discusses the areas in cartel 
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enforcement which: should be focused by Malaysia as a young competition jurisdiction 
in a developing country; and also those which would enhance the discussions on the 
legal policy aspects in competition literature. In this regard, the findings of relevant 
researches and the experiences of other countries are referred to. These experiences 
are analysed and applied to Malaysia. Hence, this work is essentially a theoretical micro 
study of the areas which are anticipated to impact cartel enforcement in Malaysia as a 
developing country with a young competition jurisdiction. The research method adopted 
for each chapter is explained in detail in each respective chapter. 
 
1.5. MOTIVATION AND NOVELTY 
 
The motivation for this study is to illustrate the importance of the implementation of an 
appropriate cartel enforcement policy to developing countries which are trade reliant. In 
this regard, the novelty does not only lie in the fact that the Competition Act 2010, 
Malaysia is a fairly recent piece of legislation which is yet to be fully implemented but 
also that this work contributes to the debate on the significance of consensus in 
international cartel enforcement to the furtherance of international trade from a legal 
policy perspective of developing countries, particularly Malaysia. Moreover, available 
literature which approaches the question of lack of utilisation of competition related 
provisions in regional TAs to address international cartel infringements is lacking. 
Leading works on regional TAs include those contained in the seminal publication by 
UNCTAD, “Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: How to Assure 
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Development Gains?”; Sokol59, Gal and Wassmer60; and Marsden and Whelan61. These 
works focus on competition related provisions in regional TAs, whilst Marsden and 
Whelan discuss the aspect of lack of cooperation in cross border competition 
enforcement under bilateral trade or competition agreements by the signatories. 
Although the work by Gal and Wassmer is regarding regional competition agreements, 
essentially such accords are actually a more evolved or detailed form of competition 
related provisions under regional TAs. These works do not focus solely on cartel 
enforcement and do not discuss the lack of utilisation of competition related provisions 
in international accords from the perspective of incentives.  Meanwhile, works on 
international cartels are also lacking, particularly from the perspective of developing 
countries due to lack of data on cartel activities in developing countries. Empirical 
research on cartels and developing countries is limited due to the difficulty in obtaining 
data and information on cartels particularly in developing countries because sometimes 
cartels such as export cartels are exempted or allowed by the law62 and empirical 
research on the impact of international cartels in developing countries have been based 
                                            
59
 Sokol, D.D., ‘Order Without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter Into Non-Enforceable Competition 
Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements’, Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol. 83 (2008) 101-163 
60
 Gal, M.S. and Wassmer, I.F., ‘Regional Agreements of Developing Jurisdictions: Unleashing the 
Potential’, in Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing  Countries, Bakhoum, M. et al 
(eds), Edward Elgar (2012) 
61
 Marsden, P. and Whelan, P., ‘The Contribution of Bilateral Trade or Competition Agreements to 
Competition Law Enforcement Cooperation between the EU and Mexico’, The British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law (2005) at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=980527  or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.980527 ; Marsden, P. and Whelan, P., ‘The Contribution of Bilateral Trade 
or Competition Agreements to Competition Law Enforcement Cooperation between Canada and Chile’, 
The British Institute of International and Comparative Law (2005) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=980525 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.980525  ; Marsden, P. and Whelan, P., ‘The Contribution of Bilateral Trade 
or Competition Agreements to Competition Law Enforcement Cooperation between Canada and Costa 
Rica’, The British Institute of International and Comparative Law (2005) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=980526  or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.980526   
62
 See: Evenett, S.J. et al, ‘International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990’s’, The World 
Economy Vol.24 Issue 9 (2001) 1221-1245 
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on the data available from developed countries such as the US, EU or supra-national 
competition bodies63. Thus, it is not surprising that most of the seminal works on the 
subject matter are also dated. They include those by Evenett et al64; and Levenstein 
and Suslow65.  
 
As for ensuring the establishment of credible competition law enforcement regime in 
developing countries, with Malaysia as a case study; there are foreseeable issues, 
limitations and challenges which may be encountered by Malaysia in enforcing anti-
competitive cartel provisions under the law. Additionally, there are also uncertainties 
which need to be addressed due to the fact that all necessary supporting guidelines are 
yet to be enacted. Uncertainties include issues related to gradual enforcement; and 
reconciling Malaysia’s socio-economic concerns with competition concerns. Research 
which specifically discusses cartel enforcement in developing countries with young 
competition agencies is rather lacking. Most of the leading works on competition law 
enforcement and young competition jurisdictions or developing countries are based on 
the general perspective of enforcement which includes issues and challenges in 
competition law enforcement66 and pre-conditions to competition law implementation67. 
                                            
63
 Such as: Levenstein, M.C. and Suslow, V.Y., ‘Contemporary International Cartels and Developing 
Countries: Economic Effects and Implications for Competition Policy’, Antitrust Law Journal Vol.71 No.3 
(2004) 801-852  
64
 Evenett, S.J. et al, ‘International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990’s’, The World Economy 
Vol.24 Issue 9 (2001) 1221-1245 
65
 Levenstein, M.C. and Suslow, V.Y., ‘Contemporary International Cartels and Developing Countries: 
Economic Effects and Implications for Competition Policy’, Antitrust Law Journal Vol.71 No.3 (2004) 801-
852 
66
 Such as International Competition Network (ICN), ‘Lessons to be Learnt From the Experiences of 
Young Competition Agencies’, Competition Policy Implementation Working Group Report (Subgroup 2),  
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It is also observed that very rarely are these findings applied at a micro level in order to 
assess their viability in relation to a specific country.  
 
1.6. THESIS STRUCTURE 
 
In summary, the issues discussed in this thesis are: the need to prohibit cartels, 
particularly by developing countries; the need for cooperation because markets 
transcend national borders; the need for developing countries to have a credible cartel 
enforcement regime in order to facilitate international cartel enforcement; and a credible 
cartel enforcement regime requires competition law to be complemented by an 
appropriate cartel enforcement policy.  As such, this thesis consists of a series of six 
chapters with four essays. The substantive discussion of this thesis commences in 
Chapter 2 - Implementing International Cartel Enforcement via Regional Trade 
Agreements: A Likely Second Best Option for Partners at Different Levels of 
Development? This chapter establishes the need for cartels to be addressed 
comprehensively at both the domestic and international level and the importance for 
developing countries of developing countries’ participation in international cartel 
enforcement. The other chapters are: Chapter 3 - Lessons from South Africa for the 
Development of an Appropriate Cartel Enforcement Policy in Malaysia; Chapter 4 - 
                                                                                                                                            
ICN, Cape Town, South Africa (May 2006) at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/library.aspx?search=&group=13&type=0&workshop=0 
67
 Such as Gal, M.S., ‘The Ecology of Antitrust Pre-conditions for Competition Law Enforcement in 
Developing Countries’, in Competition, Competitiveness and Development: Lessons from Developing 
Countries, United Nations Publication (2004), UNCTAD/ DITC/CLP/2004/1, pp.20-38 at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20041ch1_en.pdf  
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Towards an Appropriate Implementation Framework on Horizontal Agreements 
Exemptions in Malaysia; and Chapter 5 - Limitations Of the Competition Act 2010 in 
Light of Tougher Cartel Enforcement - Focus on Tacit collusion. The thesis discussion 
concludes in Chapter 6 – The Way Forward for Malaysia. Chapter 2 discusses the need 
for developing countries to be actively involved in international cartel enforcement and 
the obstacles which exists in terms of competition related provisions in regional TAs. 
Chapter 3 discusses an appropriate cartel enforcement policy for Malaysia with insights 
from South Africa based on their competition law enforcement experience; whilst 
Chapter 4 argues the importance of exemptions in ensuring that developmental and 
crucial socio-economic considerations are accounted for in cartel enforcement in 
Malaysia without compromising competition law objectives. Chapter 5 discusses the 
limitations of the Competition Act 2010 as cartel enforcement progresses in Malaysia, 
with focus on tacit collusion. Chapter 6 recommends a Roadmap for Cartel Enforcement 
in Malaysia together with other complementary cartel enforcement tools and 
instruments; implementation of the regulatory approach and advocacy to complement 
the behavioural approach; and immediate and relevant studies to be undertaken. 
  
1.7. MALAYSIA IN BRIEF 
 
Before the substantive discussion in this thesis commences, it is appropriate to discuss 
Malaysia in brief in order to provide a better understanding of the country’s historical, 
cultural and economic environment. Malaysia is a commonwealth member country 
               YASMEEN YASIM  
PGR LAW 4363795 
UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA 
 
 
28 
 
which gained its independence from Great Britain on 31 August 1957. The country was 
formerly known as Malaya until 1963 when Malaysia was formed with the inclusion of 
Singapore, and two Borneo states, namely Sabah and Sarawak. However, in 1965 
Singapore opted out of Malaysia to form its own republic. Today, Malaysia is made up 
of thirteen states and three federal territories with a population of 28.86 million as of 
201168 and per capita income of USD9, 977 in 201169. Malaysia is a middle income 
economy with a vision to achieve developed nation status by the year 202070. It is a 
multiracial nation consisting of Malays (the majority), Chinese, Indians, Indigenous 
peoples, Eurasians and others. Malaysia is a parliamentary democracy whereby the 
government of the day is led by the Prime Minister with a constitutional monarch as the 
head of state. The Malaysian legal system is based on the British common law. 
 
The British colonial administration policies in Malaya confined each race to specific 
economic activity. Malays, who are the majority group and the original inhabitants 
(bumiputera)71 of the Malay Peninsula, were mainly confined to agriculture and fisheries 
in rural, coastal and inland areas. The British had brought in Chinese and Indians to 
work in tin mines and rubber estate respectively. The Chinese were involved in mining 
and commerce and were based in the suburbs and major towns, whilst the Indians were 
mainly working in rubber estates. This created disparity in the distribution of economic 
                                            
68
 The World Bank at http://data.worldbank.org/country/malaysia accessed on 11/1/2013 
69
 The World Bank at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD accessed on 11/1/2013 
70
 As per Vision 2020 Policy, Malaysia. 
71
 Bumiputera literally means “sons of the soil”. The Malays and natives of Sabah and Sarawak are 
conferred bumiputera rights by the Federal Constitution by virtue of Article 153 Federal Constitution, 
Malaysia.  
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wealth between the different races and resulted in distrust and dissatisfaction 
particularly among the Malays who felt that they were lagging behind the migrant races. 
These culminated in the 13 May 1969 social unrest.  Consequently, the New Economic 
Policy (NEP) was implemented from 1971 till 1990. The main objective of this policy 
was to address the unequal economic wealth distribution between the races and 
eradication of poverty72.  These objectives continue to feature significantly in 
subsequent development policies in Malaysia. 
 
The Malays and natives of Sabah and Sarawak are conferred bumiputera rights by the 
Federal Constitution by virtue of Article 153 Federal Constitution, Malaysia. These rights 
are part of the social contract negotiated between the representatives of the major races 
with the British in gaining independence in 1957. In return for the bumiputeras agreeing 
to the conferring of citizenships to the migrant races, the bumiputera rights were 
granted. This is a peculiar feature of the Malaysian socio-economic and political set up 
which is often misunderstood by foreigners. Since bumiputera rights are conferred by 
the Federal Constitution which is the supreme law of the land, all policies and legislation 
have to account for the said rights. These rights are mainly reservation of quotas in 
respect of federal public service; permits; scholarship; educational or training privileges 
or special facilities accorded by the Federal Government and business and trade permit 
or license. These rights are granted to safeguard the special position of bumiputeras 
and are granted to them in addition to other rights granted to all Malaysian citizens. 
                                            
72
 Abdul Halim, S. et al, Malaysia Kita, Institut Tadbiran Awam Negara (INTAN) (1991), p.737 
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These rights are positive discrimination which is pertinent in upholding the racial 
harmony in Malaysia. However, this does not mean that the interests of other races are 
disregarded particularly in the past few years because the Malay middle class has 
increased in numbers and the poor in Malaysia now does not only largely consist of 
Malays73. This is reflected in the current development policy, the New Economic Model 
(2010-2020) wherein inclusiveness is one of the main thrusts of the policy. 
 
Malaysia is rich in natural resources and has been a major producer of palm-oil, rubber 
and tin in addition to petroleum and liquefied petroleum gas. The country is also a major 
manufactured goods exporter74. The focus of Malaysia’s industrial policy shifted from 
import substitution to export oriented industries commencing from the late 1960’s75. As 
such, international trade is one of the major contributors to the country’s economic 
growth76. Malaysia’s total trade in 2011 was recorded at Ringgit Malaysia (RM) 1.269 
trillion77, an increase of 8.7 per cent compared to 201078. Malaysia’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) in 2011 was at USD287.9 billion79.  
                                            
73
 Roslan, A.H., ‘Income Inequality, Poverty and Development Policy in Malaysia’, paper presented at the 
International Seminar on "Poverty and Sustainable Development", Université Montesquieu-Bordeaux IV 
and UNESCO-Paris, France (22-23 November 2001). 
74
 Gomez, E.T. and Jomo, K.S., Malaysia’s Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profit, Cambridge 
University Press (1999), p.1. In 2010, the manufacturing sector contributed 27.7 per cent to Malaysia’s 
real GDP. See MITI, Malaysia, Malaysia International Trade and Industry Report 2010, MITI (2011), p.36 
75
 Athukorala, P.C. and Menon, J., ‘Export-Led Industrialisation, Employment and Equity: The Malaysian 
Case’ (1996), p.5 at http://www.crawford.anu.edu.au/acde/publications/publish/papers/wp1996/965.pdf   
76
 Yusoff, M.B., ‘Malaysia Bilateral Trade Relations and Economic Growth’, International Journal of 
Business and Society Vol. 6 No.2 (2005) 55-68 
77
 At 31/12/2011 the exchange rate was USD1 = RM3.17 
78
 Malaysian External Trade Development Corporation (MATRADE), ‘Malaysia’s Trade Performance 
2011’, MATRADE website at http://www.matrade.gov.my/en/malaysia-exporters-section/155/1916-
malaysias-trade-performance-2011 accessed on 11/1/2013 
79
 The World Bank at http://data.worldbank.org/country/malaysia accessed on 11/1/2013 
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1.8. THE COMPETITION ACT 2010 AND ITS ADMINISTRATION FRAMEWORK 
 
The Malaysian competition legislation consists of two statutes; namely, the Competition 
Act 2010 and the Competition Commission Act 2010.  The former is the legislation 
which governs competition across the board in Malaysia whilst the latter concerns the 
administration and establishment of the Malaysian Competition Commission and the 
appointment of Commissioners. The Competition Act 2010 applies to any commercial 
activity within Malaysia and also activities outside Malaysia which has anti-competitive 
impact on Malaysia’s domestic market80. However, “commercial activity” under the 
Competition Act 2010 does not include “ ... any activity, directly or indirectly in the 
exercise of governmental authority; any activity conducted based on the principle of 
solidarity; and any purchase of goods or services not for the purposes of offering goods 
and services as part of an economic activity81. There are also sectors and types of 
activities which are excluded from the remit of the Malaysian competition law82. These 
include: the communications and multimedia sector and the energy sector which are 
subject to their own sectoral legislation which have some form of competition 
dimension83; and “ ... conduct engaged in order to comply with a legislative requirement;  
collective bargaining activities; revenue producing monopoly; and enterprise entrusted 
with the operation of services with general economic interests”84. The discussions in this 
thesis focus on the Competition Act 2010.  The objectives of the Competition Act 2010 
                                            
80
 Sections 3 (1) and 3 (2) Competition Act 2010, Malaysia. 
81
 Section 3 (4) Competition Act 2010, Malaysia. 
82
 See: Section 3, Section 13, the First Schedule, the Second Schedule Competition Act 2010, Malaysia. 
83
 Respectively, the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 and the Energy Commission Act 2001. 
84
 Second Schedule Competition Act 2010, Malaysia. 
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are: promotion of economic development; protecting the process of competition; and 
consumer protection85. A finding of any infringements under Part II, Competition Act 
2010 is liable to a financial penalty not exceeding ten (10) per cent of the worldwide 
turnover of the firms throughout the infringement period86. For the moment, criminal 
sanctions have not been included under the Competition Act 2010. However, private 
action is provided for by virtue of Section 64, Competition Act 2010. 
 
The main legislative provisions concerning cartels are Sections 487 and 588 Competition 
Act 2010, Malaysia. By virtue of section 4 Competition Act 2010, price fixing, market 
                                            
85
 See: Preamble, Competition Act 2010, Malaysia. 
86
 Section 40 (4) Competition Act 2010. 
87
 Section 4 Competition Act 2010 – Prohibited Horizontal and Vertical Agreement 
(1) A horizontal or vertical agreement between enterprises is prohibited insofar as the agreement has      
the object or effect of significantly preventing, restricting or distorting competition in any market for   
goods or services. 
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), a horizontal agreement between enterprises  
which has the object to — 
         (a) fix, directly or indirectly, a purchase or selling price or 
         any other trading conditions; 
         (b) share market or sources of supply; 
         (c) limit or control— 
              (i) production; 
              (ii) market outlets or market access; 
              (iii) technical or technological development; or 
              (iv) investment; or 
        (d) perform an act of bid rigging, 
 
    is deemed to have the object of significantly preventing, restricting, or distorting competition in any   
    market for goods or services. 
(3) Any enterprise which is a party to an agreement which is prohibited under this section shall be liable 
for infringement of the prohibition. 
88
 Section 5, Competition Act  2010 – Relief of Liability 
Notwithstanding section 4, an enterprise which is a party to an agreement may relieve its liability for the  
infringement of the prohibition under section 4 based on the following reasons: 
   (a) there are significant identifiable technological, efficiency or social benefits directly arising from the  
   agreement; 
   (b) the benefits could not reasonably have been provided by the parties to the agreement without the  
   agreement having the effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition; 
   (c) the detrimental effect of the agreement on competition is proportionate to the benefits provided; and 
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sharing, barriers to entry and bid rigging are deemed to have the object of significantly 
preventing competition. Once proven, these types of anti-competitive agreements are 
prohibited. Thus, it may be concluded that hard core cartel activities are easier to be 
proven under Section 4 Competition Act 2010, Malaysia because they are per se 
prohibited. However, such per se prohibitions may still be considered for exemption by 
virtue of section 5 Competition Act 2010. Thus, it may be argued that the per se 
prohibition of hard core cartel agreements under the Competition Act 2010 is unlike the 
total prohibition of such agreements under the US competition legislation but it is more 
akin to the EU competition law which provides exemptions for prohibited agreements 
subject to qualification after considering the pro and anti-competitive effect of the 
agreement in question. Therefore, theoretically, this includes even hard core cartel 
agreements. 
 
Enforcement of the Competition Act 2010 is done by the Malaysian Competition 
Commission (MyCC). The MyCC does not only investigate and prosecute but it also 
decides on cases under the competition law. Appeals of decisions made by the MyCC 
shall be heard by the Malaysian Competition Tribunal. Appeals of the Malaysian 
Competition Tribunal decisions on matters of law shall be made to the High Court. This 
is unlike the South African framework whereby the Competition Commission only 
investigates and prosecutes cases under the Competition Act 1998, South Africa but 
adjudication of cases is carried out by the South African Competition Tribunal and 
                                                                                                                                            
   (d) the agreement does not allow the enterprise concerned to eliminate competition completely in  
   respect of a substantial part of the goods or services. 
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appeals are heard by the Competition Appeal Court89. The MyCC has been established 
as an agency under the Ministry of Domestic Trade, Cooperatives and Consumerism 
Malaysia and the Minister responsible for the administration of the law is the Minister of 
Domestic Trade, Cooperatives and Consumerism. The Competition Commissioners are 
appointed by the Prime Minister upon recommendation by the Minister. 
 
1.9. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE STATE OF COMPETITION IN 
MALAYSIA 
 
Based on the above, the following preliminary observations may be made on the state 
of competition in Malaysia:  
 
i. although Malaysia’s economy and markets are already open by 
international standards, there are some competition concerns, namely: 
market concentration in some industries and political patronage and 
cronyism; 
 
ii. due to Malaysia’s small domestic economy, empirical studies on the 
manufacturing industry found that economies of scale has been the cause 
for market concentration in the manufacturing industry; 
 
                                            
89
 See: Competition Act 1998, South Africa 
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iii. industrial regulation of the Malaysian banking sector has been effective in 
ensuring competition in the market; 
 
iv. political patronage and cronyism is a significant concern for competition in 
Malaysia; 
 
v. cartels exist in the Malaysian markets; 
 
vi. the main development concerns for Malaysia is social unity through fairer 
distribution of economic wealth; and 
 
vii. the international dimension in cartel enforcement should be a concern for 
Malaysia due to the economy’s reliance on international trade. 
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CHAPTER 2:  
IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL CARTEL ENFORCEMENT VIA REGIONAL 
TRADE AGREEMENTS: A LIKELY SECOND BEST OPTION FOR PARTNERS AT 
DIFFERENT LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT? 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
International cartels90 are thriving in an environment with opportunities for private 
undertakings to engage in anti-competitive conducts. This is due to the dismantling of 
trade barriers which encourages cross border transactions and increases competition in 
the market91. However, there is not much progress in dealing with anti-competitive 
conducts of international cartels for there is yet to be any coherent consensus reached 
in regard to their enforcement92. Many have argued that ideally international cartels 
enforcement should be regulated via a supranational body such as the World Trade 
                                            
90
 International cartels may be categorised into three types, namely, 1) hard core cartels - made up of 
private producers of at least two countries who engages in price control and allocation of markets shares 
worldwide; 2) private export cartels - independent of the state and engages in price fixing or market 
allocation in export markets but not in their domestic market; and 3) state run export cartels. See Evenett, 
S.J. et al, ‘International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990’s’, The World Economy Vol.24 Issue 
9 (2001) 1221-1245, p.1222. International cartels activities therefore, expand across at least two or more 
jurisdiction whereby the cartel agreement may be executed in a foreign market and one or all of the cartel 
member firms may not have office in the country in question at all. However, the domestic market is the 
one which bears brunt of the negative impact of the cartel’s anti-competitive agreement. On the other 
hand, anti-competitive conducts of domestic firms which have entered into international cartels agreement 
may negatively impact foreign markets or both domestic and foreign markets.   
91
 Evenett, S.J. et al, ‘International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990’s’, The World Economy 
Vol.24 Issue 9 (2001) 1221-1245 
92
 See: Evenett, S.J. et al, ‘International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990’s’, The World 
Economy Vol.24 Issue 9 (2001) 1221-1245 
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Organisation (WTO)93. However, the European Union’s proposal for a multilateral 
agreement on competition under the WTO failed to be accepted particularly due to the 
strong opposition by most developing countries and the ambivalence of the United 
States of America (US)94. In the meantime, international cartels continue to exist in a 
global environment without coherent enforcement framework, to the detriment of 
vulnerable countries such as developing countries without effective competition 
regulatory regimes95. Therefore, in such a situation it would be prudent to consider 
alternative methods in dealing with issues in international cartel enforcement.  
 
One of the possibilities is to utilise regional trade agreements (regional TAs) with 
competition related provisions. Regional TAs are trade pacts between countries or a 
group of countries which accord preferential treatment to their signatories usually in 
terms of tariff reduction whereby it is lower than the WTO’s most favoured nation rate96. 
The number of regional TAs continues to rise97 and a number of developing countries 
have willingly entered into regional TAs with competition related provisions which 
sometimes are beyond the anti-cartels provisions as laid out in the EU’s proposal for a 
                                            
93
 See for example, Taylor, M., International Competition Law: A New Dimension for the WTO?, 
Cambridge University Press (2006) 
94
 Bhattacharjea, A., ‘The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on Competition Policy : A Developing  
Country Perspective’, Journal of International Economic Law, (2006) 9(2), 293-323, p. 293 
95
 See:  Levenstein, M.C. and Suslow, V.Y., ‘Contemporary International Cartels and Developing 
Countries: Economic Effects and Implications for Competition Policy’, Antitrust Law Journal Vol.71 No.3 
(2004) 801-852 
96
 See: Bhagwati, J. et al (eds), Trading Blocs: Alternative Approaches to Analyzing Preferential Trade 
Agreements, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1999), p.xiii - xiv  
97
 As of 15 January 2012 some 511 regional TAs (counting goods and services separately) have been 
notified to the WTO. See The World Trade Organisation website at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm  
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multilateral agreement on competition98. However, regional TAs signatories have not 
been actively implementing the competition related provisions to address cross border 
cartel issues. This is evident from not only the fact that to date, there is limited data and 
publicly available information on the use and implementation of competition related 
provisions by regional TAs signatories99 but also competition related provisions in 
regional TAs have rarely been used in addressing extraterritorial anti-competitive 
conducts. Instead, regional TA member countries are more likely to utilise trade 
disciplines such as anti-dumping and safeguards to address anti-competitive practices 
which create barriers to trade100. Additionally, the International Competition Network 
                                            
98
 Bhattacharjea, A.,‘The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on Competition Policy : A Developing  
Country Perspective’, Journal of International Economic Law, (2006) 9(2), 293-323, p. 294 
99
 There are a number of works in relation to regional TAs with competition related provisions which have 
been conducted especially by organisations such as the OECD, the World Bank and UNCTAD. See 
Brusick, P. et al (eds), Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: How to Assure 
Development Gains?, United Nations Publication (2005), UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2005/1, p.7 at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20051_en.pdf . However, they are rather dated and do not focus on 
the status of implementation or utilisation of competition related provisions in regional TAs. The 
implementation aspect has been studied by Marsden and Whelan in their survey on bilateral trade or 
competition agreements between EU – Mexico, Canada – Chile and Canada – Costa Rica, (2005). 
Among others, they found that there is a lack of literature and publicly available official reports on bilateral 
cooperation agreements.  See: Marsden, P. and Whelan, P., ‘The Contribution of Bilateral Trade or 
Competition Agreements to Competition Law Enforcement Cooperation between the EU and Mexico’, 
The British Institute of International and Comparative Law (2005) at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=980527  or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.980527 ; Marsden, P. and Whelan, P., ‘The Contribution of Bilateral Trade 
or Competition Agreements to Competition Law Enforcement Cooperation between Canada and Chile’, 
The British Institute of International and Comparative Law (2005) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=980525 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.980525  ; Marsden, P. and Whelan, P., ‘The Contribution of Bilateral Trade 
or Competition Agreements to Competition Law Enforcement Cooperation between Canada and Costa 
Rica’, The British Institute of International and Comparative Law (2005) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=980526  or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.980526   
100
 Cernat, L., ‘Eager to Ink, but Ready to Act? RTA Proliferation and International Cooperation on 
Competition Policy’ in P. Brusick et al (eds), Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements : How 
to Assure Development Gains?, United Nations Publication (2005), UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2005/1, p.18 at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20051_en.pdf 
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(ICN) also reported that regional TAs seem to have played a very limited role in 
international cartels enforcement cooperation101.  
  
Therefore, this work attempts to: look into the factors which discourage the utilisation of 
competition related provisions in existing regional TAs by the signatory countries; 
identify the pre-requisite elements to enable cooperation in international cartel 
enforcement between developed and developing countries; and suggest the elements 
recommended to be included in regional TAs which may encourage the signatories to 
invoke them in international cartel enforcement. In doing so, the potential for the 
competition related provisions in regional TAs to be utilised as another alternative 
method in dealing with international cartel enforcement issues between developed and 
developing countries is assessed. Thus, the research questions addressed in this 
chapter are: 1) are regional trade agreements a viable alternative for developing 
countries in addressing international cartel enforcement issues?; 2)  what are the 
factors which have caused the under-utilisation of regional trade agreements in 
facilitation of international cartel enforcement?; 3) what are the steps to be undertaken 
to enable and encourage active participation of developing countries such as Malaysia 
in cross-border cooperation in international cartel enforcement. In answering the 
research questions, the discussion does not only refer to currently available literature 
                                            
101
 International Competition Network ( ICN) Annual Conference Report, Moscow (May 2007), p. 15 at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc348.pdf 
               YASMEEN YASIM  
PGR LAW 4363795 
UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA 
 
 
40 
 
but also my own analysis of the content of 59 regional TAs texts102 between developed 
and developed countries which are in force and have been notified to the WTO as of 
May 2012. The regional TAs analysed are only those with significant103 competition 
related provisions. In the context of this work, regional TAs include bilateral and 
multilateral trade agreement involving individual countries or regional groups or 
development and trade bloc. This work focuses on regional TAs between partners at 
dissimilar levels of development104 because the main point of contention argued by 
developing countries against the EU’s proposal for a multilateral agreement on 
competition under the WTO was that they do not account for the needs of developing 
countries105.   
 
Part 2 briefly explains regional TAs and discusses the rationale for considering regional 
TAs with competition related provisions as a measure to implement international cartels 
enforcement between the signatories. Factors which contribute to the under utilisation of 
competition related provisions in regional TAs in international cartel enforcement is 
discussed in Part 3. In Part 4, the content analysis of 59 regional TAs texts between 
developed and developed countries which are in force and have been notified to the 
                                            
102
 The number of regional TAs between developed and developing countries which have been notified to 
the WTO with significant competition related provisions and are in force and available on the WTO 
website as of May 2012. See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm  
103
 Only agreements with a dedicated Chapter or Sub-Chapter on competition related provisions. 
Agreements with competition provisions which have evolved into regional competition agreements such 
as the Caribbean Community and Common Market Agreement (CARICOM) are excluded.  
104
 Specifically, the focus of the discussion is on regional TAs between developed and middle income 
developing countries as per the World Bank Classification as of July 2012 at 
http://muse.jhu.edu/about/order/wdi2012.pdf 
105
 Bhattacharjea, A., ‘The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on Competition Policy : A Developing  
Country Perspective’, Journal of International Economic Law, (2006) 9(2), 293-323, p. 296-298 
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WTO as of May 2012 is discussed. Recommendations and proposals follow in Part 5 
before the discussion concludes. This work finds that the factors which have adversely 
affected the utilisation of competition related provisions in regional TAs by signatory 
countries in international cartel enforcement are: lack of incentives for countries to 
invoke cross border competition enforcement by virtue of regional TAs; lack of sufficient 
legal commitments in cooperation; developing countries do not view international cartel 
enforcement as a priority; and inconsistencies in cross border competition enforcement. 
In this regard,  regional TAs is a viable option as an instrument in international cartels 
enforcement between middle income developing countries and developed countries 
provided that all the regional TA signatories have a credible competition enforcement 
regime in place, there are close trade relations between the signatories, the 
governments are committed to curb anti-competitive international cartel activities and 
the cooperation modality set in place under the regional TAs accounts for the limitations 
of all the signatories involved. This work also suggests that a suitable modality for 
cooperation is one which allow for the details of the implementation of cooperation to be 
determined in detail by the respective competition authorities and also includes the 
proposed minimum elements which are deemed necessary to encourage and enable 
cooperation in international cartel enforcement under regional TAs.  
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2.2. WHY REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS? 
 
Contrary to its name, regional TAs does not necessarily mean in the geographical 
sense because there are regional TAs between partners from different regions - such as 
EU-South Africa; US-Singapore; EFTA-Mexico; and Canada-Israel, and partners at 
different levels of economic development, such as Canada-Costa Rica; EU-Morocco; 
Japan-Malaysia; and NAFTA. It is referred to as regional TAs due to their discriminatory 
nature which creates a group or regionalism as opposed to multilateralism106. It has 
been argued that regional TAs distort trade liberalisation because they accord 
preferential treatment to the signatories rather than free trade for all107. Whatever the 
argument, as explained earlier, countries continue to enter into regional TAs in order to 
facilitate trade with strategic trade partners and accelerate trade and market 
liberalisation. 
 
By virtue of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994, 
regional TAs are allowed under the WTO provided that:- they lead to total tariff 
elimination between regional TA partners based on a specified schedule; the regional 
TA does not increase trade barriers with non regional TA partners; and the regional TA 
will be phased out on a definite time table. Regional TAs also have to be notified to the 
                                            
106
 Bhagwati, J., ‘Regionalism and Multilateralism : An Overview’ in Bhagwati, J., et al (eds), Trading 
Blocs : Alternative Approaches to Analyzing Preferential Trade Agreements,  Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (1999), pp.1-5 
107
 Viner explains that regional TAs can result in both beneficial trade creation among regional TA 
members and trade diversion at the expense of trade with non member countries which may be cheaper 
to source from. See Viner, J., The Customs Union Issue, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
(1950)  
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WTO. Regional TAs may also be notified to the WTO by virtue of Article V of the 
General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) or the WTO Enabling Clause. The 
latter allows for special and differential treatment to developing countries. The WTO’s 
policy on regional TAs is they should be complementary to WTO’s trade liberalisation 
efforts and not a substitute to the multilateral trading system108.   
 
As has been mentioned before, developing countries repeatedly invoked the 
development dimension in their argument against a multilateral agreement on 
competition under the WTO because they felt that the proposals do not account for their 
limited resources, lack of experience and development needs in so far as competition is 
concerned109. In addition, developing countries were and still are wary of the proposal 
for a multilateral agreement on competition under the WTO because of the belief that it 
may be used as a market access tool by developed countries110. Nevertheless, 
developing countries acknowledge the harm caused by international cartels111 and what 
is more interesting to note is that developing countries continue to enter into regional 
TAs which sometimes include competition related provisions which are beyond the anti-
cartel provisions as proposed by the EU under the WTO112. However, although the 
                                            
108
 Pascal Lamy’s speech in the Annual Memorial Silver Lecture at Columbia University, New York, (31 
Oct 2006) available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl46_e.htm 
109
 Bhattacharjea, A., ‘The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on Competition Policy : A Developing  
Country Perspective’, Journal of International Economic Law, (2006) 9(2) 293-323, p. 296-298 
110
 Singh, A., ‘ Competition and Competition Policy in Emerging Markets : International and 
Developmental Dimensions’, G-24 Discussion Paper Series No.18 (September 2002), United Nations, 
p.19 
111
 Bhattacharjea, A., ‘The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on Competition Policy : A Developing  
Country Perspective’, Journal of International Economic Law, (2006) 9(2) 293-323, p. 296-297 
112
 Such as provisions relating to abuse of dominant positions, state monopolies etc. See Evenett, S.J.,  
‘What Can We Really Learn from the Competition Provisions of RTA?’ in Brusick, P. et al (eds), 
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number of regional TAs continues to rise, those featuring competition related provisions 
have declined after 2002 when discussions on a multilateral agreement on competition 
at the WTO broke down113. These facts indicate that developing countries are willing to 
work towards establishing coherence in international cartels enforcement albeit outside 
the ambit of the WTO. The decline in the number of regional TAs with competition 
related provisions should not be a deterrent in discussing the possibility of implementing 
international cartel enforcement via the utilisation of competition related provisions in 
regional TAs. This is because the basic framework already exists and the popularity of 
regional TAs continues to grow since the 1990s114. Furthermore, in 2005, the World 
Bank reported that more than forty (40) per cent of world trade are transacted through 
preferential TAs115. Hence, the higher the volume of international trade, the more 
opportunities there are for international cartels to engage in anti-competitive behaviour 
so long as there is no effective enforcement mechanism in place. 
 
The inclusion of competition related provisions in regional TAs is also a way to advance 
the competition agenda globally. Regional TAs are accords between states and by 
“piggy-backing” competition provisions in regional TAs, it paves the way for establishing 
                                                                                                                                            
Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements : How to Assure Development Gains?, United 
Nations Publication (2005), UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2005/1  pp. 41-42 at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20051_en.pdf 
113
 Cernat, L., ‘Eager to Ink, but Ready to Act? RTA Proliferation and International Cooperation on 
Competition Policy’ in P. Brusick et al (eds), Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements : How 
to Assure Development Gains?, United Nations Publication (2005), UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2005/1 pp. 5-6 at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20051_en.pdf 
114
 Solano, O. and Sennekamp, A., ‘Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements’, OECD Trade 
Policy working paper no. 31 (2006), p. 5 availabe at 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf?cote=com/daf/td(2005)3/final&doclanguage=
en 
115
 The World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2005, (2005), Washington DC, p. 27. 
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or strengthening cross border cooperation between  the competition authorities of the 
countries involved. This is because any cooperation between jurisdictions would have to 
be preceded by some sort of accord between states in order for such cooperation to be 
authorised. Granted that competition authorities could initiate cooperation between them 
on their own but the degree of commitment and legality which comes from a formal 
accord between states is absent in such cases. Thus, the incentive to pursue such 
cooperations in cross border competition enforcement may not be as strong particularly 
when it involves countries at different levels of development and competition regulatory 
advancement.  
 
For a developing country like Malaysia which is also a trading nation, it is relevant for 
the regional TAs alternative in terms of international cartel enforcement to be looked 
into because Malaysia actively continues to enter into regional TAs with its trading 
partners116. It is also because Malaysia is still in the early days of implementation of its 
competition legislation. Additionally, a regional competition agreement set-up is a less 
possible alternative at present for Malaysia due to the fact that ASEAN member 
countries are at different levels of advancement in terms of competition law and 
policy117. Thus, there is no harm in assessing the suitability of utilising regional TAs as a 
                                            
116
 According to the Ministry of International Trade Malaysia’s website, as of July 2012, Malaysia has 
entered into 11 Free Trade Agreements and is currently negotiating Free Trade Agreements with 5 more 
countries or groups. See 
http://www.miti.gov.my/cms/content.jsp?id=com.tms.cms.section.Section_8ab55693-7f000010-72f772f7-
46d4f042 
117
 See: Gal, M.S. and Wassmer, I.F., ‘Regional Agreements of Developing Jurisdictions: Unleashing the 
Potential’, in Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing  Countries, Bakhoum, M. et al 
(eds), Edward Elgar (2012) 
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vehicle for international cartel enforcement in preparation for advancement in the 
country’s competition law enforcement regime. 
 
Regional TAs with competition related provisions are a form of bottom-up approach 
which is arguably a less cumbersome way to address substantive and procedural 
differences between the laws and legal system of all countries involved; differences in 
terms of institutional and economic development; and political environment. 
Negotiations of regional TAs are just between the proposed signatories, therefore there 
are fewer issues to be discussed and agreed upon as opposed to a multilateral 
negotiation. Additionally, countries enter into trade agreements for strategic reasons in 
pursuit of trade enhancement. Therefore, through the negotiations and bargaining 
process, the competition agenda could be furthered by using trade incentives and vice 
versa. This may be observed from some of the regional TAs between countries with 
advanced competition jurisdictions and developing countries with competition law 
whereby the terms in the regional TA provides for the approximation of the laws of the 
developing country to the standards of those of the developed competition jurisdiction 
with regard to the implementation of the competition related provisions118. Through such 
approximation, regional TAs with competition related provisions also have the potential 
to gradually integrate the differences in international cartel enforcement and encourage 
formal and structured cooperation between competition authorities of regional TA 
                                            
118
 This is particularly the case in regional TAs entered into with the EU. For example, see the regional 
TAs between: EU – FYR Macedonia, EU – Turkey, EU - CARIFORUM 
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partners through direct negotiations between the signatories119. In a multilateral set-up 
such as the WTO, progress in negotiations is slow due to the existence of many 
countries or economies with various interests and at different levels of market 
liberalisation and economic development. Any agreements will be based on the average 
standards of all WTO members, therefore considerations and interests of countries 
which are below par or above par of such standards are not best served. 
 
Undeniably, organisations such as the ICN, United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) and the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) should also be utilised in the effort to improve the present state of 
international cartels enforcement framework but their recommendations are not binding. 
Additionally, there are other types of implementation instruments which could be utilised 
to advance international cartel enforcement; such as via regional competition 
agreements or bilateral agreements. However, cooperation through the ICN network 
and OECD has its limitations because it does not involve legally binding accords and 
addressing international cartel enforcement through regional competition agreement 
may neither be an available nor suitable option for some countries120. Moreover, 
                                            
119
 Some may argue that such requirements is a new form of “colonisation” by developed countries of 
developing countries but the trade agreements accords preferential treatment to the developing country 
by the developed country which is better than MFN status as provided for under the WTO. Furthermore, 
special considerations are also accorded to the developing country signatory such as in relation to state 
aid and sensitive sectors such as agriculture and fisheries (see regional TAs between: EU – Albania, EU 
– Bosnia Herzegovina, EU – FYR Macedonia).  
120
 See: Gal, M.S. and Wassmer, I.F., ‘Regional Agreements of Developing Jurisdictions: Unleashing the 
Potential’, in Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing  Countries, Bakhoum, M. et al 
(eds), Edward Elgar (2012) 
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regional competition agreements in the context of the work by Gal and Wassmer121 are 
actually enabled through regional TAs but the competition provisions have evolved into 
a more detailed form of cooperation agreement between the signatories which 
sometimes have resulted in the establishment of regional competition authorities such 
as the Caribbean Community and Common Market Agreement (CARICOM). Moreover, 
regional competition agreements usually involve signatories in the same region. As for 
bilateral agreements, it has to be preceded by some form of accord or understanding 
between the state first before the competition agencies could discuss the possibility of 
entering into bilateral accords on cooperation in competition issues. This is not to say 
that utilising regional TAs is a better alternative than the aforementioned two other 
regimes of cooperation but what this work puts forth is that it is another available 
alternative which may be utilised and suitable for some developing countries. However, 
since competition related provisions in regional TAs are not being actively utilised by the 
signatory countries in addressing issues relating to anti-competitive international cartels, 
therefore, it is pertinent to discuss the issues in international cartel enforcement before 
the ways in which to encourage the utilisation of competition related provisions in 
regional TAs may be identified.  
 
 
 
                                            
121
 Gal, M.S. and Wassmer, I.F., ‘Regional Agreements of Developing Jurisdictions: Unleashing the 
Potential’, Bakhoum, M. et al (eds), Edward Elgar (2012) 
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2.3. WHY ARE COMPETITION RELATED PROVISIONS IN REGIONAL TRADE 
AGREEMENTS UNDER-UTILISED? 
 
It is submitted that competition related provisions in regional TAs are under-utilised 
because of four main factors; namely:- 1) lack of incentives for countries to invoke cross 
border competition enforcement by virtue of regional TAs; 2) lack of sufficient legal 
commitments in cooperation; 3) developing countries do not view international cartel 
enforcement as a priority; and 4) inconsistencies in cross border competition 
enforcement.  
 
There is lack of incentives for the regional TAs signatories to invoke competition related 
provisions to address cross border competition enforcement issues. More often than 
not, developing countries lack resources and competent competition enforcement 
authorities. Therefore, in cases where there are cross border competition issues if there 
is to be any form of enforcement, only the developed country regional TAs partners 
would have the resources and competency to undertake enforcement actions. However, 
if the cross border infringements do not affect the interests of the developed country, 
logically, there is no incentive for the said country to invoke the competition related 
provisions in regional TAs to address them. Additionally, incentives are also very much 
dependent on the strength of trade relationships between the countries and also their 
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trade interests in each other122. Thus, in order for competition related provisions in 
regional TAs to be considered as a viable alternative to address international cartel 
enforcement, the prerequisites are:- all regional TA signatories need to have credible123 
competition authorities and competent competition law enforcement124; and there is 
strong trade relationships between the regional TA partners. These prerequisites are 
pertinent in order to create and strengthen the incentive for regional TA partners to 
invoke competition related provisions in international cartel enforcement.  
 
The next obstacle in the utilisation of competition related provisions in regional TAs in 
international cartel enforcement is the weak legal commitments in cooperation under 
regional TAs. Most of the regional TAs analysed contain very broad provisions on 
competition matters and cooperation in enforcement. In addition, some regional TAs 
expressly exclude the competition chapter from being subject to the general disputes 
settlement mechanism under the regional TA. In such instances, there is either no 
                                            
122
 Cernat’s study found that the more integrated the trade relationship between regional TA partners, the 
more comprehensive the competition related provisions in their regional TAs would be. This is an 
indication that the strength of trade relationship between regional TA partners is a determinant for 
incentives to cooperate in cross border competition enforcement. See Cernat, L., ‘Eager to Ink, but Ready 
to Act? RTA Proliferation and International Cooperation on Competition Policy’ in  Brusick, P. et al (eds), 
Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements : How to Assure Development Gains?, United 
Nations Publication (2005), UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2005/1, pp.16-17 at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20051_en.pdf 
123
 In the context of this work, this means the existence of a competition enforcement regime which is 
functioning, independent and adequately resourced. 
124
 Dabbah argued that a likely consequence  of developing countries’ lack of credibility in enforcing 
competition issues with extra-territorial content may jeopardise their chances of entering into bilateral 
cooperation agreements with developed countries who may view the former as not worthy partners in this 
respect. In other words, there is less incentive (if at all) for developed countries with effective competition 
enforcement regime to enter into accords such as regional TAs with such developing countries. See 
Dabbah, M., ‘Competition Law and Policy in  Developing Countries: A Critical Assessment of the 
Challenges to Establishing an Effective Competition Law Regime’, World Competition 33, no. 3 (2010) 
457-475, p. 473 
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recourse for disputes settlement125 or disputes shall only be discussed through 
consultations126. These indicate low level legal commitments in the regional TAs which 
may be viewed as “soft law” obligations127. However, such soft law commitments are not 
without merit because they facilitate cooperation between competition agencies outside 
of a formal framework, whereby disputes are resolved at inter-agency level based on 
best practices guided by soft law organisations such as UNCTAD, ICN and OECD128. 
Still, the success of implementation of soft law commitments in this regard would very 
much depend on the strength of relationship between the competition agencies in 
question129 and also whether there are sufficient incentives for the agencies to 
cooperate.  
 
International cartel enforcement is not viewed as a priority by developing countries. This 
may be due to three main factors, namely; lack of awareness of the adverse impact of 
anti-competitive cartel activities on the economy; lack of experience and resources; and 
trade and economic interests trumping competition concerns130. Based on empirical 
estimation, international cartels potentially bring negative impact on developing 
countries particularly because most international cartel members are producers from 
                                            
125
 For example, the Australia-Chile Free Trade Agreements; EU- FYR Macedonia Free Trade Agreement 
126
 For example, the EFTA-SACU Free Trade Agreement; EFTA-Tunisia Free Trade Agreement; EU-
Albania Free Trade Agreement 
127
 As termed by Marsden and Whelan in their presentation on ‘The Contribution of Bilateral Trade or 
Competition Law Agreements to Competition Law Enforcement Cooperation between: Canada-Chile, 
Canada-Costa Rica and EU-Mexico’, Paris (October 2005) 
128
 Sokol, D.D., ‘Order Without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter Into Non-Enforceable 
Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements’, Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol. 83 (2008) 101-
163, p.136-139 
129
 Ibid, p.136 
130
 See: Sokol, D.D. and Stephan, A., ‘Prioritizing Cartel Enforcement in Developing World Competition 
Agencies’, forthcoming in Competition Law and Development, Stanford University Press (2012) 
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developed countries but conduct their business in countries where there is no 
competition law or with weak competition law regulatory regimes131. Developing 
countries also import and rely heavily on raw materials which can be easily cartelised 
such as chemicals in fertilizer production132. Producers from developing countries may 
also face market foreclosure by cartels made up of producers from developed countries 
through tariff or non tariff barriers such as by misleading the government to impose anti-
dumping duties or quotas on the import of producers from developing countries133.  
However, all these fail to be viewed as harmful by developing countries perhaps 
because it is not an illegal conduct which is glaringly obvious in the eyes of the public. 
Therefore, it is not of great concern to the public than for example the offence of 
hoarding necessities by traders. Furthermore, available evidence on the impact of 
international cartels on developing countries such as those discussed by Levenstein 
and Suslow134 may be argued to be unreliable estimates due to the difficulty in obtaining 
data and information. 
 
                                            
131
 See: Levenstein, M.C. and Suslow, V.Y., ‘Contemporary International Cartels and Developing 
Countries: Economic Effects and Implications for Competition Policy’, 71 Antitrust Law Journal No.3 
(2004) 801-852 
132
 This may be observed from the lysine cartels case. Lysine is used in the production of animal feed and 
also vitamins. The estimation of damages to consumers due to the cartel price fixing was estimated at 
US$200 million. See Levenstein, M.C. and Suslow, V.Y., ‘Contemporary International Cartels and 
Developing Countries: Economic Effects and Implications for Competition Policy’, 71 Antitrust Law 
Journal No.3 (2004) 801-852, p.820 
133
 Levenstein, M.C. and Suslow, V.Y., ‘Contemporary International Cartels and Developing Countries: 
Economic Effects and Implications for Competition Policy’, 71 Antitrust Law Journal No.3 (2004) 801-852, 
pp.820-826 
134
 Levenstein, M.C. and Suslow, V.Y., ‘Contemporary International Cartels and Developing Countries: 
Economic Effects and Implications for Competition Policy’, 71 Antitrust Law Journal No.3 (2004) 801-852 
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Developing countries’ lack of experience and resources in competition law enforcement 
means that enforcement efforts would be concentrated on domestic competition issues 
and thus, international cartel enforcement which involve more complex issues involving 
multiple jurisdictions are not a priority to developing countries. Additionally, in cases 
involving international cartels, there is also a broader problem related to gathering of 
evidence and enforcement of decisions. Evidence needed for an investigation will 
physically be located in another jurisdiction. Where a firm sells in a jurisdiction but does 
not own any assets there, it is also difficult to enforce any infringement decision or court 
order. For both of these, cooperation with the host jurisdiction is necessary. However, 
the host will generally be reluctant to help other jurisdictions punish their domestic firms 
or multinational firms which generate income and create jobs in the economy135; 
particularly if enforcement actions pushes such firms to leave the market.  
 
The inability or reluctance of developing countries to implement international cartel 
enforcement brings a very important issue, which is “who then, should police 
international cartels?”  Based on the principles of comity and sovereignty alone 
developed competition jurisdictions should not be entrusted with the task136. It is 
submitted that international cartel enforcement should be a joint effort between all the 
jurisdictions involved. However, in view of the limitations faced by developing countries, 
the tasks in investigating, prosecuting and penalising international cartels ought to be 
                                            
135
 For a discussion on how multinational corporations generate income and jobs in developing countries, 
see Qiunlivan, G., ‘Sustainable Development: The Role of Multinational Corporations’, Carnegie Mellon 
University (2001) at www.andrew.cmu.edu/course/73-371/UN_article.doc  
136
 Sokol, D.D. and Stephan, A., ‘Prioritizing Cartel Enforcement in Developing World Competition 
Agencies’, forthcoming in Competition Law and Development, Stanford University Press (2012), p.3 
               YASMEEN YASIM  
PGR LAW 4363795 
UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA 
 
 
54 
 
divided between the jurisdictions accordingly. The interplay between trade and 
competition interests between regional TA signatories may help create the incentive for 
cooperation between the regional TA partners in international cartel enforcement. For 
example, country A, a developed country with advanced competition enforcement 
regime is a major investor in country B, a developing country with a young competition 
jurisdiction. In such a case, it would be beneficial to country A to not only assist in 
building the capacity of the competition enforcement regime of country B but also assist 
and cooperate in cross border competition issues with country B in order to ensure a 
conducive market environment for undertakings to operate, hence safeguarding country 
A’s trade and investment interests in the market of country B.  Even if the firms 
behaving anti-competitively in B are doing so to the benefit of shareholders in Country 
A, if provisions on comity and consultations are available under the regional TA 
between the two countries, then such avenues would be available to be pursued by 
country B. If the competition related provisions under the regional TA include dispute 
settlement mechanism, such infringements would be able to be addressed more 
effectively. Competition related provisions are discussed in detail later in this chapter.  
 
Inconsistencies in the current international cartel enforcement framework also limit the 
utilisation of competition related provisions in regional TAs. The inconsistencies are 
chiefly due to the issues which arise out of interactions between trade and competition; 
existing international and supranational legal frameworks are not developing at the 
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same pace as globalisation and trade liberalisation; and differences in substantive and 
procedural legislative provisions.  
 
It should be noted that competition law regulates domestic markets and therefore, the 
jurisdiction of competition authorities do not extend extra-territorially except in some 
cases where anti-competitive agreements between foreign undertakings in foreign 
jurisdictions have negatively impacted their own domestic market137. Unfortunately, in 
this regard, anti-competitive practices of international cartels extend across two or more 
countries and the impact of international cartels’ anti-competitive actions are borne by 
developing countries although the offending firms are more often than not based in 
developed countries138. Ideally, effective international cartel enforcement requires the 
impact of such anti-competitive activities to be accounted for regardless of jurisdictional 
borders. However international law principles such as sovereignty and comity have to 
be acknowledged.  
 
Trade law regulates trade between states and not private undertakings, whilst 
competition law essentially regulates domestic private undertakings. In international 
cartel cases the delineation between competition and trade law and policy is often 
blurred or non-existent. This has resulted in regulatory disjunction in overlapping areas 
                                            
137
 See the explanation of the “Effects Doctrine” in F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. vs. Empagran S.A, 123 S. 
Ct.2359 (2004) 
138
 A sample based on EU cartel decisions completed between 1974 – 2010 clearly shows that 
international cartel membership involve firms based in developed countries. See Sokol, D.D. and 
Stephan, A., ‘Prioritizing Cartel Enforcement in Developing World Competition Agencies’, forthcoming in 
Competition Law and Development, Stanford University Press (2012) 
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between trade and competition where they are either under-regulated or over-
regulated139. In cases of under-regulation, domestic regulations do not include areas 
where there are no effects on its domestic market or the domestic regulation applies 
standards which are below globally optimal level such as in export cartels cases which 
do not impact the domestic market, undertakings and consumers140. On the other hand, 
over-regulation is a situation where there is an overlap between domestic laws of 
different countries such as in cases of international mergers or application of leniency 
by cartels. This may lead to undertakings incurring transaction and compliance costs in 
order to comply with laws in multiple jurisdictions and also system frictions between the 
jurisdictions involved which may result in inconsistent decisions141. All these create 
uncertainties and bring added costs in cross border commercial dealings.   
 
The fact that existing international and supranational legal frameworks are not 
developing at the same pace as globalisation and trade liberalisation has  resulted in 
gaps and lack of coherence in the enforcement of international cartel cases.  Such 
lacunae in the international regulatory framework are being taken advantage of by 
international cartels. For example, trade liberalisation may be abused by firms already 
established in the domestic market to force new entrants out of the market. This may be 
by colluding to fix prices by reacting passively to increasing imports in order to 
demonstrate harm to the local industry and therefore convince the state to use anti-
                                            
139
 Taylor, M., International Competition Law A New Dimension to the WTO?, Cambridge University 
Press (2006), p. 1-2 
140 Ibid, pp. 44 - 46 
141 Ibid,, p. 46 - 49 
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dumping measures against the imported goods of the entrant firm. This is what 
happened in the case of American ferrosilicon producers’ cartel which was formed in 
1989142. In this case, the three (3) largest US ferrosilicon producers who dominated the 
US and European ferrosilicon production markets conspired to drive ferrosilicon 
producers from China and South America out of the US and European markets. New 
entrants into the markets were due to the reduction in tariffs created by trade 
liberalisation treaties. They engaged in typical cartel behaviour by maintaining the cartel 
price and withdrew capacity from the market. In time, this created the illusion that 
producers from China and South America were dumping ferrosilicon into the US and 
European market. The cartel members filed anti-dumping complaints against the non-
cartel producers with the authorities and they succeeded143. This example also 
illustrates that trade liberalisation needs to be supported by competition law and policy 
to ensure that elimination of trade barriers and not replaced by anti-competitive 
conducts such as those engaged in by international cartels.  
 
Differences in procedural and substantive laws also have led to inconsistencies in 
international cartels enforcement. This is a usual conundrum in multi-jurisdictional 
enforcement issues. Arguably, international cartels enforcement would be easier if the 
legislation in all countries involved deem the same anti-competitive conduct as illegal. 
Even if all the jurisdictions involved have a competition law in place but if the anti-
                                            
142
 For a detailed discussion on the case, see: Pierce, R.J.  Jr., ‘Anti-dumping  Law as a Means of 
Facilitating Cartelization’, 67 Antitrust L.J. (1999-2000) 725-743 
143
 Pierce, R.J.  Jr., ‘Anti-dumping  Law as a Means of Facilitating Cartelization’, 67 Antitrust L.J. (1999-
2000) 725-743, pp.726-727  
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competitive conduct of the cartel in question is exempted or allowed by the law of one or 
some of the jurisdictions involved, it is not going to be easy for authorities from the 
jurisdiction which wishes to take action against the cartel to seek assistance from the 
other to cooperate.  This is the case for export cartels. Export cartels may be legal in the 
country of origin but illegal in the country which suffered the harmful effects of the export 
cartel. Moreover, an export cartel transfers wealth from other countries into the 
economy. Therefore, there is yet to be a unified call to ban export cartels144. Hence, the 
reasons for the difficulty in obtaining the cooperation could range from the fact that there 
has been no information or data collected on the said international cartel because the 
law is not concerned with their conducts or because the anti-competitive conduct is 
allowed under the law for the sake of development or other non competition 
consideration which may be important to that country145.    
 
Another example is regarding criminalisation of cartel offences. Apart from the US, there 
are few jurisdictions which impose criminal penalties such as incarceration of culpable 
executives working with the undertakings involved in anti-competitive cartel conducts; 
and only in some countries that do, the criminal offence is extended beyond bid rigging 
                                            
144
 For detailed discussions on export cartels see Martyniszyn, M., ‘Export Cartels: Is it Legal to Target 
Your Neighbour? Analysis in Light of Recent Case Law’, Journal of International Economic Law, 1 – 42 
(2012), Oxford University Press; Sokol, D.D,’ What Do We Really Know About Export Cartels and What is 
the Appropriate Solution?’, Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Vol. 4, pp. 967-982 (2008), 
University of Florida Levin College of Law Research Paper No. 2009-05 at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1144003 ; Becker, F., ‘The Case for Export Cartels Exemptions: Between 
Competition and Protectionism’, Journal of Competition Law & Economics 3(1): 97-126 (2007), Oxford 
University Press 
145
 Evenett, S.J. et al, ‘International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990’s’, The World Economy 
Vol.24 Issue 9 (2001) 1221-1245, p.1232  
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in public procurement146. Such differences impact cooperation between countries in 
international cartels enforcement147. For instance, in the Implementing Agreement of the 
Competition Chapter of the regional TA between Japan and Peru, the parties expressly 
stipulate that any information shared shall not be used for criminal proceedings and 
even if a party wishes to do so, it has to put the request through the proper diplomatic 
channels and not by virtue of the regional TA148.  
 
This brings us to the critical stumbling block in international competition enforcement, 
which is information sharing149. Cooperation is also hampered by limitations in 
information sharing which usually only allows for exchange of publicly available or non-
confidential information150. The laws in each jurisdiction interpret the term differently. 
                                            
146
 Nevertheless, the number of countries which have adopted criminalisation of cartel offences is 
increasing. These include Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Croatia, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Slovak Republic, South Africa, South Korea, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom and the United States of America. This is an updated list based on Beaton Wells’ list 
in Beaton-Wells, C.Y., ‘The Politics of Cartel Criminalisation: A Pessimistic View from Australia’, 
European Competition Law Review Vol. 29 (3) (2008). 
147
 Evenett, S.J. et al, ‘International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990’s’, The World Economy 
Vol.24 Issue 9 (2001) 1221-1245, p.1236  
148
 Article 19, Implementing Agreement of the Competition Chapter of the regional TA between Japan and 
Peru 
149
 Evenett, Levenstein and Suslow referred to the exchange of confidential business information as a 
“critical stumbling block” in most bilateral cooperations. See Evenett, S.J. et al, ‘International Cartel 
Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990’s’, The World Economy Vol.24 Issue 9 (2001) 1221-1245, p.1239 
150
 Based on the findings of the study by Marsden and Whelan on bilateral trade or competition 
agreements between EU – Mexico, Canada – Chile and Canada – Costa Rica, most officials surveyed 
believe that limitations in information sharing is the chief limitation on cooperation. See Marsden, P. and 
Whelan, P., ‘The Contribution of Bilateral Trade or Competition Agreements to Competition Law 
Enforcement Cooperation between the EU and Mexico’, The British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law (2005) at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=980527 
 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.980527 ; Marsden, P. and Whelan, P., ‘The Contribution of Bilateral 
Trade or Competition Agreements to Competition Law Enforcement Cooperation between Canada and 
Chile’, The British Institute of International and Comparative Law (2005) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=980525 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.980525  ; Marsden, P. and Whelan, P., 
‘The Contribution of Bilateral Trade or Competition Agreements to Competition Law Enforcement 
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What may be considered as non-confidential information in one jurisdiction may be 
considered as confidential information in another. In such a case, investigations and 
prosecution of cartel infringements with international dimensions would be very difficult. 
This can be seen in the graphite electrode cartel case. The cartel was only prosecuted 
in the US, Canada and EU. Korea tried to prosecute the cartel but was unable to obtain 
much information from the jurisdictions in which the cartel was prosecuted. Therefore, 
Korea encountered difficulty in developing its own case against the cartel151. 
Furthermore, competition jurisdictions are often reluctant to share confidential business 
information with competition authorities from other jurisdictions lest the information be 
leaked to rival firms or used inappropriately152. Additionally, firms applying for leniency 
against cartel prosecution in one jurisdiction are not guaranteed that they will also 
obtain leniency in the other jurisdictions involved. Unless there is a guarantee that they 
will be accorded leniency in all the jurisdictions involved, firms who are international 
cartel members are discouraged from applying for leniency and sharing their insider 
information153. 
 
The discussion in this section has established the reasons why competition related 
provisions in regional TAs are under-utilised. Next, the discussion proceeds to analyse 
                                                                                                                                            
Cooperation between Canada and Costa Rica’, The British Institute of International and Comparative Law 
(2005) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=980526  or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.980526. 
151
 Jenny, F., ‘International Cooperation on Competition : Myth, Reality and Perspective’, The University 
of Minnesota Law School Conference on Global Antitrust Law and Policy (2002), p.13 at 
http://www.iilj.org/courses/documents/HC2003.Jenny.pdf 
152
 Evenett, S.J. et al, ‘International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990’s’, The World Economy 
Vol.24 Issue 9 (2001) 1221-1245, p.1239 
153
 See: Sokol, D.D. and Stephan, A., ‘Prioritizing Cartel Enforcement in Developing World Competition 
Agencies’, forthcoming in Competition Law and Development, Stanford University Press (2012), pp.4 - 5 
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the competition related provisions in regional TAs to determine the extent of inclusion of 
elements which are considered pertinent to the facilitation of international cartel 
enforcement.  
 
2.4. THE PRESENT STATE OF COMPETITION RELATED PROVISIONS IN 
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS  
 
The discussion in this section is based on the content analysis of regional TA texts 
between developed and developing countries with competition related provisions. 59 
regional TA texts between developed and developing countries which are in force and 
available on the WTO website as of May 2012 were examined.  As of May 2012, the 
total texts of regional TAs which were in force and available on the WTO website was 
230. Out of the 230 texts publicly available online, 90 regional TAs are between 
developed and developing countries. As of May 2012, 59 regional TAs between 
developed and developing countries which are publicly available online contain 
competition related provisions. The matrix is as per Annex - Matrix Of Competition 
Related Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements Between Developed and 
Developing Countries based on WTO’S Regional Trade Agreement Database (As 
Of May 2012).   
 
The analysis is two-fold. First, the general observations and second, the texts are 
assessed based on the inclusion of elements which are deemed as pertinent to enable 
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and encourage international cartel enforcement between regional TAs partners by virtue 
of competition related provisions in regional TAs. In determining which elements are 
relevant, the factors which have hindered the utilisation of competition related provisions 
in regional TAs for international cartel enforcement are considered. In this regard, the 
elements which have been identified as relevant are : the requirement to adopt and 
maintain competition law measures; description of anti-competitive practices; 
cooperation in competition law enforcement; whether trade measures are allowed to be 
invoked for breach of any of the competition related provisions; information sharing; 
comity; dispute settlement; inclusion of anti-competitive mergers under the ambit of the 
regional TAs; exemptions; and special and differential treatment. The relevance of each 
element and their presence in regional TAs currently in force is discussed in this Part. 
 
In general, more than two thirds of the regional TAs between developed and developing 
countries have included competition related provisions154. The majority of developing 
countries which have entered into regional TAs with competition related provisions are 
upper middle income countries with the exception of a few such as Albania, Egypt, 
India, Indonesia, Morocco, Philippines and Vietnam. This is an indication that cross 
border competition issues which affect trade are of concern to upper middle income 
                                            
154
 66.29 per cent to be precise. 59 regional TAs with significant competition related provisions out of 89 
regional TAs between developed and developing countries listed on the WTO website as of May 2012. 
See Annexes - Matrix Of Competition Related Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements Between 
Developed and Developing Countries based on WTO’S Regional Trade Agreement Database (As Of May 
2012); Regional Trade Agreements between Developed and Developing Countries as Listed an WTO 
Website (As Of May 2012). 
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developing countries. Similar to the 2005 OECD study155, it is also observed from the 
texts analysed that most regional TAs involving European countries or blocs such as the 
EC, EU and EFTA emphasises on substantive rules whilst agreements involving the 
Americas emphasises on coordination and cooperation. Agreements which fall under 
the former category generally describe the type of anti-competitive agreements and 
conduct which are deemed as incompatible with the regional TA in so far as they affect 
trade between the signatories156 or require the approximation of the competition law of 
the country to EC’s157. In regional TAs which emphasise on substantive rules there is 
less focus on coordination and cooperation158. However, this is not a hard and fast rule 
as there are also agreements with hybrid types of emphasis particularly when they 
involve inter-regional parties in the geographical sense159.  
 
Among the most minimal competition related provisions are in the ASEAN, Australia 
and New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (AANZFTA). The AANZFTA only has 
competition provisions focusing on cooperation and capacity building despite the fact 
that the signatories, particularly ASEAN and Australia, are close trading partners160. 
                                            
155
 Solano, O. and Sennekamp, A., ‘Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements’, OECD Trade 
Policy working paper no. 31 (2006), p. 15  available at 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf?cote=com/daf/td(2005)3/final&doclanguage=
en 
156
 This is similar to the wordings of Section 101 TFEU. 
157
 See Article 70 EC – Albania Free Trade Agreement. 
158
 Solano, O. and Sennekamp, A., ‘Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements’, OECD Trade 
Policy working paper no. 31 (2006), p. 15  available at 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf?cote=com/daf/td(2005)3/final&doclanguage=
en 
159
 Ibid 
160
 Australia is one of ASEAN’s top 10 trading partners whilst trade relations between ASEAN and New 
Zealand are gaining strength whereby the volume of trade between ASEAN and New Zealand in 2011 
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This is to account for the fact that ASEAN member countries are at varying degrees of 
competition development161.  This supports the argument that strong trade relations and 
competent and credible enforcement regime incentivise the utilisation of competition 
related provisions in regional TAs. Without the two factors, there is no motivation to 
even include competition related provisions in regional TAs, if at all. There are also 
developing countries which had entered into regional TAs with competition related 
provisions despite the fact they had yet to adopt a domestic competition law or yet to 
actively enforce competition law at that point in time. Examples are the Japan – 
Malaysia Economic Partnership Agreement (JMEPA)162 and the Comprehensive 
Economic partnership Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the Republic of 
India. Nevertheless, the lack of credible and competent competition enforcement regime 
in both Malaysia and India to date may likely be the reason that the required further 
actions and cooperation in competition enforcement are yet to be undertaken. 
 
The requirement to adopt and maintain competition law measures is relevant because 
in order to enable international cartel enforcement via regional TAs first and foremost, 
the countries involved should already have a competition law in place. The requirement 
to adopt and maintain competition law measures is pertinent because if the regional TA 
partners do not have laws which regulate competition or is not serious about enforcing 
                                                                                                                                            
increased to USD8.23 billion from USD6.75 billion in 2010. Source: Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, Australia at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/focus/081201_top10_twoway_exports.html ; and ASEAN 
Secretariat website at http://www.aseansec.org/5826.htm 
161
 Article 1, Chapter 14 Agreement Establishing the ASEAN – Australia – New Zealand Free Trade Area: 
2. The parties recognise the significant differences in capacity between ASEAN Member States, Australia 
and New Zealand in the area of competition policy. 
162
 However, the agreement is subject to the yet to be drafted implementing agreement. 
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the law, then there is no legal basis to the cooperation between them in international 
cartels enforcement. In this regard, the competition related provision shall be no more 
than just a provision without any legal basis for enforcement in the country without the 
said legislative provision163. If all or at least one of the regional TA signatories is yet to 
adopt competition law, then the requirement for competition law to be adopted in the 
near future should be ‘hardwired” into the provisions of the regional TA just like in the 
U.S. – Singapore Free Trade Agreement164.  
 
A description of what amounts to an anti-competitive infringement or what shall be 
deemed illegal under the competition related provisions of the regional TA is also crucial 
to ensure that all the regional signatories are “talking the same language” so to speak. 
This is also to clarify the kind of infringements which are of concern to all the signatories 
involved. Clarifying the meaning of anti-competitive behaviour or conduct under the 
regional TA would also facilitate to iron out any differences in the substantive laws of 
each signatory. 
 
Cooperation in enforcement is an important element which should be present in 
competition related provisions under regional TAs. The main challenge in international 
cartel enforcement is dealing with extraterritorial issues because it does not only involve 
different substantive and procedural law but also different legal systems, national 
                                            
163
 Cernat, L., ‘Eager to Ink, but Ready to Act? RTA Proliferation and International Cooperation on 
Competition Policy’ in P. Brusick et al (eds), Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements : How 
to Assure Development Gains?, United Nations Publication (2005), UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2005/1, pp.23-24 
at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20051_en.pdf 
164
 See Articles 12.1  and 12.2, US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement 
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interests and regulatory and political culture. Cooperation in enforcement is usually 
executed in the form of notifications, consultations, exchange of information and 
technical assistance. The cooperation may not necessarily include all of the 
aforementioned forms and some regional TAs expressly provide that cooperation is very 
much dependent on available resources and discretion of the requested party165 which 
seem to water down the level of commitments of the parties involved.  
 
Closely related to cooperation in enforcement are the elements of information sharing 
and comity. As mentioned earlier, among the major stumbling blocks in cooperation in 
cross border competition issues is information sharing. In general only publicly available 
or non-confidential information may be shared between regional TA signatories and it is 
always subject to qualifications. The examples of limitations on sharing of information 
include provisions which only allow for publicly available information166, or subject to 
limitations imposed by the requirements of professional and business secrecy167, or 
subject to the prevailing laws on confidentiality168.  These qualifications do not facilitate 
international cartels enforcement efforts for they may jeopardize investigation and 
successful prosecution of international cartels which involve collection of extraterritorial 
evidence and information. Hence, such limitations should be revisited without 
jeopardising legitimate interests of the undertakings involved and signatories 
                                            
165
 Such as Article 167, Japan-Chile Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement. 
166
 For example, Australia-Chile Free Trade Agreement; US-Chile Free Trade Agreement; US-Peru Free 
Trade Agreement 
167
 For example, EFTA-Egypt Free Trade Agreement; EU-Algeria Free Trade Agreement; Turkey-Croatia 
Free Trade Agreement 
168
 For example, EFTA-Chile Free Trade Agreement; EFTA-Colombia Free Trade Agreement; Republic of 
Korea-Chile Free Trade Agreement 
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concerned. Comity is another relevant element which facilitates international cartel 
enforcement between regional TA signatories, however it is not always included in the 
regional TAs analysed169. Comity may either be positive170 or negative171. Comity 
ensures that the interests and sovereignty of regional TA partners are accounted for in 
competition infringements with extraterritorial aspects.  
 
Some of the regional TAs analysed provide for trade measures to be invoked to remedy 
any adverse effects on the domestic market of any of the regional TA signatories which 
may be created by anti-competitive activities originating from the actions of 
undertakings based in the jurisdiction of their regional TA partners172. A good example 
would be export cartels. Export cartels may be either private or public undertakings and 
most of the times are authorised by the state and are rarely made subject to domestic 
competition laws. When the fixed low prices of export cartels adversely impact the 
domestic competition and urgent action is needed to protect competition in the domestic 
market, the easier way would be to invoke trade measures. Arguably, if competition 
regulatory mechanisms are effectively implemented, there would be no need to resort to 
trade related measures. However, export cartels may not be based in the domestic 
                                            
169
 Comity is only expressly present in 15 regional TAs texts analysed.  
170
 Positive comity allows a party whose interests are affected by anti-competitive activities occurring in 
whole or in part in the jurisdiction of another party to request the latter to take appropriate enforcement 
action against the anti-competitive activity in question. See Marsden, P. and Whelan, P., ‘The 
Contribution of Bilateral Trade or Competition Agreements to Competition Law Enforcement Cooperation 
between Canada and Costa Rica’, The British Institute of International and Comparative Law (2005) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=980526  or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.980526, p.19 
171
 Negative comity is an assurance that the interests of other signatories to the agreement shall be 
accounted for in the enforcement action undertaken by their fellow signatory country. This is based on the 
definition provided by the Institute of Competition Law at http://www.concurrences.com/anglais/droit-de-
la-concurrence-150/Glossary-Competition-Law-Terms/comity?lang=en 
172
 22 regional TAs out of the 59 analysed. 
               YASMEEN YASIM  
PGR LAW 4363795 
UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA 
 
 
68 
 
jurisdiction and it would not be easy to obtain information and data in cartel investigation 
particularly when the export cartel undertakings are authorised by the jurisdiction of their 
country of origin. Hence, in such cases, invoking trade measures would be a better 
alternative. However, as explained earlier in this chapter, such measures may 
sometimes be abused by the domestic undertakings to preserve their anti-competitive 
cartel arrangements173. Therefore, trade related measures such as anti-dumping, 
countervailing duties and safeguards ought to be complimented by remedies under 
competition law to safeguard against abuse. 
 
The inclusion of dispute settlement mechanism is advisable to ensure issues arising out 
of international cartels enforcement between regional TA signatories are solved 
amicably regardless whether disputes are to be subject to the regional TA’s general 
dispute settlement mechanism or specific dispute settlement mechanism under the 
Competition Chapter or subject to a specific agreement between the competition 
agencies of the signatories. Most importantly the mechanism prescribed needs to be 
adhered to and possible to be effectively implemented. A dispute settlement mechanism 
which calls for cumbersome and costly modalities would be difficult to be implemented 
by the regional TA partners. Thus, it is necessary to ensure the procedures involved are 
not cumbersome, the administration costs are kept to a minimum and the 
responsibilities of each country are clearly identified and delineated. Still, nearly all of 
the regional TAs analysed  (except 2) either have expressly ruled out matters under the 
                                            
173
 See ferrosilicon producers’ cartel case as explained earlier. 
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competition chapter from being subject to the general disputes settlement mechanism174 
or are silent in regard to the settlement of disputes for competition matters.  Another 
variation is the provision of partial exception from the general dispute settlement 
mechanism175.  
 
Cartels often resort to mergers when it has become more costly to operate as cartels 
due to anti-competitive cartels enforcement176. Therefore to achieve effective 
international cartels enforcement under the regional TA framework, competition related 
provisions pertaining to anti-competitive merger control should also be included. There 
are some agreements which expressly list anti-competitive mergers as one of the types 
of anti-competitive behaviour subject to the regional TA177.  Mergers involving 
international cartels may be between undertakings based in one particular country or 
between undertakings from different countries. The impact of the merger, however, may 
affect the market or interests of one, several or all of the regional TA signatory 
countries.  However, anti-competitive mergers may not be included under the scope of 
the regional TA if they are not subject to the competition laws of the signatory countries. 
                                            
174
 In some regional TAs, there are provisions for disputes to be discussed through consultations via a 
joint committee. However, in such cases there is no finality or conclusiveness pertaining to the resolution 
of disputes because discussions through consultations means there is merely a best endeavour 
commitment by the signatories involved in solving disputes. See for example Article 15 (3) EFTA-SACU 
Free Trade Agreement. 
175
 Such as the free trade agreements between the US-Peru and the US-Chile. Under these agreements, 
only monopolies, state enterprises and information requests may be subject to the general dispute 
settlement mechanism under the preferential TA. In addition, for Chile, pricing differences are also 
included. 
176
 Mehra, P., ‘Choice Between Cartels and Horizontal Merger’, (2007), at SSRN:  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081844 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1081844 
177
 Such as the Free Trade Agreements between Australia – Chile; Panama – Singapore; Thailand - 
Australia 
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Without a legal basis in the domestic laws of the countries involved, it will not be 
possible to include mergers under the competition chapter of the regional TA. This is 
also the case with Malaysia because there is no competition dimension under the 
Malaysian merger regulation178. Only nine (9) of the regional TAs analysed have 
included anti-competitive mergers.    
 
In order to encourage the international cartel enforcement under regional TAs, the 
limitations of the developing countries would also have to be accounted for. In this 
regard, elements which provide flexibilities to developing countries such as exemptions 
and special and differential treatments ought to be included.  From the analysis, twenty 
(20) regional TAs provide for exemptions. Some of the types of exemption allowed are: 
exemption of specific measures or sectors such as in the Thailand – Australia Free 
Trade Agreement179; and state aid in agriculture and fisheries180.   Examples of special 
and differential treatment are such as those included under the competition chapter of 
some regional TAs between the EU, EFTA and developing countries such as Albania 
and Jordan.  Under those agreements, flexibilities are accorded to the developing 
countries in relation to state aid due to their developing nation status181. However, it is 
not accorded in perpetuity and subject to periodical review182.  Indeed, such flexibilities 
                                            
178
 See Chapter 5 of this thesis for detailed discussion on the likely outcomes of tougher cartel 
enforcement in Malaysia in light of the lack of merger control with a competition dimension. 
179
 See: Article 1204, Thailand – Australia Free Trade Agreement 
180
 See for example EC-Albania Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
181
 See: Article 71 (7) EC-Albania Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
182
 Article 53 (4) EC-Jordan Euro-Mediterranean Agreement 
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should not be accorded in perpetuity lest they invite complacency and perhaps also 
abuse. 
 
2.5. PROPOSALS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The difference in levels of development should not be a hindrance in cross border 
enforcement cooperation of competition cases under regional TAs, However, there are 
prerequisites which have to exist before competition related provisions in regional TAs 
could be considered as a suitable alternative for international cartel enforcement by any 
country. First, there ought to be incentives for the regional TA signatory countries to 
cooperate in international cartel enforcement by invoking the competition related 
provisions thereunder. Second, the limitations of each country should be recognised. 
Third, there has to be government commitment in eradicating the adverse impact of 
anti-competitive international cartel activities on trade liberalisation and competition.  
 
As discussed earlier, the two factors which create incentives for the inclusion and 
utilisation of competition related provisions in regional TAs are the existence of credible 
competition enforcement regimes and the strength of trade relationship between the 
regional TA partners. Without domestic competition law in place, there is no legal basis 
for cooperation. Even if there is a competition law in place, the absence of a credible 
competition enforcement regime would not incentivise a developed country with an 
advanced competition jurisdiction to invoke the competition related provisions in the 
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regional TA to address cross border competition infringements such as international 
cartels. As for the strength of trade relationship between the regional TA partners, the 
incentives are created based on the defensive and offensive trade interests of each 
country and the interplay between trade and competition considerations in the 
negotiations between the regional TA partner countries. The incentives to use regional 
TAs to facilitate international cartel enforcement therefore may be created by each 
country meeting the concerns of their regional TA partners accordingly in exchange for 
its own concerns being met.  Furthermore, the higher level of trade between the 
regional TA partners would lead to more cross border competition issues, including anti-
competitive international cartel activities. Hence, the stronger the incentive to include 
and invoke competition related provisions in regional TAs by the signatories. 
 
The second prerequisite is that the limitations of all the countries involved are 
recognised. This is to ensure that whatever modality of cooperation provided for under 
the regional TA is possible to be implemented. This therefore has to account for the 
level of development of each country, availability of resources and competition culture. 
These factors in turn would determine the form, structure and substance of competition 
related provisions to be included in the regional TA. For instance, it will be a futile 
exercise to impose a cooperation structure which is beyond the funding abilities of 
developing countries or to provide for the powers to investigate and prosecute 
international cartels mainly to the mature competition authorities of developed countries. 
Another example is pertaining to exemptions and special and differential treatment to 
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developing countries. Sometimes, regional TA signatories, regardless of level of 
economic development, have sensitive activities; industries; or markets to protect which 
could be because of socio-economic issues; development; security; or economic 
interests. For, example, the automotive industry is a sensitive industry for Malaysia; 
agriculture is a sensitive sector for most countries including the EU, Australia and New 
Zealand. Developing countries such as Albania; Egypt; and Jordan have been accorded 
flexibilities for state aid and agriculture in their regional TAs with the EU. Without such 
exemptions or flexibilities being provided for in the regional TAs, it may be difficult to 
reach a consensus and finalise the terms of the agreements in the negotiation process. 
 
The last prerequisite is regarding the government’s commitment. Including competition 
related provisions in regional TAs is not enough to address international cartel 
enforcement issues and prevent anti-competitive international cartel activities. The 
governments through their respective competition authorities must be serious in their 
commitment to invoke and implement competition related provisions in regional TAs and 
pursue cooperation in cross border competition enforcement via their respective 
competition authorities. If governments in developing countries turn a blind eye to anti-
competitive activities of firms such as multinational corporations who are international 
cartel members simply because of the market power, income generation and 
employment opportunities which they create, then there could be no effective 
cooperation in international cartel enforcement under any sort of accord or modality.  
 
               YASMEEN YASIM  
PGR LAW 4363795 
UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA 
 
 
74 
 
The discussion now arrives at the recommended structure of competition related 
provisions in regional TAs and the minimum elements which ought to be included to 
encourage the utilisation of competition related provisions in international cartel 
enforcement. In the context of this work, encourage means incentivising and facilitating 
the regional TAs signatories to utilise competition related provisions in the regional TAs 
to cooperate in international cartel enforcement.  
 
The structure recommended is for the broad provisions on competition to be included in 
the regional TA and for the details of the cooperation to be provided under an 
implementing agreement between the competition authorities involved. This is similar to 
the implementing agreements for each relevant chapter under regional TAs which are 
being practised by Japan. Such a structure allows for the details regarding the 
implementation of the competition related provisions to be thrashed out between the 
experts, namely the respective competition authorities without affecting the execution of 
the overall regional TA itself and bundling competition commitments with trade 
commitments that may be deemed as too restricting by the signatories183. In a way, it 
can be said that this recommended structure actually allows for the implementation 
agreement to be determined between the competition agencies and this could pave the 
way to the creation of a competition accord between the signatories which may evolve 
into an integrated competition agreement.  
                                            
183
 See: Sokol, D.D., ‘Order Without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter Into Non-Enforceable 
Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements’, Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol. 83 (2008) 101-
163, p.136  
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The minimum required elements which are necessary to facilitate the utilisation of 
competition related provisions under regional TAs may be divided into four categories; 
namely, advancement of the competition agenda, bridging the difference in legal 
standards, addressing the interaction between trade and competition, certainty and 
flexibilities.  Under advancement of competition, the elements are: the requirement to 
adopt and maintain competition law measures; cooperation in competition law 
enforcement. Bridging the difference in legal standards requires the following elements:  
description of anti-competitive practices; information sharing; and comity. The elements 
necessary to address the interaction between trade and competition are: whether trade 
measures are allowed to be invoked for breach of any of the competition related 
provisions; and inclusion of anti-competitive mergers under the ambit of the regional 
TAs. Certainty requires the dispute settlement element to be included and exemptions; 
and special and differential treatment are those elements which provide for flexibilities to 
account for the limitations of developing countries. 
 
The requirement to adopt and maintain competition law enforcement measures is 
necessary particularly in regional TAs with developing country signatories without 
competition law or with weak or young competition enforcement regimes. The absence 
of this element in the competition related provisions would not facilitate cooperation in 
international cartel enforcement under the regional TA unless the countries involved 
already have competition laws and credible competition enforcement regimes in place.  
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Similarly, cooperation in enforcement also has to be included to authorise cross border 
competition enforcement between the signatories. Cooperation in enforcement ought to 
be in a transparent manner based on international law principles and include 
consultation, notification, exchange of information, coordination and technical 
assistance. The absence of any one of these would render cooperation in competition 
enforcement more difficult. This is because multijurisdictional enforcement between the 
authorities of different countries requires among others, sharing of information, 
coordination and consultation. No one country could act on its own be it due to 
jurisdictional constraints or lack of resources.  
 
In solving issues of differences in legal standards and substance, the usual 
recommendation put forth is harmonisation. However, harmonisation denotes the need 
to conform to universal standards, something along the lines of a multilateral 
agreement. This does not only involve the requirement for countries with lower or 
undeveloped standards in competition policy and law to conform to higher standards as 
those of developed countries but it also means developed countries with higher and 
more established standards in competition policy and law are required to meet 
developing countries half way by sometimes lowering their standards. Such a solution 
would be unfair to both developed and developing countries and also mean a step 
backwards for developed countries with advanced competition law regimes184. This 
                                            
184
 This was also the US’s argument which resulted in their ambivalence to the EU’s proposal for a 
multilateral agreement on competition under the WTO. See Bhattacharjea, A.,‘The Case for a Multilateral 
Agreement on Competition Policy : A Developing  Country Perspective’, Journal of International 
Economic Law, 9(2) 293-323 (2006), p. 293 
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issue also relates to legal culture and convention – matters which are not likely to be 
harmonised. Therefore, in regard to regional TAs it should be a case of working along 
the lines of what is mutually acceptable to all the signatories, i.e. not harmonisation but 
identification and development of mutually acceptable standards and elements. 
 
On the other hand, if the competition related provisions which currently exists in the 
regional TAs are already the extent to which signatories are willing to agree to; and 
under-utilisation of the provisions are not because of any other reasons but only 
because of the disparity in legal standards and substance;  if the incentives are there 
and the governments are committed to the prevention of the anti-competitive 
international cartels; then there should be no hesitation on the part of the signatories to 
endeavour to iron out the differences through consultations. Legal standards are 
translations of policies. Therefore, the key in addressing the differences is to address 
the aspects where domestic laws and competition policies differ most which would 
affect international cartels enforcement between the regional TA’s partners185. Hence, 
the glaring policy differences would have to be addressed and once a mutual 
agreement is reached, they will be translated accordingly in the law. Hence, what is 
being recommended here is not the requirement for developing countries to adopt the 
legal standards and substance of their developed regional TA partners and vice versa, 
unless the objective of the regional TA is market integration. What is being suggested 
                                            
185
 This argument is along the lines of Drexl’s argument in discussing the possibility of a WTO competition 
law based on different principles than those originally proposed by the EC. He posits that harmonisation 
of legal standards alone do not guarantee equally effective enforcement See Drexl, J., ‘International 
Competition Policy After Cancun : Placing a Singapore Issue on the WTO Development Agenda’, World 
Competition Journal 27(3): 419-457 (2001), pp. 447-449   
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however is continuous coordination in cooperation and clarification of differences in 
competition policies and law through direct consultation between the relevant 
competition regulators and policy makers.  
 
In terms of definition of what is deemed as anti-competitive activities under the regional 
TA, it is necessary for the regional TA partners to mutually agree on what should be 
included under the scope of the regional TA. It is proposed that instead of including as 
many types of anti-competitive conducts under the ambit of the definition, it would be 
better to only include those priority areas or types of conducts which are of concern to 
the regional TA signatories based on the objective of the agreement. Provided that such 
conducts are also disallowed under the respective domestic competition laws. For 
instance, anti-competitive cartel activities ought to be included but due to the focus of 
the trade relations between the regional TA partners which could be in agricultural 
goods, perhaps only international cartels in food and agricultural sector should be 
initially included as one of the anti-competitive conducts under the regional TA. Another 
example is if mergers are not included under the competition law of any of the regional 
TA signatory country, then it should be excluded for the time being.  
 
The ability to share information is crucial in international cartel enforcement. The 
limitations usually imposed in sharing confidential business information in investigation, 
prosecution of cartels and calculation of damages have been a major stumbling block in 
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achieving progress in international cooperation efforts186. In order to overcome this 
stumbling block perhaps a clear interpretation of “confidential business information” and 
the types of information which could be shared ought to be clearly prescribed and a 
more secure and structured method in sharing such information should be agreed upon 
by the parties involved. A possible example is the provision on information sharing in 
the Canada-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement which provides that information shared 
are confidential and only to be used for purposes of enforcement as per under the 
notification187. In this way, the competition authorities involved have the discretion to 
determine what is confidential and could be shared and there is also a safeguard to 
ensure that the information shall not be used for any other purpose. In addition, the 
country whose competition authority possesses the information which is crucial to the 
development of a case against an international cartel by another jurisdiction may also 
be persuaded to share provided they are convinced that there are mutual benefits to 
doing so or if some trade-offs are made with trade interests.  
 
The fact that there is yet to be a “one-stop” solution in terms of leniency applications by 
cartel members whose anti-competitive activities span several jurisdictions is also an 
obstacle to information sharing and detection of international cartels. This is indeed not 
an issue which could be easily solved. It would be unfair to tell other countries which 
have suffered the impact of the anti-competitive activities of the international cartel in 
                                            
186
 Evenett, S.J. et al, ‘International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990’s’, The World Economy 
Vol.24 Issue 9 (2001) 1221-1245 
187
 See: Article XI.4 Canada-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement 
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question to just be content with the enforcement action undertaken by the authorities of 
another country. So long as enforcement action is not undertaken in all the jurisdictions 
involved, there is a possibility that the cartel may still continue their infringements in the 
jurisdiction where they are yet to face the consequences of their actions. Furthermore, 
ideally, the quantum of fines imposed would have to also account for the adverse effect 
on all the jurisdictions involved but in reality this is not so. Thus, it is proposed that the 
regional TA signatories should address this significant gap in international cartel 
enforcement through a modality of consultation and coordination which is akin to a “one 
stop” solution in handling leniency applications and facilitating sharing of relevant 
information between the competition authorities involved. A good example would be the 
ECN Model Leniency Programme (the ECN Model)188 implemented in the EU. The ECN 
Model is labelled as a “soft harmonisation” of different leniency procedures implemented 
in the respective jurisdiction of EU member states189. “Soft harmonisation” in the ECN 
Model involves triggering harmonisation of existing leniency programmes and facilitate 
the adoption of leniency programme by the few member states which are yet to adopt 
one190.  Even if such “soft harmonisation” is not required under or is absent from the 
terms of the regional TAs in question, the common elements between the leniency 
programmes implemented in the respective jurisdictions of the regional TAs’ signatories 
could be derived with earnest negotiations and consultations by endeavouring to 
address the glaring disparities first. Glaring disparities include the lack of leniency 
                                            
188
 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/mlp_revised_2012_en.pdf  
189
 See the ECN Model Leniency Programme Explanatory Notes, para. 7 
190
 Ibid 
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programme in one or some of the signatories’ competition regime or the difference in 
the standard of evidence required to apply for leniency. This proposal does sound like a 
big ask to all those concerned but if the regional TA signatories are seriously committed 
about curbing international cartel activities, then the effort has to be made. 
 
The differences between the enforcement capacity and legal standards in competition 
law between the regional TA signatories also call for the element of comity to be 
included in the competition related provisions of regional TAs. Comity enables the 
regional TA partners to assist each other in terms of enforcement action without 
undermining their sovereignty. Again in this regard it is proposed for such differences to 
be solved through coordination and cooperation191. For example, perhaps the 
appropriate domestic authority should be allowed to investigate the case however, the 
results of the investigation are later transferred to the most appropriate enforcer192. In 
such an instance, the competition authorities of the countries involved would have to 
discuss and map out each other’s strengths and weaknesses before deciding on which 
authority would be best to undertake which aspect in order to ensure successful 
investigation and prosecution of international cartels cases. Hence, comity should be 
included in order to affirm all the signatories that the sovereignty of all regional TA 
partners are respected and due consideration will be accorded to each other’s interests 
in the enforcement of the international cartels between the jurisdictions. 
                                            
191
 See: Drexl’s argument in regard to Podszun’s suggestion on procedural law on international cartel 
competition in Drexl, J., ‘International Competition Policy After Cancun : Placing a Singapore Issue on the 
WTO Development Agenda’, World Competition Journal 27(3): 419-457 (2001), pp. 453 
192
 Ibid 
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The next category is addressing the interaction between trade and competition. In order 
to address such issues such as those brought about by export cartels, trade related 
measures ought to also be included as a possible remedy for international cartel 
infringements with trade dimensions. However, the invocation of trade measures such 
as anti-dumping, countervailing duties and safeguards would have to be coupled with 
consultations between the competition authorities of the relevant regional TA 
signatories. This is to ensure that the trade measures are not abused to safeguard anti-
competitive cartel arrangements. However, it is foreseeable that most developing 
countries would be reluctant to couple such significant trade measures with competition 
remedies due to the interests of their own export cartels. Nevertheless, the premise of 
the discussion in this chapter is encouraging the utilisation of regional TAs in 
international cartel enforcement and in order to facilitate an effective cooperation in 
international cartel enforcement, this element is recommended. Failure to include it in 
the competition related provisions of regional TAs will not facilitate the narrowing of the 
gaps in international cartel enforcement. 
 
Another element is the inclusion of anti-competitive mergers under the purview of the 
regional TA. The caveat here is this is only possible if mergers are included in the 
competition laws of all the regional TA signatories. If merger control with competition 
dimensions is included in the laws of all the regional TA signatories, then such provision 
should be included. This is because deterrence of international cartels requires a 
comprehensive approach in order to deter anti-competitive merger of international 
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cartels which may result in abuse of dominance if allowed193. Again, in this instance, 
information sharing between all the authorities involved is the key.  
 
The next category is clarity which calls for a clear provision on the modality for disputes 
settlement. In regional TAs currently enforced and notified to the WTO, disputes under 
the competition chapter in the regional TA are either subject to the general disputes 
settlement mechanism of the regional TA; or expressly excluded altogether from the 
general regional TA dispute settlement mechanism or; a specific dispute settlement 
mechanism may be provided under the competition chapter. A clear provision of dispute 
settlement mechanism for competition related provisions under regional TAs signifies 
commitment to cooperation in cross border competition enforcement by the signatory 
countries because it provides clarity and certainty as to the resolution of any disputes 
between the signatories in regard to the implementation of the competition related 
provisions under the accord. Indeed the strongest form of commitment would be for the 
dispute settlement of matters under the competition chapter to be subject to the dispute 
settlement mechanism of the regional TA; however, it may not be preferred by many 
countries regardless of their development status194. Therefore, the second best 
alternative recommended is subjecting disputes of matters arising out of the competition 
chapter to the disputes settlement modality prescribed by the respective competition 
                                            
193
 See: Evenett, S.J. et al, ‘International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990’s’, The World 
Economy Vol.24 Issue 9 (2001) 1221-1245, pp.1221-1222. 
194
 For example, the US stance in regard to inclusion of a competition chapter under regional TAs is that it 
does not oppose to the inclusion so long as the chapter remains non-binding and the regional TA partners 
deem the inclusion of competition chapter is important. See Sokol, D.D., ‘Order Without (Enforceable) 
Law: Why Countries Enter Into Non-Enforceable Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements’, 
Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol. 83 (2008) 101-163, p.129 
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agencies under implementing agreement in order to ensure that disputes are settled 
based on their competitive effects rather than the basis of discriminatory legislation 
alone195.  The prescribed modality may also be in the form of consultations and 
negotiations stipulated in a best endeavour language rather than say disputes resolution 
via a tribunal. Such low level commitment allows more freedom and discretion for the 
competition agencies to develop norms and through best practices guided by 
organisations such as UNCTAD, ICN and OECD196. Nevertheless, the downside is that 
such forms of soft law obligations are non-binding. 
 
The strengths and limitations of all regional TAs signatories have to be recognised in 
order to enable international cartel enforcement cooperation under regional TAs. For 
example, in consideration of the developing countries’ development needs and 
limitations, competition related provisions in regional TAs ought to allow flexibilities to be 
accorded to developing countries. This is to encourage more developing countries to 
agree to the inclusion of a competition chapter under preferential TAs with developed 
countries particularly, flexibilities such as exemptions and special and differential 
treatment should be included in the competition related provisions on a non-reciprocal 
basis. However, such flexibilities need not be granted automatically to developing 
countries for it would depend on the level of development and needs of the country. 
                                            
195
 These are the distinct concerns between trade and competition. See Sokol, D.D., ‘Order Without 
(Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter Into Non-Enforceable Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade 
Agreements’, Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol. 83 (2008) 101-163, p.135 
196
 Sokol, D.D., ‘Order Without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter Into Non-Enforceable 
Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements’, Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol. 83 (2008) 101-
163, p.137-139 
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Upper middle income developing countries such as Mexico and Chile may not require 
as much flexibilities as lower middle income developing countries such as Kenya or 
Egypt. The flexibilities also should not be accorded in perpetuity and subject to 
periodical review in order to phase them out over time.  Perhaps during the period when 
such flexibilities are in place, developed and developing countries regional TAs 
signatories should focus on activities such as technical assistance and capacity 
building.  
 
Apart from the aforementioned prerequisites, structure and elements to be included, it is 
also pertinent to note that links with existing networks in international competition such 
as OECD, ICN, UNCTAD, World Bank and the WTO are also necessary and useful. 
The guidelines, recommendations and works which have been conducted under the 
said organisations are good reference points in international cartel enforcement197. 
Thus, in the implementation of competition related provisions in regional TAs, these 
organisations may be consulted by the signatories particularly in matters of best 
practices, clarification and disputes settlement.    
 
 
 
 
                                            
197
 These include : OECD’s Best Practices for the Formal Exchange of Information Between Competition 
Authorities in Hard Core Cartels Investigations (2005); ICN’s Report on Cooperation Between 
Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations (2007) 
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2.6. CONCLUSION 
 
Perhaps some groups in the global competition fraternity are not very keen on the idea 
of pursuing a solution for international competition enforcement under trade foras or via 
trade instruments. Whilst such concerns are appreciated, the competition fraternity have 
to acknowledge that first, issues in international cartel enforcement are yet to be 
effectively resolved. Second, bilateral cooperation between competition authorities 
could not be initiated as fast as the rate of regional TAs being entered into by countries. 
Therefore, there is no harm in “piggy-backing” the competition agenda onto trade 
frameworks such as regional TAs. Third, although initiatives and works on international 
cartels enforcement under ICN and also OECD are pertinent to the development of an 
effective international cartels framework on competition, they are not legally binding and 
are mere recommendations.   
 
The factors which have adversely affected the utilisation of competition related 
provisions in regional TAs by signatory countries in international cartel enforcement are: 
lack of incentives for countries to invoke cross border competition enforcement by virtue 
of regional TAs; lack of sufficient legal commitments in cooperation; developing 
countries do not view international cartel enforcement as a priority; and inconsistencies 
in cross border competition enforcement. This work finds that, regional TAs is a viable 
option as an instrument in international cartels enforcement between middle income 
developing countries and developed countries provided that all the regional TA 
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signatories have a credible competition enforcement regime in place, there are close 
trade relations between the signatories, the governments are committed to curb anti-
competitive international cartel activities and the cooperation modality set in place under 
the regional TAs accounts for the limitations of all the signatories involved. A suitable 
modality for cooperation is one which allow for the details of the implementation of 
cooperation to be determined in detail by the respective competition authorities and also 
includes the proposed minimum elements which are deemed necessary to encourage 
and enable cooperation in international cartel enforcement under regional TAs.  
 
In connection to the elements recommended to be included in regional TAs, what needs 
to be highlighted is that despite the fact that current works have argued that letters of 
the law such as the limitations imposed on information sharing are the biggest stumbling 
block in cross border cooperation in competition law enforcement, what has been 
observed is that the main obstacle in pursuing international cartel enforcement under 
regional TAs provisions is the regional TA signatories themselves. At the end of the day, 
if the countries are serious about addressing anti-competitive international cartel 
activities in their regional jurisdictions, they have to show their commitments. Letters of 
the law such as competition related provisions in regional TAs can be changed. 
However, if there are so many reservations from the regional TA signatories, then it just 
will not work.  
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The solution to implement international enforcement under competition related 
provisions in regional TAs is neither an idealistic one nor is it without limitations. 
However, it is one of the possible ways forward in achieving better clarity and 
coherence in the international cartels enforcement framework. Governments and the 
international competition fraternity in particular should be open to suggestions in relation 
to international cartels enforcement even when it involves utilising available trade 
frameworks as a facilitating measure and links with existing supranational organisation 
on competition such as ICN, UNCTAD and the OECD are recommended. 
 
Data and information on the implementation of cross border competition enforcement 
under regional TAs, both anecdotal and empirical are still lacking. Therefore there is 
plenty of room for future research on the subject matter such as on jurisdictional issues 
in its implementation, for example in cases where more than one regional TA apply in a 
particular international cartel case. A possible answer may be dependent on having to 
do some sort of analysis on which regional TA would involve cheaper costs, less 
cumbersome procedures and higher probability of successfully uncovering and 
prosecuting the cartel. Such a question is indeed pertinent and warrants research in the 
future.  
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CHAPTER 3: 
LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN 
APPROPRIATE CARTEL ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN MALAYSIA 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 2 explains how regional TAs could be a viable instrument to strengthen 
international cartel enforcement. The discussion in Chapter 2 argues that one of the 
main pre-requisites to enable cross border competition enforcement by virtue of regional 
TAs is that the all the signatories must have a legislative instrument which illegalise or 
deters cartels. Additionally, the incentive to include competition under the scope of 
regional TAs and utilisation of competition related provisions in international cartel 
enforcement requires the existence of a credible cartel enforcement regime in the 
jurisdictions of the signatories.  Credible cartel enforcement regimes require the 
adoption of a suitable competition law to be complemented by an appropriate cartel 
enforcement policy in order to affect effective cartel enforcement. Thus, now the 
discussion of this thesis moves to the challenges Malaysia faces domestically in 
developing an effective enforcement regime and the elements which should be included 
in an appropriate cartel enforcement policy for Malaysia. As explained earlier in Chapter 
1 of this thesis, Malaysia is chosen because of its middle income developing country 
status and also the significant role of international trade in its economy. 
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Cartels are illicit in nature and thus, are not easily detected without adequate resources, 
knowledge and experience on the part of competition law enforcers. It is therefore of no 
surprise that young competition jurisdictions of developing countries perceive cartel 
enforcement as difficult and somewhat daunting. Infact, some jurisdictions like South 
Africa choose to focus on mergers and acquisitions in the first five years of their 
competition law enforcement whereby few cartels were investigated and prosecuted 
under the Competition Act 1998, South Africa throughout the said period because of 
such perception198.  In addition, competition authorities in developing countries have to 
also contend with clashes with developmental concerns and lack of competition culture 
in their jurisdiction199. Malaysia, as a developing country with a young competition 
jurisdiction also faces these challenges in dealing with cartel enforcement. Thus, it is 
pertinent for Malaysia to identify a suitable cartel enforcement policy which would not 
only facilitate the competition agenda but also prevent disjunctions with other non-
competition policies and considerations which are pertinent to the country’s 
development. This is so that Malaysia is not stuck in the doldrums of “nascent stage of 
competition law enforcement” for an unnecessarily long time due to implementation 
issues.  
 
                                            
198
 See  Lavoie, C., ‘South Africa’s Corporate Leniency Policy: A Five Year Review’, World Competition 
Vol. 33(1) (2010), 141-162, pp.142-143 
199
  International Competition Network (ICN), ‘Lessons to be Learnt From the Experiences of Young 
Competition Agencies’, Competition Policy Implementation Working Group Report (Subgroup 2),  ICN, 
Cape Town, South Africa (May 2006) at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/library.aspx?search=&group=13&type=0&workshop=0  
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So, the question now is “how to determine an appropriate cartel enforcement policy for 
Malaysia?” In order to determine the answer, this work argues that it should be tailor 
made to Malaysia’s competition agenda; socio-economic ideology; and development 
needs whilst referring to a suitable competition law jurisdiction for insights. In this 
regard, Malaysia’s competition agenda is determined based on its competition concerns 
and competition law objectives; whilst Malaysia socio-economic ideology is very much 
based on fair economic wealth distribution between all the different groups in society. 
Malaysia’s development needs is not just based on material standard of living, namely 
to achieve high income economy status by the year 2020 but also  in terms of access to 
better quality of life and availability of options to its citizens200. Hence, as a trading 
nation, Malaysia’s development needs are very much dependent on trade and industry. 
Therefore, this work argues that South Africa is a suitable competition jurisdiction for 
Malaysia to refer to for insights because of: similarity in terms of development level and 
socio-economic issues; success in cartel enforcement201; and the inclusion of the public 
interest element in its competition jurisprudence which is sympathetic to inclusive 
development202.  
                                            
200
 See Malaysia’s New Economic Policy and also the development concept based on Sen’s argument in 
Todaro, M.P. and Smith, S.C., Economic Development, Tenth Edition (2009), Pearson Education, pp.16-
19. 
201
 South Africa is among the newer competition jurisdictions outside the E.U., U.S.A and Canada which 
have marked increased rates of cartel detection over the last ten years. See Connor, J.M., ‘Cartel 
Detection and Duration Worldwide’, Competition Policy International Antitrust Chronicle, (September 
2011) (2) 
202
 See: Fox, E.M., ‘In Search of a Competition Law Fit for Developing Countries’, New York University 
Law and Economics Research Paper No.11-04 (2011), p.11 at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1761619  
or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1761619; Hodge, J. et al, ‘Public Interest Provisions in the South African 
Competition Act: A Critical Review’, in Moodaliyar, K. And Roberts, S. (eds), The Development of 
Competition Law and Economics in South Africa, Human Sciences Research Council South Africa 
(2012), pp.2-15 
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The next research question is “what are the general principles in developing an 
appropriate cartel enforcement policy for Malaysia?” This work argues that Malaysia 
should aim for effective cartel enforcement. Therefore, the chapter identifies what ought 
to be effective cartel enforcement in the Malaysian context. The general principles for 
developing an appropriate cartel enforcement in Malaysia are identified by discussing 
the limitations faced or are would likely be based by the MyCC in cartel enforcement. 
This discussion is interwoven with insights from the South African competition law 
enforcement experience.  This work argues that the general principles for developing an 
appropriate cartel enforcement policy for Malaysia should account for the limitations of 
the competition authorities and the country’s developmental concerns without 
compromising competition. The last research question addressed in this chapter is 
“what are the lessons to be learned from South Africa in regard to cartel enforcement?” 
What effective cartel enforcement in the Malaysian context should refer to ; the general 
principles for developing an appropriate cartel enforcement policy for Malaysia; and the 
lessons to be learned from South Africa would be relevant to the formulation of 
Malaysia’s cartel enforcement policy which is discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
 
The research method adopted in this discussion is not only based on the relevant 
literature but also reference to the South African experience in competition law 
enforcement. References are also made to the competition legislation of South Africa 
and Malaysia. Publications of the South African competition authorities and also those 
of supranational bodies such as ICN, OECD and UNCTAD are also referred to. The 
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findings in this chapter are relevant to the formulation of an appropriate cartel 
enforcement policy for Malaysia. 
 
The motivation for this work is not only because of Malaysia’s lack of an official policy 
on cartel enforcement since it is still early days for competition law enforcement; but 
also because of the fact that public interest is significantly featured in the South African 
Competition Act 1998204 and the argument by Fox regarding South African competition 
jurisprudence which the author finds interesting and feels that the idea should be 
assessed by determining whether there are any useful insights which may be gained by 
Malaysia from the South African competition law enforcement experience. According to 
Fox, the South African competition jurisprudence reflects the challenges in integrating 
feasible enforcement in light of “... scarce resources of the authority, well-endowed 
adversaries, and historically privileged dominant firms, with the need to formulate and 
apply sound principles that promote competition and do not handicap efficiency”205. 
Hence, the South African jurisprudence is useful reference for countries concerned with 
inclusive development206.  As such, this work is a novelty because there is yet to be any 
study conducted on effective cartel enforcement in Malaysia and the insights which may 
be gained by Malaysia from South Africa; albeit theoretically due to the early days of 
competition law enforcement in Malaysia. Most of the works on cartel enforcement in 
                                            
204
 Public interest is stated in the preamble and purpose of the Competition Act 1998, South Africa and 
stipulated as a consideration in the assessment of exemptions and mergers of the same. 
205
 Fox, E.M., ‘In Search of a Competition Law Fit for Developing Countries’, New York University Law 
and Economics Research Paper No.11-04 (2011), p.11 at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1761619 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1761619  
206
 Ibid  
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young competition jurisdictions are included under the more general discussion on 
competition law enforcement and leading works on effectiveness are usually from the 
economic207 or policy perspectives208. Although the findings of this work are specifically 
catered for Malaysia, it is hoped that it could also be useful reference for other middle 
income developing countries with young competition jurisdictions and contribute to the 
enhancement of the scholarship on development of developing countries’ competition 
law jurisprudence. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Part 2 explains why South Africa 
has been chosen as a reference to Malaysia. Part 3 discusses effective cartel 
enforcement in the Malaysian context. The general principles of developing an 
appropriate cartel enforcement policy are discussed and identified in Part 4. Part 5 
discusses the lessons to be learned from the South African competition law 
enforcement experience before the discussion concludes.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
207
 Such as Schinkel, M.P., ‘Effective Cartel Enforcement in Europe’, World Competition: Law and 
Economics Review Vol.30 (2007) 539-572 
208
 Such as United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), ‘Foundations of an 
Effective Competition Agency – Note by the UNCTAD Secretariat’, Intergovernmental Group of Experts 
on Competition Law and Policy, Eleventh Session, Geneva, UNCTAD (19-21 July 2011) at 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ciclpd8_en.pdf  
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3.2. DETERMINING AN APPROPRIATE CARTEL ENFORCEMENT POLICY FOR 
MALAYSIA -  WHY SOUTH AFRICA? 
 
The laws of each country have to be tailor made to their own prevailing socio-economic 
ideology and development needs, among others209. Therefore, it is not wise to simply 
copy and adopt the legal provisions of foreign jurisdictions without any prior assessment 
of their suitability for the country or without adaptations made. The same argument 
would also apply to formulation and adoption of policies because policies complement 
legislation in the implementation of the law. In determining an appropriate cartel 
enforcement policy for Malaysia, the country needs to formulate its own policy based on 
what is relevant to the country in achieving the objectives of competition law without 
compromising its development objectives and ensuring that the policy is workable in the 
Malaysian environment and acceptable by society210. In this regard, Malaysia ought to 
also refer to the experience of other competition jurisdictions. However, the international 
standards in competition law are predominantly influenced by those of the US and EU 
which may not fit the developmental needs and limitations of developing countries 
without adaptation211.  
                                            
209
 See: Gal, M. S., ‘The 'Cut and Paste' of Article 82 of the EC Treaty in Israel: Conditions for a 
Successful Transplant’, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 08-03 (2008) at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1082035  
210
 See: Gal, M. S., ‘The 'Cut and Paste' of Article 82 of the EC Treaty in Israel: Conditions for a 
Successful Transplant’, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 08-03 (2008) at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1082035; Fox, E.M., ‘In Search of a Competition Law Fit for Developing 
Countries’, New York University Law and Economics Research Paper No.11-04 (2011), p.8  at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1761619 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1761619  
211
 Fox, E.M., ‘In Search of a Competition Law Fit for Developing Countries’, New York University Law 
and Economics Research Paper No.11-04 (2011), p.8  at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1761619 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1761619  
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In determining a suitable competition jurisdiction for Malaysia to refer to for insights on 
cartel enforcement, this work argues that  the jurisdiction : should be an upper middle 
income developing economy just like Malaysia; is actively implementing its competition 
law and have achieved acknowledged achievements in cartel enforcement; and lastly, 
possesses features which are sympathetic to inclusive development. In this regard, 
South Africa is deemed as a suitable competition jurisdiction for Malaysia to refer to. 
This is because it is an upper middle income developing country like Malaysia; it has 
achieved acknowledged achievements in cartel enforcement; it shares similar socio-
economic challenges and concerns as Malaysia; and arguably it is the only competition 
jurisdiction in the world where inclusive development is prominently featured in its 
jurisprudence.  
 
It is relevant for Malaysia to refer to the experiences of South Africa, a fellow upper 
middle income developing country212 to see what are the enforcement tools and 
strategies which have worked in South Africa within the limits of resources and 
expertise available in a country at the upper middle income level. The South African 
cartel enforcement regime has managed to account for the limited resources of the 
competition agencies by being innovative and resorting to basic techniques in cartel 
investigation213. Whilst advocacy has been strategically implemented in garnering public 
                                            
212
 See: the World Bank Classification as of July 2012 at http://muse.jhu.edu/about/order/wdi2012.pdf 
213
 See: Roberts, S., ‘Screening for Cartels – Insights from the South African Experience’, From Collusion 
to Competition, Competition Policy International, Monthly Cartel Column, 2
nd
 Issue (2012) at  
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/second-issue-from-collusion-to-
competition?utm_source=CPI+Subscribers&utm_campaign=b89330024c-
Thursday_September_27_2012&utm_medium=email 
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support and demand for cartel enforcement; which in turn, facilitates cartel enforcement 
against well endowed and historically privileged dominant firms214.  
 
Additionally, South Africa is an upper middle income developing country where the 
majority of its population is black but the economy is largely dominated by whites. The 
marginalisation of its non-white population from the colonisation era was exacerbated 
by the infamous racial segregation policy, apartheid. The end of apartheid in the early 
1990’s resulted in legislative reforms which included the adoption of the Competition Act 
1998 and also implementation of the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) Policy. 
Malaysia too is a middle income developing country216 where the natives of the land, 
and also the majority group (largely the Malays) in society were also economically 
marginalised by British colonial policies217 and which still continues to this day whereby 
the country’s economy is largely controlled by the Chinese whilst political power is 
controlled by bumiputeras. Hence, the Malaysia’s development policies since the 1970’s 
aim for fairer distribution of economic wealth between the different races in society and 
the policies have been implemented against the backdrop of the Federal Constitution 
which provides for special position of the bumiputeras particularly in terms of 
reservation of quotas in respect of federal public service; permits; scholarship; 
                                            
214
 Stricter cartel enforcement such as criminalisation of cartels was implemented as a result of public 
support and demand for stricter enforcement. See Lavoie, C., ‘South Africa’s Corporate Leniency Policy: 
A Five Year Review’, World Competition Vol. 33(1) (2010), 141-162, p.159    
216
 See: the World Bank Classification as of July 2012 at http://muse.jhu.edu/about/order/wdi2012.pdf 
217
 See: discussion in Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
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educational or training privileges or special facilities accorded by the Federal 
Government and business and trade permit or license218. 
 
t is also warranted for Malaysia to refer to South Africa’s cartel enforcement experience 
because of its achievements. South Africa is among the newer competition jurisdictions 
outside of the leading competition jurisdictions which have achieved significant increase 
in the rate of cartel detection over the last ten years219. Its efforts in cartel enforcement 
have made a significant positive impact on the level of competition in South Africa. From 
1999 till March 2009 the number of complaints, consent orders and settlements under 
Sections 4 (1) (a) and 4 (1) (b) referred to the Competition Tribunal markedly increased 
from only 1 in 1999/2000 to 18 in 2008/2009220. In addition, substantial increase in 
administrative penalties imposed by the Competition Tribunal has been largely due to 
the uncovering of hard core cartels such as the 250 Million Rand fine imposed on Sasol 
Chemical Industries221. The South African Competition Commission has managed to 
increase “ ... competition in various industries and improved consumer access to 
product choice at competitive prices”222 despite being that of a developing country and 
the fact that competition law has only been actively implemented in South Africa from 
                                            
218
 See Artcle 153, Federal Constitution Malaysia. Also see discussion in Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
219
 South Africa is among the newer competition jurisdictions outside the E.U., U.S.A and Canada which 
have marked increased rates of cartel detection over the last ten years. See Connor, J.M., ‘Cartel 
Detection and Duration Worldwide’, Competition Policy International Antitrust Chronicle, (September 
2011) (2) 
220
 Ten Years of Enforcement by the South African Competition Authorities – Unleashing Rivalries 1999-
2009, Competition Commission, Competition Tribunal, South Africa (2009), Figure 6, p.41 at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/10-year-review accessed on 20/10/2011 
221
 Ibid, Table 5, p.42  
222
 Lavoie, C., ‘South Africa’s Corporate Leniency Policy: A Five Year Review’, World Competition Vol. 
33(1) (2010), 141-162, p.141   
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1999.  Additionally, South Africa’s progress in implementing its competition law have 
been recognised by the global competition fraternity via the good reviews it received 
from the OECD (2003), World Bank (2005) and Global Competition Review (2008)223.  
 
In terms of level of development and achievements in cartel enforcement, it may be 
argued that South Africa is not that different from other competition jurisdictions in 
developing countries such as Chile and Mexico which are actively enforcing their 
competition law. However, the elements which distinguish South Africa from the others 
as a suitable reference for Malaysia are the emphasis on similar socio-economic issues 
in terms of distribution of wealth between different groups in society and the fact that 
public interest has been expressly provided for in the Competition Act 1998, South  
Africa. Public interest is expressly provided for in the preamble and purpose of the 
Competition Act 1998224 and also extended in the assessment of exemptions and 
                                            
223
 See: Ten Years of Enforcement by the South African Competition Authorities – Unleashing Rivalries 
1999-2009, Competition Commission, Competition Tribunal, South Africa (2009), p.3 at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/10-year-review accessed on 20/10/2011 
224
 PREAMBLE -  
The people of South Africa recognise: 
That apartheid and other discriminatory laws and practices of the past resulted in excessive 
concentrations of ownership and control within the national economy, inadequate restraints against anti-
competitive trade practices, and unjust restrictions on full and free participation in the economy by all 
South Africans. 
 
That the economy must be open to greater ownership by a greater number of South Africans. 
That credible competition law, and effective structures to administer that law, are necessary for an 
efficient functioning economy. 
That an efficient, competitive economic environment, balancing the interests of workers, owners and 
consumers and focused on development, will benefit all South Africans.  
 
IN ORDER TO – 
 
provide all South Africans equal opportunity to participate fairly in the national economy; 
achieve a more effective and efficient economy in South Africa; 
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mergers under the Competition Act 1998225. Therefore, the law requires consideration of 
public interest which go beyond competition boundaries For example, exemption may 
be granted to agreements which contribute to “... promotion of the ability of small 
businesses, or firms controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons, to 
become competitive”226. Public interest in the South African competition law context 
refers to non-competition considerations which are economic in nature such as trade 
and industry interests and non-economic in nature such as equity and fairness227. Public 
interest has largely been considered in merger cases228. In the assessment of cases 
under the Competition Act 1998, South Africa, public interest is to be assessed with 
other competition considerations and it has to be substantive229. Although the Malaysian 
competition law has not been as expressive in providing for such non-competition 
considerations under the Competition Act  2010, non-competition considerations such 
                                                                                                                                            
provide for markets in which consumers have access to, and can freely select, the quality and variety of 
goods and services they desire; 
create greater capability and an environment for South Africans to compete effectively in international 
markets; 
restrain particular trade practices which undermine a competitive economy; 
regulate the transfer of economic ownership in keeping with the public interest; 
establish independent institutions to monitor economic competition; and 
give effect to the international law obligations of the Republic. 
225
 Hodge, J. et al, ‘Public Interest Provisions in The South African Competition Act- A Critical Review’, 
Competition Policy, Law and Economics Conference (2009), p.3   
226
 Section 10 (3) (b) (ii) Competition Act 1998, South Africa. 
227
 Hodge, J. et al, ‘Public Interest Provisions in the South African Competition Act: A Critical Review’, in 
Moodaliyar, K. And Roberts, S. (Eds), The Development of Competition Law and Economics in South 
Africa, Human Sciences Research Council South Africa (2012), p.4 
228
 See: Hodge, J. et al, ‘Public Interest Provisions in The South African Competition Act- A Critical 
Review’, Competition Policy, Law and Economics Conference (2009); Boshoff, W. et al, ‘The Economics 
Of Public Interest Provisions In South African Competition Policy’, Sixth Annual Competition Law, 
Economics and Policy Conference, South  Africa (2012) at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/events/SIxth-Annual-Competition-Law-Economics-and-Policy-
Conference-in-South-Africa-2012/NewFolder-3/The-economics-of-public-interest-provisions-in-South-
African-competition-policy.pdf  
229
 The Competition Act 1998, South Africa however does not clarify what is “substantive”. See Hodge, J. 
et al, ‘Public Interest Provisions in The South African Competition Act- A Critical Review’, Competition 
Policy, Law and Economics Conference (2009), p.8 
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as “significant identifiable technological, efficiency and social benefits” are justifications 
for application for exemptions under Section 5, Competition Act 2010. So long as the 
detrimental effect of the agreement on competition is proportionate to its benefits.   
Hence, in the assessment of exemptions under the Competition Act 2010, the MyCC 
has to account for non-competition considerations with significant identifiable 
technological, efficiency and social benefits which may include trade and industrial 
policies and socio-economic considerations such as bumiputera rights, which is a socio-
economic ideology that is entrenched in the Federal Constitution, the supreme law of 
the land230.   
 
Public interest or non-competition considerations have to be accounted for in the 
implementation of competition law particularly in developing countries with new 
competition jurisdictions. This is to accommodate economic development231 and also to 
prevent disjunctions between competition and other policies that are relevant to the 
country’s economic development232 and ingrained in the socio-economic ideology of the 
country.  Otherwise, it may compromise public support for effective competition law 
enforcement. Therefore, although public interest has largely been considered in merger 
cases in South Africa, it would be useful for Malaysia to refer to South African 
                                            
230
 See discussion in Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
231
 Sometimes, competition should be restricted to accommodate innovation and investment for the sake 
of development. See: Singh, A. and Dhumale, R., ‘Competition Policy, Development and Developing 
Countries’, South Centre Working Papers 7 (November 1999) available at 
http://southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=315%3Acompetition-policy-
development-and-developing-countries-&catid=56%3Aother-issues-related-to-trade-
negotiations&Itemid=67&lang=en; and discussion on the theory on the relationship between competition 
and innovation in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
232
 Lewis, D., ‘The Role of Public Interest in Merger Evaluation’, ICN, Merger Working Group, Naples (28-
29 September 2002) 
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competition jurisprudence to examine how public interest factors are balanced with 
competition considerations and the issues related to it. This in turn determines the 
lessons to be learned for cartel enforcement in Malaysia.   
 
The study of South African competition jurisprudence on public interest and inclusive 
development has also been recommended in available literature. Fox suggested six 
choices for possible competition law model for developing countries233. The idea for this 
discussion is partly based on Model 4 – a model which combines the laws of developing 
countries which have developed a compass and which prominently feature the South 
African competition jurisprudence, one of the most developed among developing 
countries234. The South African competition jurisprudence reflects the challenges in 
integrating feasible enforcement in light of “... scarce resources of the authority, well-
endowed adversaries, and historically privileged dominant firms, with the need to 
formulate and apply sound principles that promote competition and do not handicap 
efficiency”236. . These elements are indeed relevant to Malaysia in cartel enforcement in 
view of the limitations in resources faced particularly by the MyCC as a young 
competition authority238; the existence of well endowed firms where some enjoy the 
                                            
233
 Fox, E.M., ‘In Search of a Competition Law Fit for Developing Countries’, New York University Law 
and Economics Research Paper No.11-04 (2011) at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1761619 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1761619  
234
 Ibid, p.11 
236
 Ibid 
238
 As a new agency under the Ministry of Domestic Trade, Consumerism and Co-operatives which is 
dependent on government funding, the MyCC would need to prove their worth before additional funding 
could be channelled to it. 
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benefits of political patronage239; and the significance of inclusive development agenda 
in Malaysia’s development policies240.  
 
It ought to be noted that South Africa adopted the Competition Act 1998 as part of the 
country’s regulatory reform in order to address excessive concentration and control in 
the South African economy and the negative impact on development244 due to the 
inequality exacerbated and created under apartheid; and also to facilitate the opening 
up of its previously “closed” economy due to the embargo imposed by the international 
community. In contrast, Malaysia’s Competition Act 2010 was adopted with the aim to 
facilitate the country’s development via a more competitive and efficient market, in light 
of its target to be a high income country by 2020. In Malaysia’s case, its competition law 
is not part of a legislative reform but an instrument to facilitate development. This is 
because unlike the Competition Act 1998, South Africa, the Competition Act 2010 was 
adopted at a time when Malaysia’s economy and market were already relatively open 
by international standards245 and Malaysia’s economy is significantly reliant on 
international trade246. Perhaps this may be a back of the envelope way of justifying the 
                                            
239
 For a detailed discussion on the link between economy and politics and instances of political 
patronage in Malaysia, see: Gomez, E.T. and Jomo, K.S., Malaysia’s Political Economy: Politics, 
Patronage and Profit, Cambridge University Press (1999); Jomo, K.S., ‘Industrialisation and Industrial 
Policy in Malaysia’, in Jomo, K.S. (ed.), Malaysian Industrial Policy, National University of Singapore 
(NUS) Press Singapore (2007).  
240
 See discussion in Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
244
 See: Foreword from the Minister of Trade and Industry, Ten Years of Enforcement by the South 
African Competition Authorities – Unleashing Rivalries 1999-2009, Competition Commission, Competition 
Tribunal, South Africa (2009) at http://www.compcom.co.za/10-year-review accessed on 20/10/2011. 
245
 The World Bank, Malaysia Overview, at http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/malaysia/overview 
accessed on 8/4/2013  
246
 Yusoff, M.B., ‘Malaysia Bilateral Trade Relations and Economic Growth’, International Journal of 
Business and Society Vol. 6 No.2 (2005) 55-68; Minister of International Trade and Industry, Malaysia, 
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exclusion of merger control from the remit of the Malaysian competition law. That is, due 
to Malaysia’s open economy, the need for a structural remedy in addressing anti-
competitive conducts under the Competition Act 2010 is less “pressing” as compared to 
South Africa. However, it has to be highlighted that economic development is the aim of 
competition laws of both South Africa and Malaysia and that both countries adopted 
competition law based on internal reasons and not external pressures such as a 
condition for financial bailouts by the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank or 
a prerequisite to trade agreements247.  
  
Based on the above, it can be said that Malaysia and South Africa are at the same level 
of development and share some similarities in regard to development and socio-
economic concerns. Although the competition law of both countries are concerned with 
development, Malaysia’s competition law does not include structural remedies. 
Therefore, in addressing anti-competitive cartels, under the current competition law 
framework in Malaysia, cartel enforcement could not be complemented by merger 
control258.  The similarities shared with Malaysia, South Africa’s achievements and 
experiences in cartel enforcement as explained above; and also the fact that the South 
African competition jurisprudence is sympathetic to inclusive development, justify 
                                                                                                                                            
‘Malaysia’s Trading Nation Status Remains. Net Trade Influences Cyclical Economic Development and 
Long Term Growth Potential’, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Malaysia (MITI) (May 2012), 
MITI’s website at http://www.miti.gov.my/cms/content.jsp?id=com.tms.cms.article.Article_b1bdb34f-
c0a8156f-67ec67ec-23d4494c accessed on 11/1/ 2013 
247
 Marcos, F., ‘Do Developing Countries Need Competition Laws and Policy?’, (September 2006), p.3 at 
SSRN http://ssrn.com/abstract=930562 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.930562  
258
 See Chapter 5 of this thesis for further discussion. 
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Malaysia to refer to the South African competition law enforcement experience for 
insights in determining an appropriate cartel enforcement policy for Malaysia. 
 
3.3. EFFECTIVE CARTEL ENFORCEMENT IN THE MALAYSIAN CONTEXT 
 
Effective cartel enforcement is a ubiquitous term in competition literature; however it 
may be argued that it is not easy to define for it is rather subjective. This is because 
what may be effective for one country may not be so for another. Nevertheless there are 
elements which are universally applicable in assessing whether cartel enforcement has 
been effectively implemented. For example, independence of the competition authorities 
is universally applicable for without it, the credibility of the competition authorities could 
not be established. This section discusses effective cartel enforcement in the Malaysian 
context. 
 
Effectiveness in cartel enforcement should be assessed in a comprehensive manner. 
This is because effective cartel enforcement cannot be adequately assessed based on 
indicators such as the number of cases investigated or adjudicated or the amount of fine 
imposed because sometimes there are small and low profile cases which may be of 
significant impact to competition law development259. Furthermore, advocacy 
programmes may also contribute to the effectiveness competition agency by facilitating 
                                            
259
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), ‘Foundations of an Effective 
Competition Agency – Note by the UNCTAD Secretariat’, Intergovernmental Group of Experts on 
Competition Law and Policy, Eleventh Session, Geneva, UNCTAD (19-21 July 2011), pp.5-6 at 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ciclpd8_en.pdf 
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awareness260, which impact could not be reflected in terms of numbers but more 
appropriately, it may be reflected for instance, in the increase in the level of support for 
competition law enforcement. Additionally, in the case of cartel enforcement, it also has 
to be supported by market and economic statistics such as the price trends and level of 
market concentration in each industry or sector. This is because cartel prices are set 
above the competitive level in order to gain near monopoly profit. An analysis of the 
price level in the sector or industry pre and post cartel enforcement may be used as an 
indicator for effective cartel enforcement, as is the level of market concentration.  
 
Additionally, effective cartel enforcement ought to also account for appropriate use of 
resources. UNCTAD outlined in its report on ‘Foundations of an Effective Competition 
Agency’261 that effective enforcement means the competition agency or authority 
achieves its objectives through appropriate use of resources. This may be determined 
through evaluation and the preparation of annual reports and also peer reviews. 
Although the UNCTAD report concerns the overall effectiveness of a competition 
agency, proper utilisation of resources is still relevant in effective cartel enforcement, 
particularly in the context of developing countries where access and availability of 
resources is more limited as compared to developed countries. Why is proper 
                                            
260 Ibid, p.6 
261
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), ‘Foundations of an Effective 
Competition Agency – Note by the UNCTAD Secretariat’, Intergovernmental Group of Experts on 
Competition Law and Policy, Eleventh Session, Geneva, UNCTAD (19-21 July 2011) at 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ciclpd8_en.pdf  
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management of resources important to effective cartel enforcement in the context of 
developing countries? It is because cartel enforcement requires significant resources to 
be focused on it as it involves well endowed foes of competition authorities who would 
go to any lengths necessary to conceal their activities. Thus their discovery requires 
expertise, time and adequate number of people to focus on investigative works. Proper 
management of resources means the ability of the competition authority to function and 
produce results by utilising the limited available resources.  
 
Effective cartel enforcement arises when there is a credible threat of detection and 
imposition of heavy penalties – which in turn leads to uncovering of cartels and deters 
anti-competitive cartel arrangements. Due to the illicit nature of cartels, being effective 
requires focussing on weaknesses of cartels which would destabilise their illicit 
arrangements and take away their main incentive, which is anti-competitive profit.  The 
weaknesses of cartels relate to: coordination; monitoring and preventing new entrants 
into the market262.  Cartels are more likely to succeed in concentrated markets because 
it renders coordination between the cartel members easier. This does not mean that 
cartels cannot exist in unconcentrated markets but in such markets, there is more 
reliance on coordination in the guise of trade associations263. Cartels also need to be 
able to monitor their cartel members in order to deter cheating due to the incentive of 
increasing individual firm’s profit. Hence, cartels invests their resources in monitoring 
                                            
262
 Levenstein, M.C. and Suslow, V., ‘What Determines Cartel Success?’, Journal of Economic Literature 
Vol.44 (1) (March 2006) 43-95, p.44  
263
 Ibid 
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mechanisms such as joint sales agencies and information sharing or even more 
sophisticated mechanisms over time such as a hierarchical system in their decision 
making264. Additionally, cartels may also adopt punishment mechanisms to deter 
cheating such as via price wars. The potential for new entrants to enter the market 
increases over time as the incumbent firms are able to respond to high cartel prices265.  
Cartels that survive are those which are: able to adjust to changes in the market and 
overcome challenges pertaining to coordination; monitoring and market entry; and exist 
in markets with features that facilitate collusion266. Therefore, competition authorities 
should invest their resources on enforcement tools and mechanisms which operate by 
taking away the incentive for cartels to collude and creating incentives for cartel 
members to cheat on each other rather than just relying on purely investigative works in 
uncovering cartels.  
 
In the context of developing countries, there is also an extra dimension to be 
considered; - effective cartel enforcement need to also account for cartels with gains 
which trump their anti-competitive benefits. This is to ensure that effective cartel 
enforcement would not hamper or become an obstacle to development and accounts for 
significant elements in the prevailing socio-economic ideology of the country in order to 
                                            
264
 See Stigler, G., ‘A Theory of Oligopoly’, Journal of Political Economy 72 (1) (1964) 44-61; Levenstein, 
M.C. and Suslow, V., ‘What Determines Cartel Success?’, Journal of Economic Literature Vol.44 (1) 
(March 2006) 43-95; Griffin, J.M., ‘An Inside Look at a Cartel at Work: Common Characteristics of 
International Cartels’, Fighting Cartels- Why and How?, Swedish Competition Authority (2001) at 
http://www.kkv.se/upload/filer/eng/publications/3rdnordic010412.pdf#page=29 
265
 Levenstein, M.C. and Suslow, V., ‘What Determines Cartel Success?’, Journal of Economic Literature 
Vol.44 (1) (March 2006) 43-95, p.45 
266
 Ibid, p.57 
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facilitate acceptance of competition law. Without such flexibilities, it would be difficult to 
even implement competition law in the jurisdiction, let alone facilitating effective cartel 
enforcement. 
 
In view of the above, it may be summed that effective cartel enforcement in Malaysia is 
achieved when credible competition authorities and competent competition law 
enforcement are established. Credible means the existence of a competition 
enforcement regime which is able to function within its limited resources; independent; 
and accepted by society. Whilst competent competition law enforcement means the 
ability of the competition authorities to detect, investigate and prosecute cartels under 
the law which in turn creates credible risk of discovery and punishment to cartels 
without compromising development gains to the country.   
 
In the next section, the general principles of developing an appropriate cartel 
enforcement policy are discussed with insights from the South African competition law 
enforcement experience. The insights from South Africa illustrate how the jurisdiction 
has addressed the elements which have been deemed  by this discussion as relevant to 
effective cartel enforcement in the Malaysian context, throughout the years. 
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3.4. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DEVELOPING AN APPROPRIATE CARTEL 
ENFORCEMENT POLICY FOR MALAYSIA WITH INSIGHTS FROM SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
The aim of Malaysia’s cartel enforcement policy should be effective cartel enforcement 
as per the Malaysian context which is explained in the previous section. As such, under 
this section, the general principles of developing Malaysia’s cartel enforcement policy 
are determined through a discussion on the limitations faced or would be faced by the 
MyCC in cartel enforcement in achieving effective cartel enforcement as explained in 
the previous section.  The limitations are explained in terms of the challenges faced by 
the MyCC and interwoven with insights from the South African competition enforcement 
experience.  
 
A study conducted by the ICN in 2006 illustrates the challenges faced by young 
competition authorities in enforcing competition law in their respective jurisdictions267. 
The challenges identified include lack of competition culture, limited financial and 
human resources and inadequate legislative provisions. Malaysia, as a developing 
country with a young competition jurisdiction would also be facing challenges in 
enforcing its competition law, which includes cartel enforcement. Since competition law 
                                            
267
 International Competition Network (ICN), ‘Lessons to be Learnt From the Experiences of Young 
Competition Agencies’, Competition Policy Implementation Working Group Report (Subgroup 2),  ICN, 
Cape Town, South Africa (May 2006), p.38 at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/library.aspx?search=&group=13&type=0&workshop=0  
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will be gradually implemented in Malaysia268, some challenges are immediate whilst 
some are soon to come. The immediate challenges include lack of competition culture, 
limited financial and human resources and untrained judiciary. Whilst the ones which 
are soon to come are those which may arise as cartel enforcement in Malaysia 
progresses and these include inadequate legislative provisions and clashes between 
competition and developmental policies and political interference. 
 
Competition culture refers to an environment where there is awareness of the rules of 
competition law among the stakeholders such as the business community, 
governmental agencies, non-governmental agencies, the judiciary, the media and the 
general public and also of their responsibility to ensure that such rules are adhered to in 
the interest of competition and overall economic development269. There is a lack of 
awareness of the competition concept in Malaysia and ignorance breeds unwarranted 
fear and suspicion. The Malaysian business community and industries have been wary 
and suspicious of competition law because they view it as government interference in 
their freedom to do business270. This is hardly surprising because business communities 
in other countries such as South Africa shared a similar view when competition law was 
adopted by their countries due to their lack of awareness and understanding of 
                                            
268
 As outlined by the Minister of Domestic Trade, Co-operatives and Consumerism in his speech to the 
Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives), Malaysian Parliament on 20 April 2010, Hansard Report 
(Malay version), pp.151-152  
269
 International Competition Network (ICN), ‘Lessons to be Learnt From the Experiences of Young 
Competition Agencies’, Competition Policy Implementation Working Group Report (Subgroup 2),  ICN, 
Cape Town, South Africa (May 2006), p.38 at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/library.aspx?search=&group=13&type=0&workshop=0  
270
 This is based on feedback gathered from briefings to businesses and industries which the author 
participated in as an officer in the Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs (1997-2003). 
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competition law271. There was lack of competition culture in South Africa when the 
Competition Act 1998 was first implemented and this is hardly surprising considering the 
fact that the law was introduced as a regulatory reform to address the socio-economic 
imbalances created by policies of the past where the industries were highly 
concentrated and businesses were protected or owned by the state and some cartels 
were even sanctioned by the state under the apartheid era272.  
 
It is not only perceived government interference which may detrimentally affect their 
commercial freedom that businesses fear but also that cartel enforcement would 
detrimentally affect the economic rent which they have been enjoying from their 
profiteering prior to the introduction of competition law. The South African competition 
authorities were up against well-endowed and historically privileged firms273 who were 
resisting the new legislation which was threatening their business operation274 and 
without a doubt, also their enjoyment of economic rent. Businesses which have been 
enjoying economic rent before the introduction of competition law in the jurisdiction may 
likely form rent preserving alliances to influence the decision makers to ensure that their 
                                            
271
 International Competition Network (ICN), ‘Lessons to be Learnt From the Experiences of Young 
Competition Agencies’, Competition Policy Implementation Working Group Report (Subgroup 2),  ICN, 
Cape Town, South Africa (May 2006), pp.38-39 at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/library.aspx?search=&group=13&type=0&workshop=0  
272
 ‘Ten Years of Enforcement by the South African Competition Authorities – Unleashing Rivalries 1999-
2009’, Competition Commission, Competition Tribunal, South Africa (2009), p.1-2 at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/10-year-review accessed on 20/10/2011. 
273
 Fox, E.M., ‘In Search of a Competition Law Fit for Developing Countries’, New York University Law 
and Economics Research Paper No.11-04 (2011), p.11 at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1761619 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1761619 
274
 International Competition Network (ICN), ‘Lessons to be Learnt From the Experiences of Young 
Competition Agencies’, Competition Policy Implementation Working Group Report (Subgroup 2),  ICN, 
Cape Town, South Africa (May 2006), p.38 at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/library.aspx?search=&group=13&type=0&workshop=0 
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interests are not jeopardised by competition law enforcement275. An example of how 
such rent preserving alliance operates can be seen from the passing of the much 
watered down Hong Kong Competition Ordinance which was finally enacted on 14 June 
2012276. The MyCC too may face resistance from rent seeking alliance who may lobby 
against competition law enforcement and this may lead to political interference in cartel 
enforcement and decisions made not in the best interest of the public277. It is not 
uncommon for key players in the industry to have close relationships with decision 
makers such as government officials and political masters. This includes instances 
when firms are also owned by cronies and families of the decision makers278. 
Furthermore, some of the government policies which have been implemented since the 
1980’s such as “Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community (BCIC)” and 
“Malaysia Incorporated” and the more recently implemented “Malaysia 2020” have also 
created political patronage and closer relations between large corporate groups and 
political leaders279 and these may facilitate rent seeking activities280. 
                                            
275
 Chowdhury, M.,’The Political Economy of Law Reform in Developing Countries’,  Sixth ASCOLA 
Conference – New Competition Jurisdictions: Shaping Policies and Building Institutions (July 2011), 
King’s College London, p.2  
276
 Angela Wang & Co., Introducing the New Competition Law in Hong Kong, Global Legal Resources (12 
September 2012) at http://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=28210 
277
 See Stigler, G., The Theory of Economic Regulation (1971), Dahl, R.A. et al (eds.), ‘The Democracy 
Sourcebook’, MIT Press (2003), pp.393-397 at 
http://wxy.seu.edu.cn/humanities/sociology/htmledit/uploadfile/system/20110322/20110322171107276.pd
f#page=406 
278
 See: Fraser, D.R. et al, ‘Capital Structure and Political Patronage: The Case of Malaysia’, Journal of 
Banking and Finance 30 (2006) 1291-1308; Johnson, S. and Mitton, T., ‘Cronyism and Capital Controls: 
Evidence from Malaysia’, Working Paper 8521, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) (2001) at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8521  
279
 See: Jomo, K.S., ‘Industrialisation and Industrial Policy in Malaysia’, Malaysian Industrial Policy, NUS 
Press Singapore (2007), pp. 18-19; Fraser, D.R. et al, ‘Capital Structure and Political Patronage: The 
Case of Malaysia’, Journal of Banking and Finance 30 (2006) 1291-1308; Johnson, S. and Mitton, T., 
‘Cronyism and Capital Controls: Evidence from Malaysia’, Working Paper 8521, National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) (2001) at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8521  
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Thus, without instilling awareness among the business community, government officials, 
political masters and the public at large of the harms of anti-competitive cartel activities 
and the benefit which comes with effective enforcement, enforcement actions may not 
achieve the desired outcomes especially when they involve those which are dependent 
on insider information and industrial self reporting281 such as leniency and compliance 
programmes.  Lack of awareness and respect for competition law and its objectives also 
would not bring about the support and demand needed for cartel enforcement282. 
Without support for cartel enforcement, it may result in curtailment of competition 
agency powers, criticism of enforcement actions and budgetary restrictions283.  These in 
turn would adversely affect cartel enforcement. 
 
In this regard,   the South African Competition Commission focused on enhancing public 
awareness of the Competition Act 1998 and its implications in the first five (5) years of 
                                                                                                                                            
280
 For a discussion on how economic rent seeking activity is facilitated through political patronage in 
Malaysia, see Gomez, E.T. and Jomo, K.S., Malaysia’s Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profit, 
Cambridge University Press (1999) 
281
 Refer to the Tunisian Competition Authority  experience - see Competition Policy Implementation 
Working Group Report (Subgroup 2), ‘Lessons to be Learnt From the Experiences of Young Competition 
Agencies’, ICN, Cape Town, South Africa (May 2006), p.10 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/library.aspx?search=&group=13&type=0&workshop=0    
282
 For detailed discussion on generating demand for competition law enforcement see: Chowdhury, 
M.,’The Political Economy of Law Reform in Developing Countries’, Sixth ASCOLA Conference – New 
Competition Jurisdictions: Shaping Policies and Building Institutions (July 2011), King’s College London; 
and Gal, M.S., ‘The Ecology of Antitrust Pre-conditions for Competition Law Enforcement in Developing 
Countries’, in Competition, Competitiveness and Development: Lessons from Developing Countries, 
United Nations Publication (2004), UNCTAD/ DITC/CLP/2004/1 
283
  Chowdhury, M.,’The Political Economy of Law Reform in Developing Countries’,  Sixth ASCOLA 
Conference – New Competition Jurisdictions: Shaping Policies and Building Institutions (July 2011), 
King’s College London, p.13 
               YASMEEN YASIM  
PGR LAW 4363795 
UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA 
 
 
115 
 
competition law implementation in South Africa284. Public demand and support for cartel 
enforcement could be generated through the enhancement of public awareness of the 
adverse effect of anti-competitive cartel activities such as price fixing of essentials on 
consumers and the economy in general. Thus, competition advocacy and awareness 
programmes are useful in combating the lobbying efforts of rent seeking pressure 
groups against competition law and cartel enforcement285 by triggering a paradigm shift 
in the competition culture of the country. The South African Competition Commission 
has been implementing strategic competition advocacy by engaging in awareness 
programmes which explain the benefits of cartel enforcement such as dialogues and 
consultation with the business community, public and also the international competition 
fraternity in regard to cartel enforcement286. The South African Competition Commission 
is also provided with a mandate to advocate their views to other relevant regulatory and 
public agencies under the Competition Act 1998287. The Commission have also been 
savvy in using the media to highlight the uncovering of cartels especially in the 
prioritised sectors. This has resulted in increased public awareness on the harmful 
effect of cartel conducts on consumers and economic growth which manifested in 
                                            
284
 Minister of Trade and Industry, South Africa, Foreword, Annual Report 2003-2004, Competition 
Commission, South Africa, p.1 at http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Files/annual-report-2003-2004.pdf 
accessed on 20/10/2011 
285
 For the detailed discussion on the concept of demand and supply to explain the development stages of 
competition law in developing countries, see Chowdhury, M.,’The Political Economy of Law Reform in 
Developing Countries’,  Sixth ASCOLA Conference – New Competition Jurisdictions: Shaping Policies 
and Building Institutions (July 2011), King’s College London. 
286
 See: Ten Years of Enforcement by the South African Competition Authorities – Unleashing Rivalries 
1999-2009, Competition Commission, Competition Tribunal, South Africa (2009), pp.73-80  at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/10-year-review accessed on 20/10/2011 
287
 See: Section 82 Competition Act 1998, South Africa. 
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members of the public becoming informants for the Commission288; and public calls for 
sanctions to be imposed not just on firms but also individuals involved in cartel 
activities289. Criminal sanctions against cartel offences were introduced in South Africa 
with public support290. 
 
Limited resources, namely trained human resources and adequate fund; are also major 
obstacles faced by developing countries in cartel enforcement where public fund is 
small as compared to developed countries. As a young competition jurisdiction in a 
developing country, Malaysia too faces this challenge. In Malaysia at the moment, the 
MyCC receives funding from the government via the Ministry of Domestic Trade, Co-
operatives and Consumerism. Thus, any application for budget increase and 
expenditure is subject to the rules, regulations and procedures as set out by the Ministry 
of Finance and would have to be strongly justified by proving the MyCC’s competency in 
carrying out their functions thus far. Such justification would involve performance and 
impact measurements. If inadequate budget is allocated, then it will hamper cartel 
enforcement and adversely impact performance of the MyCC.  This is a pertinent point 
to be highlighted particularly in view of the fact that Section 16 (3) (b), Competition Act 
2010 provides that the MyCC has the discretion to close an investigation if in its opinion, 
continuing the investigation would not constitute the making the best use of the MyCC’s 
                                            
288
 See: Ten Years of Enforcement by the South African Competition Authorities – Unleashing Rivalries 
1999-2009, Competition Commission, Competition Tribunal, South Africa (2009), p.46  at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/10-year-review accessed on 20/10/2011 
289
 Lavoie, C., ‘South Africa’s Corporate Leniency Policy: A Five Year Review’, World Competition Vol. 
33(1) (2010) 141-162, p.159 
290
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resources. Although the meaning of the phrase “would not constitute the making the 
best use of the [MyCC’s] resources” is yet to be interpreted, the author is of the opinion 
that it could be a double edged sword. This is because the provision may be abused to 
unduly influence or pressure the MyCC to close an investigation without sound 
justifications or the abuse may even be by the MyCC itself to ensure targets are met 
and complex cases which detrimentally affect the MyCC’s performance targets are 
closed. On the other hand, the provision could be utilised by the MyCC to be innovative 
in managing its limited resources via prioritisation. In this regard, it would be useful to 
refer to the measures which had been adopted by South Africa in addressing the issue 
of enforcing competition law with limited resources.  
 
South Africa also faced issues with limited resources in implementation of competition 
law in the country291. In order to attain effective enforcement, adequate resources have 
to be allocated to the competition agencies. Conducting awareness and advocacy 
programmes; training human resources to carry out cartel enforcement work; training 
the judiciary to adjudicate cartel cases; offering attractive remuneration packages in 
order to employ people with the required expertise and carrying out investigative work 
and prosecuting cartels are part of effective cartel enforcement regime. Effective cartel 
enforcement requires specific and trained competition officials to focus on cartel 
detection, investigation and prosecution. Needless to say, all the aforementioned 
                                            
291
 International Competition Network (ICN), ‘Lessons to be Learnt From the Experiences of Young 
Competition Agencies’, Competition Policy Implementation Working Group Report (Subgroup 2),  ICN, 
Cape Town, South Africa (May 2006), pp. 24 and 31 at 
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require adequate staffing and financial resources. In order to overcome the challenges 
which come with lack of resources, South Africa has been strategic and innovative in 
enforcing the Competition Act 1998 by streamlining their enforcement processes 
through prioritisation292; adopting utilising basic techniques and enforcement tools which 
facilitate the uncovering of cartels – which lessen enforcement costs; strong powers of 
investigation; and heavy penalties for cartels. The bottom line is to establish: a 
perception of credible threat of detection to cartels; the threat of heavy penalty being 
imposed; and It is necessary to implement at reasonable costs, enforcement tools which 
may ensure a reasonable degree of compliance with the law293 in order to facilitate 
effective cartel enforcement. 
 
In order to create credible threat of detection, the South African Competition 
Commission adopted basic techniques in cartel detection which is complemented by 
legislative provisions that provide for strong enforcement powers and which are simple 
to administer – these accommodate the limited experience of enforcement officials in 
carrying out cartel enforcement; adopted enforcement tools which utilised the 
weaknesses of cartels which maximised the impact and adopted a selective approach in 
regards to the industries to be focused on in cartel enforcement; and the penalties 
imposed on cartel infringements are also quite severe.  
 
                                            
292
 Ibid, p. 24  
293
 Based on Posner’s theory on enforcement. See Posner, R.A., Antitrust Law (Second Ed.), The 
University of Chicago Press (2001), Chapter 10 – The Problem of Enforcement. 
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The basic techniques in cartel detection utilised by the South African Competition 
Commission involves both structural and behavioural approaches294. The focus was on 
industries which have been identified under the prioritisation framework as prone to 
cartels, such as concentrated markets with homogenous products. Whilst behavioural 
screening involves observations of price and quantity data which can be readily 
collected and understanding how firms interact in making pricing and supply decisions. 
The adoption of basic techniques in cartel detection may give rise to the criticism that 
they would result in type I295 and/or type II296 enforcement errors because enforcement 
could be based on insufficient data and information297. However, where developing 
countries are concerned, sometimes second best options or the lesser between two 
evils would have to be adopted. Cartel enforcement has to start somewhere and if it 
was only to commenced after everything is nearly perfect, then it may take years before 
competition law or cartel enforcement could be implemented in that jurisdiction – 
rendering the law as “toothless” and a mockery. Therefore, competition authorities in 
jurisdictions with limited resources would have to solve this conundrum by adopting 
                                            
294
 Roberts, S., ‘Screening for Cartels – Insights from the South African Experience’, From Collusion to 
Competition, Competition Policy International, Monthly Cartel Column, 2nd Issue (2012), pp.3-6 at  
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/second-issue-from-collusion-to-
competition?utm_source=CPI+Subscribers&utm_campaign=b89330024c-
Thursday_September_27_2012&utm_medium=email  
295
 Schinkel and Tuinstra defined it as “ ... finding an industry that is competitive liable of anti- competitive 
behaviour.” See Schinkel, M.P. and Tuinstra, J., ‘Imperfect Competition Law Enforcement’, CeNDEF 
Working Paper No. 04-07 (June 2004), p. 6 at http://www1.fee.uva.nl/fm/PAPERS/maartenpieter.pdf  
296 Schinkel and Tuinstra defined it as “ ... acquitting companies that have in fact acted anti-
competitively.” See Schinkel, M.P. and Tuinstra, J., ‘Imperfect Competition Law Enforcement’, CeNDEF 
Working Paper No. 04-07 (June 2004), p. 6 at http://www1.fee.uva.nl/fm/PAPERS/maartenpieter.pdf  
297
 Such as “ … firm costs, consumer demand, prices, sales, potential efficiency gains, and possible 
collusive agreements.” Schinkel, M.P. and Tuinstra, J., ‘Imperfect Competition Law Enforcement’, 
CeNDEF Working Paper No. 04-07 (June 2004), p. 5 at 
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measures which lessens incidences of errors in enforcement or errors which are less 
detrimental. In this regard, Schinkel and Tuinstra argued that in a simple cartel setting, 
competition authorities with limited budgets should weigh investigation costs against the 
fine level. Therefore, cartel enforcement efforts should be focused on traditional and 
stable industries and more lenient towards high paced venture industries298.  In the 
former, the industry and its market behaviour are well understood by industry 
specialists299; therefore, there is sufficient information to base enforcement actions on 
which in turn would lessen the probability of erroneous enforcement.  
 
Under the South African cartel enforcement regime, the Competition Commission is 
vested with strong powers of investigation such as the power to search and enter 
premises300 and issue summons to a person who is believed to be able to assist in the 
investigation by providing information and documents301. These strong powers of 
investigation are complemented by simple judicial administration in so far as hard core 
cartel offences are concerned.  Hard core cartel offences are per se offences under the 
South African competition legislation. Per se offences are arguably easier to be 
enforced because once they are proven, there are no defences available. There will not 
be any need to consider the pro and anti-competitive benefits of the conduct in 
question, unlike in cases involving the rule of reason standard. This is arguably a 
favourable method for young competition agencies without much enforcement 
                                            
298
 Schinkel, M.P. and Tuinstra, J., ‘Imperfect Competition Law Enforcement’, CeNDEF Working Paper 
No. 04-07 (June 2004), pp.25-26 at http://www1.fee.uva.nl/fm/PAPERS/maartenpieter.pdf  
299
 Ibid, p. 25  
300
 Sections 46-49 Competition Act 1998, South Africa 
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experience. In addition, hard core cartel offences such as price fixing, market allocation 
and bid rigging are the more serious offences which impact directly onto consumers. 
Therefore these are the type of cartel offences the public could relate to which in turn 
would help to garner support and demand for cartel enforcement in developing 
countries with new competition authorities.  
 
The MyCC too is vested with strong powers of investigation and enforcement under the 
law. Infact, in some aspects, the powers are wider and stronger than those of the South 
African Competition Commission as provided for by the Competition Act 1998. For 
example, under the Competition Act 1998, South Africa, searches without warrant may 
not be conducted on a private dwelling302. Searches with or without warrant may only be 
conducted during the day unless a night time search is necessary and justifiable303. 
Furthermore, in cases of searches with warrant, the judge or magistrate who issued the 
warrant has authorised a night time search304. The South African Competition 
Commission may also compensate those who suffered damage due to forced entry onto 
the premise when no one responsible for the premises was present305. However, under 
the Malaysian Competition Act 2010, searches with or without warrant may be carried 
out at any reasonable time day or night and does not exclude private dwellings306. In 
addition, even if the search warrant is defective, it shall still be admissible307 and no 
                                            
302
 Section 47 (1) Competition Act 1998, South Africa 
303
 Sections 46 (4) and 47 (3) Competition Act 1998, South Africa 
304
 Section 46 (4) Competition Act 1998, South Africa 
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costs or damages shall be recoverable in relation to the seizure of document or data 
unless it was executed without reasonable excuse308. In terms of the standard of proof 
for hard core cartels, although the Competition Act 2010 does not expressly use the 
term per se, hard core cartel infringements are easier to prove because they are 
deemed to have an object to restrict competition and thus do not require any further 
assessment of their effect309. Thus, hard core cartels are also arguably easier to be 
administered by the MyCC under the Competition Act 2010.  
 
Limited resources do not allow for optimum enforcement. In this regard, this work 
argues that such jurisdictions would have to be selective in their cartel enforcement 
work. It is better to enforce few but significant industries and markets effectively rather 
than stretching limited resources thin through across the board enforcement which may 
lead to increase in erroneous enforcement310.  Being selective may also be argued as 
gradual implementation in terms of cartel enforcement. Implementing a gradual but 
dynamic cartel enforcement approach means allowing time for not only the authorities to 
gain adequate experience before implementing full enforcement but also enable them to 
adjust enforcement works being carried out with available resources and allowing 
businesses and other stakeholders to adjust to the new “rules of the game” under the 
competition law. These entail: prioritising industries with tendencies to collude, costs of 
production are fairly easily monitored and “... investigation is both reasonably 
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 Section 31 Competition Act 2010, Malaysia 
309
 See Section 4 Competition Act 2010, Malaysia 
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inexpensive and efficient ...”311; going for blatant cartel infringements such as industries 
which have been historically accorded with protection by the state; implementing a 
reactive strategy in lesser prioritised industries (i.e. those which would involve “high 
investigation costs relative to the fine level and the margin of assessment errors is 
substantial”312); and focusing on competition advocacy and awareness programmes 
particularly in the early days of cartel enforcement.  
 
The cartel prioritisation framework implemented in South Africa prioritises sectors and 
industries based on: impact on poor consumers; contribution to accelerated and shared 
growth in terms of national economic policy; and likelihood of substantial competition 
concerns313.  As a result, in 2008 four priority sectors were identified, namely; food and 
agro-processing, infrastructure and construction, intermediate industrial products and 
financial services314. The prioritisation framework is essential to South Africa because of 
the need to manage the limited resources available for competition law enforcement. 
Developing countries such as South Africa lack resources in enabling effective 
enforcement against anti-competitive activities, therefore informed choices would have 
to be made. Nevertheless, the prioritisation of the four sectors does not mean that 
action would not be taken against anti-competitive offences in other areas. This is 
                                            
311
 Ibid, p.25  
312
 Ibid  
313
 Ten Years of Enforcement by the South African Competition Authorities – Unleashing Rivalries 1999-
2009, Competition Commission, Competition Tribunal, South Africa (2009), Box 7, p.39  at 
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evident from the fact that leniency applications continue to be received even from other 
sectors of the economy315.  
 
The Corporate Leniency Policy (CLP) which was introduced in 2004316 brought 
significant impact in cartel enforcement in South Africa317. In South Africa, the CLP is an 
enforcement tool adopted to facilitate the detection and prosecution of cartels by the 
Competition Commission under Section 4 (1) (b) of the Competition Act 1998 and is 
only available to collusive horizontal agreement offences. The CLP operates as 
leverage for the Competition Commission in presenting a strong and credible threat to 
firms suspected of being involved in cartel arrangements, i.e. that it is better for the firm 
to confess and blow the whistle on their co-conspirators than facing the risk of 
substantial financial penalty and that their immunity from prosecution is assured318. In 
order to qualify and apply for immunity, first, the applicant firm has to be the first through 
the door. This is an important feature of CLP which rewards the first firm which is willing 
                                            
315
 Lavoie, C., ‘South Africa’s Corporate Leniency Policy: A Five Year Review’, World Competition Vol. 
33(1) (2010), 141-162, pp.154-155 
316
 Notice 195 of 2004, Government Gazette No. 25963 of 24 February 2004. 
317
 The applications for leniency under the CLP showed marked increase when improvements were made 
to the CLP in 2007. From April 2007 to March 2012 more than 350 applications were received under the 
CLP. See Roberts, S., ‘Screening for Cartels – Insights from the South African Experience’, From 
Collusion to Competition, Competition Policy International, Monthly Cartel Column, 2nd Issue (2012), 
Figure 1. Number of CLP Applications, by Broad Sector, p.2 at  
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/second-issue-from-collusion-to-
competition?utm_source=CPI+Subscribers&utm_campaign=b89330024c-
Thursday_September_27_2012&utm_medium=email     
318
 In other words it is very much based on the Game Theory’s ‘prisoner dilemma’ concept. The penalty 
for anti-competitive cartel activities under the Competition Act 1998 is     ‘ ... not exceeding ten per cent of 
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financial year’ as provided under Section 59 (2) Competition Act 1998, South Africa. 
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to cooperate and disclose information on the cartel activities which it is involved in319.   
Second, the cartel activity in question would have had an impact on the South African 
market, regardless of the location where the activities have taken place. Immunity 
granted by competition authorities in other countries pertaining to the cartel activity in 
question does not automatically qualify the applicant firm for immunity under the 
Competition Act 1998 in South Africa. Immunity is given severally to each contravention 
reported unless it is not possible to do so320.  Immunity from prosecution under the CLP 
is given on a conditional basis until full and final determination of the case is made by 
the Competition Tribunal321. This is to ensure full cooperation from the applicant firm322.   
The CLP was reviewed and improved in 2008323. This was to increase the effectiveness 
of CLP as an enforcement tool. From the implementation of the amendment there is 
more certainty in the decision to grant immunity to applicant firm whereby immunity will 
be given so long as all the conditions attached to the immunity are fulfilled by the firm. 
Ringleaders and instigators are now also eligible for immunity and the marker procedure 
was also introduced. Under the marker procedure, an applicant firm is able to reserve 
their place in the queue of applicants to allow the firm to gather information and 
evidence for the formal application for leniency. All these are whilst the investigation into 
                                            
319
 Lavoie, C., ‘South Africa’s Corporate Leniency Policy: A Five Year Review’, World Competition Vol. 
33(1) (2010), 141-162, p.144 
320
 Ten Years of Enforcement by the South African Competition Authorities – Unleashing Rivalries 1999-
2009, Competition Commission, Competition Tribunal, South Africa (2009), p.47  at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/10-year-review accessed on 20/10/2011. 
321
 For the conditions see Ten Years of Enforcement by the South African Competition Authorities – 
Unleashing Rivalries 1999-2009, Competition Commission, Competition Tribunal, South Africa (2009), 
p.47  at http://www.compcom.co.za/10-year-review accessed on 20/10/2011. 
322
 Lavoie, C., ‘South Africa’s Corporate Leniency Policy: A Five Year Review’, World Competition Vol. 
33(1) (2010), 141-162, p.149 
323
 Notice 628 of 2008, Government Gazette No. 31064 of 23 May 2008 
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the cartel by the Competition Commission is ongoing. Under the amendment, oral 
submissions are also allowed in order to protect the disclosing firm from the discovery of 
documents being used against it in other jurisdiction. The Commission is vested with 
discretionary powers to accommodate potential firms in their disclosure. This is a form 
of incentive to encourage disclosure of cartel activities under the CLP. Nevertheless this 
does not completely negate the need for submission of written submissions for 
immunity.  
 
In Malaysia, the Competition Act 2010 specifically provides for a leniency regime324. 
Although leniency is one of the main features of cartel enforcement in South Africa, it is 
not specifically provided for under the Competition Act 1998, instead, it is in the form of 
a policy. Under the Malaysian competition legislation, different percentage of reduction 
of penalties are allowed depending on whether the applicant firm is the “first through the 
door” or the stages at which admission or cooperation was made or any other 
circumstances based on the discretion of the MyCC. The advantage of leniency being 
specifically provided for under the law is that there is legal certainty in the provision of 
immunity to co-operating cartel members.   
 
The existence of credible risk of cartel detection has to be coupled with deterrent 
penalties325. The cartel enforcement regime ought to be able to deter firms in engaging 
                                            
324
 Section 41 Competition Act 2010, Malaysia 
325
 The penalty for anti-competitive cartel activities under the Competition Act 1998 is     ‘ ... not exceeding 
ten per cent of firm’s annual turnover in the Republic and its exports from the Republic during the firm’s 
preceding financial year’ – See Section 59 (2) Competition Act 1998, South Africa  
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in cartel activities by making it costlier to continue with their anti-competitive cartel 
arrangements.  The South African approach to penalties under the Competition Law 
1998 is that of deterrence. The Competition Tribunal stated in its decision in the case of 
Harmony Gold Mining Limited, Durban Roodepoort Deep Limited vs. Mittal Steel South 
Africa Limited, Macsteel International Holdings326 that the aim of administrative penalty 
is deterrence. The Competition Tribunal is empowered by virtue of Section 59 (1) to 
impose penalties on a first offence on cases involving hard core cartel offences under 
Section 4 (1) (b), the more serious the conduct, the heavier the penalty which may be 
imposed327.  Additionally, the introduction of criminal sanctions for cartel offences under 
the 2009 amendments328 brings a more serious threat to not just the firms but also the 
individuals involved in cartel arrangements329, provided the South African competition 
authorities are able to demonstrate competence in administering criminal procedure 
alongside civil procedure in cartel enforcement330. In terms of penalty, the Malaysian 
                                            
326
 Case No. 13/CR/Feb 2004, at http://www.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/Case-
Documents/13CRFeb04remedies.pdf  accessed on 12/12/2011 
327
 See Section 59 (3) Competition Act 1998, South Africa for the list of factors to be considered by the 
Competition Tribunal in deciding on the appropriate penalty. 
328
 Competition Amendment Act 2009, South Africa 
329
 Individuals who are directors or managers who cause firms to engage in cartel activities are now liable 
to a fine not exceeding 500, 000 Rand or imprisonment not exceeding ten years or both (see Sections 12 
and 13 Competition Amendment Act 2009, South Africa). A new organ known as the National Prosecution 
Authority (NPA) has been created by virtue of the amendment and its function is to prosecute persons 
committing criminal offence under the Competition Amendment Act 2009. However, the authority to certify 
firms or persons subject to criminal liability under the Competition Amendment Act 2009 who are 
deserving of leniency is vested with the Competition Commission (see Sections 8 and 12 Competition 
Amendment Act 2009, South Africa).  
330
 At this point in time, it is still too early to provide a reasonable assessment of the enforcement of 
criminal sanctions on cartel offences in South Africa and there is yet to be much information available on 
the public domain. However, Lavoie asserted that the implementation of criminal sanctions on cartel 
offences in South Africa will be a challenging task, particularly in terms of meshing the differences in the 
administration of civil and criminal jurisdiction in cartel enforcement and managing the interaction 
between the Competition Commission, NPA and other relevant bodies (see Lavoie, C., ‘South Africa’s 
Corporate Leniency Policy: A Five Year Review’, World Competition Vol. 33(1) (2010) 141-162, pp. 158-
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competition legislation provides for substantive fines to be imposed on infringement 
offences under Part II of the Competition Act 2010 cases which include prohibited cartel 
agreements. The MyCC may impose a fine not exceeding ten (10) per cent of the 
worldwide turnover over the period of the infringement331. However, since Malaysia is 
currently implementing a “soft approach” in enforcement which emphasises on remedial 
action to allow time for businesses to understand the working of competition law and 
comply with its legislative requirements332, the imposition of such substantial fines for 
competition law infringements in Malaysia is yet to be seen. Nevertheless, in order to 
attain effective cartel enforcement in Malaysia, the full force of the law, including the 
imposition of significant penalty in cartel cases within the ambit of the law would have to 
be enforced. 
 
The above discussion concerns the challenges which are currently being faced by the 
MyCC with insights from the South African experience. There will also be other 
                                                                                                                                            
162. Furthermore, even developed countries are facing issues in the implementation of criminal sanctions 
on cartel offences (see R vs. Burns and Ors [2010]); For the UK Office of Fair Trading Review of the 
collapse of criminal trial in R vs. Burns and Ors see ‘Project Condor Board Review’ at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/board/2010/Project_Condor_Board_Review.pdf accessed on 
15/12/2011; For discussion of issues in the administration of leniency policy in criminal cartel cases in the 
United Kingdom see Stephan, A., ‘How Dishonesty Killed the Cartel Offence’, Criminal Law Review, Vol.6 
(2011) 446-455; For discussion of issues in the administration of leniency policy in criminal cartel cases in 
the United Kingdom see Edgehill, K., ‘Is the UK Cartel Offence Dead or Is There a Problem with 
Immunity? – The Role of Immunity as a Prosecutorial Tool in Criminal Cartel Offences in the UK and 
Australia (2011) at 
http://www.unisa.edu.au/crma/docs/CCW%202011/Paper%20and%20Commentaries/Day2Session4Com
mentary1.pdf 
331
 Section 41 (4) Competition Act 2010, Malaysia 
332
 See: The Malaysian Reserve, ‘MyCC Issues 1
st
 ‘Proposed Decision’ Against Price Fixing’ (25 October 
2012) at 
http://themalaysianreserve.com/main/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2396:mycc-
issues-1st-proposed-decision-against-price-fixing&catid=36:corporate-malaysia&Itemid=120 accessed on 
26/10/ 2012 
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challenges which will be faced by the MyCC soon particularly because of the Malaysian 
Government’s policy decision to gradually implement its competition law333. Before the 
discussion moves on to the foreseeable future challenges, for purposes of clarity, an 
explanation of the policy decision on gradual implementation is warranted. 
 
The gradual implementation of the Malaysian competition law means the legislation is 
being implemented in phases which commenced from January 2011.  The initial stage 
focuses on the setting up of the MyCC and after eighteen (18) months the other 
provisions shall be implemented334. The justifications for the decision to gradually 
implement the Malaysian competition law were explained as: 1) based on the 
experience of other competition jurisdictions such as Singapore, Indonesia and Japan 
which focused on advocacy and awareness programmes before enforcing their 
respective competition legislation; and 2) to allow a transition period for Malaysian 
businesses to be ready for the implementation of competition law and for the MyCC to 
be ready to enforce it335. In tabling the bill to Parliament, the Minister of Domestic Trade, 
Co-operatives and Consumerism, Malaysia highlighted the case of Japan which only 
initiated its first case under the Anti-monopoly Act 1947 forty (40) years after the 
adoption of its competition law336. The author is of the opinion that this is a superficial 
                                            
333
 As outlined by the Minister of Domestic Trade, Co-operatives and Consumerism in his speech to the 
Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives), Malaysian Parliament on 20 April 2010, Hansard Report 
(Malay version), pp.151-152 
334
 Minister of Domestic Trade, Co-operatives and Consumerism in his speech to the Dewan Rakyat 
(House of Representatives), Malaysian Parliament on 20 April 2010, Hansard Report (Malay version), 
p.151  
335
 Ibid 
336
 Ibid 
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assessment because there are other factors involved. The global economic and market 
scenario when Japan adopted its competition law were not as liberalised and open as 
today and the law was imposed on Japan by the American forces administration after 
the end of the Second World War337. At the same time the Minister highlighted that 
Singapore implemented its law only one year after adoption whilst Indonesia took six 
years to initiate its first competition law case after the adoption of its law in 1999338. In 
this regard, the author is of the opinion that the emphasis should not have been on the 
duration it took the aforementioned jurisdictions to implement their respective 
competition laws but it all depends on the readiness level of each country which is 
dependent on the level of development339; level of institutional development340; 
openness of the economy341 and prevailing socio-economic ideology342.  
 
Although it has been explained that the other provisions under the Competition Act 2010 
shall be implemented after eighteen (18) months from January 2011, there is yet to be a 
                                            
337
 For a discussion on the history of Japanese competition policy, see Beeman, M.L., Public Policy and 
Economic Competition in Japan – Change and Continuity in Antimonopoly Policy, 1973-1995, Routledge 
(2002) 
338
 Minister of Domestic Trade, Co-operatives and Consumerism in his speech to the Dewan Rakyat 
(House of Representatives), Malaysian Parliament on 20 April 2010, Hansard Report (Malay version), 
pp.151 
339
 For a discussion on the link between effective competition law enforcement and a country’s growth 
based on GDP per capita, see Mateus, A.M., Competition Law and Development: What Competition Law 
Regime?’, (October  2010) at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1699643 
340
 For a discussion on the link between institutional development, see: Mateus, A.M., Competition Law 
and Development: What Competition Law Regime?’, (October  2010) at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1699643 
341
 Competition policy and law are tools implemented to regulate market imperfections; thus, the more 
open the economy, the more receptive and ready a country would be to competition law. The case in 
point would be that of Singapore which fully enforced its competition law after a year of its adoption.   
342
 See Gal, M.S., ‘The Ecology of Antitrust Pre-conditions for Competition Law Enforcement in 
Developing Countries’, Competition, Competitiveness And Development: Lessons from Developing 
Countries, UNCTAD (2004), pp.23-30 at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20041ch1_en.pdf 
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clear indication from the MyCC as to what gradual implementation entails for cartel 
enforcement in Malaysia – i.e. whether after the said duration all provisions pertaining to 
horizontal agreements will be fully enforced; or whether certain types of businesses or 
sectors would be provided with a longer grace period for compliance; and as to the 
approach which will be implemented in cartel enforcement. Thus far, the MyCC has 
been focusing on advocacy and awareness programmes343 and carrying out cartel 
enforcement on “easy pickings” cases based on a “soft approach”.  This may be 
observed in the first proposed decision by the MyCC against price fixing by the 
Cameron Highlands Floriculturist Association344. The case was based on media reports 
on the announcement made by the Cameron Highlands Floriculturist Association that its 
members have agreed to increase flower prices by ten (10) per cent. The MyCC had 
issued a notice labelled as “proposed decision” to the association for price fixing 
activities which contravenes the Competition Act 2010. The proposed decision calls for 
the association to cease their price fixing of flowers and to provide an undertaking that 
its members shall refrain from any anti-competitive activities. The MyCC also has asked 
the association to make a public announcement of its remedial actions in mainstream 
media. This decision has been labelled as a ‘soft approach” by the MyCC because of 
the emphasis on remedial measures in order to encourage business compliance instead 
of imposition of fines. It is well and good that at this early juncture, that competition 
                                            
343
 See: the Malaysian Competition website for the details on the training sessions and briefings/ dialogue 
sessions which have been conducted by the MyCC since early 2011 at http://www.mycc.gov.my  
344
 The Malaysian Reserve, ‘MyCC Issues 1
st
 ‘Proposed Decision’ Against Price Fixing’ (25 October 2012) 
at http://themalaysianreserve.com/main/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2396:mycc-
issues-1st-proposed-decision-against-price-fixing&catid=36:corporate-malaysia&Itemid=120 accessed on 
26 October 2012 
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advocacy and awareness are focused on but there has to be a cut-off point in cartel 
enforcement when the MyCC illustrates that it means business and the full force of the 
law will be imposed. Otherwise, there is likelihood that Malaysia would be trapped in the 
“nascent stage” of cartel enforcement even after some years of competition law 
implementation; hence, the need for a policy which includes a plan clearly mapping out 
the milestones to be achieved by Malaysia in cartel enforcement.  
 
The recent case concerning the share swap and collaborative agreement between 
AirAsia and Malaysia Airlines (MAS) displays the lack of clarity in the cartel enforcement 
strategy of the MyCC (if there is one) and illustrates the need for the MyCC to go 
beyond advocacy and remedial strategy in cartel enforcement sooner rather than later. 
Airasia is the Malaysian low cost carrier whilst MAS is the country’s national carrier 
which is also a Government Linked Company (GLC). The share swap and collaborative 
agreement between AirAsia and MAS in August 2011 was a commercial agreement 
which received backing from the government (via the sectoral regulator and Ministry of 
Transport) due to the national interests involved, particularly in curbing losses suffered 
by Malaysia Airlines. Despite the argument by both AirAsia and Malaysia Airlines that 
the agreement was entered into for efficiency reasons, the result is that AirAsia has 
ceased operations on certain routes and rendered Malaysia Airlines as sole the 
Malaysian airline firm servicing routes such as Kuala Lumpur – London; Kuala Lumpur – 
Paris; and Kuala Lumpur – New Delhi. As a result, consumers are left at a disadvantage 
with less choice for low cost fares for those routes. Although, the agreement was 
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cancelled in May 2012, the decision for AirAsia to cease operations on those routes 
stayed. Despite the fact that the agreement was essentially a merger agreement 
between the undertakings, the MyCC is empowered to investigate the impact of the 
agreement which on the face of it seemed to involve market division which negatively 
impacts consumers. The point being emphasised here is that the MyCC was not 
consulted by the firms in their decision to enter into the agreement. This case was 
highlighted in the media which also questioned the MyCC’s ability to undertake 
enforcement action on the case345. Despite sufficient publicity on the passing of the 
Competition Act 2010 and the many advocacy and awareness programmes which have 
been held by the Ministry of Domestic Trade, Co-operatives and Consumerism since the 
early 1990’s346 and the MyCC since early 2011347, the firms involved simply bypassed 
the MyCC by failing to consult the authority before entering into the share swap and 
collaborative agreement despite the probability of anti-competitive impact on the long 
haul air transport market. In response to the question by the media, MyCC merely 
responded that it has written to the firms involved to request for a copy of the 
                                            
345
 See: The Star Online Malaysia, MyCC to Investigate if AirAsia-MAS Share Swap has Made Airfares 
Go Up, (4 January 2012) at 
http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2012/1/4/business/10199177&sec=business  
accessed on 7/8/2012; Channel News Asia, AirAsia and Rival Malaysia Airlines Cancel Share Swap, (2 
May 2012) at http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific_business/view/1198610/1/.html 
accessed on 7/8/2012. 
346
 This is based on the author’s knowledge and experience as the desk officer for competition policy in 
the Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs Malaysia (1997-2003). 
347
 Until October 2011, 30 briefing/dialogue sessions have been held by the Malaysian Competition 
Commission. These involved stakeholders such as producers, professional bodies, policy makers, 
academicians, consumer associations and the Bank of Malaysia. See Malaysian Competition 
Commission website at http://www.mycc.gov.my/269_213_213/Web/WebPage/2011/2011.html 
accessed on 28/12/2011. 
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agreement348 - a response which does not reflect clarity, clout, authority and credibility. 
A “soft approach” in cartel enforcement is only relevant up to a certain point to allow 
time for businesses and industries to familiarise themselves with the requirements 
under the Competition Act 2010. However, the MyCC would have to be clear and 
convincing in ensuring that the grace period is only temporary. 
 
In view of the above, it is relevant to note that cartel enforcement was also somewhat 
gradually implemented in South Africa. From 1999 to 2004, the South African 
Competition Commission’s cartel enforcement strategy was reactive, whereby it only 
went after “low hanging fruits” such as cases of blatant agreement on price fixing in 
sectors which have previously been legally sanctioned349; and very much dependent on 
complaints from third parties which did not always involve competition issues but may 
be contractual in nature350. The South African Competition Commission also focused on 
advocacy and awareness works in the early days of its competition law enforcement351. 
However, such a strategy did not make a significant impact on cartel enforcement in 
                                            
348
 See: The Star Online Malaysia, MyCC to Investigate if AirAsia-MAS Share Swap has Made Airfares 
Go Up, (4 January 2012) at 
http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2012/1/4/business/10199177&sec=business 
accessed on 7/8/2012; Channel News Asia, AirAsia and Rival Malaysia Airlines Cancel Share Swap, (2 
May 2012) at http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific_business/view/1198610/1/.html 
accessed on 7/8/2012. 
349
 See: Competition Commission vs. Board of Healthcare Funders, Case no. 07/CR/Feb05; South 
African Medical Association, case no. 23/CR/Apr04 at http://www.comptrib.co.za/ accessed on 
13/11/2011. 
350
 Most of the complaints received regarding alleged prohibited practices resulted in non-referrals 
because they were found to be contractual disputes. See Annual Report 2003/2004, Competition 
Commission, South Africa, p.16 at http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Files/annual-report-2003-2004.pdf 
accessed on 20/10/2011 
351
 Foreword by The Minister of Trade and Industry, South Africa, Annual Report 2003-2004, p.1, 
Competition Commission South Africa at http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Files/annual-report-2003-
2004.pdf  
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South Africa. Significant change to cartel enforcement in South Africa only occurred in 
2004 whereby the enforcement strategy changed from reactive to pro-active352 which 
included the adoption of a leniency policy and prioritisation of cartel enforcement.  
 
In regard to the gradual implementation policy of the Competition Act 2010, the 
challenges which would soon be faced by the MyCC in cartel enforcement include 
inadequate legislative provisions; clashes between competition and other policies which 
are crucial to Malaysia’s development objectives; and political interference.  
 
It is not uncommon for inadequacies in the law to be discovered particularly in the first 
few years of enforcement353. The MyCC may likely face the same challenge particularly 
as cartel enforcement becomes stricter. Stricter cartel enforcement may likely either 
push cartels further underground or lead to increase in mergers354. Businesses have to 
be dynamic in order to survive and this includes adapting to changes in the legal 
environment. In view of the lack of merger control with a competition dimension in 
Malaysia, one of the foreseeable challenges that would be faced by the MyCC as cartel 
enforcement becomes stricter is the merger of cartels which thereafter evolves into 
                                            
352
 See: Ten Years of Enforcement by the South African Competition Authorities – Unleashing Rivalries 
1999-2009, Competition Commission, Competition Tribunal, South Africa (2009) at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/10-year-review accessed on 20/10/2011. 
353
 For examples of inadequate legislation in young competition jurisdictions, see: International 
Competition Network (ICN), ‘Lessons to be Learnt From the Experiences of Young Competition 
Agencies’, Competition Policy Implementation Working Group Report (Subgroup 2),  ICN, Cape Town, 
South Africa (May 2006), pp.9-11 at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/library.aspx?search=&group=13&type=0&workshop=0   
354
 Schinkel, M.P., ‘Effective Cartel Enforcement in Europe’, World Competition: Law and Economics 
Review Vol.30 (2007) 539-572; Mehra, P., ‘Choice Between Cartels and Horizontal Merger’, (2007), at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081844  or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1081844 
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firms engaging in collusion355. Collusions are even harder to detect than cartels 
because it is difficult to assess with adequate precision whether the anti-competitive 
impact on the market is due to reasonable commercial responses by the firms or 
because of collusion between the firms. It is made even more difficult to prove due to 
the issues that arise out of the differences in the legal and economic concepts of 
collusion356. Hence, perhaps the absence of merger control with a competition 
dimension in Malaysia may render enforcement more challenging for the MyCC but until 
the required economic research is conducted to determine a more up to date and 
accurate diagnosis of the market characteristics and conditions in Malaysia, this cannot 
be said with certainty357. In South Africa, structural issues could also be addressed 
through merger control. In fact, the South African competition regime focused on merger 
control from the moment the Competition Act 1998 was enforced in South Africa in 
order to address markets which were highly concentrated which was one of the effects 
of apartheid and international sanctions on South Africa’s economy358. 
 
 Another important aspect is the balancing of public interest or non-competition 
considerations with competition considerations in the implementation of competition law. 
The South African competition law expressly provides for public interest to be 
accounted for under the preamble and purpose of the Competition Act 1998. 
                                            
355
 See discussion in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
356
 See discussion on tacit collusion in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
357
 Ibid 
358
 Foreword by The Minister of Trade and Industry, South Africa, Annual Report 2003-2004, p.1, 
Competition Commission South Africa at http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Files/annual-report-2003-
2004.pdf ; Lavoie, C., ‘South Africa’s Corporate Leniency Policy: A Five Year Review’, World Competition 
Vol. 33(1) (2010) 141-162, pp. 142-143. 
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Additionally, public interest also has to be considered in merger and exemption 
applications under Section 12A and Section 10, Competition Act 1998, respectively. The 
South African competition law describes what may amount to public interest359. South 
African case laws on public interest have also developed particularly in merger cases 
under the Competition Act 1998. Such cases include Minister of Economic Development 
et al and Wal-Mart Stores Inc. et al (Wal-Mart/ Massmart)360; Metropolitan Holdings Ltd/ 
Momentum Group Limited (Metropolitan/ Momentum)361; and Kansai Paint Co. Ltd and 
Freeworld Coatings Ltd (Kansai/ Freeworld)362. In these cases, employment was 
considered as public interest.  
 
In Wal-Mart/ Massmart, the government argued that the merger would lead to 
employment losses in South Africa and adverse impact on the development of the 
domestic industries and small and medium sized businesses because the global 
procurement networking of Wal-Mart may lead to procurement being diverted to Asia 
where production costs are cheaper. However, the Competition Appeal Court (CAC) 
approved the merger because it felt that the competition authorities had not properly 
considered public interest as required under the law in their assessment. In 
                                            
359 For mergers under Section 12A (3), they include the impact that the merger will have on : a particular 
industrial sector or region;  employment;  the ability of small businesses, or firms controlled or owned by historically 
disadvantaged persons, to become competitive; and  the ability of national industries to compete in international 
markets. For exemptions under Section 10 (3) (b) they include anti-competitive agreements that constibute to: 
the maintenance and promotion of exports; promotion of the ability of small businesses owned or 
controlled by historically disadvantaged persons to become competitive; change in productive capacity 
necessary to stop decline in an industry; the economic stability of an industry as designated by the 
Minister after consulting the Minister responsible for that industry.. 
360
 Case no 110/CAC/Jul11   
361
 Case no 41/LMJul10 
362
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Metropolitan/Momentum, the Competition Tribunal approved the merger subject to 
certain conditions relating to retrenchments. This case highlights that pro-competitive 
mergers can be prohibited if the public interest is not adequately addressed by the 
merging parties. In Kansai/ Freeworld, the issue was regarding the hostile takeover of 
Freeworld by Kansai. Freeworld was the only local manufacturer of automotive coatings 
supplying to the domestic automotive industry and it was also an exemplar of black 
economic empowerment. The South African Competition Commission approved the 
takeover subject to certain conditions which included Kansai having to divest 
Freeworld’s automotive coating business and a requirement to manufacture automotive 
coating locally. However, these conditions were withdrawn after negotiations between 
the Competition Commission and the merging entities.   
 
These seminal merger cases on public interest illustrate that under the South African 
competition jurisprudence, public interest can serve to salvage an anti-competitive 
merger or it can lead to the prohibition of pro-competitive merger. Second, public 
interest needs to be considered regardless of the competition analysis. However, it 
ought to be noted that although the law provides that public interest to be considered 
has to be substantial, it does not explain the meaning of “substantial” in the South 
African competition law context363. Case law also has yet to define it. Nevertheless, the 
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 See Section 12A (1) (b) Competition Act 1998, South Africa 
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Competition Tribunal held in Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd/ Stellenbosch Farmers 
Winery Group Ltd364 that the meaning of “substantial” would depend on the context. 
 
In Malaysia, the Competition Act 2010 also provides for non-competition considerations 
to be balanced with competition considerations in the granting of exemptions under 
Section 5, Competition Act 2010. Section 5 provides that exemption may be granted 
under Section 5, Competition Act 2010 if “ ... there are  significant identifiable 
technological, efficiency or social benefits directly arising out of the agreement ...”. 
However, the law does not interpret the meaning of “significant identifiable 
technological, efficiency or social benefits directly arising out of the agreement”, nor 
does it list out the type of considerations which qualify under the said categories as per 
the South African competition law. Therefore, based on the South African experience, 
the question of “what to be considered”? is paramount and needs to be resolved by 
Malaysia considering the lack of interpretation and guidance on non-competition 
consideration under the Competition Act 2010. In this regard, the types of public interest 
listed under the South African competition law could be useful guidance for Malaysia 
because they include trade, industrial and socio-economic concerns – matters which 
are also relevant to Malaysia. In terms of determining “significant identifiable” non-
competition considerations, the method proposed by Townley could be relevant for 
Malaysia. According to Townley, public interests which are more relevant to the 
achievement of the meta-objective of the law would be prioritised in terms of the weight 
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assigned365. Townley stressed on the importance of determining the meta- objective of 
the jurisdiction’s competition law and assigning qualitative weights to non-economic 
considerations based on the meta-objective366. Although the method specifically 
focuses on non-economic or equity based considerations, the author is of the opinion 
that it could be relevant in determining the significance of the non-competition 
consideration to be considered.  
 
The next issue regarding non-competition considerations is “how to balance non-
competition with competition considerations?” This work argues that the balancing 
needs to be done based on a systematic and transparent mechanism. This is to ensure 
that decisions made are based on sound justifications; political interference and 
lobbying are kept at bay by limiting elements of arbitrariness and discretion in the 
assessment which may lead to abuse or decisions made based on irrelevant 
considerations - which in turn would jeopardise effective competition law enforcement. 
For example, the Malaysian Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community (BCIC) 
policy did not achieve the thirty (30) per cent Bumiputera equity ownership in the 
economy as outlined under the NEP which ended in 1990367. The BCIC resulted in 
political patronage which favoured certain Bumiputera businesses because of the 
arbitrary manner of its implementation, whereby the government arbitrarily selects the 
                                            
365
 Townley, C., Article 81 EC and Public Policy, Hart Publishing (2009), Chapter 8 
366
 Townley defines meta-objective as the ultimate aim or over-arching objective. See: Townley, C., Article 
81 EC and Public Policy, Hart Publishing (2009), p.287 
367
 At the end of the NEP period, Bumiputera equity ownership was at only 19.3 per cent. See Roslan, 
A.H., ‘Income Inequality, Poverty and Development Policy in Malaysia’, paper presented at the 
International Seminar on "Poverty and Sustainable Development", Université Montesquieu-Bordeaux IV 
and UNESCO-Paris, France (22-23 November 2001), Table V.10, p.18  
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businesses, industries and entrepreneurs to be accorded special treatment under the 
BCIC368. The policy benefited only certain groups of Bumiputera entrepreneurs and 
businesses and widened the intra-ethnic wealth gap369. As a result, the intra-ethnic 
income disparity has worsened as opposed to inter-ethnic income disparity370.  
However, the South African competition jurisprudence illustrates that balancing public 
interest and competition considerations is challenging. Nevertheless, this work does not 
propose for equity based public interest consideration to be excluded lest consumers 
are denied the benefits that come with such public interest; competition goals are 
jeopardised; and competition law is not seen as being complementary to other 
government policies and vice versa.   
 
First, it should be noted that public interest or non-competition consideration 
encompasses both efficiency and equity goals371 whereby the latter is usually difficult to 
be translated into a quantifiable form because equity concerns elements of fairness and 
justice which are subjective in nature372. On the hand, conventional competition 
                                            
368
 See: Gomez, E.T. and Jomo, K.S., Malaysia’s Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profit, 
Cambridge University Press (1999); Jomo, K.S., ‘Industrialisation and Industrial Policy in Malaysia’, in 
Jomo, K.S. (ed.), Malaysian Industrial Policy, National University of Singapore (NUS) Press Singapore 
(2007)   
369
 See: Roslan, A.H., ‘Income Inequality, Poverty and Development Policy in Malaysia’, paper presented 
at the International Seminar on "Poverty and Sustainable Development", Université Montesquieu-
Bordeaux IV and UNESCO-Paris, France (22-23 November 2001). 
370
 Ibid, pp.18-20 
371
 Contrast this with Townley’s view on “public policy” in the context of Article 101 TFEU. Townley viewed 
“public policy” as synonym to “non-economic” goals, which are all public policy goals such as public 
health, plurarity of the media except consumer welfare.See: Townley, C., ‘Which Goals Count  in Article 
101 TFEU?: Public Policy and Its Discontents’, European Competition Law Review, Issue 9 (2011) 441-
448, footnote 2 
372
 Boshoff, W. et al, ‘The Economics Of Public Interest Provisions In South African Competition Policy’, 
Sixth Annual Competition Law, Economics and Policy Conference, South  Africa (2012) at 
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standard concerns consumer welfare and efficiency which are economic standards. It is 
challenging to translate equity based considerations such as “impact of ability of small 
businesses to become competitive” into quantifiable economic terms373. Second, 
calculation under an economic model in competition law is based on partial equilibrium 
approach because it would facilitate reasonable predictions on the impact on the market 
in question; whereas public interest considerations concern potential effects which are 
sometimes beyond the market374. This is because public interest sometimes impact 
markets or industries beyond the one being considered in competition matters. Third, 
public interest sometimes involves assessments based on dynamic efficiency which 
concerns long term productivity that involves future uncertainties375.  However, all these 
should not be hindrances in the quest to develop an economic model for the balancing 
of non-competition with competition considerations.  
 
In regard to the quantification of non-economic based considerations, Townley has 
suggested a possible method for quantification of non-economic considerations376 
whereby quantitative weights are to be assigned to them by accounting for: the 
significance of the impact of the non-economic consideration; combining qualitative and 
                                                                                                                                            
Conference-in-South-Africa-2012/NewFolder-3/The-economics-of-public-interest-provisions-in-South-
African-competition-policy.pdf 
373
 Ibid, p. 26 
374
 Hodge, J. et al, ‘Public Interest Provisions in the South African Competition Act: A Critical Review’, in 
Moodaliyar, K. And Roberts, S. (Eds), The Development of Competition Law and Economics in South 
Africa, Human Sciences Research Council South Africa (2012), pp.12-13 
375
 Boshoff, W. et al, ‘The Economics Of Public Interest Provisions In South African Competition Policy’, 
Sixth Annual Competition Law, Economics and Policy Conference, South  Africa (2012), p.27 at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/events/SIxth-Annual-Competition-Law-Economics-and-Policy-
Conference-in-South-Africa-2012/NewFolder-3/The-economics-of-public-interest-provisions-in-South-
African-competition-policy.pdf 
376
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quantitative weights via a suitable method of calculation; likelihood that the objective will 
be achieved/harmed; and comparison between present and future cost and benefits via 
discounting mechanism. However, Boshoff et al377 argued that public interest with 
efficiency goals should be prioritised because efficiency and equity goals are often 
mutually reinforcing. Thus, for example, in assessing “impact of ability of small 
businesses to become competitive” or environmental concerns, it could be translated in 
economic terms by looking at the impact on allocation of resources. Alternatively, to 
ensure equity based consideration which are too difficult to be translated into economic 
terms are not excluded, the weight allocation method as suggested by Townley could 
be utilised to complement the economic approach in quantifying non-economic 
considerations. ,As for the method of calculation under the economic approach to 
account for the impact of public interest which are beyond the market in question, 
Hodge et al argued that assessment based on general equilibrium approach is required 
in dealing with public interest considerations which concern potential effects beyond the 
market in question378. For instance, in Wal-Mart/ Massmart, the impact on employment 
was modelled using a broader interpretation of employment multipliers in supplier 
industries and employment conditions from a social accounting matrix rather than just 
considering pure employment numbers. However, this would entail the gathering of data 
                                            
377
 Boshoff, W. et al, ‘The Economics Of Public Interest Provisions In South African Competition Policy’, 
Sixth Annual Competition Law, Economics and Policy Conference, South  Africa (2012) at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/events/SIxth-Annual-Competition-Law-Economics-and-Policy-
Conference-in-South-Africa-2012/NewFolder-3/The-economics-of-public-interest-provisions-in-South-
African-competition-policy.pdf,  
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and documents which are beyond the standard information required in standard 
competition analysis. In this regard, the method in determining “the relevant market” is 
paramount and the approach to be utilised ought to be case specific, depending on the 
nature of the public interest in question – whether it would potentially impact a broader 
sector across the economy.  The economic calculation of non-competition 
considerations in developing countries should be based on dynamic efficiency goals to 
encourage innovation for the sake of development379 regardless of the uncertainties. Of 
course, calculation based on static efficiency goals would present a more accurate 
outcome as compared to dynamic efficiency goals which concern future outcomes, but 
for developing countries, the dynamic efficiency approach is growth and development 
friendly.   
 
The next issue regarding the balancing of competition with non-competition 
considerations is on the suitability of competition institutions in determining issues 
concerning public interest which involves considerations which are beyond competition 
concerns. It has been argued that public interest issues should only be dealt with by the 
government and competition officials have not been mandated to decide on public 
policy issues380. Another argument is that public interest would be more appropriately 
                                            
379
 See discussion in Chapter 4 of this thesis regarding the theory on the relationship between competition 
and innovation.   
380
 Boshoff, W. et al, ‘The Economics Of Public Interest Provisions In South African Competition Policy’, 
Sixth Annual Competition Law, Economics and Policy Conference, South  Africa (2012), p.27 at 
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dealt with under other legislation or policies and not competition381. However, 
competition authorities should be made accountable for any trade-offs between 
competition and public interest that they would have to make in their assessment382. 
Competition issues such as exemptions granted to cartels and mergers may impact not 
just the market in question but also other linked markets and industries; the economy 
across the board; and also significant social issues in the country. This may be seen 
from Wal-Mart/ Massmart, where one of the likely impacts of the merger would be 
employment losses in South Africa and adverse impact on the development of the 
domestic industries and small and medium sized businesses because the global 
procurement networking of Wal-Mart may lead to procurement being diverted to Asia 
where production costs are cheaper. A competition authority may not be in the best 
position to decide on matters which are beyond or outside of the remit of their expertise 
and responsibilities383. In this regard, reference to other agencies would have to be 
made and this may risk competition considerations being trumped by other 
considerations such as trade and industry – hence, undermining the independence of 
the competition authority.  This could be seen from the cases of Wal-mart/ Massmart 
and Kansai/ Freeworld where the government tried to manipulate the competition 
authorities to enforce its industrial policy on foreign direct investment via their 
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 See: ‘Article 101 (3) – A Discussion of Narrow Versus Broad Definition of Benefits’,  Office of Fair 
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382
 See: Townley, C., ‘Which Goals Count  in Article 101 TFEU?: Public Policy and Its Discontents’, 
European Competition Law Review, Issue 9 (2011) 441-448, pp.447-448 
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interventions in the said merger applications which were considered by the competition 
authorities384. South African case law on mergers provides a viable view on the way to 
solve this issue. In Metropolitan Holdings Ltd/ Momentum Group Ltd, it was held that the 
South African competition authorities are only concerned with residual public interest by 
complementing or supporting the functions of other government authorities385. A Labour 
Tribunal would not be a suitable entity to determine public interest issues in regard to 
competition matters and its function also differs from the competition authorities in  
terms of timing of its decision making because the assessment of the competition 
authorities are prior to the merger whilst a Labour Tribunal would conduct their 
assessment post merger386. Competition authorities are merely empowered to consider 
merger specific impacts on public interests and not public interest issues which are not 
related to the merger in question387. In the author’s opinion, competition authorities who 
have been mandated by the law to consider public interest or non-competition 
considerations in the implementation of competition should be accountable for their 
decision. Of course, reference and advice from other relevant entities should be sought 
but independence in decision making is paramount. The decision to be made has to be 
independently done via a systematic and transparent model, based on appropriate 
justifications.  Otherwise, the credibility of the competition authorities may be adversely 
affected and it would not be good for effective competition law enforcement388.  
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The MyCC may also have to deal with another aspect in terms of the interaction 
between competition and development – that is, competition policy being made 
subservient to other policies, particularly industrial and trade policies. A good early 
example would be the “watering down” of the draft Competition Bill 2010 whereby the 
merger control provisions were excluded from the Competition Act 2010 due to the 
feedback from Bank Negara Malaysia and the Securities Commission for the sake of 
capital market development and enhancing the competitiveness of domestic players 
through mergers and acquisition401. It may be argued that this is a result of competition 
being viewed as a subservient to the country’s development agenda. This competition 
with development agenda would be an impediment to cartel enforcement in Malaysia if 
appropriate assessment mechanisms are not adopted. A proper mechanism could be 
one which weighs the pro and anti-competitive benefits of the issue at hand and the 
assessment ought to be based on dynamic efficiency goals. This is to ensure that any 
flexibilities accorded are justified and do not involve total elimination of competition. 
 
In implementing cartel enforcement, it is also likely that the MyCC would have to deal 
with cartel infringements involving government linked companies or firms which enjoy 
the benefit of political patronage. In such cases, there may be political intervention in 
the decision and course of action to be undertaken by the MyCC; or the firms may also 
plead for exemption or even exclusion from the remit of the Competition Act 2010. In 
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cases of political intervention in order to protect firms which enjoy economic rent due to 
political patronage, the independence of the MyCC is paramount. In the latter instance, 
it is pertinent for an appropriate filtering mechanism to be adopted and duly 
implemented to prevent rent seeking activities which are deceptively pleaded as 
activities which qualify to be exempted or excluded from the remit of the Competition 
Act 2010. For example, rent seeking activities of firms enjoying political patronage may 
be pleaded as involving “ ... enterprises entrusted with the operation of services of 
general economic interest in so far as the prohibition under Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 of 
Part II would obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned 
to that enterprise.”402 
 
Undue pressure such as political interference in the enforcement works of the MyCC 
could be alleviated or prevented through independence of the competition authorities. 
Independence of competition authorities means they are able to make unfettered 
decisions. When competition authorities are seen to be independent in their decision 
making where their decisions are not influenced by other parties and they are free to 
implement the law accordingly without being constrained by being made subject to 
another body, then public respect and confidence would be gained. Under the South 
African competition law regime, the Competition Commission administers the law – 
conducting investigations, prosecuting cases and making recommendations before the 
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Competition Tribunal403. This is in contrast to the Malaysian set-up whereby the MyCC 
is the enforcer and adjudicator of cases under the Competition Act 2010, appeals is 
heard by the Competition Appeal Tribunal.  It may be argued that the South African 
structure renders lesser responsibilities on the Competition Commission and thus allows 
them to be more focused on investigation and prosecution works. Moreover, it could be 
perceived that there is more independence in the adjudication because it is conducted 
by a different body.  
 
In terms of appointment of competition officials, in South Africa, the appointment of 
Competition Commissioners is made by the Minister of Trade and Industry, South Africa 
whilst appointment of the members of the Competition Tribunal is made by the 
President of South Africa404. In Malaysia, Competition Commissioners and members of 
the Competition Appeal Tribunal are appointed by the Prime Minister of Malaysia based 
on nomination by the Minister of Domestic Trade, Co-operatives and Consumerism405. 
In this regard, it may also be perceived that the competition law adjudicators in South 
Africa are more superior that the Competition Commission officials because they are 
appointed by the President. Therefore, the Competition Tribunal Members could not be 
influenced by the Competition Commission officials in their decision making.  
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 OECD, Competition Law and Policy in South Africa – An OECD Peer Review, (May 2003), p.37 
404
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The MyCC has been established as an agency under the purview of the Ministry of 
Domestic Trade, Co-operatives and Consumerism and the said Minister is also 
responsible for the implementation of the Competition Commission Act 2010. In this 
regard, the responsible Minister also has the discretion to amend the exclusion list 
under the Competition Act 2010406 whereas under the South African competition law, 
the responsible Minister is only empowered to designate industries to be exempted in 
view of its economic stability after consultation with the Minister responsible for the 
industry in question. Clearly, the powers of the responsible Minister under the Malaysian 
competition law is wider and could be exercised without any significant check and 
balance mechanism installed. This is because exclusion is wider than exemption as it 
carves out the excluded activity; industry; or business from the remit of competition law 
altogether. Moreover, the exemption to be granted for the economic stability of the 
industry under the South African law as designated by the Minister requires the Minister 
to consult the Minister responsible to the industry in question in making the designation.  
 
Thus, it could be argued that under the present structure and competition regulatory 
framework in Malaysia, there may be room for interference in the decision making 
process of the MyCC. These enable the Minister to influence not only the decisions of 
the MyCC because of the position of the MyCC and also the wide powers granted to the 
Minister under the Competition Act 2010 to exclude; but also through selection of 
individuals to be appointed as Commissioners. Currently, there is no apparent check 
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and balance mechanism in place to prevent abuse of discretionary powers by the 
Minister. Appeals to the decisions of the MyCC are heard before the Competition 
Appeal Tribunal whose members, as mentioned earlier are also appointed by the Prime 
Minister based on the recommendation of the responsible Minister. 
 
To sum, the general principles which are relevant to Malaysia in formulating an 
appropriate cartel enforcement policy in the implementation of the Competition Act 2010 
are: addressing the lack of competition culture; implementing cartel enforcement within 
the allowance of limited resources; clarification of the modality for gradual 
implementation of the Competition Act 2010; addressing legislation inadequacies; 
addressing disjunctions with other policies which are pertinent to Malaysia’s 
development objectives; and establishing and maintaining independence of the 
competition authorities. South Africa have also experienced similar challenges and 
limitations as explained above and despite some differences in the legal framework and 
provisions, there are valuable lessons to be learned by Malaysia from South Africa. 
These are discussed in detail in the next section. 
 
3.5. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM SOUTH AFRICA IN FORMULATING AN 
APPROPRIATE CARTEL ENFORCEMENT POLICY FOR MALAYSIA 
 
Before the discussion proceeds, the differences between Malaysia and South Africa 
should be noted, particularly concerning the circumstance and market environment of 
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each country when their respective competition law was adopted. This is important in 
order to determine what are the adaptations which would have to be made by Malaysia 
should it decide to emulate the South African cartel enforcement policies, methods and 
approaches.  The first difference is that the South African competition law was adopted 
as part of the legislative reform post apartheid; whilst Malaysia’s was adopted for 
development facilitation purposes – to achieve developed nation or high income status 
by 2020. The second difference is that at the time of the adoption of the Competition Act 
1998, the South African market was highly concentrated to which some were 
sanctioned by the state; the market was only just opening to international trade due to 
the embargo imposed by the international community and import substitution reliant and 
there was income and quality of life disparity between the minority and majority groups 
in South Africa407. However, its property rights were strong and the market institutions 
were well developed408.  Malaysia faced some of these issues such as income disparity, 
reliance on import substitution and has addressed them throughout the 1970’s and 
1980’s409. Additionally, when the Competition Act 2010 was adopted, Malaysia’s 
economy was already open and significantly reliant on international trade. Nevertheless 
there are competition concerns in the form of market concentration in some industries, 
coupled with political patronage and cronyism, price fixing and possible market 
allocation cases which have been uncovered.  
 
                                            
407
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Nevertheless, the similarities between Malaysia and South Africa as explained earlier 
are relevant and despite the above mentioned differences, both pieces of legislation 
have development as one of their main aims. Perhaps Malaysia is not wrong at all in not 
focusing on the structural aspect in its competition law at the moment and that the need 
for a structural approach in competition law enforcement would emerge as cartel 
enforcement progresses to become stricter. With the absence of the competition 
dimension in the countries current merger control regulation, the limited resources 
available to the MyCC could be focused on cartel enforcement and other aspects of 
competition law. The significance of the above mentioned differences is, by logical 
deduction, it would not be too bold to suggest that Malaysia should be able to 
implement stricter cartel enforcement within a shorter period than it took South Africa 
which was five (5) years after adoption of the law. On the other hand, the difference in 
terms of market openness between Malaysia and South Africa when their respective 
competition laws were adopted could be used as an excuse veiled as a justification to 
delay tougher cartel enforcement or full implementation of the Competition Act 2010.  
 
Nevertheless, the point being emphasised here is not that the above said differences 
between South Africa and Malaysia renders South Africa’s competition law enforcement 
experience irrelevant or unsuitable to be referred to by Malaysia but that cartel 
enforcement should be focused on by Malaysia from the get go since merger regulation 
is not in the picture and the South African experience in gradually implementing its 
cartel enforcement is relevant to Malaysia in view of the government’s decision to 
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gradually implement the Competition Act 2010. This is because if gradual enforcement 
is incorrectly implemented, Malaysia’s cartel enforcement would not advance 
accordingly. Determining a suitable formula in terms of gradual enforcement is pertinent 
because gradual enforcement itself may be viewed as a “watering down” of competition 
law enforcement.  Therefore, gradual enforcement requires both a suitable approach to 
acclimatise society to accept and respect competition law and also accommodate 
development and socio-economic concerns under the competition regulatory 
framework.  
 
South Africa’s competition law enforcement experience has illustrated that cartel 
enforcement strategy would have to be dynamic, conforming to the competition 
agencies’ level of competency and capacity and public awareness of competition policy 
and law. Initially, the cartel enforcement approach ought to be softer and reactive. This 
is to allow time for the competition agencies to build up their competency and capacity 
and also to accord businesses a grace period to be familiar with the requirements under 
the competition law and undertake remedial actions, or in other words, putting their 
houses in order. So far, Malaysia is on the right track; however, there has to be a 
definite time limit set for this transactional period and it would have to be acted on 
without entertaining any request for extensions. In the meantime, the MyCC should start 
honing their skills in cartel enforcement by going after glaring cartel infringements such 
as those involving hard core cartel offences which have been provided for under the 
Competition Act 2010 as having the object of significantly preventing, restricting or 
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distorting competition410.  Such infringements would be easier to establish. Cartel 
enforcement should be implemented in Malaysia from the beginning of implementation 
of competition law and should not be subject to any abeyance or exemptions or 
limitations in the remit which have been provided for under the law. In order for a shift in 
the business culture paradigm to occur, the law has to be enforced albeit based on 
appropriate strategies. 
 
As per South Africa’s cartel enforcement experience, Malaysia should adopt cartel 
enforcement tools which are less costly and able to be implemented but would bear a 
marked impact on cartel detection. These include a leniency programme and a 
prioritisation framework, similar to those implemented in South Africa. The advantage 
for Malaysia is that leniency is mandated under the Competition Act 2010411, whereas in 
South Africa it is part of its cartel enforcement policy. Based on the South African 
experience, the leniency policy is effective in detecting cartels when coupled with 
proactive cartel enforcement which increases the risk of detection. Despite this, it is 
recommended that Malaysia’s leniency programme is drafted even in the initial stages 
of cartel enforcement, by referring to the South African leniency policy and also the 
worldwide best practices. Once the MyCC is ready to implement stricter cartel 
enforcement, the leniency policy can be immediately implemented.  
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Another enforcement tool implemented in South Africa which ought to be immediately 
adopted by Malaysia is a prioritisation framework in cartel enforcement. Malaysia’s 
prioritisation framework should include areas and industries which are:  traditional and 
stable industries where the industry and its market behaviour are well understood by 
industry specialists so as to lessen erroneous enforcement actions; prone to cartel 
infringements; and bear direct impacts to consumers - particularly poorer groups of 
consumers and the public at large. As such, the MyCC would have to identify markets 
with features which would facilitate collusion such as concentrated markets, 
homogenous goods and inelastic demands. Additionally, the MyCC should also look 
into trade associations’ activities including those in unconcentrated markets and 
industries. The limited resources for cartel enforcement therefore could be concentrated 
on the priority markets and industries. However, suspicious activities in other markets 
and industries should not be pushed aside. Although it has been argued that prioritising 
certain markets would send the message to businesses that it would be less risky to 
cartelise in “unprioritised” markets412 but this is an appropriate approach for developing 
countries with limited resources. 
 
Leniency programme and prioritisation framework should be coupled with basic 
techniques in cartel screening which does not require complicated efforts in cartel 
detection via resource intensive investigations and sophisticated economic analysis. 
                                            
412
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The South African experience has shown that basic techniques such as analysis of 
price and supply trends based on readily available data and gaining information by 
asking basic questions regarding price determination by firms are effective in detecting 
cartels. This approach is suitable for Malaysia as a developing country with a young 
competition jurisdiction. However, as cartel enforcement progresses and the skills and 
experience of the MyCC in cartel enforcement improves and more resources are 
available, more developed, technical and sophisticated techniques should be adopted 
and implemented. In this regard, the need for investment in training human resources 
and also setting-up a dedicated team focussing on cartel enforcement is clear. Like it or 
not, cartel enforcement requires technical and adequate knowledge on the psychology 
and economics of cartels which would go to any lengths necessary to prevent discovery 
of their illicit arrangements. 
 
South Africa’s cartel enforcement experience also shows that in order to take away the 
incentive for firms to cartelise, there has to be threat of serious penalties. Earlier 
discussion in this chapter has explained how cartel infringements are imposed heavy 
fines and also highlighted the fact that South African competition law now also provides 
for criminal sanctions in cartel cases. In this regard, the Malaysian competition 
legislation provides for substantive fines to be imposed on infringement offences under 
Part II of the Competition Act 2010 cases which include prohibited cartel agreements. 
The MyCC may impose a fine not exceeding ten (10) per cent of the worldwide turnover 
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over the period of the infringement413. Other than the infringements under Part II, any 
person (natural and/or body corporate) who commits an offence under the Competition 
Act 2010 of which there are no specific penalty mentioned, may be subject to heavy 
fines and imprisonment414. Offences include those committed in relation to the 
investigation and enforcement of the Competition Act 2010. Clearly, these reflect 
Malaysia’s seriousness in combating not only cartels but prohibited anti-competitive 
conducts in general. These penalties should be fully implemented after the grace period 
for remedial actions ends in order to deter firms from entering into anti-competitive 
horizontal agreements or continuing with their cartel arrangements by rendering cartels 
more costly for firms to operate and not profitable enough to rationalise or maintain the 
cartel agreements between its members. 
 
Strategic competition advocacy also features significantly in the South African 
competition law regime. The South African cartel enforcement experience shows that 
Malaysia has to adopt strategic competition advocacy in engagements between the 
MyCC with other regulators and policy making agencies; and also building competition 
awareness in the country. Based on what has been undertaken by the MyCC so far, 
awareness and advocacy programmes have been focused on by the MyCC since early 
                                            
413
 Section 41 (4) Competition Act 2010, Malaysia 
414
 See Sections 61 and 63 Competition Act 2010, Malaysia. The imprisonment penalty in this regard 
relates to conducts which affect the investigation and enforcement of the Competition Act 2010 are 
considered as offences which are punishable by imprisonment of individuals even offending for the first 
time and/or substantive fines. This is different from the introduction of criminal sanctions for cartel 
offences in South Africa because cartel offences per se are not subject to criminal sanctions but failure to 
provide access to records to the Competition Commission in the investigation and enforcement of cases 
under the Act is an offence which may result in imprisonment of the individual involved. (see Section 20 
Competition Act 2010, Malaysia). 
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2011. As at December 2011, the MyCC have held or jointly held a number of public 
consultations415, training courses416 and briefing or dialogue sessions with 
stakeholders417. It is also interesting to note that the first training session jointly 
organised with APEC was on mechanisms against cartel offences. This may be viewed 
as a reflection of Malaysia’s concern on anti-competitive cartel activities. This is all well 
and good but in order to garner significant impact within the constraints of limited 
resources, competition advocacy has to be strategically implemented – a lesson to be 
learned from South Africa. This includes tailoring competition advocacy programmes 
according to the target group and establishing good networking with the media. 
Advocacy programmes with other regulators and policy making agencies ought to be 
implemented via formal mechanisms such as joint committees or memorandums of 
understanding. This is to ensure that the MyCC’s views on issues with competition 
dimensions are accounted for in the decision making process of other economic and 
commercial areas and there is coordination between the enforcement efforts of the 
MyCC with those of other agencies. In relation to businesses, the MyCC should be 
engaging in consultation and advisory programmes in order to facilitate undertakings to 
                                            
415
 Such as regarding “Guidelines on: Market Definition, Chapter 1 and Complaints Procedures”. See 
MyCC website at http://www.mycc.gov.my/234_179_179/Web/WebEvent/Events/Upcoming-Events.html  
accessed on 28/12/2011 
416
 Among others: APEC Training Course on Competition Policy - Effective Mechanism Against Cartel 
Offences, 10-12 October 2011, Penang, Malaysia; The Competition Act 2010 – Impact, Issues and 
Challenges, 13 October 2011, Science University of Malaysia, Penang; Seminar on Competition Law and 
Consumer Welfare, 3 November 2011, Kuala Lumpur. See MyCC website at 
http://www.mycc.gov.my/234_179_179/Web/WebEvent/Events/Upcoming-Events.html  accessed on 
28/12/2011 
417
 Until October 2011, 30 briefing/dialogue sessions have been held by the Malaysian Competition 
Commission. These involved stakeholders such as producers, professional bodies, policy makers, 
academicians, consumer associations and the Bank of Malaysia. See Malaysian Competition 
Commission website at http://www.mycc.gov.my/269_213_213/Web/WebPage/2011/2011.html accessed 
on 28/12/2011. 
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“put their houses in order” as per the requirements of the Competition Act 2010. As for 
consumers and the public at large, awareness programmes explaining the workings and 
benefits of competition law and the harm of cartels to the economy and consumers 
should be carried out. Particular emphasis should be accorded to the aspects which 
illustrates cartel harms in areas which consumers and the public at large can relate to 
such as the prices of food, agricultural inputs construction materials. Additionally, in 
Malaysia, it would also be useful for the competition concept to be explained in terms of 
its parallels with Islamic concepts418. This is indeed useful because Malaysia is a 
Muslim majority and Muslim led country, namely by the Malays who largely make up not 
only the civil service but also the higher echelons of Malaysian politics. Hence, it would 
also be useful to garner support for cartel enforcement and increase the awareness of 
the benefits of cartel enforcement not only amongst the consumers and public at large, 
but also the decision makers in the country.  
 
Strategic partnerships and networking with the media would also be useful initiatives. As 
the saying goes “people will believe it when they see it”, so the MyCC would have to 
initiate a few cases of cartel infringements which could be highlighted by the media to 
demonstrate the harmful effects of cartels and the advantages of cartel enforcement.  
However, in highlighting cartel investigation and prosecution, the MyCC should heed all 
legislative related provisions lest such publicity backfires like what happened to the 
                                            
418
 For an explanation of the Islamic perspective on competition law and policy see Zulkifli, H., ‘Islamic 
Perspective on The Competition Law and Policy’, Islamic Science University of Malaysia (2008) at 
http://zulkiflihasan.files.wordpress.com/2008/07/islam-and-competition-policy.pdf 
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South African Competition Commission in 2001 in the investigation of cement cartel419. 
This is because such enforcement mistakes would not only be detrimental to the 
MyCC’s efforts in establishing their credibility but they also risk facing legal action by the 
alleged cartelist firms which are mostly firms which would not hesitate to institute legal 
action against the MyCC.    
 
Malaysia ought to take note of the difficulty in balancing non-competition considerations 
such as public interest under the Competition Act 1998, South Africa and competition 
considerations of efficiency and consumer welfare. Assessing competition cases based 
on considerations which go beyond economic considerations of efficiency and 
consumer welfare would result in distortions in allocation of resources and distribution of 
wealth. Although the South African jurisprudence on this aspect has been developed 
based on merger cases, the lesson to be learned here is also relevant to cartel 
enforcement particularly in regard to the granting of exemptions or exclusions. For 
Malaysia, this lesson is relevant in regard to the assessment of pro and anti-competitive 
benefits of a cartel infringement of cases which involve non-competition issues which 
are relevant to the socio-economic development and prevailing ideology of the country, 
                                            
419
 The Competition Commission raided the premises of companies allegedly involved in anti-competitive 
agreements in the cement industry. In this case the High Court set aside the Competition Commission’s 
summons on procedural ground and also because the rights of the respondents had been infringed by the 
Competition Commission by informing the media of the search and seizure and facilitating the latter’s 
access to the premise during the raid. In their eagerness to highlight their investigative efforts and 
increase public awareness of the benefits of cartel enforcement, the Competition Commission was not 
mindful enough of procedural law. Although the reactive strategy afforded time to the South African 
Competition Commission to hone their expertise in cartel enforcement and establish their credibility, it did 
not always give rise to commendable results. See: Pretoria Portland Cement Company Ltd. and Another 
vs. Commission and Others, case no. 64/2001 at http://www.comptrib.co.za/  accessed on 13/11/2011; 
Lavoie, C., ‘South Africa’s Corporate Leniency Policy: A Five Year Review’, World Competition Vol. 33(1) 
(2010), 141-162, p.142.  
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such as bumiputera rights or in connection to programmes and policies of poverty 
eradication and fairer distribution of economic wealth between the races.   
 
In terms of establishing the independence of the MyCC, Malaysia should take note of 
the importance of establishing check and balance mechanisms to ensure any aspects of 
cartel enforcement under the competition law which involves discretion is based on 
systematic and objective assessments. This is to prevent abuse of discretionary powers 
either by the MyCC, its commissioners or the minister. This could be implemented either 
be through administrative measures or amendments to the law if necessary. Along this 
same line of argument, Malaysia ought to note that independence of the competition 
authorities is important in order to establish their credibility in the eyes of the public, 
particularly the business community and consumers. There are some aspects in the 
structure; nature of appointment of Competition Commissioners and Competition 
Appeal Tribunal members; and discretionary powers of the responsible Minister which 
may affect the perception of independence of the competition authorities in carrying  out 
their functions. Thus, it is vital that check and balance mechanisms are established. 
 
The tools and policies implemented by South Africa in cartel enforcement are not novel. 
Cartel enforcement tools such as leniency are also included in the competition 
enforcement framework of other jurisdictions such as the EU, US, Japan and Australia. 
However, their experiences have shown that such tools could facilitate cartel 
enforcement regardless of the development level of the country. Additionally, South 
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Africa’s experience have also emphasised the need for competition authorities in 
developing countries to be innovative in cartel enforcement, albeit within the limits of 
available resources.  
 
To recap, effective cartel enforcement in the Malaysian context as proposed by this 
work refers to the existence of credible competition authorities and competent 
competition law enforcement. Credible means the existence of a competition 
enforcement regime which is able to function within its limited resources; independent; 
and accepted by society. Whilst competent competition law enforcement means the 
ability of the competition authorities to detect, investigate and prosecute cartels under 
the law which in turn creates credible risk of discovery and punishment to cartels 
without compromising development gains to the country.  South Africa’s competition law 
regime had established credibility and competency because as illustrated in this 
chapter, the South African competition authorities have been able to function within the 
limitations of their resources; the framework of the South African competition law 
enforcement regime also provides for adequate checks and balances to enable the 
competition authorities to enforce the law independently; and competition culture has 
been established in South Africa which is reflected in the public support for criminal 
sanctions to be imposed on cartel infringements. These establish credibility. Whilst the 
increase in leniency applications and number of cartel discoveries in South Africa as 
discussed earlier; the imposition of heavy financial penalties in cartel infringement 
cases; and the South African competition authorities endeavour in accommodating the 
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development dimension in their enforcement of competition law, such as public interests 
considerations – establishes competency. Thus, the South African competition law 
enforcement experience is indeed relevant reference for Malaysia.  
 
3.6. CONCLUSION 
 
In answering the question of “how to determine an appropriate cartel enforcement policy 
for Malaysia?” this work explains that Malaysia’s cartel enforcement policy needs to be 
formulated based on Malaysia’s own terms; accounting for the objectives of its 
competition law; development objectives; and prevailing socio-economic ideology. In 
this regard, Malaysia should refer to other competition jurisdictions for insights. The 
discussion argues that reference to the South African competition law enforcement 
experience is warranted based on shared similarities with Malaysia in terms of 
development and socio-economic concerns; their achievements in cartel enforcement 
despite the limitations faced by the competition authorities; and the argument that South 
African competition jurisprudence is sympathetic to inclusive development – which is 
also relevant to Malaysia.  
 
The second research question - “what are the general principles in developing an 
appropriate cartel enforcement policy for Malaysia?” is answered by first discussing 
effective cartel enforcement in the Malaysian context. Effective cartel enforcement as 
proposed in this work refers to the existence of credible competition authorities and 
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competent competition law enforcement. Credible means the existence of a competition 
enforcement regime which is able to function within its limited resources; independent; 
and accepted by society. Whilst competent competition law enforcement means the 
ability of the competition authorities to detect, investigate and prosecute cartels under 
the law which in turn creates credible risk of discovery and punishment to cartels 
without compromising development gains to the country.  This is relevant because the 
aim of Malaysia’s cartel enforcement policy should be affective cartel enforcement; thus, 
the general principles in developing an appropriate cartel enforcement policy for 
Malaysia have to be guided by effective cartel enforcement in the Malaysian context. As 
such, the general principles in developing an appropriate cartel enforcement policy for 
Malaysia identified in this discussion are: addressing the lack of competition culture; 
implementing cartel enforcement within the allowance of limited resources; clarification 
of the modality for gradual implementation of the Competition Act 2010; addressing 
legislation inadequacies; addressing disjunctions with other policies which are pertinent 
to Malaysia’s development objectives; and establishing and maintaining independence 
of the competition authorities. 
 
In answering the last research question, “what are the lessons to be learned from South 
Africa in regard to cartel enforcement?”, this work has laid out several lessons to be 
learned from South Africa in regard to cartel enforcement. In summary, cartel 
enforcement should be dynamic, strategic and innovative. These involve: implementing 
appropriate approaches as cartel enforcement progresses in Malaysia – becoming 
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stricter in time as society’s awareness of competition and cartel enforcement experience 
develops; adoption of cartel enforcement tools which are less costly and simple to 
implement but would bear a marked impact on cartel detection; adopting strategic 
competition advocacy in engagements between the MyCC and other regulators, policy 
making agencies and the public in order to build competition awareness in the country; 
noting that accounting for non-competition consideration in cartel enforcement which 
require assessments that go beyond the economic considerations of efficiency and 
consumer welfare risks misallocation of resources and distortions in distribution of 
economic wealth; and the importance of establishing the independence of the 
competition authorities. More importantly, this work has illustrated that the South African 
competition law enforcement experience is indeed relevant to Malaysia because the 
elements for the two indicators of effective cartel enforcement in the Malaysian context 
as recommended by this work are present under the South African Competition regime. 
 
Most of the cartel enforcement tools and approaches which have been implemented by 
the South African competition authorities are not novel to the competition fraternity. 
However, what their cartel enforcement experience and competition law jurisprudence 
have pointed out is that limitations faced by developing countries and development 
concerns could be managed and accommodated without compromising competition 
goals. This may be inferred through the gradual cartel enforcement approach (reactive 
to proactive); innovativeness in implementation commensurate with available resources; 
and the South African competition authorities’ attempts to accommodate public interest 
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in the implementation of the Competition Act 1998. Nevertheless, this work is not 
advocating for Malaysia to solely refer to South Africa in regard to cartel enforcement 
but that South Africa’s competition law enforcement and jurisprudence should not be 
failed to be studied by fellow middle income developing countries such as Malaysia.  
The point being put across is that in regard to gaining insights for the formulation of an 
appropriate cartel enforcement policy for Malaysia, the South African competition law 
enforcement experience is relevant. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
TOWARDS AN APPROPRIATE IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK ON 
HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS EXEMPTIONS IN MALAYSIA 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Ideally, competition law should apply across the board on all industries, enterprise, 
private or public entities so long as they are engaging in commercial activities420. 
However, sometimes exemptions and exclusions are provided for in a country’s 
competition legislation based on economic or non-economic considerations421. In June 
2010, the Malaysian Competition Act 2010 was passed by Parliament and both 
exemptions and exclusions have been included in the legislation. Although exemptions 
and exclusions are sometimes used interchangeably422, this work distinguishes between 
exclusions and exemptions. Khemani explained exemptions as being “excused or free 
from some obligation to which others are subject” while exclusions as being “excluded 
                                            
420
 Khemani, R.S., ‘Application of Competition Law: Exemptions and Exceptions’, UNCTAD (2002), 
UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/Misc.25, p.5 available at http://www.unctad.org/EN/docs/ditcclpmisc25_en.pdf  
421
 The objectives of exemptions vary across jurisdictions worldwide. Namely they include: efficiency 
(Canada, New Zealand); public interest (United Kingdom); consumer welfare and economic efficiency 
(US); fairness (Indonesia, Russian Federation) (see Khemani, R.S., ‘Application of Competition Law: 
Exemptions and Exceptions’, UNCTAD (2002), UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/Misc.25, p.8 available at 
http://www.unctad.org/EN/docs/ditcclpmisc25_en.pdf ) 
Based on the objectives of its competition law, Malaysia’s objectives for exemptions are: economic 
development, promotion of competition and consumer protection based on efficiency goals (see preamble 
to the Competition Act 2010) 
422
 The flexibilities accorded to various anti-competitive activities in Japan from 1950’s to 1973 are usually 
referred to as exemptions. However, in actual fact some of them are exclusions because such anti-
competitive activities were excluded from the application of the Anti-monopoly Act 1947. For example, 
laws which allowed for the formation of government approved cartels including SME cartels, Import-
Export cartels and textile cartels exempted the cartels from the scope of application of the Anti-monopoly 
Act 1947. These were actually exclusions because such cartels were excluded regardless of the anti-
competitive conducts they were engaging in.    
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from or not conforming to a general class, principle, rule etc”423 . In other words, the 
exempted activity per se is subject to the purview of competition law but the excluded 
activity is not. Exclusions are carved out of the remit of the law ab initio. For example, in 
certain jurisdictions, although price fixing cartels are generally prohibited under 
competition law; in theory, if the applicant firm could prove that it fulfils certain 
conditions as stipulated under the law, it may be allowed and exempted from being 
subject to the rules regarding anti-competitive cartels424. On the other hand, exclusions 
are activities or a class of activities which are not subject to the anti-competitive 
prohibitions under competition law ab initio, such as certain aspects of the agricultural 
sector under EU competition law425; and collective bargaining activities or revenue 
producing monopolies in Malaysia which have been excluded by virtue of the Second 
Schedule and Section 13, Competition Act 2010. Under the Malaysian competition 
legislation, exemptions and exclusions are distinct426. 
 
The focus of this discussion is exemption of horizontal agreements, particularly cartel 
exemptions as provided for under the Malaysian Competition Act 2010 which shall be 
administered by the Malaysian Competition Commission (MyCC). Malaysia has adopted 
                                            
423
 Khemani, R.S., ‘Application of Competition Law: Exemptions and Exceptions’, UNCTAD (2002), 
UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/Misc.25, p.1  available at http://www.unctad.org/EN/docs/ditcclpmisc25_en.pdf 
424
 See: Article 101 TFEU. There is a two tier assessment system where agreements deemed as 
restricting competition under Article 101(1) TFEU but it may be allowed after and so long as the 
requirements under Article 101(3) TFEU are proven to be met.  
425
 Regulation 1184/2006 EU provides that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU apply to the production and trade 
of agriculture EXCEPT for: i) agreements, decisions and practices which form an integral part of national 
market organisations;ii) agreements, decisions and practices which are necessary for the attainment of 
the objectives of the CAP; and iii) agreements between farmers or association of farmers belonging to a 
single Member State not involving and obligation to charge identical prices.   
426
 Exemptions are by virtue of Sections 6 and 8 whilst exclusions are by virtue of Section 13 Competition 
Act 2010, Malaysia.  
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EU style exemptions provisions under the Competition Act 2010427. However, only time 
will tell whether Malaysia, a developing country, would be able to appropriately 
implement an exemption mechanism which is based on that of one of the leading 
competition jurisdictions in the world. 
 
Exemptions may be viewed as a mechanism that waters down competition legislation 
and the goals of competition policy due to the fact that it authorises restrictions in 
competition428. It also makes advocacy activities and efforts to strengthen competition 
culture harder due to differential treatment and inconsistencies. However, there are 
rationales for exemptions in competition, such as for the sake of economic growth and 
development based on dynamic efficiency goals429 and non-competition factors based 
on broader public policy considerations430. Nevertheless, exemptions have to be 
properly implemented to ensure that the relief granted is based on sound justifications 
according to the law and that exemptions are not abused. Otherwise, exemptions may 
not facilitate competition enforcement particularly for young competition agencies in 
developing countries. This chapter focuses on horizontal agreements between 
competitors because it is relatively easier to justify vertical restraints as compared to 
                                            
427
 The observation that Malaysia’s exemptions provisions under the Competition Act 2010 is modelled on 
those of the EU is based on the fact that the Competition Act 2010 are similarly worded (albeit under 
different provisions) with Article 101 TFEU; the distinction between individual and block exemptions; and 
the legislative provisions on the granting of exemptions are also based on broad conditions. 
428
 Khemani, R.S., ‘Application of Competition Law: Exemptions and Exceptions’, UNCTAD (2002), 
UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/Misc.25, pp.5-7  available at http://www.unctad.org/EN/docs/ditcclpmisc25_en.pdf )  
429
 An example of exemptions granted based on dynamic efficiency goals are horizontal research and 
development agreements in order to encourage innovation. 
430
 Examples of exemptions granted based on fairness are those granted to small and medium sized 
industries or sectors where the producers or owners of the firms are made up of disadvantaged groups in 
society (see Section 10 (3) (b) Competition Act 1998, South Africa); and exemptions granted to trade 
unions to address unequal bargaining power between employees and employers.  
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horizontal agreements between competitors which are prima facie more anti-
competitive431. Nevertheless, there have been instances when even hard core cartel 
agreements432 are exempted and there are horizontal agreements which warrant 
exemptions such as technology transfer agreements and cooperation in research and 
development agreements433. 
 
Exemptions cannot be appropriately implemented without a workable implementation 
framework despite the fact that the law is already in place. Without a workable 
implementation framework competition agencies risk granting exemptions which may be 
improperly granted either in substance or procedurally. This of course would negatively 
impact cartel enforcement under the law. Therefore, it is useful to discuss how the EU 
style legislative provisions on exemptions could be made to be implementable in 
Malaysia based on the factors which are likely to affect appropriate implementation of 
exemptions in Malaysia and the EU’s experience in the granting of exemptions. Main 
reference is made to the EU exemption mechanism because the Malaysian competition 
law provisions on horizontal agreements prohibitions and exemptions are based on 
those of Article 101 TFEU. As such, the research questions addressed in this chapter 
are: 1) What are the factors which influence proper implementation of exemptions in 
developing countries?; 2) could EU style exemptions mechanism be workable in 
                                            
431
 Jones, A. and Sufrin, B., EC Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, Third Edition (2008), 
Oxford University Press,  p. 225 
432
 See: for example, Visa International-Multilateral Interchange Fee, [2002] OJ L 318/17, [2003] 4 CMLR 
283. The case involved price fixing agreement between banks within the Visa system.  
433
 For example, the EU regulation on block exemptions for research and development, Commission 
Regulation (EU) No 1217/2010, OJ L335/36 (18.12.10). 
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Malaysia?; and if so, 3) what are the necessary elements to be included in the 
implementation framework for the granting of exemptions in Malaysia? 
 
The novelty of  this work lies not merely on the fact that it is about a new piece of 
legislation which is yet to be fully enforced but also because discussions in present 
literature do not emphasise on the implementation of cartel exemptions as much as say 
for example leniency and international cartel enforcement. Most work on cartel 
exemptions are in connection to other aspects such as export cartels434 or small and 
medium sized industries435.  There have been past work conducted among the policy 
circles such as UNCTAD436, WTO437 and the OECD438 which focused on exemptions 
but they are neither recent nor sufficiently extensive. The data gathered are mostly from 
developed countries such as OECD member countries. To date there is yet to be a 
study conducted on exemptions specifically in developing countries. 
 
The limitation of this work is that since the Competition Act 2010 is yet to be fully 
enforced and the relevant guidelines are not in place, the premise of the discussion is 
                                            
434
 See:  Levenstein, M. C. and Suslow, V. Y., ‘The Changing International Status of Export Cartel 
Exemptions’,  American University International Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 3; Ross School of Business 
Paper No. 897 (2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=618201 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.618201 
435
 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), ‘General Cartel Bans: Criteria for 
Exemption for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises’, OCDE/GD(97)53, OECD (1997) available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/54/1920345.pdf 
436
 Khemani, R.S., ‘Application of Competition Law: Exemptions and Exceptions’, UNCTAD (2002), 
UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/Misc.25 available at http://www.unctad.org/EN/docs/ditcclpmisc25_en.pdf 
437
 World Trade Organization, “Exceptions, Exemptions, and Exclusions Contained in 
Members’ National Competition Legislation”, WTO (2001), WT/WGTCP/W/172 (2001) available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/WGTCP/W172.doc 
438
 Hawk, B.E., ‘OECD Trade Committee study of the Sectoral Coverage (and Limitations) of Competition 
Laws and Policies’ OECD (1996) 
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based on foreseeable outcomes based on the experiences of the EU in particular and 
also those of Japan and South Africa. These are jurisdictions which have been 
implementing exemptions under their respective competition law. The EU is chosen 
because Malaysia has adopted EU style exemptions legislative provisions, Japan is 
chosen because of its experience in granting cartel exemptions throughout the years 
since 1950’s when it was still a developing country to date. South Africa is chosen 
because of its similar development status with Malaysia and the fact that its competition 
law is sympathetic to inclusive development439.  However, the main reference is focused 
on the EU experience in the granting of exemptions due to the similarity of legal 
provisions. 
 
The discussion in this chapter is organised as follows: in Part 2, exemption is explained 
in general and the notion that the existence of exemptions weakens competition law is 
discussed. Part 3 explains the meaning of appropriate implementation of exemptions 
and discusses the factors which are required to enable appropriate implementation of 
exemptions under the Competition Act 2010. Part 4 discusses the similarities and 
differences between the EU legislative provisions on exemptions and its Malaysian 
counterpart. This is to assess whether the EU style exemption mechanism could be 
workable for Malaysia. Part 5 discusses the necessary elements to be included in the 
                                            
439
 Fox, E.M., ‘In Search of a Competition Law Fit for Developing Countries’, New York University Law 
and Economics Research Paper No.11-04 (2011), p.11 at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1761619 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1761619 . See discussion in Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
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implementation framework for the granting of exemptions in Malaysia before the 
discussion concludes.  
 
4.2. EXEMPTIONS: WHAT ARE THEY AND DO THEY WEAKEN COMPETITION 
LAW?  
 
In competition law, exemption is a tool which could be utilised to facilitate acceptance of 
competition law by accommodating other objectives and programmes which relate to 
the prevailing socio-economic ideology and developmental needs of the country. Most 
of the times, exemptions are granted in pursuit of warranted objectives which include 
national interest440; development441 and broader policy objectives which complement 
and facilitate public acceptance of competition442 particularly in countries with young 
competition jurisdictions where competition is a novel concept to businesses and also 
                                            
440
 This may include food security; development of national champions; and strategic economic and trade 
interests. 
441
 For instance, various exemptions were granted to cartels in Japan from 1950’s to 1973 due to the 
country’s focus on industrial policy to generate growth which resulted in competition policy being made 
subservient to industrial policy. This in turn resulted in weak competition law enforcement. However this 
was not a case which illustrated that exemptions weakened competition law. Instead, it was a case of a 
conscious decision made by a country to focus on industrialisation for the sake of growth and 
development and exemptions were just a tool appropriated to achieve that goal. It can be argued that the 
exemptions granted in Japan then were based on justifications which were relevant to the country’s 
development goals at the time. See: Beeman, M.L., Public Policy and Economic Competition in Japan – 
Change and Continuity in Antimonopoly Policy, 1973-1995, Routledge (2002); Singh, A. and Dhumale, 
R., ‘Competition Policy, Development and Developing Countries’, South Centre Working Papers 7 
(November 1999) available at 
http://southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=315%3Acompetition-policy-
development-and-developing-countries-&catid=56%3Aother-issues-related-to-trade-
negotiations&Itemid=67&lang=en 
442
 For instance, under Section 10 (3) (b) (ii) Competition Act 1998, South Africa, exemptions may be 
granted to firms owned or controlled by historically disadvantaged people. This is in line with the country’s 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) Policy which has to be accounted for in order to remedy the 
economic distortions which resulted out of Apartheid, by virtue of the public interest consideration as 
stipulate under the Preamble, Competition Act 1998.  
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the public at large.  If such exemptions are not granted, or exemptions are granted 
solely based on efficiency and consumer welfare objectives without accounting for 
development and broader policy objectives, competition law may not be workable in 
such jurisdiction due operational issues in the implementation of the law which may 
include inconsistencies or disjunctions with other national policies such as development 
and industrial policies. For example, if exemptions are not accorded to certain activities 
which relate to food security or industries which promote national champions – the 
competition legislation would be inconsistent with the country’s industrial and 
developmental policies or competition law may even stifle innovation and investment 
which facilitate development based on dynamic efficiency goals443.  
 
Under most competition law regimes, exemptions are not automatically granted without 
proper assessment. In jurisdictions where there is no provision for direct application 
such as under Article 101 TFEU, exemptions usually have to be separately applied for 
by the firm involved from the competition authority because as explained earlier, 
exempted firms or activities are not exempted ab initio from the remit of the competition 
law444. However, in Malaysia there have been instances where firms which have pre-
emptively applied for exemptions under the Malaysian competition law without being 
uncovered as engaging in anti-competitive infringements under the Competition Act 
                                            
443
 See discussion below on the theory of the relationship between competition and innovation and how 
innovation leads to growth and development. 
444
 See discussion on the EU and Malaysian competition law exemption mechanism below.  
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2010 by the MyCC beforehand445. The four (4) firms were from the logistics; insurance 
and food industries.  One applied for an individual exemption whilst the other 3 applies 
for block exemptions. Usually, the burden of proof in exemption applications falls onto 
the applicant firm.  
 
The inclusion of exemptions in competition law is not necessarily an indication that the 
legislation is weak because exemptions are provided for even under the competition law 
of developed countries such as EU, Japan, the US and Australia. These are all 
examples of advanced competition jurisdictions with strong competition law 
enforcement. It should be noted that based on the experience of countries such as 
Japan, as competition jurisdictions advance and the economy becomes more 
developed, the categories or number of exemptions granted are lessened or gradually 
phased out446. This may be because of stronger competition culture; change in 
economic priorities; and domestic industries have developed and become competitive 
enough to face competition in open markets. Nevertheless, improper granting of 
exemptions may weaken competition law and become obstacles in furthering the 
competition agenda in the country447.  Firms which are granted exemption gain an 
advantage over their competitors by being permitted to engage in the exempted anti-
competitive activity. This may not only affect production and distributive efficiency but 
                                            
445
 See report in The Star online, Malaysia website at 
http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2012/4/26/business/11176730&sec=business accessed on 
4 March 2013. 
446
 Beeman, M.L. Public Policy and Economic Competition in Japan – Change and Continuity in 
Antimonopoly Policy, 1973-1995, Routledge (2002), pp. 40-41 
447
 Khemani, R.S., ‘Application of Competition Law: Exemptions and Exceptions’, UNCTAD (2002), 
UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/Misc.25, p.5  available at http://www.unctad.org/EN/docs/ditcclpmisc25_en.pdf 
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also undermine consumer welfare via supra-competitive prices (profiteering) and lesser 
product choices and quality. Therefore, exemptions granted without sound economic 
justifications may not just lead to inefficiency but also unfairness. These include 
instances when exemptions are used as a protectionist tool either by restricting market 
entry448 or favouring certain firms which enjoy political patronage and close relations 
with decision makers449. 
 
In terms of trade, protection granted to domestic firms may act as non-tariff barriers to 
entry particularly in cases of block exemptions or industry wide exemptions because 
these types of exemptions do not call for a case by case assessment of the exemptions. 
Existing players in the domestic market may prevent or limit market access to foreign 
firms interested in entering the domestic market by entering into arrangements which 
may seem to be efficiency based horizontal agreements such as exclusive technology 
sharing agreement in which in actual fact excludes the new entrant or continued 
existence of the foreign firm in the market450. This type of protection could be used to 
protect national champions which provide employment in the country; are 
interconnected with other strategic industries; and are the national pride or flag bearer 
                                            
448
 See: the argument by Hawk in Hawk, B.E., Antitrust and Market Access: The Scope and Coverage of 
Competition Laws and Implications for Trade, OECD (1996), Overview. 
449
 For example some of Malaysia’s policies in the 1980’s such as “Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial 
Community”, “Malaysia Incorporated” and “Malaysia 2020” have created political patronage and closer 
relations between large corporate groups and political leaders. See Jomo, K.S., ‘Industrialisation and 
Industrial Policy in Malaysia’, in Jomo, K.S., Malaysian Industrial Policy, NUS Press Singapore (2007), pp. 
18-19 
450
 This is based on Hawk’s argument on the relaxed application and enforcement of competition law. He 
argued that it is not easy to discern whether measures such as exemptions granted to certain domestic 
industries are appropriate or merely protectionist. See Hawk, B.E., Antitrust and Market Access: The 
Scope and Coverage of Competition Laws and Implications for Trade, OECD (1996), Overview. 
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of the country.  National car manufacturers in the automotive industry are good 
examples for these instances.   
 
Firms granted exemptions due to political patronage and close relations with decision 
makers increase the potential for corruption. This is because competition law 
enforcement affects the economic rent enjoyed by such groups451. Therefore, they 
would be doing anything necessary to ensure that they continue to enjoy economic rent. 
This include industrial lobbying of politicians and decision makers and resorting to 
bribery in order to influence economic policy decision making in their favour, such as by 
exempting or excluding their cartel activities from the purview of competition law. 
Although the law expressly stipulates the instances where exemption are warranted; 
without clear and systematic assessment methods, the granting of exemptions could be 
more open to abuse particularly when the competition authority’s independence in 
decision making could be unduly influenced by political pressure. 
 
In regard to cartels, the existence of exemption and exclusion provisions under the law 
renders cartels to be distinguished into “good and bad cartels”452 in the sense that the 
“good cartels” are anti-competitive but deemed as necessary based on the efficiency or 
non-economic considerations whilst the “bad cartels” are those which not only restrict 
                                            
451
 Chowdhury, M.,’The Political Economy of Law Reform in Developing Countries’, Sixth ASCOLA 
Conference – New Competition Jurisdictions: Shaping Policies and Building Institutions (July 2011), 
King’s College London, p. 2 
452
 This observation was made by Beeman in reference to the Japanese experience in exempting cartels. 
See Beeman, M.L., Public Policy and Economic Competition in Japan – Change and Continuity in 
Antimonopoly Policy, 1973-1995, Routledge (2002),  pp.18-20 
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competition but also without sufficient merit (if at all) to be tolerated. Therefore, 
exemption is a useful feature for developing countries to accommodate the country’s 
development objectives, i.e. by allowing cartels which engage in anti-competitive 
horizontal agreements which have gains that offset their anti-competitive effect. This is 
in line with the argument that in order to achieve efficiency goals, sometimes 
competition should be restricted due to the competitive disequilibrium which is more 
pronounced in developing countries453 and also the argument on the relationship 
between competition and innovation. Schumpeter argued that highly concentrated 
industries have a higher incentive to innovate because of the economic rent which will 
be enjoyed due to lack of competitors454. The inverted ‘U’ shaped relationship between 
competition and innovation in oligopolistic markets found by Scherer has more recently 
been found in more advanced studies of the phenomenon455. This suggests two 
possibilities; first, firms will innovate up to a certain level so long as total industry profits 
are sufficient to cover the initial development costs to the firms.  Beyond this level, as 
total industry profits fall, there is no incentive for the firms to invest in innovations. 
Second, that under Schumpeter’s monopoly model, firms are slow to invest, preferring 
to achieve profit maximisation via slower, risk free investments unless there are small 
                                            
453
 Singh, A., ‘Multilateral Competition Policy and Economic Development: A Developing Country 
Perspective on the European Union Proposals’, UNCTAD (2004), p. 6 available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp200310_en.pdf  
454
 See: Scherer, F.M., ‘Schumpeter and Plausible Capitalism’ Journal of Economic Literature 30 (1992), 
1416-1433  
455
 See: Aghion et al, ‘Competition and Innovation: An Inverted U Relationship’ (2004), AIM Research 
Working Paper Series at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1306944 ; Aghion, P. and Griffith, R., ‘Competition and 
Growth: Reconciling Theory and Evidence’, Zeuthen Lectures. MIT Press: Cambridge, US (2008)  
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rivals or entrants investing in new technology which threaten their monopoly profits456. 
However, it ought to be noted that even if the type of oligopolistic industry in question is 
innovation driven such as pharmaceutical and automotive industries there would be less 
incentive to innovate if the innovation is just a small improvement and there is still going 
to be competition with older generations of the same product. Therefore, this theory 
indicates that sometimes less competition is good for innovation which contributes to 
economic development based on dynamic efficiency goals. Thus, in such instances 
exemptions are warranted to be granted to cartels due to the weightier benefits to 
development which restriction in competition brings.  
 
Based on the preceding arguments, it is submitted that in order to ensure exemptions 
are not granted for reasons which may weaken competition objectives and may become 
obstacles in cartel enforcement, the implementation of exemptions should be based on 
an appropriate implementation framework. 
 
4.3. APPROPRIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXEMPTIONS IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
 
Appropriate implementation of exemptions in the context of this discussion refers to the 
granting of exemptions based on transparent and sound justifications as per the 
                                            
456
 Lipczinski, J. and Wilson, J. Industrial Organisation: An Analysis of Competitive Markets, Pearson 
Education Limited (2001), p.251; See also Aghion et al, ‘Competition and Innovation: An Inverted U 
Relationship’ (2004), AIM Research Working Paper Series at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1306944 
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objectives of the prevailing competition legislation, which also facilitates cartel 
enforcement. For developing countries, the relevant elements are: exemptions based on 
dynamic efficiency goals and fairness, and a workable implementation mechanism. 
Workable means that it is suitable and able to be implemented within the confines of 
institutional limitations of the country. Therefore, it is submitted that the factors which 
ought to be accounted for in the proper implementation of exemptions in developing 
countries are: development oriented based on dynamic efficiency goals and broader 
public policy objectives; transparency; and institutional limitations. 
 
The author argues that exemptions should be development oriented in developing 
countries because any flexibility granted is to ensure that the adoption and 
implementation of competition law does not become obstacles in achieving economic 
growth and development and could be accepted by society. A development oriented 
exemption mechanism is in line with the proscribed objectives of competition law and 
policy for developing countries, i.e. based on dynamic efficiency goals and fairness457. 
Dynamic efficiency concerns the incentives for long term productivity growth in order to 
yield lower prices and better goods for consumers458. Fairness refers to broader public 
policy considerations which either may lead to efficiency or the achievement of 
                                            
457
 See:  Singh, A. and Dhumale, R., ‘Competition Policy, Development and Developing Countries’, South 
Centre Working Papers 7 (November 1999) at 
http://southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=315%3Acompetition-policy-
development-and-developing-countries-&catid=56%3Aother-issues-related-to-trade-
negotiations&Itemid=67&lang=en ; Gal, M.S., ‘The Ecology of Antitrust Pre-conditions for Competition 
Law Enforcement in Developing Countries’, in Competition, Competitiveness and Development: Lessons 
from Developing Countries, United Nations Publication (2004), UNCTAD/ DITC/CLP/2004/1, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20041ch1_en.pdf 
458
  Gal, M.S., Competition  Policy for Small Market Economies, Harvard University Press (2003), p.14 
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objectives which are relevant to the prevailing socio-economic ideology of the country - 
considerations which are integral to social acceptance of competition policy and law and 
may disintegrate the social fabric of the country if they are unaccounted for459. For 
Malaysia, broader policy objectives may include bumiputera empowerment in the 
economy and equal wealth distribution between all ethnicities in Malaysia. However, this 
work is not suggesting that the moment an anti-competitive agreement is found to have 
a development dimension; then it warrants to be exempted from the application of 
competition law. Instead, what is submitted here is that it is not enough for an anti-
competitive agreement to merely be allowed based on the existence of development 
gains because the gains would also have to outweigh the anti-competitive impact of the 
agreement. Otherwise, the attainment of competition objectives could be jeopardised. 
 
For example, even if the agreement in question is one which involves hard core cartel 
activities, so long as there are justifiable benefits which may contribute to economic 
development of the country, it warrants an exemption provided the gains outweighs its 
anti-competitive benefit. This is because if the pro and anti-competitive benefits of a 
competition restricting agreement were to be of the same weight, i.e. fifty-fifty (no 
change), then there is insufficient justification to allow it460. Exemptions accord an 
                                            
459
 Gal, M.S., ‘The Ecology of Antitrust Pre-conditions for Competition Law Enforcement in Developing 
Countries’, in Competition, Competitiveness and Development: Lessons from Developing Countries, 
United Nations Publication (2004), UNCTAD/ DITC/CLP/2004/1, p. 28 available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20041ch1_en.pdf . For example, exemptions granted to historically 
disadvantaged groups in society such as to accommodate the Black Economic Empowerment Policy in 
South Africa. This is provided for under Section 10 (3) (b) (ii) Competition Act 1998, South Africa.  
460
 However, under the Competition Act 2010, the detriment to competition should be proportionate to the 
benefits (see Section 5 (c) Competition Act 2010, Malaysia). Until and unless the interpretation of 
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advantage to the firm over its competitors which are actually an intervention into the 
workings of the market. Market interventions should not be improperly exercised unless 
it is with sound economic justifications and have the potential to result in gains which 
trump the anti-competitive impact on the market. This is also the case when there are 
overlaps between competition and other policies such as industrial policy. In the context 
of exemptions, it is not enough that because an anti-competitive agreement has the 
potential to increase long term productivity growth in strategic industries or may lead to 
fairness in the market by protecting the domestic industries in order to allow them to 
grow and become more competitive, then the agreement should be exempted461. This is 
to ensure that any exemption granted does not totally eliminate competition but to 
accommodate growth. Otherwise the purpose of adopting competition policy and law 
becomes futile. Thus, in cases of overlaps between competition policy and other 
policies such as industrial policy and developmental policy, the dynamic efficiency 
benefits and fairness of such anti-competitive agreements have to outweigh the pro-
competitive benefit of prohibiting them.  
 
This may be observed from the Japanese implementation of exemptions from 1950’s – 
1973. Throughout this period, vast exemptions were accorded to cartels in order to spur 
                                                                                                                                            
“proportionate” is clarified by MyCC or the courts, the meaning of proportionate is unclear. This author is 
of the opinion that “proportionate” in the context of this provision may be interpreted as commensurate or 
comparable, which is subjective.   
461
 See Singh and Dhumale’s argument in proscribing the Japanese competition policy and law 
experience from 1950’s to 1973 for developing countries in Singh, A. and Dhumale, R., ‘Competition 
Policy, Development and Developing Countries’, South Centre Working Papers 7 (November 1999) at 
http://southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=315%3Acompetition-policy-
development-and-developing-countries-&catid=56%3Aother-issues-related-to-trade-
negotiations&Itemid=67&lang=en 
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economic growth and strengthen the level of competitiveness of Japanese firms and 
industries462. Japan achieved historically unprecedented economic growth during this 
period. The country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at ten (10) per cent per 
annum, manufacturing production rose about thirteen (13) per cent per annum and its 
share in world exports of manufacture rose by a huge ten (10) percentage points463. 
Under Japan’s coordination and competition approach, when there was an overlap 
between industrial and competition policy, precedence was accorded to industrial policy 
in order to achieve the relevant structural changes for the sake of development. 
Therefore, cooperation amongst firms was encouraged in order to promote investments 
and technological development by the private sector. However, this does not mean that 
competition policy was suppressed without justification. This is because under this 
concept, actions which improve or strengthen the market structure such as exempting 
cartels from the remit of competition law for the sake of development of strategic 
domestic industries may be allowed. The Japanese government, through the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) implemented contest based industrial policies 
through incentives which were tied to performance in export markets, technological 
development and technological development. As a result, competition among the firms 
                                            
462
 Okimoto, D.I., ‘Between the MITI and the Market’, Stanford University Press (1989), pp.12-13 as cited 
in Singh, A. and Dhumale, R., “Competition Policy, Development and Developing Countries”, Singh, A. 
and Dhumale, R., ‘Competition Policy, Development and Developing Countries’, South Centre Working 
Papers 7 (November 1999), p.10 at 
http://southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=315%3Acompetition-policy-
development-and-developing-countries-&catid=56%3Aother-issues-related-to-trade-
negotiations&Itemid=67&lang=en 
463
 Singh, A. and Dhumale, R., ‘Competition Policy, Development and Developing Countries’, South 
Centre Working Papers 7 (November 1999), p.12 at 
http://southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=315%3Acompetition-policy-
development-and-developing-countries-&catid=56%3Aother-issues-related-to-trade-
negotiations&Itemid=67&lang=en 
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in the market was intense464. This is an example of simulated competition. Korea also 
broadly followed the Japanese strategy and it also managed to transform itself into an 
industrialised and technologically advanced country465. 
 
Useful insights for Malaysia could also be gained by referring to how the South African 
competition regime’s attempts to accommodate public interest considerations in merger 
cases as provided for under the Competition Act 1998, South Africa466. Accommodating 
non-competition considerations based on equity and fairness under competition law is 
challenging because some non-competition considerations could not be translated into 
economic quantification467 to enable an assessment to weigh those equity based 
considerations against competition considerations such as efficiency and consumer 
welfare468. Additionally, accommodating such non-competition considerations should be 
done systematically in order to prevent the weighing of pro and anti-competitive gains of 
                                            
464
 Singh, A., ‘Competition and Competition Policy in Emerging Markets : International and Developmental 
Dimensions’, G-24 Discussion Paper Series No.18 (2002), UNCTAD, p.17-18 
465
 Singh, A. and Dhumale, R., ‘Competition Policy, Development and Developing Countries’, South 
Centre Working Papers 7 (November 1999), pp.12-13 at 
http://southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=315%3Acompetition-policy-
development-and-developing-countries-&catid=56%3Aother-issues-related-to-trade-
negotiations&Itemid=67&lang=en 
466
 See discussion in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
467
 Such as exemptions applied based on: significant and identifiable social benefits (Section 5 (a) 
Competition Act 2010, Malaysia); enabling small and medium sized industries and enterprises to become 
competitive (See Sections 2 (e) and 10 (3) (ii) Competition Act 1998, South Africa); and enabling firms 
controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged person to become competitive (See Sections 2 (f) and 
10 (3) (ii) Competition Act 1998, South Africa). See also, Boshoff, W. et al, ‘The Economics Of Public 
Interest Provisions In South African Competition Policy’, Sixth Annual Competition Law, Economics and 
Policy Conference, South  Africa (2012), p.26 at http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/events/SIxth-
Annual-Competition-Law-Economics-and-Policy-Conference-in-South-Africa-2012/NewFolder-3/The-
economics-of-public-interest-provisions-in-South-African-competition-policy.pdf  
468
 See: Boshoff, W. et al, ‘The Economics Of Public Interest Provisions In South African Competition 
Policy’, Sixth Annual Competition Law, Economics and Policy Conference, South  Africa (2012) at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/events/SIxth-Annual-Competition-Law-Economics-and-Policy-
Conference-in-South-Africa-2012/NewFolder-3/The-economics-of-public-interest-provisions-in-South-
African-competition-policy.pdf  
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the infringement which involve non-competition considerations in an arbitrary and 
discretionary manner469. Although the Competition Tribunal, South Africa have 
attempted to provide interpretations on the application of the relevant legislative 
provisions under the Competition Act 1998, South Africa pertaining to the public interest 
dimension in merger cases, a suitable economic model on the weighing of public 
interest against competition considerations is yet to be identified470.  
 
In addition to adopting a systematic mechanism in assessing applications for 
exemption, an appropriate exemption mechanism also calls for transparency in 
exercising powers to exempt471. This is because exemption accords an advantage to 
the firm or firms in question over their competitors in the market. If decisions are not 
made transparently then it would not facilitate effective competition enforcement which 
would in turn undermine the agency’s credibility and competition goals. Transparency is 
especially pertinent in exemptions of hard core anti-competitive horizontal agreements. 
Although it has been argued that in theory it would be difficult to justify the exemption of 
hard core cartels such as price fixing cartels between competitors, it is still not 
                                            
469
 Ibid, pp.8-13  
470
 See: Hodge, J. et al, ‘Public Interest Provisions in The South African Competition Act- A Critical 
Review’, Competition Policy, Law and Economics Conference (2009), pp.12-13; and Boshoff, W. et al, 
‘The Economics Of Public Interest Provisions In South African Competition Policy’, Sixth Annual 
Competition Law, Economics and Policy Conference, South  Africa (2012) at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/events/SIxth-Annual-Competition-Law-Economics-and-Policy-
Conference-in-South-Africa-2012/NewFolder-3/The-economics-of-public-interest-provisions-in-South-
African-competition-policy.pdf  
471
 See: International Competition Network (ICN), ‘Defining Hard Core Cartel Conduct: Effective 
Institutions Effective Penalties’, Building Blocks for Effective Anti-Cartel Regimes Vol.1, ICN 4
th
 Annual 
Conference, Bonn, Germany, ICN (2005), pp. 13-14 
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impossible472, particularly under EU competition law (which Malaysia’s exemptions 
provisions are modelled on), because there have been instances where horizontal price 
fixing agreements have been exempted under EU law473. By publishing and clearly 
explaining the reasons for the granting or refusal of exemptions any doubts or 
suspicions may be cleared as to the reasons for the granting of the “special treatment” 
to the firm or firms in question by the competition agency. This in turn would establish 
the credibility of the agency, a crucial element in garnering public support for 
competition law and cartel enforcement particularly in young competition jurisdictions 
which lack competition culture and views competition law as unsuitable for developing 
countries. 
 
In addition, transparency also breeds clarity of the rules pertaining to exemptions. 
Without clarity in the rules, cartels may be de-motivated from applying for exemptions 
due to uncertainty of the outcome should they apply for exemption for their anti-
competitive agreement. This may result in either the cartels merging474 or going deeper 
underground – both undesirable outcomes which would not facilitate effective cartel 
                                            
472
 Jones, A. and Sufrin, B., EC Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, Third Edition (2008), 
Oxford University Press, p. 221. 
473
 Ibid, pp. 223-224. Also see for example the following cases: Visa International-Multilateral Interchange 
Fee, [2002] OJ L 318/17, [2003] 4 CMLR 283; Reims II [1999] OJ L275/17 (renewal), [2004] OJ L56/76; 
CECED 2000 OJ L187/47, [2000] 5 CMLR 635 
474
 When the United Kingdom introduced the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956 which outlawed cartels, 
it triggered a wave of mergers. Similarly, cartels in the US steel and railroad industries resorted to 
mergers after the Sherman Act, which banned cartels, was introduced in 1898. See Mehra, P., ‘Choice 
Between Cartel and Horizontal Merger’, (2007), p.2 at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081844 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1081844 ; The same pattern may be observed in the international merger 
movements in the 1990’s See Evenett, S.J.. et al, ‘International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 
1990s’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2680 (2002); 
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enforcement in young competition jurisdictions especially when there is no merger 
regulation with competition dimension under the present legislative framework475.  
 
Competition agencies must be seen to be independent and fair. Competition agencies 
should be impartial to industrial lobbying and not be made subject to political 
intervention or influence in their decision making, i.e, from the influences of groups 
whose enjoyment of economic rent are affected by cartel enforcement via prohibition of 
their anti-competitive conducts476. In terms of being seen to be fair, relevant groups 
which may be affected by the granting or refusal of exemptions ought to also be 
consulted. Independence is also connected with transparency as explained above. 
Being transparent does not merely mean the publication justifications of decisions. It 
should also include engaging the public and the business community through 
awareness and advocacy programmes which explains how competition agencies carry 
out their responsibilities. In order to ensure independence, relevant safeguards to act as 
checks and balance should be in existence. This include the appointment of credible 
key officials of the competition agency who are fair, neutral and knowledgeable; not 
making the competition agency subject to the jurisdiction or purview of agencies or 
ministries with limited remit but rather, subject to the purview of an entity with strong 
                                            
475
 Malaysia’s Code of Take-Overs and Mergers 2010 which is implemented by the Malaysian Securities 
Commission currently does not have a competition dimension. Merger control has also been excluded 
from the remit of the Competition Act 2010.  
476
 Chowdhury, M.,’The Political Economy of Law Reform in Developing Countries’, Sixth ASCOLA 
Conference – New Competition Jurisdictions: Shaping Policies and Building Institutions (July 2011), 
King’s College London, p. 2; Gal, M.S., ‘The Ecology of Antitrust Pre-conditions for Competition Law 
Enforcement in Developing Countries’, in Competition, Competitiveness and Development: Lessons from 
Developing Countries, United Nations Publication (2004), UNCTAD/ DITC/CLP/2004/1 p.31 at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20041ch1_en.pdf 
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political influence and a wide authority remit477; and providing for administrative and 
judicial review of decisions made by the competition commission.  
 
Appropriate implementation of the exemption mechanism also calls for the institutional 
limitations to be accounted for because institutional disequilibrium in developing 
countries may take time to develop and evolve. If the exemption mechanism provided 
for under the law does not account for the institutional factors, the exemptions 
implementation framework may not be able to be appropriately implemented. The 
institutional limitations include legislative provisions which require simple judicial 
administration, lack of adequately trained competition officials and judiciary, challenges 
in establishing the independence of competition authorities, and level of competition law 
enforcement. 
 
Young competition agencies lack experience and knowledge in implementing 
competition law. Thus, in order to ensure exemptions are able to be appropriately 
implemented, the relevant legal provisions ought to allow for simple judicial 
administration. For example, under EU law, the prerequisite for applying for exemptions 
under Article 101 (3) is that agreements must be deemed to be restrictive of competition 
under Article 101 (1) TFEU. Determining whether an agreement is anti-competitive or 
                                            
477
 This is based on Gal’s argument that one of the methods to reduce the influence of pressure groups 
against competition law is by forming pro-law pressure groups under a strong political anchor such as the 
Prime Minister’s office and also the fact that the impact of competition law cuts across all industries and 
markets. Gal, M.S., ‘The Ecology of Antitrust Pre-conditions for Competition Law Enforcement in 
Developing Countries’, in Competition, Competitiveness and Development: Lessons from Developing 
Countries, United Nations Publication (2004), UNCTAD/ DITC/CLP/2004/1, pp. 31-33 at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20041ch1_en.pdf 
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restrictive in effect is not easy478 and in determining its object, it is insufficient to merely 
scrutinise the explicit content of the formal agreement. Such provisions call for the 
utilisation of legal and economic approach in assessing exemptions under EU law. It 
requires analysing the presumed, actual and potential anti-competitive effect of the 
agreement479. All these require expertise in legal, economic and other relevant fields 
such as business and accounting in order to enable the implementation of legal and 
economic approach.  Among the aspects to be included in the assessment are: a 
determination of relevant market definition; interpretation of the content of the 
agreements; scrutiny of the involved firms’ conduct and behaviour in the market; and 
assessment of pro and anti-competitive benefits of the agreement which includes 
considerations based on the economic concept of efficiency480.  It may be inferred that 
the assessment for exemptions under the Malaysian competition legislation would call 
for more or less similar approach. Of course Malaysia could just adopt the arguably 
easier formalistic approach as implemented by the Commission before the 
modernisation regulation but it may deprive anti-competitive agreements with significant 
efficiency gains from being exempted simply because of the narrow interpretation of the 
legislative provisions481. 
 
                                            
478
 Jones, A. and Sufrin, B., EC Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, Third Edition (2008), 
Oxford University Press, p. 222. 
479
 Ibid, p.207  
480
 See: Guidelines on the Application of Article 101 (3) TFEU (formerly 81 (3) of the Treaty) (204/C 
101/08) 
481
 See: Jones, A. and Sufrin, B., EC Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, Third Edition (2008), 
Oxford University Press, p. 208-209 
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Compare that with the simpler and more narrowly stipulated exemption provisions under 
Competition Act 1998, South Africa. For example, in cases where the exemption applied 
on the promotion of small businesses or business owned by historically disadvantaged 
persons482, the assessment to be made by the competition agency would not be as 
complicated as that under the implementation of EU law because what needs to be 
determined is merely whether the business in question falls under the category of small 
businesses or that it is owned by persons who are considered as historically 
disadvantaged under the relevant legislative provisions. Therefore, it is submitted that 
exemption provisions which do not require more complex legal and economic analysis 
are arguably easier to be implemented and more suitable with the limitations faced by 
young competition authorities.  Simple judicial administration would also facilitate 
timeliness in decision making. Firms need fast decisions regarding their exemption 
application lest their businesses are detrimentally affected. Therefore, any decisions to 
be made ought to be done in a timely manner without compromising procedural and 
substantive legislative requirements. As such, it is important that the procedures 
instituted are not cumbersome and suitable with the level of institutional development of 
the country.   
 
Despite the advantage of narrowly stipulated conditions for exemptions, it ought to be 
noted that exemption provisions based on broad provisions such as those of the EU 
give room to accommodate fast moving business innovations and dynamics and other 
                                            
482
 See: Section 10 (3) (b) (ii) Competition Act 1998, South Africa. 
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non-efficiency gains considerations to be accounted for483. Therefore, if the exemptions 
are listed and narrowly stipulated such as those of the exemption provisions under the 
current Anti-Monopoly Act in Japan484 and Section 10 Competition Act 1998, South 
Africa, if there are new types of business innovations which warrant exemptions, then 
the relevant legislative provisions would have to be amended and amendments of 
legislation is a cumbersome process unless the law stipulates that the responsible 
Minister is empowered to amend the list under a regulation. Such a process would be 
less cumbersome but it is open to abuse due to the discretionary power vested with the 
authorised Minister. Thus, it is submitted that since Malaysia has adopted broad 
conditions for meeting the eligibility for exemptions, the relevant complementary 
legislative instruments and mechanisms ought to be in place to facilitate and guide the 
competition agencies in carrying out their powers in the granting of exemptions. 
 
The granting of exemptions requires competition officials and judiciary who are 
adequately trained in the implementation and adjudication of competition law. This is to 
ensure that exemptions are not inappropriately granted that they authorise insufficiently 
justified anti-competitive agreements which in turn may be detrimental to achieving 
competition objectives and effective cartel enforcement. This is because, as has been 
explained earlier, more often than not the assessment of exemption applications calls 
                                            
483
 Such as employment, see: Case 26/76 Metro-SB-Grossmarkte GmbH vs. Commission (No.1) [1977] 
ECR 1857, [1978] 2 CMLR 1; reduction of pollution that leads to technological improvement, see Exxon/ 
Shell [1994] OJ L144/20. 
484
 Acts under intellectual property rights (Section 21, Antimonopoly Act 1947, Japan); acts of co-
operatives (Section 22, Antimonopoly Act 1947, Japan); and resale price maintenance contracts (Section 
23, Antimonopoly Act 1947, Japan) 
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for legal and economic analysis. Even when it concerns European style block 
exemptions which do not require individual application for exemptions, the regulator has 
to determine among others; the sectors, industries or type of firms to be exempted; and 
the type of agreements and their contents which are blacklisted or allowed. All these 
require implementation by people who are adequately trained. 
 
Exemptions are tied to the finding of infringements under the law by the competition 
agency. Therefore the workability of the exemptions implementation framework is 
dependent on the level of competition enforcement in place. In countries which had only 
recently adopted competition law, enforcement may be gradually implemented485 and 
the focus might not yet be on cartel enforcement486. Therefore the number of 
applications for exemptions may likely be lower as compared to more mature 
competition jurisdictions487. Hence, in the early days of competition law implementation 
when cartel enforcement provisions are yet to be fully enforced, the competition 
agencies ought to focus on block exemptions or conditions for the eligibility of 
                                            
485
 Malaysia’s competition law is being gradually implemented from early 2011. This was outlined by the 
Minister of Domestic Trade, Co-operatives and Consumerism in his speech to the Dewan Rakyat (House 
of Representatives), Malaysian Parliament on 20 April 2010, Hansard Report (Malay version), pp.151-
152. The Competition Act 2010 has been gradually implemented from early 2011. At the time of writing, 
the MyCC has only been engaging in consultation, awareness and advocacy programmes and 
enforcement of blatant price fixing reactively based on a soft approach. See respectively:  MyCC website 
at http://www.mycc.gov.my/234_179_179/Web/WebEvent/Events/Upcoming-Events.html  accessed on 
27/3/2012; and The Malaysian Reserve, ‘MyCC Issues 1
st
 ‘Proposed Decision’ Against Price Fixing’ (25 
October 2012) at 
http://themalaysianreserve.com/main/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2396:mycc-
issues-1st-proposed-decision-against-price-fixing&catid=36:corporate-malaysia&Itemid=120 accessed on 
26/10/2012 
486
 Refer to the South African experience in cartel enforcement in Chapter 3 of this thesis. The South 
African Competition Commission initially concentrated on mergers in the first five (5) years of competition 
law implementation and they applied a reactive approach in cartel enforcement during that period. 
487
 Khemani, R.S., ‘Application of Competition Law: Exemptions and Exceptions’, UNCTAD (2002), 
UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/Misc.25, p.11  available at http://www.unctad.org/EN/docs/ditcclpmisc25_en.pdf 
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exemptions for sector or industrial wide exemptions. This is because once anti-
competitive cartels provisions are fully enforced, then the competition agencies would 
also have to focus on individual exemptions488 which require case by case legal and 
economic assessments. Once the competition law is fully implemented, the granting of 
exemptions also require monitoring of the exempted firms or industries to ensure that 
the conditions attached to the granting of the exemptions are adhered to or fulfilled. Any 
breaches of the conditions ought to be sanctioned accordingly. Without competition law 
enforcement, exemptions cannot be appropriately implemented and inappropriate 
implementation of exemptions would not facilitate effective cartel enforcement. 
 
4.4. ARTICLE 101 TFEU AND THE EXEMPTIONS PROVISIONS UNDER THE 
COMPETITION ACT 2010: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
 
Before the discussion proceeds to the elements which ought to be included in the 
Malaysian exemptions implementation framework, the main similarities and differences 
between the EU law and Malaysian law should be examined and appreciated in order to 
assess whether the EU style exemption mechanism could accommodate developmental 
objectives and become workable to be implemented by the MyCC in Malaysia. 
Additionally, it would also facilitate the identification of necessary elements in the 
Malaysian exemption implementation framework. 
 
                                            
488
 For jurisdictions with European style exemption provisions such as Malaysia. 
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The similarities between the Malaysian legislative provisions on exemptions under the 
Competition Act 2010 and Article 101 TFEU are: 1) Section 4 of the Competition Act 
2010489 which provide for agreements prohibited under the Competition Act 2010 are 
similarly worded to that of Article 101 (1) TFEU490; 2) Section 5 of the Competition Act 
2010491 which provides for the broad conditions for exemptions under the Competition 
                                            
489
 Section 4, Competition Act 2010 – Prohibited Horizontal and Vertical Agreement 
    (1) A horizontal or vertical agreement between enterprises is prohibited insofar as the agreement    
         has the object or effect of significantly preventing, restricting or distorting competition in 
         any market for goods or services. 
    (2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), a horizontal agreement between   
         enterprises which has the object to— 
         (a) fix, directly or indirectly, a purchase or selling price or 
         any other trading conditions; 
         (b) share market or sources of supply; 
         (c) limit or control— 
              (i) production; 
              (ii) market outlets or market access; 
              (iii) technical or technological development; or 
              (iv) investment; or 
        (d) perform an act of bid rigging, 
 
is deemed to have the object of significantly preventing, restricting, or distorting competition in any market 
for goods or services. 
  (3) Any enterprise which is a party to an agreement which is prohibited under this section shall be     
       liable for infringement of   the prohibition. 
490
 Art. 101 (1) TFEU 
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements between 
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and tacit collusion which may affect trade 
between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition within the common market, and in particular those which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them 
at a competitive disadvantage; 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject 
of such contracts. 
491
 Section 5, Competition Act 2010 - Relief of liability 
Notwithstanding section 4, an enterprise which is a party to an agreement may relieve its liability for the 
infringement of the prohibition under section 4 based on the following reasons: 
(a) there are significant identifiable technological, efficiency or social benefits directly arising from the 
agreement; 
(b) the benefits could not reasonably have been provided by the parties to the agreement without the 
agreement having the effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition; 
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Act 2010 is similar to the broad conditions492 for exemptions stipulated under Article 101 
(3) TFEU493; and 3) both EU competition law under the TFEU and the Competition Act 
2010 provide for individual and block exemptions. As such, it is submitted that there is a 
requirement for a two-tier assessment under the Competition Act 2010, Malaysia. 
However, there is no direct application of the provisions on exemptions. There is a 
requirement for a two-tier assessment in the granting of exemptions based on Section 
5, Competition Act 2010 because application for exemptions is dependent on the finding 
of a prohibition under Section 4, Competition Act 2010. Agreements which are not 
deemed as prohibited under Section 4 of the Competition Act 2010 are not eligible to 
apply for exemptions under the Competition Act 2010. This is similar to the relationship 
between Article 101 (1) TFEU and Article 101 (3) TFEU. However, the difference 
between the Malaysian law and EU law is that the provisions on prohibited agreements 
and the provisions for exemptions are separated under different sections. Therefore, 
although a prohibition under Section 4, Competition Act 2010 qualifies it to be 
                                                                                                                                            
(c) the detrimental effect of the agreement on competition is proportionate to the benefits provided; and 
(d) the agreement does not allow the enterprise concerned to eliminate competition completely in respect 
of a substantial part of the goods or services.  
492 Under Section 5 Competition Act 2010, Malaysia, the broad conditions on exemptions are:            1) 
technological, efficiency and social benefits, 2) indispensability of the restriction, 3) pro and anti-
competitive effects are proportionate, 4) no complete elimination of competition. While under Article 101 
(3) TFEU, the broad conditions for exemption are: 1) efficiency gains,  2) fair share for consumers, 3) 
indispensability of the restriction, and 4) no elimination of competition.   
493
 Article 101 (3) TFEU 
The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of: 
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings; 
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings; 
- any concerted practice or category of tacit collusion, 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or 
economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not: 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of 
these objectives; 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the 
products in question.  
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considered for exemption under Section 5, Competition Act 2010; the firms involved 
have a choice in whether to proceed with applying for exemptions or to just accept the 
prohibition without applying for exemption. This illustrates that there is no direct 
application of exemptions provisions on prohibited agreements. This is akin to the EU 
exemption mechanism before the implementation of the Modernisation Regulation in 
2004.  
 
Nevertheless, a relevant point needs to be highlighted in this regard.  It may be argued 
that in Malaysia, that there is a sort of direct application in instances when firms pre-
emptively apply for exemption without having been uncovered as involving in anti-
competitive infringements in the first place494. In such cases, based on provisions of the 
Competition Act 2010, the author is of the opinion that the MyCC would initially still need 
to assess whether the activities in question are anti-competitive infringements by virtue 
of Section 4, Competition Act 2010.  However, the assessment of the exemption 
application may directly be done immediately after since the application has been 
submitted.  
 
Under the EU exemption mechanism, Article 101 TFEU495 is directly applicable496. This 
is so because after the agreement is ruled as restrictive of competition, the burden of 
                                            
494
 Four (4) firms in the Malaysian logistics; insurance; and food industries had pre-emptively applied for 
exemptions from the MyCC; see The Star online, Malaysia website at 
http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2012/4/26/business/11176730&sec=business accessed 4 
March  2013. 
495
 In discussing EU law on exemptions, Article 101 TFEU ought to be examined as a whole because the 
granting of exemptions under 101 (3) TFEU is connected to Article 101 (1) TFEU. Exemptions under 
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proof immediately falls on the firm involved to prove that the agreement qualifies for an 
exemption under 101 (3) TFEU) and there is no need for the firm to apply for an 
individual exemption separately because the applicability of Article 101 (3) TFEU is 
automatic497. If the competition agency finds that the gains outweigh the anti-
competitive effect of the agreement, then the firm benefits from an exception to the 
competition rules. The granting of exemptions under EU law calls for a two-tier 
assessment involving both legal and economic approach. The assessment under Article 
101 (1) TFEU is concerned with allocative efficiency and accounts for presumed, actual 
and like anti-competitive effects of the restraint. Whilst the economics based US like 
rule of reason assessment of the pro and anti-competitive effects of the agreement is 
carried out under Article 101 (3), which renders the focus of the assessment on 
productive and dynamic efficiency498.  
 
Thus, in the case of Malaysia, the issue which would likely arise is also pertaining to the 
approach to be adopted in the assessments of agreements under Section 4, 
Competition Act 2010 and application for exemptions under Section 5, Competition Act 
2010, particularly because there is no direct application of the provisions on 
exemptions. If the weighing of the pro and anti-competitive effect of the agreement is to 
                                                                                                                                            
Article 101 (3) cannot be utilised unless the agreement is deemed as restrictive under Article 101 (1) 
TFEU. 
496
 Regulation (EC) No.1/2003 ceases the monopoly of the Commission in granting exemptions under 
Article 101 (3) TFEU (ex- Article 81(3) EC) and decentralises the power to NCAs with effect from 1 May 
2004.  
497
 Before the implementation of Regulation (EC) No.1/2003, the firms involved would have to apply for 
individual exemption with the Commission.  
498
 For an in depth  discussion on the debate on the economic approach to be implemented in the 
assessment of cases under Article 101 TFEU, see Jones, A. and Sufrin, B., EC Competition Law: Text, 
Cases, and Materials, Third Edition (2008), Oxford University Press, pp. 206-269 
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be conducted under Section 4, then it would be redundant to repeat it in assessing the 
exemptions application for the same agreement if it is found to be restrictive of 
competition. However, if the weighing is only to be conducted in assessing the 
exemption application, then there is a possibility that a restrictive agreement with 
efficiency gains may be prohibited because the firm in question have a choice in 
applying for exemptions or otherwise under the Competition Act 2010 as there is no 
direct application of Section 5, Competition Act 2010 in cases of Section 4, Competition 
Act 2010 infringement.  
 
This issue would not arise in considering horizontal agreements which have been 
stipulated as having the object of restricting competition because in such cases there is 
no need to assess their effect. However, the issue is more related to agreements where 
their effect would have to be assessed. This issue would need to be clarified by the 
MyCC and confirmed by the courts because it involves the interpretation of a legislative 
provision. If the weighing of the pro and anti-competitive effects is to be conducted 
under Section 4 of the Competition Act 2010, then it risks the possibility that the 
assessments to be made for exemptions under Section 5 will be more focused on 
broader policy considerations. This is not desirable because exemptions is not a 
privilege to be lightly granted merely based on broader policy considerations but to be 
coupled with economic considerations based on dynamic efficiency goals unless it is 
integral to the social acceptance of competition policy and law and may disintegrate the 
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social fabric of the country if they are unaccounted for499. Moreover, any broader policy 
considerations which are not connected to efficiency gains but pertinent to the 
acceptance and workability of competition policy and law in Malaysia could be excluded 
based on the Minister’s discretion under Section 13 of the Competition Act 2010. A 
possible solution to this may require different treatments between agreements which 
object restricts competition and those which are restrictive as to their effect. The 
weighing of the pro and anti-competitive benefits of agreements with restrictive object 
could be conducted under Section 5 of the Competition Act 2010 whilst the pro and anti-
competitive effects of agreements being assessed on their effect could be conducted 
under Section 4 of the Competition Act 2010 itself. Any applications for exemption of 
agreements with restrictive effect should be confined to broader public policy 
considerations which have potential gains to efficiency500 and development.  
 
The next difference is that under the Section 4 (2) of the Competition Act 2010, certain 
types of horizontal agreements are expressly recognised as having the object of 
restricting competition. Mostly they are hard core cartel agreements, i.e. price fixing, 
market allocation, production limitation and bid rigging. Limitation of investment or 
technical or technological developments are also included. Such so called per se rules 
are easier to be implemented especially for young competition agencies such as 
                                            
499
 Gal, M.S., ‘The Ecology of Antitrust Pre-conditions for Competition Law Enforcement in Developing 
Countries’, in Competition, Competitiveness and Development: Lessons from Developing Countries, 
United Nations Publication (2004), UNCTAD/ DITC/CLP/2004/1, p. 28 available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20041ch1_en.pdf 
500
 This is one of the possible ways of reconciling Article 101 (1) TFEU and Article 101 (3) TFEU as 
discussed by Jones and Sufrin. See Jones, A. and Sufrin, B., EC Competition Law: Text, Cases, and 
Materials, Third Edition (2008), Oxford University Press, pp. 206-207 
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Malaysia because once the object of the agreement is proven to be of the type which 
are deemed restricting of competition, then there is no need for any assessment on its 
effect to be made. Then next step in terms of exemptions is for the firm to apply for one 
and for the MyCC to assess in terms of its pro and anti-competitive benefits. Under EU 
law, the determination of whether an agreement has as its object, restriction of 
competition is guided by case laws and parameters which are explained under the 
relevant guidelines. Malaysia therefore has taken the shorter route by expressly 
determining them under the law. This approach is arguably better for Malaysia because 
case laws take time to be settled.  
 
The fact that Section 4 (2), Competition Act 2010 has expressly declared certain types 
of horizontal agreements as having the object to restrict competition indicates that 
Malaysia is serious in their efforts to prevent anti-competitive cartel arrangements by 
rendering hard core cartel infringements such as price fixing; market allocation; and bid 
rigging as easier to prove infringements in the sense that once such conducts are 
proven, they could be prohibited without having to consider the anti-competitive effects. 
However, the existence of Section 5, Competition Act 2010 in theory means that even 
hard core anti-competitive cartel agreements such as price fixing, market allocation and 
bid rigging agreements could be exempted, just like under EU law. Therefore, block 
exemptions on the type of horizontal agreements which are prohibited or allowed has to 
be in place before cartel enforcement is fully implemented. This is to ensure that only 
horizontal agreements with gains are exempted. 
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The other difference is that there is a single market dimension in the EU law - only 
agreements which appreciably affect trade between member states are subject to 
Article 101 TFEU. Therefore, the de minimis rule applies in this instance. Under the 
Competition Act 2010, for the moment, it cannot be claimed with certainty that there 
would no requirement for the de minimis rule to be applied in case of exemptions. This 
is because under Section 4, Competition Act 2010, there is a requirement for the 
agreement to be significantly, preventing, limiting or distorting competition in the market. 
The meaning of significantly is yet to be provided for. Although the de minimis rule to be 
applied in Malaysia would not be involving the element of “trade between states” like the 
EU de minimis rule; it is foreseeable that there will be a need for the de minimis rule to 
be applied due to the provisions of Section 4, albeit based on a different benchmark. If 
agreements do not significantly restrict competition, there is no justification to prohibit 
them. Only agreements which have been prohibited under Section 4, Competition Act 
2010 are eligible to be considered for exemptions. Therefore, there is a need for 
Malaysia to determine the meaning of “significantly, preventing, limiting or distorting 
competition in the market”.  
 
After discussing the main similarities and differences between the Malaysian and EU 
law on exemptions, the question now is, “Could the exemption provisions under the 
Competition Act 2010 which is based on Article 101 TFEU accommodate development 
objectives and fairness considerations?”  This is a relevant question to be addressed 
because it involves adoption of legislative provisions of a jurisdiction which is not at 
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similar levels of development. The answer is yes, it is possible. However, the 
differences between the provisions in EU and Malaysian law need to be accounted for 
by Malaysia in the implementation of exemptions under the Competition Act 2010. 
Malaysia has to note that one of the main features of EU law is the single market 
dimension; that the pre-modernisation EU exemption mechanism would be more 
relevant to be referred to by Malaysia in regard to the two tier assessment of 
exemptions; and that the EU competition authorities are better resourced and more 
experienced as compared to the MyCC.  
 
Nevertheless, it is possible to implement an EU style exemption in Malaysia because 
the EU competition jurisprudence and exemption mechanism are not solely based on 
efficiency and consumer welfare but it is able to accommodate non-efficiency 
considerations through the balancing of pro and anti-competitive benefits. This is 
relevant to developing countries such as Malaysia because competition law in 
developing countries should not be implemented based on purely competition 
objectives501 and one of the objectives of the Competition Act 2010 is promotion of 
economic development502. Socio-economic factors have been considered by the 
Commission and European Courts in making assessments under Article 101 (3) TFEU 
in the past. These include employment503, job creation and bringing in foreign 
                                            
501
 Gal, M.S., ‘The Ecology of Antitrust: Preconditions for Competition law Enforcement in Developing 
Countries’, Competition, Competitiveness and Development : Lessons from Developing Countries, United 
Nations Publication (2004), p. 27 
502
 See Preamble, Competition Act 2010 
503
 Case 26/76 Metro-SB-Grossmarkte GmbH vs. Commission (No.1) [1977] ECR 1857, [1978] 2 CMLR 
1. 
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investment to a poor region504 and reduction of pollution that leads to technological 
improvement505. The caveat is that the other conditions under Article 101 (3) would also 
have to be met before exemption is granted. In this regard, under the Malaysian 
competition law provision on exemptions, social benefits have been included as one of 
the conditions which may qualify for exemptions. This is an example of an adaptation 
which has been made by Malaysia in regard to its adoption of EU style exemption 
provisions under the Competition Act 2010.  
 
4.5. A WORKABLE EXEMPTIONS IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK FOR 
MALAYSIA 
 
The elements which are recommended to be included in the Malaysian implementation 
framework on exemptions are: regulatory instruments which aid and guide the granting 
of exemption; safeguards pertaining to the independence of the MyCC; the 
establishment of a coordination and consultancy committee; and prioritisation policy 
pertaining to cartel enforcement. 
 
There are various regulations, guidelines and precedents in assisting the Commission 
and national competition authorities (NCAs)506 in assessing applications for exemptions 
under Article 101 (3) TFEU. Likewise, before the MyCC could exercise its powers to 
                                            
504
 Ford/ Volkswagen [1993] OJ L20/14, [1993] 5 CMLR 617. 
505
 Exxon/ Shell [1994] OJ L144/20 
506
 Regulation (EC) No.1/2003 ceases the monopoly of the Commission in granting exemptions under 
Article 101 (3) TFEU (ex- Article 81(3) EC) and decentralises the power to NCAs with effect from 1 May 
2004.  
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exempt under the law, similar regulatory instruments would also have to be in place as 
guidance in granting exemptions. Among the guidelines which ought to be in place are 
on: the implementation of Section 4 of the Competition Act 2010; the implementation of 
the granting of individual and block exemptions; and the assessment of exemption 
applications under Section 5 of the Competition Act 2010. The regulations which ought 
to be in place include on block exemptions on horizontal agreements and vertical 
agreements.  
 
In formulating the guidelines and regulations, those of the EU may be referred to. 
However, adaptations would have to be made in line with Malaysia’s level of institutional 
and economic development. It is submitted that the guidelines and regulations would be 
useful not only to the MyCC officials in their assessments of exemptions application but 
also that they would help to provide clarity to the industry and firms pertaining to the 
do’s and don’ts with regard to their horizontal agreements. These guidelines and 
regulations should include: 
 
i) the approaches to be implemented in carrying out assessments to determine 
whether an agreement is restricting of competition and in assessing the pro and 
anti-competitive effect of the agreement in regard to the granting of exemptions. 
In this regard, it is recommended that Malaysia opts for an economic approach 
rather than a formalistic one to ensure that efficiency gains of anti-competitive 
agreements are accounted for. Additionally, it ought to be determined at which 
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juncture should the weighing of the pro and anti-competitive effects of 
agreements are to be conducted – at the point of assessing the restrictive object 
and effect or at the point of assessing the application for exemption? This is 
because of the fact that there is no direct application of the exemption provisions 
under the Competition Act 2010, unlike under Article 101 TFEU. Hence, it is 
recommended that the weighing of the pro and anti-competitive benefits of 
agreements with restrictive object to be conducted under Section 5, Competition 
Act 2010 whilst the weighing of the pro and anti-competitive effects for 
agreements being assessed for their effect is to be conducted under Section 4, 
Competition Act 2010 itself. Any applications for exemption of agreements with 
restrictive effect should be confined to broader public policy considerations which 
have potential gains to efficiency, consumer welfare and development. 
Regardless of the assessment approach to be decided upon by the MyCC, in 
order to facilitate the decision making process, the aspects which ought to be 
accounted for in making the assessments should be stipulated; 
 
ii) determining whether there is a need for a de minimis rule to be applied in terms 
of agreements which significantly restrict, limit or prevent competition. If so, then 
the factors to be accounted for in the de minimis rule have to be provided for. 
This rule would indeed be useful when the Competition Act 2010 is fully enforced 
and the volume of application for exemptions increases;  and 
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iii) the types of horizontal agreements to be allowed and prohibited particularly those 
which have been prohibited “per se” by virtue of Section 4, Competition Act 2010 
but may have gains which could offset the anti-competitive effect. This is 
because in theory, even hard core anti-competitive cartel agreement such as bid 
rigging and price fixing which have been prohibited “per se” under Section 4, 
Competition Act 2010, may be granted exemptions. Due to the lack of experience 
and knowledge of young competition authorities such as MyCC in implementing 
exemptions particularly in making assessments, it would facilitate the 
implementation process if the form and content of such agreements which may 
be exempted are provided for in the form of guidelines or regulations. 
Additionally, under Section 4, Competition Act 2010, horizontal agreements 
which limit technology or technological development or investment have been 
prohibited “per se” as being deemed as having an object of significantly 
restricting competition. However, research and development agreements, 
technology sharing agreements are the common types of horizontal agreements 
which are exempted in some jurisdictions507 due to their efficiency gains which 
encourage growth through investments and innovations. Therefore to facilitate 
the granting of exemptions in regard to such agreements, it would be prudent to 
spell out the terms and conditions in such agreements which may and may not 
be exempted in the form of block exemptions. 
 
                                            
507
 For example, the EU regulation on block exemption for research and development, Commission 
Regulation (EU) No 1217/2010, OJ L335/36 (18.12.10)  
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The prerequisite for applying for individual exemption under Section 6, Competition Act 
2010 is that the agreement in question has been deemed as prohibited under Section 4, 
Competition Act 2010. Therefore, the granting of exemptions under Section 6 shall be 
affected by the volume of prohibitions decided by the MyCC under Section 4. In the 
early days of leading up to the full enforcement of cartel regulation under the 
Competition Act 2010, the focus should be not only to advocacy and awareness 
programmes but also to the formulation of the implementation guidelines and 
regulations including those on block exemptions. By the time of full enforcement of the 
law, all the said statutory instruments would have to be in place lest business 
opportunities are lost due to the inefficiency and unpreparedness of the MyCC. 
 
For purposes of independence and establishing the credibility of the MyCC, it is 
insufficient for decisions made by the MyCC to be published and explained508 in order to 
demonstrate transparency. Independence and credibility also requires disassociation 
from political figures and industrial lobbyists who seek to influence economic policy 
decision making in their favour.  In this regard, the appointment of key officials in MyCC 
must be transparently made and there should also be mechanisms and safeguards in 
ensuring the independence of MyCC. The appointment of the Commissioners is by the 
Prime Minister based on the recommendation of the Minister509. There is a possibility 
that the individuals appointed are not solely based on merit but also their political 
                                            
508
 Publication of decisions in granting individual exemptions and block exemptions are provided for 
respectively under Section 6 (2) and Section 9 Competition Act 2010, Malaysia. 
509
 Section 5, Competition Commission Act 2010, Malaysia. 
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affiliations and also close relationship with those in power. Therefore, in order to 
overcome this perception, the appointment of those with political affiliations or enjoy 
close relationships with the decision makers ought to be avoided. This includes 
refraining from appointing serving members of parliament and figures affiliated with 
firms which enjoy political patronage510.   
 
The position of the MyCC is also a factor which influences its independence. The MyCC 
has been created as an agency under the Ministry of Domestic Trade, Consumerism 
and Cooperatives. It is submitted that subjecting the MyCC to the jurisdiction of a 
Ministry whose responsibilities are limited to certain areas and not across all economic 
activity may become a challenge for the MyCC in carrying out its function especially 
when dealing with Ministries which are considered to be more senior in terms of 
jurisdiction and ministerial ranking, because competition law and policy apply across all 
industries. These include Ministries such as the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI), Ministry of Agriculture and Agro-Based Industry, Ministry of Plantation 
Industries and Commodities and the Economic Planning Unit; among others. All these 
government agencies are responsible in one way or another in industrial and trade 
policy making. On top of these Ministries, there are also sectoral agencies and 
regulators to contend with. Hence, it is submitted that the present organisational 
structure is open to the risk of competition policy being unnecessarily made subservient 
                                            
510
 Although Section 8, Competition Commission Act 2010, Malaysia provides that the Chairman and 
Commissioners shall not hold any other office without prior approval of the Minister, the discretion to act 
upon this provisions vests in the Minister. Moreover, it is not unheard of in Malaysia for serving Members 
of Parliament and active members of the ruling party to be appointed as board members of sectoral 
regulators such as the Commercial Vehicle Licensing Board. 
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to industrial policy. It would have been more ideal for the MyCC to be created as an 
agency under the Prime Minister’s Department or a central agency because it would 
overcome issues related to remit and seniority. Another possible but perhaps more 
ambitious alternative is for the Chairman of the MyCC to be accorded the rank of 
Minister511, thus conferring the MyCC the same rank as a Ministry. 
 
In cases of overlap of jurisdiction particularly with sectoral regulators, there should be a 
coordination mechanism in place to address any overlapping issues lest they become 
obstacles in the implementation of exemptions. In this regard, the South African 
Competition Commission overcame such obstacles by entering into memorandum of 
understandings (MoUs) with the relevant sectoral regulators512. However, Section 3, 
Competition Act 2010 provides that the Competition Act 2010 does not apply to the 
communications and multimedia sector and the energy which are governed by their own 
sectoral legislation which are in turn administered by their respective sectoral 
regulators. These are listed in the First Schedule of the Competition Act 2010. The 
Minister has the discretion to amend the First Schedule. These two sectors have been 
                                            
511
 According the Chairman of the Japan Fair Trade Commission with a Cabinet rank facilitates 
enforcement of competition and policy in Japan in regard to remit and also seniority of agency. Based on 
the discussion with Japan Fair Trade Commission officials during the author’s participation in the JICA 
Antimonopoly Act and Competition Policy Course (30 August – 28 September 2000), Tokyo, Japan. This 
suggestion is also in line with Gal’s argument that a political anchor or godfather for competition law 
would be useful to reduce the influence of pressure groups which are anti-competition law in developing 
countries. See Gal, M.S., ‘The Ecology of Antitrust Pre-conditions for Competition Law Enforcement in 
Developing Countries’, in Competition, Competitiveness and Development: Lessons from Developing 
Countries, United Nations Publication (2004), UNCTAD/ DITC/CLP/2004/1, p.33 at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20041ch1_en.pdf    
512
 Currently, there are four such MoUs which has been entered into between the South African 
Competition Commission and sectoral regulators. See Competition Commission South Africa website at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/mou/ accessed on 27/3/2012. 
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excluded due to the existence of competition dimension in their respective sectoral laws 
which have existed prior to the enactment of the Competition Act 2010, although to 
date, active enforcement of the competition dimension by the sectoral regulators 
remains to be seen. Hopefully other sectors would not be excluded from the purview of 
the Competition Act 2010 in the future just because of the existence of competition 
dimension in their respective sectoral regulations. Otherwise, it may create different 
standards in competition law enforcement in Malaysia and any loopholes may be taken 
advantage of by cartels. In such cases it would be better to follow the example of South 
Africa because the MoUs do not exclude the application of competition law altogether 
but it provides a coordinated way in which to handle issues of concurrent jurisdictions.  
 
It is also important for Malaysia to take note of the fact that there is yet to be any 
suitable economic model which could be utilised in the weighing of non-competition 
considerations which are based on equity against competition considerations based on 
economic considerations such as efficiency and consumer welfare513. Without a suitable 
model, there is a risk that exemptions based on equity such as the empowerment of 
Bumiputeras in the economy or promotion of national champions could be 
inappropriately granted or even abused. Thus, it would be relevant for the Malaysian 
                                            
513
 As identified by research on assessment of the public interest dimension under the South  African 
competition law which include: Hodge, J. et al, ‘Public Interest Provisions in The South African 
Competition Act- A Critical Review’, Competition Policy, Law and Economics Conference (2009); and 
Boshoff, W. et al, ‘The Economics Of Public Interest Provisions In South African Competition Policy’, Sixth 
Annual Competition Law, Economics and Policy Conference, South  Africa (2012) at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/events/SIxth-Annual-Competition-Law-Economics-and-Policy-
Conference-in-South-Africa-2012/NewFolder-3/The-economics-of-public-interest-provisions-in-South-
African-competition-policy.pdf   
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competition authorities to conduct an economic study on formulating such an economic 
model lest exemptions based on equity considerations such as significant and 
identifiable social benefit as stipulated under Section 5 (a), Competition Act 2010, 
Malaysia are not granted based on erroneous principles which in turn could lead to 
misallocation of resources and inefficiency. 
 
4.6. CONCLUSION 
 
Exemptions are relevant not only to developing countries but also developed countries. 
The difference is that for developed countries or countries with mature competition 
regimes, exemptions granted may have been lessened over time due to regulatory 
reform514 or they may require more in depth and sophisticated form of assessment in 
line with their advanced development status, business innovations, maturity of 
competition agencies and stronger competition culture. The granting of exemptions 
does not weaken competition law provided they are based on sound economic 
justifications. Hence, exemptions may strengthen competition law by accommodating 
not only efficiency goals but also relevant broader public policy objectives which may 
result in efficiency outcomes or facilitate the acceptance of competition policy and law 
                                            
514 Like in the case of Japan - In 1998, the number of exemptions granted in Japan was greatly reduced 
by ninety (90) per cent from more than 1000 previously exempted from the provisions of the Anti-
Monopoly Act 1947 via various laws and administrative guidance cartels as authorised by the Japanese 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry. See Jacobs, S.H., Regulatory Reform in Japan, OECD 
(1999), p.216. From 2003, only three types of exemptions remain under the Anti-monopoly Act 1947 as a 
result of the revision of the law exercised in 1999-2000, namely: acts under intellectual property rights, 
acts of cooperatives and resale price maintenance contracts. See Takahashi, I., ‘Anti-Monopoly Act 
Exemptions in Japan’, the Specific Workshop between the Drafting Committee on Competition Law of 
Vietnam and the Japan Fair Trade Commission, JFTC (2003), p.1-2 and 8-9 at 
http://www.jftc.go.jp/eacpf/05/hanoiTaka.pdf 
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particularly in developing countries which lack competition culture. As such, exemption 
is a useful tool for ensuring the achievement of developmental objectives under 
competition law. The factors which influence proper implementation of exemptions in 
developing countries are: development oriented goals, transparency and institutional 
limitations. The point highlighted here is that the number of exemptions granted or the 
fact that exemptions are provided for under the law should not be the sole focus in 
assessing whether exemptions have “weakened” the law but the emphasis should be on 
whether the exemptions were based on sound justifications. 
  
This work also explains how EU style exemption provisions may be made workable in 
Malaysia. Despite the fact that Malaysia modelled its exemption provisions on that of 
the EU, this discussion has illustrated that it is possible to make it workable based on 
the fact that it can accommodate development and fairness considerations. However, in 
order to make the EU style legislative provisions become implementable, certain 
adjustments have been made in the exemption provisions under the Competition Act 
2010 and these need to be complemented by the relevant regulatory tools as 
discussed. The EU experience and jurisprudence in the granting of exemptions are 
useful guidance in determining the areas which ought to be focused on in determining a 
workable exemptions implementation framework in Malaysia. Additionally, if Malaysia 
were to adopt an economic approach in the granting of exemptions, in theory, even hard 
core cartel agreements may qualify for an exemption so long as the gains outweigh the 
anti-competitive effect. This feature is indeed useful for developing countries such as 
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Malaysia because sometimes cartel arrangements have the potential to contribute to 
economic growth particularly in terms of agreements on innovations and investments. 
 
This work submits that the necessary elements which ought to be included in the 
implementation framework for the granting of exemptions in Malaysia are: regulatory 
instruments which aid and guide the granting of exemption; safeguards pertaining to the 
independence of the MyCC; the establishment of a coordination and consultancy 
committee; prioritisation framework pertaining to exemptions; and an appropriate 
economic model for the assessment of exemptions. All these pertain to the clarification 
of the implementation of the granting of exemptions in Malaysia, addressing the 
loopholes in the legislative provisions through complementary legislative instruments 
and transparency. 
 
Future work which is very relevant and should be immediately considered is on a 
suitable economic model for the assessment in the granting of exemptions which could 
accommodate the weighing of non-competition considerations that are based on equity 
against competition considerations based on economic considerations such as 
efficiency and consumer welfare. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
LIMITATIONS OF THE COMPETITION ACT 2010 IN LIGHT OF TOUGHER CARTEL 
ENFORCEMENT – FOCUS ON TACIT COLLUSION 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
For the moment, the Malaysian Competition Commission (MyCC) is implementing a 
“soft approach” in cartel enforcement whereby the focus is remedial action as opposed 
to deterrence and also emphasis on competition advocacy and awareness515. This may 
be observed from the first proposed decision by the MyCC against price fixing by the 
Cameron Highlands Floriculturist Association where the MyCC’s proposed decision 
emphasises on remedial measures in order to encourage business compliance instead 
of imposition of fines. This is not surprising considering Malaysia is still in the nascent 
stage of competition law enforcement. Furthermore, the rationale for the soft approach 
is to provide a ‘grace period” for businesses to put their operations in order in 
accordance to the provisions of the Competition Act 2010; also to inculcate and promote 
a competition culture in Malaysia; and provide time for the MyCC to prepare for tougher 
cartel enforcement. Once businesses are familiar with the requirement of the 
Competition Act 2010; adequate public awareness of the workings and benefits of 
competition law has been instilled; and the MyCC is ready to implement cartel 
                                            
515
 See: The Malaysian Reserve, ‘MyCC Issues 1
st
 ‘Proposed Decision’ Against Price Fixing’ (25 October 
2012) at 
http://themalaysianreserve.com/main/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2396:mycc-
issues-1st-proposed-decision-against-price-fixing&catid=36:corporate-malaysia&Itemid=120 accessed on 
26/10/ 2012 
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enforcement on a par with the standards enforced internationally, tougher cartel 
enforcement would have to be implemented. Otherwise, effective cartel enforcement 
and promotion of competition in Malaysia could not be facilitated.  
 
Tougher cartel enforcement refers to stricter cartel enforcement. It includes any form of 
change in cartel enforcement which brings about higher risk of detection of cartels and 
renders cartel set-up more difficult and costlier to maintain. This may be inferred from 
the findings by Evenett, Levenstein and Suslow516 which explained that the wave of 
mergers and joint ventures between international cartel members in 1990’s was due to 
the introduction and revision of leniency programmes in several jurisdictions, bilateral 
cooperations between selected jurisdictions in cross-border cartel enforcement and 
more focus on international cartel enforcement by the global fraternity, namely through 
the OECD. Therefore, in the context of young competition jurisdictions which are opting 
for gradual enforcement of competition law (such as Malaysia), tougher cartel 
enforcement would also include the change in cartel enforcement strategy from a “soft 
approach” which emphasises on remedial action and competition advocacy and 
awareness to a pro-active approach which aims for deterrence; once the competition 
agency acquires sufficient capacity and competency to enable pro-active cartel 
enforcement. 
 
 
                                            
516
 Evenett, S.J. et al, ‘International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990’s’, The World Economy 
Vol.24 Issue 9 (2001) 1221-1245 
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Literature suggests that tougher cartel enforcement may either lead cartels to: merge; 
go further underground to avoid detection; or dissolve   – depending on the costs, risks, 
efficiency factors and practicality factors517. This is not surprising because survival of 
businesses is very much dependent on their ability to evolve and also innovations in 
business practices. The focus of this chapter is on cartels which opt to merge and 
thereafter evolve into tacit collusion in a more concentrated market. Tacit collusion 
occurs when the market outcome resembles that of an explicit collusion or even a 
formal cartel518. In this regard, the characteristic of oligopolistic markets facilitate tacit 
collusion because there is no explicit agreement involved between the firms but through 
their interdependence, they align their conducts which maximises their profits519. 
Therefore, the premise of this work is to determine whether available empirical evidence 
points to the possibility that there are markets in Malaysia where tacit collusion 
becomes more feasible due to changes in the market structure through mergers in light 
of tougher cartel enforcement. If it is so, then, the next question is whether they could 
be of significant concern to Malaysia?  In a nutshell, what is being asked in this chapter 
is: if hard core cartel behaviour could be effectively remedied through cartel 
enforcement, will this actually solve the problem or will the firms be able to continue 
coordinating their behaviour tacitly, possibly after some appropriate market restructuring 
                                            
517
 For detailed discussion on these factors based on the findings of the relevant literature see Mehra, P., 
‘Choice Between Cartels and Horizontal Merger’, (2007), p.8 at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081844  or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1081844 
518
 Ivaldi, M. et al, The Economics of Tacit collusion, Final Report for DG Competition European 
Commission (March 2003), p.4 
519
 Jones, A. and Sufrin, B., EU Competition Law; Text, Cases and Materials, Fourth Edition (2011), 
Oxford University Press, p. 784 
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using mergers? In other words, the apparent victory over hard-core cartels may be false 
in that the problem with higher price has not gone away, but the means through which 
the firms achieve this have changed. These are discussed from the Malaysian 
perspective where merger control is not under the remit of the Competition Act 2010; 
and the fact that the Malaysian merger control regulation, namely the Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers 2010 is without a competition dimension. Thus the research 
questions being asked in this chapter are: 1) how could tougher cartel enforcement 
bring about the problem of tacit collusion through mergers of firms?; 2) would the 
current provisions of the Competition Act 2010 be adequate to address tacit collusion?; 
and 3) how best to address tacit collusion which becomes more feasible due to mergers 
in light of tougher cartel enforcement in Malaysia?  
 
The first research question is explained in terms of the findings of relevant literature on: 
observations of significant merger waves which occurred after tougher cartel 
enforcement was implemented in jurisdictions around the world. The second research 
question is answered by discussing  the theories and concepts of tacit collusion; the 
lack of competition dimension in Malaysia’s merger control regulation and the law’s 
adequacy in dealing with tacit collusion which arises as a result of mergers in light of 
tougher cartel enforcement. In this regard, significant reference is made to EU 
provisions dealing with tacit collusion. This is because Malaysia’s competition law is “EU 
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style” whereby the law prohibits concerted practices520 and collective abuse of 
dominance521. The third research question is answered by discussing the state of 
market structure in Malaysia against the adequacy of the current provisions under the 
Competition Act 2010.   
 
The motivation of the research is based on the fact that Malaysia is among the new 
competition jurisdictions which have opted not to include competition dimension in its 
merger control regulation. Thus, the author is of the opinion that it is interesting to 
research into the link between merger control and cartel enforcement in a developing 
country setting. This particularly based on the argument that markets in developing 
countries tend to be highly concentrated due to high barriers to entry, less efficient 
capital market, cronyism and political patronage522. In terms of market environment in 
developing countries, there is a trend towards an increase in industrial concentration523.  
So, it is a valid academic interest to assess whether the lack of competition dimension 
in Malaysia’s merger control would not facilitate effective cartel enforcement in 
Malaysia. 
 
                                            
520
 Section 2 Competition Act 2010, Malaysia stipulates that “agreement” in the context of the Competition 
Act 2010 includes concerted practice; whilst horizontal agreements with the object or effect to significantly 
distort competition in the market are prohibited by virtue of Section 4, Competition Act 2010. 
521
 Section 10 Competition Act 2010, Malaysia 
522
 Fox, E.M., ‘In Search of a Competition Law Fit for Developing Countries’, New York University Law 
and Economics Research Paper No.11-04 (2011), p.9 at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1761619 
or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1761619  
523
 Whish, R., Competition Law, Lexis Nexis, Fifth Edition (2003), p.506 
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Although Malaysia is still in the nascent stage of competition law enforcement and 
tougher cartel enforcement is yet to be implemented, the foreseeable outcomes of 
tougher cartel enforcement is explained by referring to the findings of relevant research 
in the literature and empirical evidence available thus far. Hence, this work is essentially 
a theoretical discussion of the anticipated impact of tougher cartel enforcement and the 
limitations of the current competition legislative framework in dealing with the 
anticipated issues.  The focus of the discussion is on the enforcement of horizontal 
agreements; therefore in the context of this work, mergers do not refer to vertical 
mergers. The novelty of this work lies in the fact that the Competition Act 2010 is a fairly 
new piece of legislation which has yet to be truly tried and tested. Therefore, its 
adequacy or limitations are yet to be seen. It should be noted that this work does not 
discuss whether Malaysia needs to include the competition in the country’s merger 
control regulation but it discusses the adequacy of the Competition Act 2010 in dealing 
with collusions. The author is of the opinion that the question of whether Malaysia needs 
to include a competition dimension in its merger control regulation could only be 
adequately answered through economic research. 
 
The discussion in this chapter is arranged as follows: Part 2 explains how tougher cartel 
enforcement could drive cartels to merge and maintain their supra-competitive profits by 
coordinating their practices in a more concentrated market and the Malaysian market 
structure based on empirical findings of available literature. Part 3 explains the theories 
and concepts of tacit collusion. The adequacy of Malaysia’s Competition Act 2010 in 
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dealing with tacit collusion is discussed in Part 4.  Part 5 discusses how best to address 
tacit collusion which arise out of change in market structure due to mergers in light of 
tougher cartel enforcement. Proposals and recommendations are discussed in Part 6 
before the discussion concludes. 
 
5.2. TOUGHER CARTEL ENFORCEMENT AND BUSINESS ADAPTATION 
 
Tougher cartel enforcement impacts the incentives of the firms to collude by rendering 
cartels more difficult, costlier and riskier to maintain524. It is more difficult because of 
cartel enforcement measures which facilitate cartel detection such as leniency 
programmes which reward cartel members who are willing to “snitch” on fellow 
cartelists. Therefore, cartel members would have to be more vigilantly monitored and 
punishment of cheating cartel firms which have strayed from the agreement through 
mechanisms such as price wars is more difficult to be executed lest it alerts competition 
officials of the cartel’s existence in the market.   These render cartel agreements costlier 
to maintain because cartels would be forced to adopt more sophisticated mechanisms 
to avoid detection525. There is also the risk of heavy penalties which would be imposed 
which in turn would adversely affect their cartel profits. In short, it becomes riskier and 
costlier to maintain cartel agreements because of increased possibility of detection and 
credible threat of punishment which comes with tougher cartel enforcement by 
                                            
524
 See: Levenstein, M.C. and Suslow, V.Y., ‘What Determines Cartel Success?’, Journal of Economic 
Literature Vol.44 (1) (March 2006) 43-95  
525
 Griffin, J.M., ‘An Inside Look at a Cartel at Work: Common Characteristics of International Cartels’, 
Fighting Cartels- Why and How?, Swedish Competition Authority (2001) 29-55 at 
http://www.kkv.se/upload/filer/eng/publications/3rdnordic010412.pdf#page=29 
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competition agencies with improved competency and capacity in enforcing competition 
law in the jurisdiction.  
 
The choice of the ensuing course of action to be undertaken by the colluding firms in 
light of tougher cartel enforcement would be dependent on what is more cost effective; 
efficient; and practical for the firms526. The findings in the literature suggest that the 
factors which affect the choice between cartel and merger are not only development of 
competition law but also: ownership structure; development of financial and capital 
markets; concentration; entry; economies of scale; and proportion of firms involved in 
collusion527. In this regard, there are four possible outcomes for cartels, namely; 
merging; or entering into joint venture agreements which may be used as guises for 
collusion528; or maintaining the cartel agreement but going “deeper underground” by 
adopting and investing in mechanisms to avoid detection and prevent cheating by their 
own members who want to increase their individual profit529; or dissolving the cartel. As 
mentioned earlier, the focus of this discussion is on cartels which opt to merge to form a 
market structure better suited for tacit collusion. 
                                            
526
 For detailed discussion on the findings of the relevant literature see Mehra, P., ‘Choice Between 
Cartels and Horizontal Merger’, (2007), p.8 at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081844  or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1081844  
527
 Mehra, P., ‘Choice Between Cartels and Horizontal Merger’, (2007), p.8 at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081844 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1081844 
528
 Based on empirical evidence, Evenett, Levenstein and Suslow found that tougher cartel enforcement 
resulted in international cartel merging or entering into joint venture agreements as guises for 
continuation of their anti-competitive conducts. See Evenett, S.J. et al, ‘International Cartel Enforcement: 
Lessons from the 1990’s’, The World Economy Vol.24 Issue 9 (2001) 1221-1245 
529
 See: Levenstein, M.C. and Suslow, V.Y., ‘What Determines Cartel Success?’, Journal of Economic 
Literature Vol.44 (1) (March 2006) 43-95; Griffin, J.M., ‘An Inside Look at a Cartel at Work: Common 
Characteristics of International Cartels’, Fighting Cartels- Why and How?, Swedish Competition Authority 
(2001) 29-55 at http://www.kkv.se/upload/filer/eng/publications/3rdnordic010412.pdf#page=29 
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Examples of past mergers triggered by tougher cartel enforcement range from mergers 
which occurred in the American steel and railroad industries after the Sherman Act was 
introduced in the US in 1898 and cartels were banned; to when the United Kingdom 
introduced the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956 which outlawed cartels530; and the 
1990’s wave of joint ventures and mergers in cartel prone industries531. There are also 
more recent cases of former cartel members resorting to mergers such as in the French 
market of urban transport industry involving the firms, Transdev and Veolia532.  
 
In Malaysia, cartels opting for mergers would be more likely in view of the fact that there 
is no competition dimension under the country’s merger control regulation. In other 
words, the structural approach is not available under the Malaysian competition law 
framework because it has been excluded from the remit of the Competition Act 2010 
based on Malaysia’s development needs, which has been explained as to encourage 
the development of capital market in Malaysia533. Although there is a Code on Take-
Overs and Mergers 2010 enforced by the Securities Commission Malaysia to regulate 
mergers between companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, there is no 
competition dimension under the said legislative instrument. Therefore, mergers 
                                            
530
 For a summary of the literature on selection of choice between mergers and cartels which was 
triggered due to developments in competition law see: Mehra, P., ‘Choice Between Cartels and Horizontal 
Merger’, (2007), p.8 at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081844 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1081844 
531
 See: Evenett, S.J. et al, ‘International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990’s’, The World 
Economy Vol.24 Issue 9 (2001) 1221-1245 
532
 See: Langlais, A.C. and Tropeano, J.P., ‘Fight Cartels or Control Mergers? On the Optimal Allocation 
of Enforcement Efforts Within Competition Policy’, Working paper 2011-18, Université Paris Ouest 
Nanterre La Defense, EconomiX, p.2  at http://economix.fr/pdf/dt/2011/WP_EcoX_2011-18.pdf 
533
 As mentioned by the Minister of Domestic Trade, Co-operatives and Consumerism in his speech to the 
Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives), Malaysian Parliament on 20 April 2010, Hansard Report 
(Malay version), p.147 
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between cartel members driven by tougher cartel enforcement are a likely option for 
Malaysian cartelists. Based on the current provisions of the Competition Act 2010, only 
behavioural remedies are provided for under the law to address tacit collusion. They are 
prohibition of anti-competitive horizontal agreements under Section 4, Competition Act 
2010; and prohibition of abuse of collective dominance under Section 10, Competition 
Act 2010. However, the adequacy of these provisions is moot and this is discussed later 
in this chapter. 
 
Therefore, when tougher cartel enforcement is implemented in Malaysia; the impact on 
competition law enforcement is that cartels may evolve into tacit collusion, thus 
enhancing the opportunity for a more “difficult to detect” form of anti-competitive 
horizontal agreement to thrive in more concentrated markets which are better suited for 
tacit collusion. It needs to be emphasised that the argument here is not that tacit 
collusion will only arise upon the implementation of tougher cartel enforcement, but the 
point being put across is that without competition dimension in merger control to 
complement cartel enforcement in regulating horizontal agreements, infringing 
businesses could utilise any gaps in the law for purposes of profit maximisation to their 
benefit and to the detriment of consumers through a more feasible approach. However, 
this possibility is dependent on the market conditions in Malaysia. This is because not 
all mergers between firms in concentrated markets would result in tacit collusion.  
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The works by Kuhn on factors that facilitate joint collusion in the context of merger 
control534 and Ivaldi et al in their report for DG Competition have been insightful in 
identifying the factors which enable firms to tacitly collude and the impact on merger 
control535. It was found that tacit collusion does not only depend on structural variables 
but also characteristics of the demand side and characteristics of the supply side536. 
The factors which influence firms to tacitly collude include: number of competitors; 
significance of market share; barriers to entry; frequency of interaction; market 
transparency; demand growth; business cycles and demand fluctuations; the role of 
innovation; symmetries; product differentiation; and multi-market contact537. However, 
the change in these factors as a result of mergers differ in terms of their impact on the 
deviation and punishment incentives to collude and the factors which fall under each 
category differs for each market538. Hence, Ivaldi et al argued that the factors may be 
divided into several categories based on their relevance to the sustainability of firms to 
collude; namely:  “ ... factors which may or may not be affected by the merger have a 
decisive impact on the firms’ ability to sustain collusion; factors that are both relevant 
and likely to be affected by mergers; and factors that can have an influence on the 
sustainability of collusion, possibly to a lesser extent and that may or may not be directly 
                                            
534
 See: Kuhn, K. U., ‘An Economists’ Guide Through the Joint Dominance Jungle’, Michigan Law and 
Economics Research Paper No. 02-014 (2001) at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=349523 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.349523 ; 
535
 Ivaldi, M. et al, The Economics of Tacit Collusion, Final Report for DG Competition European 
Commission (March 2003) 
536
 Ibid, pp.58-63  
537
 Ibid, pp.12-57 
538
 Ibid, pp.67-70 
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affected by mergers ...”539. Therefore, based on the above said findings, it may be 
inferred that not all mergers would lead firms to tacitly collude such as engaging in tacit 
collusion. There are instances when the current structure in some markets does not 
allow for collusion; however, a series of mergers can restructure the industry so that 
tacit collusion becomes feasible, for example by making each firm more similar in size 
etc. However, in some markets, even mergers cannot restructure them such that 
successful collusion is feasible. Therefore, the question now is whether the first set of 
cases is significant in Malaysia and could merger control alleviate the problem?  This 
requires assessment of the findings of studies on market structure in Malaysia. 
Nevertheless, the disclaimer which ought to be emphasised is that the first arm of the 
question could only be adequately answered through economic research whilst the 
second arm is discussed later in this chapter. However, some insights may be gained 
from findings of available empirical research on market structure in Malaysia. 
 
Malaysia is an open state led economy where the government role in economic decision 
making continues to be lessened540. However, several studies on the manufacturing 
industry and banking industry had found evidence of market concentration. An empirical 
                                            
539
 Ibid 
540
 See Beeson, M., ‘Mahathir and the Markets: Globalisation and the Pursuit of Economic Autonomy in 
Malaysia’, Pacific Affairs Vol. 73 No. 3 335-351 (Fall 2000), p.340; and The World Bank, Malaysia 
Overview, at http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/malaysia/overview  Examples of liberalisation include: 
the banking sector continues to be liberalised since 2009; seventeen (17) services subsectors were 
liberalised from January 2012. Malaysia has also embarked on privatisation of nationalised firms and 
sectors since the early 1980’s.  
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study on the manufacturing industry in 2006541 discovered that: due to Malaysia’s 
relatively small economy, economies of scale is the cause for market concentration in 
Malaysia; foreign firms owned or controlled a significant share of the local industry and 
they have an upper hand in the market as compared to local firms because of their 
technology, marketing skills and R & D development which may deter entry of local 
firms into the market or lead to their winding up or bankruptcy that in turn would 
increase market concentration; market concentration of the Malaysian manufacturing 
industry is rather high as compared with most other countries; however, competition in 
certain sectors of the industry had increased over time. The findings of this study have 
been consistent with other earlier seminal empirical studies on the Malaysian 
manufacturing industry542.  It should be noted that this study by Mohammad Ridhuan 
and Suhaila are based on data from 1986 to 1990. However, in view of the fact that 
liberalisation in Malaysia earnestly commenced from 1995 when Malaysia joined the 
WTO, market concentration in Malaysia’s manufacturing industries could have 
increased with the more liberalised entry of foreign firms, particularly considering the 
fact that industrial consolidation is encouraged by the government. Indeed, this impact 
may be observed in Malaysia’s banking industry.   
 
                                            
541
 Muhammad Ridhuan, B. and Suhaila, A.J., ‘Industrial Structure and Concentration in the Malaysian 
Manufacturing Industry’, International Journal of Management and Strategy 13 (Special Issue) (2006) 83-
101  
542
 See: Rugayah M., ‘The Measurement of Market Concentration and Profitability in Malaysian Manufacturing’, The 
Malaysian Economic Review (1992) 23(1): 1-11 Yusuf, Z. A. and Phang H. E., ‘ Industrial Market Structure in 
Malaysia 1979-1990: A Profile’,  Bank Negara Malaysia, Discussion Paper No. 21 (1993); Nor Ghani M. N., Z. 
Osman, A. Z. Abdullah, and Jun C. Y., ‘Trends in the Malaysian Industrial Market Structures’, Jurnal Ekonomi 
Malaysia (2000) 34: 3-20 ; Nor Ghani M. N., A. Z. Abdullah and S. D. Applanaidu, ‘ Advertising Intensity, 
Concentration and Profitability in Malaysian Manufacturing Revisited: A Simultaneous Equation Approach’,  
International Journal of Management Studies (2004) 11(2): 45-53  
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The findings of a 2004 empirical study by Nasser Katib on the market structure and 
performance in the Malaysian banking industry suggests that market concentration 
determines profitability in the Malaysian banking  industry543. However, the empirical 
findings found that market structure was not consistently correlated with profitability of 
price due to the constant industrial monitoring conducted by Bank Negara Malaysia (the 
Central Bank of Malaysia), which ensured competition in the market544. The study also 
found that the market share of the three (3) largest banks is forty five (45) per cent. This 
is based on the share of total bank deposits in the market in 1995. Although this study 
was based on dated data, it should be noted that the industrial consolidation exercise in 
the Malaysian banking sector which has been ongoing since the onset of the new 
millennium in order to create six (6) domestic financial groups in the industry have led to 
even higher market  concentration level545. Anecdotal evidence based on media reports 
also indicates that there may be market concentration in the cement industry546.  
 
Based on these findings it may be inferred that market concentration in the studied 
industries are high because of the small size of Malaysia’s domestic market and that 
economies of scale is the cause of market concentration. Although the high market 
                                            
543
 Nasser Katib, M., ‘Market Structure and Performance in the Malaysian Banking Industry: A Robust 
Estimation’, 8th Capital Markets Conference, Indian Institute of Capital Markets Paper (2004) at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=872266 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.872266   
544
 Ibid, p.13   
545
 The mergers of Malaysian banks have been on the advice on the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank 
Negara Malaysia) as a response to market liberalisation. See The Star Malaysia, Bank Negara Explains 
Rationale for Bank Mergers, (11 August 1999) at 
http://mir.com.my/lb/econ_plan/contents/press_release/110899merge.htm accessed on 5/1/2013   
546
 See: The Star newspaper report, Probe Warranted if Cement Makers have Pact to Raise Prices, 
(3/8/2012) at http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2012/8/3/business/11786336&sec=business 
accessed 13/1/2013 
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concentration in the manufacturing and banking industries in Malaysia indicates that 
there are not many competitors in the market which could facilitate coordination 
between the firms, the studies did not go into the details of the other factors which 
enable tacit collusion such as: symmetry between firms; the demand growth; level of 
dependency on innovation; level and type of interaction between the firms; level of 
market transparency; etc. However, regulation has managed to keep competition in 
check in the banking industry. The findings are insufficient to provide a strong argument 
for the inclusion of a competition dimension in Malaysia’s merger control laws for the 
moment. Nevertheless, the findings of the study on the banking industry suggest that 
effective monitoring by the regulator is necessary to ensure that the ongoing bank 
merger exercise do not result in anti-competitive outcomes to the detriment of 
consumers.   
 
Nevertheless, it ought to be noted that the studies were conducted before the 
introduction of competition law in Malaysia; significant empirical studies have been 
limited to the manufacturing and banking industries; and the studies were based on 
dated data which predates Malaysia’s WTO membership. Furthermore, the studies did 
not specifically focus on the impact of mergers on factors which enable tacit collusion as 
identified by Ivaldi et al and Kuhn. It has to also be acknowledged that obtaining data for 
such studies is not easy due to confidentiality laws; business secrecy; and also lack of 
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collection of the relevant data particularly in developing countries547. This signals a need 
for a more comprehensive study on market concentration in Malaysia which 
incorporates markets with oligopolistic tendencies in order to provide a more accurate 
diagnosis of Malaysia’s competition concerns. Furthermore, it should also be noted that 
the said empirical studies and anecdotal indications give rise to the possibility that there 
may be market concentration in other Malaysian industries. After all, markets in 
developing countries tend to be highly concentrated due to high barriers to entry, less 
efficient capital market, cronyism and political patronage548 and in terms of the global 
trend in market environment, there is a trend towards increase in industrial 
concentration549.  
 
Although available empirical research findings on the Malaysian manufacturing and 
banking industries at this point in time could not strongly support the argument for the 
the inclusion of a competition dimension in Malaysia’s merger control laws, the point 
being made in this discussion is not that Malaysia must include a competition dimension 
in its merger control regulation but that the Competition Act 2010 may be inadequate to 
address tacit collusion in light of tougher cartel enforcement. Not including a competition 
dimension in the country’s merger control regulation may be appropriate for Malaysia for 
the moment; however, as competition law enforcement advances through the years and 
                                            
547
 Muhammad Ridhuan, B. and Suhaila, A.J., ‘Industrial Structure and Concentration in the Malaysian 
Manufacturing Industry’, International Journal of Management and Strategy 13 (Special Issue) (2006) 83-
101, p.100  
548
 Fox, E.M., ‘In Search of a Competition Law Fit for Developing Countries’, New York University Law 
and Economics Research Paper No.11-04 (2011), p.9 at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1761619 
or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1761619  
549
 Whish, R., Competition Law, Lexis Nexis, Fifth Edition (2003), p.506 
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Malaysia edges nearer to achieving a developed nation status and business practices 
evolve, the need for a competition dimension in Malaysia’s merger control regulation 
may arise.  
 
5.3. THE THEORIES OF TACIT COLLUSION 
 
Before the limitations of the Competition Act 2010 in dealing with tacit collusion could be 
assessed, an explanation of the theories and concepts of tacit collusion is necessary. In 
this regard, this section discusses how oligopolistic markets facilitate tacit collusion; the 
types of collusion; the mechanics of tacit collusion; the difference between the legal and 
economic concept of collusion; the difficulty in uncovering tacit collusion; and how best 
to address tacit collusion. 
 
Oligopoly lies somewhere between monopoly and perfect competition. Its market 
characteristics include: few large firms; inelastic demand; homogenous products; high 
barriers to entry; advertising and promotions driven; and interdependence between the 
firms in decision making. The characteristics of oligopolistic markets renders that a firm 
must consider the market behaviour of their competitors in order to determine its own 
best policy550. Therefore, prices in oligopolistic markets tend to be rigid because any 
price change by one firm will be followed by the others551. Hence, the characteristics of 
                                            
550
 Carlton, D.W. and Perloff, J.M., Modern Industrial Organization, Prentice Hall, 4
th
 Edition (2005), p.157 
551
 See: M. Motta, Competition Policy Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press (2004), pp.142-
149; Whish, R., Competition Law, Lexis Nexis, Fifth Edition (2003), pp.505-509 
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oligopolistic markets facilitate collusion through the interdependence of firms in their 
market behaviour552. Despite the fact that oligopolistic markets can facilitate collusion, it 
should not be automatically presumed that oligopolies result in inefficiencies553.  It used 
to be the prevalent belief that “oligopoly is a single problem that competition law needed 
to address”554. This view was changed as a result of later empirical studies, which found 
that higher profits could be better explained as a result of greater efficiencies 
accompanied by firm size and higher concentration555. Repeated game theory models 
also showed that coordination in oligopolistic markets is more difficult to achieve than it 
was originally thought556. Hence, there is no conclusive agreement amongst economists 
that oligopolies would result in good or bad outcomes for consumers because it would 
depend on various market specific factors such as market conditions and nature of 
rivalry between the firms557. But then again, non-collusive oligopoly outcomes are 
indeed desirable as opposed to collusive outcomes as far as consumers are concerned. 
 
                                            
552
 Firms may still compete very aggressively even if there are only two firms in the market. For example, 
two bidders who really want a contract to deliver a service may bid very aggressively against each other 
initially. However, they may come to realise that this aggression only lead to short term gains and it would 
be better for them to collude due to higher long term gains for both.  
553
 See Hawk, B.E. and Motta, G.A., ‘Oligopolies and Collective Dominance: A Solution in Search of a 
Problem’, (Eighth Edition of the Treviso Conference on ‘Antitrust Between EC Law and National 
Law’) (2008), Fordham University School of Law (November 2008), pp.60-62 at SSRN : 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1301693    
554
 Ibid, p.61  
555
 Ibid, pp.60-62   
556
 Ibid, p.61 
557
 Statement by Peter Freeman, Chairman of the UK Office of Fair Trading (2007) as cited in Hawk, B.E. 
and Motta, G.A., ‘Oligopolies and Collective Dominance: A Solution in Search of a 
Problem’, (Eighth Edition of the Treviso Conference on ‘Antitrust Between EC Law and National 
Law’) (2008), Fordham University School of Law (November 2008), p.62 at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1301693  
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Tacit collusion is not an easy concept to grasp not only because of the difference 
between the categorisation of collusion in US and EU competition law but also due to 
the difference between the legal and economic concept of collusion. US law categorises 
collusion into explicit collusion; conscious parallelism; and concerted action558. Under 
US competition law, explicit collusion such as cartel agreement is prohibited by 
competition law; however, conscious parallelism is legal; whilst concerted action is a 
gray area under US competition law559. Concerted action under US law is coordination 
between firms which are conducted through some form of communication which are 
beyond conscious parallelism but do not expressly propose or reach an agreement560. 
Concerted action and conscious parallelism are both viewed as tacit collusion under US 
competition law561.  Under EU competition law, explicit collusions are also prohibited 
and purely parallel behaviour which occurs as a reasonable commercial response to the 
behaviour of competitors in the market is not prohibited; however, concerted practices 
are not considered as tacit collusion. Concerted practice under EU competition law has 
been interpreted as “... coordination between undertakings which, without having  
reached the stage where  an agreement, properly so called, has been  concluded, 
knowingly substitutes practical cooperation between  them for the risks of 
competition”562. Tacit collusion on the other hand, does not involve any explicit 
agreement but occurs because of the interdependence of oligopolists in aligning their 
                                            
558
 Harrington Jr., J.E., ‘A Theory of Tacit Collusion’, John Hopkins University (January 2012), pp.2- 3 at 
http://econ.jhu.edu/wp-content/uploads/pdf/papers/wp588_harrington.pdf 
559
 Ibid 
560
 Ibid 
561
 Ibid 
562
 ICI vs. Commission, [1972] ECR 619, paras. 64 and 65. 
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actions to maximise their profits563. However, tacit collusion may be deemed to be an 
indication of concerted practice is there is no other explicable justification for tacit 
collusion based on market conditions564.  
 
Collusion is also viewed differently in law and economics. In law, although a formal 
agreement is not necessary, collusion requires some form of collective agreement or 
concerted practice565. Whilst in economics, collusion refers directly to the market 
outcomes and the existence of an agreement is immaterial566. Therefore, under the 
economic concept, it is immaterial how the firms managed to arrive at supra-competition 
price. Due to the difference between the legal concept which is translated into the law 
and the economic concept; explicit collusion is illegal under the law but tacit collusion 
could escape prohibition under EU competition law unless there is proof of concerted 
practice under Article 101 TFEU or abuse of collective dominance under Article 102 
TFEU. So, in markets where mergers occur due to tougher cartel enforcement, would 
not a more concentrated market structure facilitate concerted practice and abuse of 
collective dominance among oligopolists?; or result in undetected cartels becoming 
                                            
563
 Jones, A. and Sufrin, B., EU Competition Law; Text, Cases and Materials, Fourth Edition (2011), 
Oxford University Press, p. 784 
564
 See the ECJ’s judgment in Wood Pulp, Cases C-89, 104, 114, 116-17, and 125-9/85, [1993] ECR I-
1307 
565
 Buccirossi, P., ‘Facilitating Practices’, Buccirossi, P. (ed.), Handbook of Antitrust Economics, The MIT 
Press (2008), p.305 
566
 Kuhn, K. U., ‘An Economists’ Guide Through the Joint Dominance Jungle’, Michigan Law and 
Economics Research Paper No. 02-014 (2001), pp.7-8 at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=349523 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.349523  
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even harder to detect?  Hawk and Motta567 referred to these situations as “oligopoly 
gap” and “cartel gap”. The “oligopoly gap” concerns the question of “how to ensure firms 
compete and not cooperate when they are aware that they are highly interdependent?”; 
whilst the “cartel gap” is undiscoverable cartels which could thrive and operate 
undetected in the market due to the environment in oligopolistic markets568. 
Nevertheless, it ought to be noted that tacit collusion is not feasible in all oligopolistic 
markets569 and is dependent on factors which enable collusion570 as mentioned in the 
previous section of this chapter.  
 
Tacit collusion arises from dynamic and repeated interaction between the firms in the 
market571. It is more or less driven by similar elements as cartels572 in terms of: 
incentives to profiteer above the competitive level; the need to monitor and punish 
deviation due to the possibility of increasing individual profit level; the need to 
coordinate in order to reach an agreement; the need to create barriers to entry against 
                                            
567
 Hawk, B.E. and Motta, G.A., ‘Oligopolies and Collective Dominance: A Solution in Search of a 
Problem’, (Eighth Edition of the Treviso Conference on ‘Antitrust Between EC Law and National Law’) 
(2008), Fordham University School of Law (November 2008), at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1301693   
568
 However, Hawk and Motta argued that the “carte” gap” is not significant because cartels require 
effective organisation and repeated communication which are bound to leave an evidence trail. 
Furthermore, cartel enforcement tools such as leniency programmes facilitate the uncovering of cartels. 
See: Hawk, B.E. and Motta, G.A., ‘Oligopolies and Collective Dominance: A Solution in Search of a 
Problem’, (Eighth Edition of the Treviso Conference on ‘Antitrust Between EC Law and National Law’) 
(2008), Fordham University School of Law (November 2008), SSRN: at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1301693    
569
 Stigler, G., ‘A Theory of Oligopoly’, Journal of Political Economy 72 (1964), p.44 
570
 See; Ivaldi, M. et al, The Economics of Tacit Collusion, Final Report for DG Competition European 
Commission (March 2003) 
571
 Ibid, p.7 
572
 For a discussion on how cartels work, see: Levenstein, M.C. and Suslow, V., ‘What Determines Cartel 
Success?’, Journal of Economic Literature Vol.44 (1) (March 2006) 43-95 
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firms which could undermine their anti-competitive set-up573.  However, there are also 
other factors which determine the sustainability of tacit collusion, which include: 
symmetry of firms; number of competitors; frequency of interaction; market 
transparency; innovativeness in the market; demand growth; and business cycle and 
demand fluctuation574. In general the mechanics of collusion are: the sustainability of 
tacit collusion is dependent on: the ability to coordinate; the dynamics between collusive 
and deviation profits; and the ability to monitor and punish deviation575.  
 
It is not easy for oligopolists to coordinate and arrive at a collusive price which would 
make all the firms better off by gaining supra-normal profits. However, based on the 
Games Theory, repeated interactions between the firms which in turn render the action 
of rivals more transparent facilitate tacit collusion576. Nevertheless it should be noted 
that economic theory cannot predict with precision which of the collusive equilibria price 
would be arrived at by the firms577. The firms would also have to be able to monitor, 
detect and punish deviation by rivals. Basically, there is trust among the firms to collude, 
but should one of them deviate from the collusion to increase individual profit, then the 
trust is lost and the firms would engage in price wars to punish the deviating rivals by 
                                            
573
 See: Ivaldi, M. et al, The Economics of Tacit Collusion, Final Report for DG Competition European 
Commission (March 2003);  Buccirossi, P., ‘Facilitating Practices’, Buccirossi, P. (ed.), Handbook of 
Antitrust Economics, The MIT Press (2008) 
574
 Ibid 
575
 Buccirossi, P., ‘Facilitating Practices’, Buccirossi, P. (ed.), Handbook of Antitrust Economics, The MIT 
Press (2008), pp.307-311 
576
 Buccirossi, P., ‘Facilitating Practices’, Buccirossi, P. (ed.), Handbook of Antitrust Economics, The MIT 
Press (2008), p.307; Harrington Jr., J.E., ‘A Theory of Tacit Collusion’, John Hopkins University (January 
2012), p.4 at http://econ.jhu.edu/wp-content/uploads/pdf/papers/wp588_harrington.pdf  
577
 Ivaldi, M. et al, The Economics of Tacit Collusion, Final Report for DG Competition European 
Commission (March 2003), p.6 
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either bringing down the price to normal level or specifically targeting the profit of the 
deviating firm578. The ability to monitor and punish deviating firms is only possible 
through repeated interaction between the firms and also the dynamic between collusive 
and deviation profits579. Collusion is easier to maintain when collusive profits are higher 
and/or deviation profits are lower580. The swifter a deviation is detected and punished, 
the lesser the incentive to deviate because of the lower short run gain from deviation 
and the higher loss inflicted by the punishment581. Therefore, the punishment must be 
“... credible and sufficiently severe to offset the gains from deviation”582. Tacit collusion 
is easier to sustain in a growing market where the future gains are more than the short 
term ones; hence the lack of incentive for firms to deviate583. Barriers to entry also affect 
the sustainability of tacit collusion. If there are low or no barriers of entry into the market, 
then tacit collusion could not be sustained because the new entrant would be imposing 
below the collusive price level and this in would affect the collusive gains584. Entrants 
into the market would also not enable punishment to be inflicted on rivals who decide to 
break away from the collusion585. Additionally, it ought to be noted that asymmetries 
between firms; innovative markets; business cycles and demand fluctuations hinder 
tacit collusion because these factors do not render the mechanics of tacit collusion 
                                            
578
 Ibid, pp.5-6  
579
 Ibid, pp.6-10 
580
 Buccirossi, P., ‘Facilitating Practices’, Buccirossi, P. (ed.), Handbook of Antitrust Economics, The MIT 
Press (2008), p.309 
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 Ivaldi, M. et al, The Economics of Tacit Collusion, Final Report for DG Competition European 
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sustainable586. Symmetry of firms is not dependent on market share alone but also 
production capacity and cost587. The lesser the number of competitors in the market, the 
easier it is to tacitly collude because it renders coordination easier and the profit share 
of each firm would be higher588. The point which has to be emphasised is that the 
reaction of each market to the above said collusion enabling factors is dependent on the 
market structure and characteristics589. 
 
The fact that cartels and tacit collusion are driven by the same elements is not 
surprising because cartel agreements and tacit collusion are both collusive agreements. 
The difference with cartels is that in the context of cartels, there is explicit agreement 
between the cartel members to engage in anti-competitive activities which popularly 
include price fixing. Some cartels are even administered under formal set-ups with 
regular albeit clandestine meetings held. Thus, cartels are arguably easier to enforce 
the law against because cartels require “ ... effective organisation with respect to 
coordination and cheating.”590 This increases the possibility of creation of evidence 
because cartels require communication between the cartelists which includes frequent 
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meetings591. In this regard, tacit collusion of the types which are prohibited under the 
law is arguably more difficult to prove because of the difficulty in gathering hard 
evidence to distinguish whether the anti-competitive outcomes are due to parallel 
conduct or concerted practice or abuse of collective dominance. This is illustrated in the 
discussion below. 
 
The behavioural approaches (concerted practices and abuse of collective dominance) in 
addressing tacit collusion are not infallible. Their limitations could be explained through 
the mechanics of tacit collusion and the relevant case laws. The problem of coordination 
in tacit collusion arises because of the difficulty in determining a jointly optimal price or 
quantity for all the firms involved592. If the price set is too low, the profit could not be 
maximised. If the price is too high due to a change in demand and one of the firms 
starts to lower its price, without communicating, this may be viewed as a deviation from 
the collusive price by its competitors and the competitors might initiate a price war by 
increasing production to punish the seemingly deviating firm. In cartel agreements, the 
firms overcome the problem of coordination through an explicit agreement. However, in 
tacit collusion, the firms need to coordinate their behaviour to select the price or quantity 
which is jointly optimal for all the firms without involving any explicit agreement.  If the 
firms arrive at a jointly optimal price by engaging in practices which facilitate 
coordination in order to enable them to anticipate the actions of their rivals, then they 
                                            
591
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592
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may be liable for concerted practice under Article 101 TFEU. This may include 
publication of their intentions through repeated dealings between the firms in the 
market593. By coordinating their actions, firms for example, are able to restrict output in 
order to maximise their profits through the imposition of supra-competitive prices to the 
detriment of consumers594. It should be noted collusion does not only involve the price 
dimension, firms could also collude in terms of levels of production; capacity choices; 
and bidding markets595. 
 
There are various factors to be considered In order to determine whether the 
communication and information exchange in question facilitate collusion. For instance, if 
the communication leads to the facilitation of collusion such as through the creation of 
market transparency due to the: market conditions; market structure; the nature of 
information exchanged; and the level of data disaggregation involved in the case, it may 
be deemed that the communication could facilitate coordination between the competing 
firms596.  Another way to detect tacit collusion is through the existence of repeated 
interactions between the firms. This is how the firms tacitly “communicate” with each 
other in order to not only facilitate coordination but also a means for conflict 
                                            
593
 Buccirossi, P., ‘Facilitating Practices’, Buccirossi, P. (ed.), Handbook of Antitrust Economics, The MIT 
Press (2008), p.312 
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resolution597. Repeated communication by exchanging simultaneous messages reduces 
the probability of coordination failure598. Such indirect communication could be in the 
form of information exchanges; or announcements; or communication between 
competing firms in auctions599. Buccirossi600 argued that very simple forms of 
communication would suffice when firms are symmetric and have perfectly aligned 
interests. However, in a more complex market set-up; riskier coordination environment 
and where coordination involves firms with asymmetric interests, sequential or repeated 
communication would have to be resorted to in order to find acceptable solutions to 
issues on coordination and bargaining. In United States vs. Airline Tariff Publishing 
Co.601, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) alleged that the repeated feeding of 
information on airline ticket prices for first and last ticket tickets dates and first and last 
travel dates by airlines on a database accessible to all airlines  and travel agents, 
amounted to practices which facilitated collusion. The case was resolved through 
settlement.  
 
However, it should also be noted that courts have mainly relied on hard evidence of tacit 
collusion rather than market data because the latter is not adequate proof for tacit 
collusion and also it is difficult to determine with adequate precision the competitive 
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 Buccirossi, P., ‘Facilitating Practices’, Buccirossi, P. (ed.), Handbook of Antitrust Economics, The MIT 
Press (2008), p.315 
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 See: Motta, M., Competition Policy Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press (2004), pp.150-
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price in each market602. Price wars are not proof of tacit collusion unless it occurs 
repeatedly to the point of raising suspicion of collusion. This is because price wars could 
be just episodes where firms adjust to factors such as entry of new firms into the market 
or fall in demand603. Hard evidence includes historical evidence of explicit market 
sharing agreements as in the Soda-Ash604 case. Thus, it can be said that in tacit 
collusion cases, the uncovering of communication is more difficult as compared to the 
discovery of direct evidence in cartel cases, particularly because hard evidence of 
communication is required and market data has been insufficient as proof of tacit 
collusion. 
 
Apart from being caught under Article 101 TFEU when concerted practices are involved; 
under EU competition law, tacit collusion may also be prohibited under Article 102 
TFEU if there is proven to be abuse of collective dominance. It used to be interpreted 
that the term “one or more undertakings” under Article 102 TFEU referred only to 
entities within the same corporate group or formed part of the same economic entity605. 
This position was changed in the Flat Glass606 case whereby the court held that Article 
102 TFEU could apply to economically independent undertakings which collectively 
holds a dominant position. The EU courts in several cases applied the concept of 
                                            
602
 Motta, M., Competition Policy Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press (2004), pp.185-190 
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1403, paras. 357-358 
               YASMEEN YASIM  
PGR LAW 4363795 
UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA 
 
 
243 
 
collective dominance to firms which were bound together by contractual links607. Whilst 
in Irish Sugar plc vs. Commission608, firms linked by vertical agreements and significant 
equity holding were held to amount to collective dominance under Article 102 TFEU. In 
Almelo, the ECJ attempted to clarify the meaning of “link” between the firms to establish 
collective dominance under Article 102 TFEU by stating that “ ... the firms must be 
linked in such a way that they adopt the same conduct on the market”609.  However, the 
court failed to clarify what links were required to amount to collective dominance under 
Article 102 TFEU610. To date most of the collective dominance cases under Article 102 
TFEU are those linked by some consensual arrangement611. This suggests that EU 
courts have been reluctant to find abuse of collective dominance solely based on 
evidence of interdependence.  
 
So, the question now is whether a behavioural remedy alone is adequate to address 
tacit collusion in a more concentrated market better suited for collusion? It is difficult to 
say for certain as to what is the best way to address tacit collusion which arises due to 
market structure issues.  Moreover, the debate on how best to address tacit collusion is 
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 For example, French-West African Shipowners’ Committees [1992] OJ L134/1; CEWAL [1993] OJ 
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 Hawk, B.E. and Motta, G.A., ‘Oligopolies and Collective Dominance: A Solution in Search of a 
Problem’, (Eighth Edition of the Treviso Conference on ‘Antitrust Between EC Law and National 
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also still ongoing612. It needs to be noted that tacit collusion is not per se prohibited 
under both EU and US competition law. It is only when tacit collusion involves concerted 
practices or abuse of joint dominance that it may be caught under the provisions of 
Article 101 TFEU or Article 102 TFEU respectively; and as explained earlier, mergers 
would exacerbate the oligopoly gap and cartel gap which exist because of the limitation 
of the aforesaid behavioural approaches. In regard to the oligopoly gap, it ought to be 
noted that not all mergers would lead to tacit collusion613. Therefore, in order to address 
tacit collusion, the factors which enable tacit collusion would have to be assessed to 
determine which markets are prone to tacit collusion so that appropriate measures 
could be adopted under merger regulation.  As for the cartel gap, cartel enforcement 
tools such as leniency programmes have also facilitated the discovery of cartels614 and 
therefore could be utilised to lessen the cartel gap.  
 
Nevertheless if these gaps significantly exist and the factors which enable tacit collusion 
are present in the market; what ought to be the appropriate approach to be adopted in 
                                            
612
 For detailed discussions see: Kuhn, K. U., ‘An Economists’ Guide Through the Joint Dominance 
Jungle’, Michigan Law and Economics Research Paper No. 02-014 (2001), at SSRN: 
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Lexis Nexis, Fifth Edition (2003), pp.510-512; Hawk, B.E. and Motta, G.A., ‘Oligopolies and Collective 
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Between EC Law and National Law’) (2008), Fordham University School of Law (November 2008) at 
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addressing tacit collusion? Currently, there are several tools available to competition 
law enforcers to remedy tacit collusion (depending on the legislative provisions). As 
mentioned earlier, under EU law, tacit collusion could be caught by the provisions on 
concerted practice under Article 101 TFEU or abuse of collective dominance under 
Article 102 TFEU. Additionally, the European Commission has also utilised merger 
control to “ ... prevent mergers between firms which are likely to create a market 
situation in which tacit collusion is likely or more likely.”615 The regulatory approach has 
also been utilised in the United Kingdom to address tacit collusion issues through 
market enquiries616. However, not all of these tools are available to some competition 
jurisdictions. For example, in Malaysia, merger control is not available to address tacit 
collusion because the Malaysian merger control regulation does not include a 
competition dimension. In the US, addressing tacit collusion under abuse of dominance 
provision under Section 2, Sherman Act has been rejected by the US Courts617.  
 
It has been argued that it is sensible or more appropriate to address collusion via a 
structural approach since tacit collusion are infringements which arise out of market 
structure conditions618. Moreover prevention is better than cure particularly where ex-
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ante mergers are concerned619. In the US, merger control is the only tool utilised to 
address the gaps in behavioural remedies for tacit collusion620. The utilisation of merger 
control to address tacit collusion could be justified by the fact that there is yet to be a 
market test which could detect collusive prices adequately621. Thus, asset transactions 
between firms which could significantly facilitate tacitly collusive behaviour in the market 
should be regulated622. Nevertheless, Whish cautioned that utilising the structural 
approach to address problems of oligopolistic markets would require exceptional 
circumstances to justify dismantling of oligopolistic market structures especially 
considering the fact that the theory of oligopolistic interdependence is not without 
criticisms623. Whish’s argument would be more relevant to cases of pre-existing 
dominance but much less so to new merger applications particularly in light of tougher 
cartel enforcement, whereby mergers in oligopolistic markets, especially those which 
are prone to cartels ought to be suspiciously viewed. Still, as mentioned earlier, simply 
because firms exist in an oligopolistic market does not necessarily mean that the 
presumption of tacit collusion should be automatic and that mergers between firms in 
                                                                                                                                            
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.349523 ; Hawk, B.E. and Motta, G.A., ‘Oligopolies and Collective 
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620
 Hawk and Motta labelled this as the oligopoly gap. See Hawk, B.E. and Motta, G.A., ‘Oligopolies and 
Collective Dominance: A Solution in Search of a Problem’, (Eighth Edition of the Treviso Conference on 
‘Antitrust Between EC Law and National Law’) (2008), Fordham University School of Law (November 
2008), p.65 at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1301693   
621
 Kuhn, K. U., ‘An Economists’ Guide Through the Joint Dominance Jungle’, Michigan Law and 
Economics Research Paper No. 02-014 (2001), p.9 at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=349523 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.349523 
622
 Ibid 
623
 Whish, R., Competition Law, Lexis Nexis, Fifth Edition (2003), pp.510-512 
               YASMEEN YASIM  
PGR LAW 4363795 
UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA 
 
 
247 
 
such markets should be prohibited because the characteristics of oligopolistic markets 
merely facilitate tacit collusion. Hence, the focus should be on the impact of the merger 
on factors which would render tacit collusion significantly easier to sustain624. 
 
The other method which could be utilised to complement the behavioural approach in 
addressing collusion is the regulatory approach. Whish suggested that a regulatory 
approach to address collusion would involve fixing prices in oligopolistic markets at a 
“competitive” or “reasonable” level625. However, because of the difficulty to determine 
what is “competitive” or “reasonable”, it is better for it to be left to market forces rather 
than a regulator626. Alternatively, regulation could require periodical price notifications to 
the regulator and fixing the price of the notifying firm at the notified price, this would limit 
the ability of firms to adjust their prices based on their rival’s conduct627. However, this 
would be cumbersome and require significant amount of government resources to 
implement628. Nevertheless, regulatory approaches such as the UK Market Investigation 
procedure which enable the competition authority to conduct market enquiries and have 
vested broad powers in the competition authority to remedy adverse effects on 
competition in the market have been able to identify adverse outcomes for consumers 
but have failed to identify evidence of tacit collusion629. The procedure is less 
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prosecutorial and does not involve any admission of liability or wrong doing630. Section 
11, Competition Act 2010 empowers the MyCC to conduct market reviews – this could 
be utilised to implement an approach similar to the UK Market Investigation procedure.  
Another form of regulatory approach which had been proposed is for the competition 
authorities or industrial regulator to black list facilitating practices in the form of 
guidelines631. However, this may lead to erroneous prohibitions because tacit collusion 
cannot be adequately assessed based on the checklist method632. 
 
Based on the preceding arguments and findings in the literature, it may be concluded 
that the behavioural approach is not without limitations and could result in tacit collusion 
which lead to inefficiencies falling through oligopolistic and cartel gaps. However, 
whether other approaches such as structural or regulatory approach ought to be utilised 
to address tacit collusion, it is dependent on two (2) main elements: first, whether the 
gaps are significant; and second, on market conditions – the existence of factors which 
enable tacit collusion. If both elements exist, then the structural approach and regulatory 
approach are warranted. Ex-ante merger control is useful to filter mergers which would 
increase the likelihood of collusion in the market ex-post; hence, lowering incidences of 
collusion with inefficient outcomes in the market. This in turn would lessen the need for 
behavioural corrective measures. However, in so far as the regulatory approach  is 
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concerned, the author is of the opinion that even if one or both aforesaid factors are not 
in the picture, it could be utilised so long  as it neither involves cumbersome procedures 
nor is costly to implement.   
 
5.4. LIMITATIONS OF THE COMPETITION ACT 2010 
 
The glaring fact which ought to be noted is that merger control in Malaysia is without a 
competition dimension. The Malaysian Code on Takeovers and Mergers 2010 does not 
provide that the competition dimension is to be considered in the assessment of merger 
applications. There are also no provisions on merger control under the Competition Act 
2010. Therefore, structural remedy in dealing with the likely changes in the market 
which could be brought about by tougher cartel enforcement is not available under the 
current Malaysian competition law framework. Behavioural remedies for tacit collusion 
are provided for under the Competition Act 2010. Section 10 (1), Competition Act 2010 
prohibits both unilateral and collective abuse of dominance; whilst the provision on anti-
competitive horizontal agreements under Section 4, Competition Act 2010 prohibits 
concerted practices. However, whether the said provisions would be adequate to 
address tacit collusion in light of tougher cartel enforcement in Malaysia could only be 
ascertained once the law has been fully enforced and case laws are developed. 
Nevertheless, based mainly on the EU experience, implementation issues could be 
anticipated. This is because the EU jurisprudence on tacit collusion is relevant to 
Malaysia due to the fact that the aforementioned provisions under Malaysia’s 
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competition law is similar to the corresponding provisions on concerted practices and 
abuse of collective dominance under the EU competition law  and also because EU law 
recognises collective dominance as a competition law infringement633. The assessment 
is made in terms of the adequacy of the legislative provisions in addressing the 
“oligopoly gap” and the “cartel gap”. 
 
It ought to be noted that although Section 4, Competition Act 2010 does not expressly 
list concerted practice as a prohibition like its EU equivalent, Article 101 TFEU; the 
interpretation provision, Section 2, Competition Act 2010 provides that “agreement” 
under the Competition Act 2010 also includes concerted practice. Section 2, 
Competition Act 2010 interprets concerted practice as “... any form of coordination 
between enterprises which knowingly substitutes practical cooperation between them 
for the risks of competition and includes any practice which involves direct or indirect 
contact or communication between enterprises, the object or effect of which is either— 
(a) to influence the conduct of one or more enterprises in a market; or (b) to disclose the 
course of conduct which an enterprise has decided to adopt or is contemplating to adopt 
in a market, in circumstances where such disclosure would not have been made under 
normal conditions of competition ...”. This interpretation is similar to EU competition 
jurisprudence as explained in the decision of ICI vs. Commission, which is, “... 
                                            
633
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coordination between undertakings which, without having  reached the stage where  an 
agreement, properly so called, has been  concluded, knowingly substitutes practical 
cooperation between  them for the risks of competition”634. The difference is that the 
interpretation provided under Section 2, Competition Act 2010 is more extensive which 
would facilitate enforcement by the MyCC.  
 
Both the Malaysian and EU interpretation of concerted practice is concerned with 
“coordination” as opposed to the anti-competitive outcomes in the market. This may 
lead to coordination which results in efficiency being caught under the provision for 
concerted practices; particularly considering the fact that studies on the Malaysian 
manufacturing and banking sector found that market concentration in Malaysia is driven 
by economies of scale and not because of profiteering635. So, should coordination in 
such markets be prohibited despite the fact that it leads to efficiencies in the market? 
Rightly, it should not but because of the difference between legal and economic 
concepts of collusion, then this contributes to the “oligopoly gap”. But then again, such 
concerted practice could qualify for exemption under Section 5, Competition Act 2010 
provided the efficiency can be proven as one of those which could be exempted. 
 
Concerted practice under the Competition Act 2010 includes both direct and indirect 
communication. This is also well and good but discovering any form of communication 
is not easy in tacit collusion cases. In the EU, the courts look at hard evidence of 
                                            
634
 ICI vs. Commission, [1972] ECR 619, paras. 64 and 65. 
635
 Refer to earlier discussion in Part 5.2. of this chapter. 
               YASMEEN YASIM  
PGR LAW 4363795 
UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA 
 
 
252 
 
communication in regard to proof for concerted practice636. Moreover, the existence of 
concerted practice would only be accepted if there is no other explicable reason for it to 
exist in the market after accounting for the market structure637. Discovery would be even 
more difficult when the market becomes more concentrated through mergers. 
Therefore, the establishment of competent, credible and adequately endowed 
competition law enforcement machineries is paramount to ensure strong and effective 
enforcement to cater for the extensive and in depth investigative works required in 
regard to discovery of coordination in tacit collusion. 
 
Section 10, Competition Act 2010 prohibits both independent and collective abuse of 
dominance. Section 2, Competition Act 2010 interprets dominant position as “... a 
situation in which one or more enterprises possess such significant power in a market to 
adjust prices or outputs or trading terms, without effective constraint from competitors or 
potential competitors ...”. However, interpretation of collective dominance has not been 
provided for under the Competition Act 2010. Therefore, the MyCC should clarify what 
amounts to collective dominance under the Competition Act 2010 - namely, type of link 
between the firms involved and whether an oligopolistic link is required. This needs to 
be confirmed by the courts. If collective dominance under Section 10, Competition Act 
2010 includes interdependent firms in oligopolistic markets; then the question is, would 
the Malaysian competition authorities and the courts be willing to include firms which 
                                            
636
 For a detailed discussion on the standard of proof for collusion and the relevant cases, see Motta, M., 
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are not linked by some form of consensual arrangement as being collectively dominant; 
which is unlike in the EU where the courts have been reluctant to find abuse of 
collective dominance solely based on evidence of interdependence? This is a valid 
question in view of the fact that tacit agreement is difficult to prove and there is yet to be 
a market test available to ascertain with adequate precision the competitive price in the 
market638.  
 
Based on the above, it can be argued that it would not be easy for cartel enforcement to 
merely rely on behavioural approaches in dealing with the “oligopoly gap” because of 
the market structure which enables interdependence and may also likely involve 
cooperation between the firms either in the form of concerted practice or joint collusion. 
The market structure renders it difficult to discover cooperation between oligopolists. As 
for the “cartel gap”, Hawk and Motta argued that it is not significant because cartels 
require effective organisation and repeated communication which are bound to leave an 
evidence trail. Furthermore, cartel enforcement tools such as leniency programmes 
facilitate the uncovering of cartels. This argument is well and good; but what about 
undiscovered cartels which are operating well and where the incentive to deviate is 
lesser than the cartel gains? Indeed it is arguably easier to detect evidence on cartel 
agreements as compared to tacit collusions; however, cartel detection is not easy 
because of its illicit nature and the lengths cartelists go to in order to avoid detection639. 
                                            
638
 See: discussion on the standard of proof for collusion in Motta,M., Competition Policy Theory and 
Practice, Cambridge University Press (2004), pp.185-190 
639
 For an example of the lengths cartels are willing to go to in order to avoid detection, see: Griffin, J.M., 
‘An Inside Look at a Cartel at Work: Common Characteristics of International Cartels’, Fighting Cartels- 
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Yes, leniency is a valuable and useful tool in cartel detection and it is expressly provide 
for under Section 41 Competition Act 2010; but in order for it to be effective, it needs to 
be coupled with credible risk of detection; the threat of tough penalties; and clear and 
reliable promise of amnesty640.  
 
Section 11 Competition Act 2010 provides for market reviews to be conducted by the 
MyCC on its own initiative or upon request by the Minister. However, the market review 
provided for under the law is only in regard to studies on anti-competitive features in the 
market641. The findings of studies conducted under the said market reviews are only to 
be published and made available to the public642. These provisions are clearly not the 
same as the market investigations procedure which is carried out by the competition 
authority in the United Kingdom because the Malaysian law does not empower the 
MyCC with the power to remedy any findings of anti-competitive behaviour in its market 
review. Nevertheless, in conducting market reviews, the MyCC could administratively as 
the competition regulator in Malaysia implement remedial measures through 
negotiations and consultations with the infringing firms. The main thing to note is that 
the administrative procedures adopted should not be cumbersome or costly. Moreover, 
there is also nothing to prevent the MyCC from taking enforcement action in accordance 
to the Competition Act 2010 should there be a need for tougher measures to be 
                                                                                                                                            
Why and How?, Swedish Competition Authority (2001) at 
http://www.kkv.se/upload/filer/eng/publications/3rdnordic010412.pdf#page=29 
640
 OECD Policy Brief, Using Leniency to Fight Hard Core Cartels, September 2001, p.4 at OECD 
website: www.oecd.org/daf/ca/1890449.pdf  
641
 Section 11 Competition Act 2010, Malaysia. 
642
  See: Section 12 Competition Act 2010, Malaysia. 
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implemented. Thus, this regulatory approach could be utilised to complement the 
behavioural approach in dealing with tacit collusions under the Competition Act 2010.  
 
Additionally, before competition dimension is included or even if it is not included after 
all under Malaysian merger control law, the MyCC could resort to utilising advocacy to 
pro-actively persuade the relevant agencies and regulators to consider the highlighted 
competition concerns in their decision making. For example, when a proposed merger 
could potentially give rise to collusion with anti-competitive outcomes, the MyCC could 
highlight their competition concerns to the Securities Commission Malaysia. However, it 
has to be noted that this would just merely be persuasive and it would also depend on 
the level of clout possessed by the MyCC643. This is because the Code of Take-overs 
and Mergers 2010 does not provide for any competition dimension to be considered. 
Moreover, if the merger of cartels would facilitate the development of capital market in 
Malaysia, then any competition concerns highlighted by the MyCC may just be set-aside 
and superseded by the said development agenda, even if there is potential for collusion 
between the firms in a more concentrated oligopolistic market. Apart from the Securities 
Commission, the MyCC could also engage with sectoral regulators in collusion prone 
industries via consultations to ensure competition considerations are accounted for in 
sectoral regulation. After all sectoral regulation is a complementary measure to 
                                            
643
 Unless the competition agency is provided with a mandate to advocate their views to other relevant 
regulatory and public agencies such as in Canada, Italy, the Republic of Korea, Russia and South Africa. 
See Dabbah, M., International and Comparative Competition Law, Cambridge University Press (2010), p. 
67 
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competition policy in industrial supervision644 and the industrial monitoring conducted by 
Bank Negara Malaysia has been successful in ensuring anti-competitive outcomes do 
not arise as a result of the ongoing merger exercise645. However, it ought to be noted 
that the energy sector and the communications and multimedia sector are excluded 
from the remit of the Competition Act 2010646 because their sectoral regulations have 
already included competition dimensions647.  
 
Due to the limitations of the behavioural remedies available under the Competition Act 
2010, anti-competitive infringements which arise due to the market structure have to 
also be addressed through the structural approach and/or the regulatory approach and 
supported by competition advocacy initiatives. As it is now, there are limitations in the 
Competition Act 2010 in regard to addressing tacit collusions. However, as to whether 
such limitations would impact effective competition enforcement in Malaysia in light of 
tougher cartel enforcement, it would need to be assessed against the significance of the 
“oligopoly gap” and “cartel gap” in the market and also the Malaysian market structure. 
The latter is to assess the presence of elements which would enable tacit collusion 
based on their changes in response to mergers.  
 
                                            
644
 See: Aubert, C. and Pouyet, J., ‘Competition Policy, Regulation and the Institutional Design of Industry 
Supervision’, Louvain Economic Review Vol. 70 (2) (2004) 153-168 
645
 See: Nasser Katib, M., ‘Market Structure and Performance in the Malaysian Banking Industry: A 
Robust Estimation’, 8th Capital Markets Conference, Indian Institute of Capital Markets Paper (2004), 
p.13 at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=872266 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.872266   
646
 See: Section 3 (3) and First Schedule Competition Act 2010, Malaysia 
647
 Respectively, the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 and the Energy Commission Act 2001. 
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It should also be noted that a challenge which may likely arise is that the evolution of 
cartels into tacit collusion due to mergers in light of tougher cartel enforcement would 
also adversely impact cartel enforcement. This is because since merger control is not 
available to filter mergers between firms with the likelihood to tacitly collude, then the 
burden to address tacit collusion would also still have to be borne partly through cartel 
enforcement because of the prohibition of concerted practice under Section 4, 
Competition Act Malaysia. Thus, in a way, it would be status quo for cartel enforcement 
albeit with the extra and arguably more complex dimension of tacit collusion.  
 
5.5. PROPOSALS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
First and foremost, a comprehensive empirical study needs to be carried out on the 
level of market concentration in Malaysia. The study should include major industries 
with oligopolistic tendencies. The scope of the study should include the level of market 
concentration but also the enabling factors for market concentration in the market; the 
existence and magnitude of facilitating factors for tacit collusion in the market and their 
response to change in the market structure via mergers. The study should aim to: 
capture an adequately accurate diagnosis of Malaysia’s level of market concentration 
across the board; determine whether market concentration is driven by economies of 
scale or supra-competition profit; and to identify markets or industries with likelihood for 
merger in light of tougher cartel enforcement. These studies could also be carried out 
severally based on industry. Such empirical studies are needed in order to determine 
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whether there is a need to include a competition dimension in Malaysia’s merger control 
regime. If there is adequate justification to do so, then the case for it should be 
supported by strong empirical evidence not only to ensure that Malaysia implements 
appropriate competition policy and enforcement strategies but also because it is 
anticipated that it will not be easy for the MyCC to convince the government and other 
relevant sectoral regulators particularly Bank Negara Malaysia, the Securities 
Commission and the Ministry of Finance to agree to the inclusion of a competition 
dimension under the country’s merger control regime. This is not only because the 
country’s development agenda trumps competition interests but because of reasons of 
agency seniority and “turf” protection. Therefore, a convincing and hard case to refute 
would have to be supported by strong empirical evidence. 
 
Thereafter, the appropriate action to be undertaken would depend on the findings of the 
proposed empirical study/studies. If the findings support the inclusion of a competition 
dimension in Malaysia’s merger control regime; then, it is proposed as follows: 
 
i) legal framework – 
The first alternative is to include a competition dimension in the Code of 
Take-overs and Mergers 2010 to enable competition considerations to be 
accounted for in merger applications. Therefore, the Securities 
Commission would not have to hand over their “turf” to the MyCC and 
merger control with competition dimension could be implemented in 
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Malaysia. The second alternative is for the competition dimension of 
merger control to be included under the remit of the Competition Act 2010 
but mergers involving selective strategic industries; types of commercial 
activities; or undertakings are excluded or carved out from the remit of the 
Competition Act 2010. The industries, types of commercial activities and 
undertaking selected ought to be based on sound economic development 
justifications; and 
 
ii) merger control to also assess the potential for abuse of collective 
dominance –  
 
Under both the abovementioned alternatives, mergers should not only 
account for potential for unilateral abuse of dominance but also the 
potential for abuse of collective dominance. This is because the 
assessment of the two types of abuse of dominance involves different 
variables, likewise their remedies648.  In this regard, the works by Kuhn649 
and Ivaldi et al650 are useful to be referred to. Therefore, it would be useful 
for the Securities Commission Malaysia and the MyCC to jointly issue 
                                            
648
 Kuhn, K. U., ‘An Economists’ Guide Through the Joint Dominance Jungle’, Michigan Law and 
Economics Research Paper No. 02-014 (2001), pp.10-13 at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=349523 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.349523 
649
 Kuhn, K. U., ‘An Economists’ Guide Through the Joint Dominance Jungle’, Michigan Law and 
Economics Research Paper No. 02-014 (2001), at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=349523 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.349523 
650
 Ivaldi, M. et al, The Economics of Tacit Collusion, Final Report for DG Competition European 
Commission (March 2003)   
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Guidelines pertaining to the driving factors for collusion and their impact 
on merger regulation in Malaysia. This is to facilitate merger officials in 
their assessment and also to provide clarity to businesses. However, it 
needs to be emphasised that merger applications for firms in oligopolistic 
markets are more appropriate to be assessed based on structural analysis 
and not solely via the checklist method. This is to ensure that mergers in 
oligopolistic markets are not being overzealously blocked by merger 
officials. 
 
If the findings of the empirical studies cannot support the inclusion of a competition 
dimension into Malaysia’s merger control regime; then the regulatory approach and 
advocacy should be adopted to complement the behavioural remedies under the 
Competition Act 2010. In this regard: 
 
i) the MyCC should set up coordination and consultation mechanisms 
between itself and the Securities Commission; other relevant policy 
making agencies; and industrial or sectoral regulators in order to pro-
actively persuade, if not ensure that competition concerns are considered 
by the said agencies in their decision making and also to iron out any 
inconsistencies between competition enforcement and industrial 
regulation. For instance, in carrying out their duties, there is a possibility 
that the MyCC and other agencies and regulators would come across 
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information which would be useful to one another651. As such, consultation 
is crucial in order to enable: views to be exchanged and information which 
are not confidential to be shared; and  
 
ii) the MyCC should adopt regulatory approaches which are practical; less 
cumbersome; cost effective and less formal in addressing anti-competitive 
issues in oligopolistic markets. This should include the following: (a) 
remedial actions through market reviews and issuing the relevant 
guidelines.  The guidelines should include clarification on: the types of 
communication which may amount to direct or indirect communication in 
terms of concerted practice as prohibited under Section 4, Competition Act 
2010, something akin to the Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among 
Competitors (AGCAC) issued by the US Federal Trade Commission and 
US Department of Justice. This is to facilitate businesses in the dos and 
don’ts of tacit collusion which in turn would provide certainty in terms of 
competition law enforcement; (b) the meaning of collective dominance 
under Section 10, Competition Act 2010. This is to clarify not only the 
                                            
651
 For example, information uncovered during the evaluation of mergers and acquisitions information 
pertaining to collusion may be uncovered. However, legal barriers to information sharing ought to be 
noted. Even in jurisdictions which do not exclude mergers from the remit of their competition laws impose 
limitations in use of such information.  Therefore, this option is unlikely to be viable for the MyCC under 
the current legal framework. Still, it is an option which could be pursued by Malaysia in future. See 
Ghosal, V., ‘The law and Economics of Enhancing Cartel Enforcement: Using Information from Non-
Cartel Investigations to Prosecute Cartels’, Review of Law and Economics Vol. 7 (2) (2011) 501-538.  
Another example is when the MyCC uncovers information of price fixing by merged entity made up of 
former cartel members in the communications and multimedia sector or the energy sector, it would be 
useful if the MyCC could provide the information to the respective sectoral regulators for further 
consideration.   
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meaning  of collective dominance under the Competition Act 2010 but also 
as to whether collective dominance under the Malaysian competition law 
would require the firms representing themselves as one entity and also the 
type of link required between the firms which amounts to collective 
dominance.  
 
It should be noted that the regulatory approach and advocacy are recommended to be 
implemented regardless of the findings of the suggested empirical study/studies. Infact, 
guidelines and advocacy works pertaining to collusion ought to be initiated even before 
tougher cartel enforcement is implemented in Malaysia. This is because collusion 
should be dealt with in a comprehensive manner because it is a more complex 
infringement as compared to cartels and the possible shortcomings in behavioural 
remedies available under the Competition Act 2010, as explained earlier.  
 
It should also be noted that just because cartels have merged and evolved into 
coordination does not mean that the burden of cartel enforcement would be lessened. 
On the contrary, the MyCC should be more vigilant of tacit collusion in carrying out 
cartel enforcement. In this regard, appropriate strategies ought to be adopted and these 
include: stepping up monitoring of announcements through trade associations; 
identifying industries and markets which are prone to collusion and include them in the 
prioritisation framework on cartel enforcement; utilising cartel detection tools such as 
leniency programme which could also be useful in detecting tacit collusion by creating 
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incentives for oligopolists to snitch on their fellow colluders652. Hence, it is pivotal for 
cartel enforcement tools and instruments which would facilitate detection and create 
credible threat for punishment to be already up and running by the time tougher cartel 
enforcement is implemented in Malaysia.  
 
5.6. CONCLUSION 
 
As discussed above, tacit collusion is a more complex form of competition law 
infringement as compared to cartels. This is because it is difficult to pinpoint adequately 
whether the anti-competitive outcomes in the market are due to coordination or joint 
collusion between oligopolists or are merely as a result of parallel conducts due to the 
market structure. In the first place, there is yet to be an adequately precise economic 
test available to determine the competitive price in the market. It is also difficult to say 
for certain as to what is the best way to address collusion. However, in determining 
suitable approaches in addressing tacit collusion, two main aspects should be 
considered; they are: the significance of “oligopoly gap” and “cartel gap”; and the 
existence of factors which would enable tacit collusion based on their response to 
change in market structure via mergers.  
 
The implementation of tougher cartel enforcement may likely lead to cartels merging 
and evolving into tacitly colluding oligopolists in a more concentrated market which is 
                                            
652
 Motta, M., Competition Policy Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press (2004), pp.193-202 
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better suited for collusion; particularly when merger control law does not have a 
competition dimension. Available literature discussion points to this likelihood.  
However, in the Malaysian context, the need for the competition dimension to be 
included in its Code on Takeovers and Mergers 2010 needs to be supported by 
empirical evidence which to date is insufficient. Available empirical evidence so far 
(which is yet to be adequately sufficient because it is only based on empirical studies of 
the manufacturing and banking industries and also conducted before the adoption of 
competition law in Malaysia) points that despite the fact there is market concentration in 
the manufacturing and banking industries, the driving factor was economies of scale 
instead of supra-competition profits.  
 
Adequacy of the current provisions under the Competition Act 2010 in dealing with tacit 
collusion cannot be answered with certainty at this point in time because it could only be 
answered in time as competition law enforcement progresses in Malaysia and also 
based on supporting evidence from economic research. However, based on the current 
provisions on concerted practice, joint collusion and market reviews and with insights 
from EU jurisprudence on tacit collusion; there are limitations to the remedies available 
under the Competition Act 2010.  
 
As for the appropriate approach for Malaysia to adopt in dealing with tacit collusion in 
light of tougher cartel enforcement, it would indeed depend on the significance of the 
“oligopoly gap” and “cartel gap”; and the existence of factors which would enable tacit 
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collusion based on their response to change in market structure via mergers. Even if 
there is no supporting empirical evidence for the inclusion of a competition dimension in 
Malaysia’s merger control regime, it is appropriate for behavioural remedies to be 
complemented by the regulatory approach and advocacy. In the event that there is 
empirical findings in future and much warranted research on the state of market 
concentration in Malaysia, this work has put forth some possible alternatives in terms of 
the legal framework for merger control; namely: including a competition dimension in the 
Code of Take-overs and Mergers 2010 or including merger control under the 
Competition Act 2010 but excluding selective strategic industries, types of commercial 
activities or undertakings from the remit of the law.  
 
Despite all the arguments which have been put forth in this chapter, it needs to be 
cautioned that the discussion in this chapter is theoretical in nature based on the 
findings of available studies in the literature and also EU jurisprudence on tacit 
collusion; in view of the similarities between the Malaysian legal provisions on 
prohibition of anti-competitive horizontal agreements and abuse of dominance and 
those of the EU. Nevertheless, the discussion in this work has highlighted the need for: 
first, a comprehensive study to be carried out on the state of market concentration in 
Malaysia and the anticipated evolution in business practices as competition law 
enforcement progresses; second, for an assessment to be carried out on the 
significance of the “oligopoly gap” and “cartel gap” in Malaysia; and third, after a few 
years of competition law enforcement, an assessment ought to be carried out to 
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determine the adequacy of available remedies under the Competition Act 2010 in 
addressing tacit collusion without being complemented by the structural approach via 
merger control with competition dimension. 
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CHAPTER 6:  
THE WAY FORWARD FOR MALAYSIA 
 
6.1. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
Before the way forward for Malaysia in terms of policy recommendations on cartel 
enforcement is discussed, it is prudent to recap the main findings of all the substantive 
discussions in the chapters of this thesis.  
 
The difference in levels of development should not be a hindrance in cross border 
enforcement cooperation of competition cases under regional TAs, However, there are 
prerequisites which have to exist before competition related provisions in regional TAs 
could be considered as a suitable alternative for international cartel enforcement by any 
country. First, there ought to be incentives for the regional TA signatory countries to 
cooperate in international cartel enforcement by invoking the competition related 
provisions thereunder. Second, the limitations of each country should be recognised. 
Third, there has to be government commitment in eradicating the adverse impact of 
anti-competitive international cartel activities on trade liberalisation and competition; 
  
The two factors which create incentives for the inclusion and utilisation of competition 
related provisions in regional TAs are the existence of credible competition enforcement 
regimes and the strength of trade relationship between the regional TA partners. 
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Without domestic competition law in place, there is no legal basis for cooperation. Even 
if there is a competition law in place, the absence of a credible competition enforcement 
regime would not incentivise a developed country with an advanced competition 
jurisdiction to invoke the competition related provisions in the regional TA to address 
cross border competition infringements such as international cartels. As for the strength 
of trade relationship between the regional TA partners, the incentives are created based 
on the defensive and offensive trade interests of each country and the interplay 
between trade and competition considerations in the negotiations between the regional 
TA partner countries. 
 
The structure recommended for regional TAs between developed and developing 
countries is for the broad provisions on competition to be included in the regional TA 
and for the details of the cooperation to be provided under an implementing agreement 
between the competition authorities involved. This is similar to the implementing 
agreements for each relevant chapter under regional TAs which are being practised by 
Japan. Such a structure allows for the details regarding the implementation of the 
competition related provisions to be thrashed out between the experts, namely the 
respective competition authorities without affecting the execution of the overall regional 
TA itself and bundling competition commitments with trade commitments that may be 
deemed as too restricting by the signatories653; 
 
                                            
653
 See: Sokol, D.D., ‘Order Without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter Into Non-Enforceable 
Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements’, Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol. 83 (2008) 101-
163, p.136  
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The recommended minimum required elements which are necessary to facilitate the 
utilisation of competition related provisions under regional TAs may be divided into four 
categories; namely, advancement of the competition agenda, bridging the difference in 
legal standards, addressing the interaction between trade and competition, certainty 
and flexibilities.  Under advancement of competition, the elements are: the requirement 
to adopt and maintain competition law measures; cooperation in competition law 
enforcement. Bridging the difference in legal standards requires the following elements:  
description of anti-competitive practices; information sharing; and comity. The elements 
necessary to address the interaction between trade and competition are: whether trade 
measures are allowed to be invoked for breach of any of the competition related 
provisions; and inclusion of anti-competitive mergers under the ambit of the regional 
TAs. Certainty requires the dispute settlement element to be included and exemptions; 
and special and differential treatment are those elements which provide for flexibilities to 
account for the limitations of developing countries; 
 
Links with existing networks in international competition such as OECD, ICN, UNCTAD, 
World Bank and the WTO are also necessary and useful. The guidelines, 
recommendations and works which have been conducted under the said organisations 
are good reference points in international cartels enforcement654. Thus, in the 
implementation of competition related provisions in regional TAs, these organisations 
                                            
654
 These include : OECD’s Best Practices for the Formal Exchange of Information Between Competition 
Authorities in Hard Core Cartels Investigations (2005); ICN’s Report on Cooperation Between 
Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations (2007) 
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may be consulted by the signatories particularly in matters of best practices, clarification 
and disputes settlement; 
 
Future studies on jurisdictional issues in implementation of regional TAs are warranted; 
for example, in cases where more than one regional TA apply in a particular 
international cartel case. A possible answer may be dependent on having to do some 
sort of analysis on which regional TA would involve cheaper costs, less cumbersome 
procedures and higher probability of successfully uncovering and prosecuting the cartel. 
Such a question is indeed pertinent and warrants research in the future. 
 
Malaysia’s cartel enforcement policy needs to be formulated based on Malaysia’s own 
terms; accounting for the objectives of its competition law; development objectives; and 
prevailing socio-economic ideology. In this regard, it is useful for Malaysia to refer to 
other suitable competition jurisdictions for insights. Reference to the South African 
competition law enforcement experience is warranted based on shared similarities with 
Malaysia in terms of development and socio-economic concerns; their achievements in 
cartel enforcement despite the limitations faced by the competition authorities; and the 
argument that South African competition jurisprudence is sympathetic to inclusive 
development – which is also relevant to Malaysia.  
 
Effective cartel enforcement as proposed in this work refers to the existence of credible 
competition authorities and competent competition law enforcement. Credible means 
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the existence of a competition enforcement regime which is able to function within its 
limited resources; independent; and accepted by society. Whilst competent competition 
law enforcement means the ability of the competition authorities to detect, investigate 
and prosecute cartels under the law which in turn creates credible risk of discovery and 
punishment to cartels without compromising development gains to the country.  This is 
relevant because the aim of Malaysia’s cartel enforcement policy should be affective 
cartel enforcement; thus, the general principles in developing an appropriate cartel 
enforcement policy for Malaysia have to be guided by effective cartel enforcement in the 
Malaysian context.  
 
The general principles in developing an appropriate cartel enforcement policy for 
Malaysia identified in this discussion are: addressing the lack of competition culture; 
implementing cartel enforcement within the allowance of limited resources; clarification 
of the modality for gradual implementation of the Competition Act 2010; addressing 
legislation inadequacies; addressing disjunctions with other policies which are pertinent 
to Malaysia’s development objectives; and establishing and maintaining independence 
of the competition authorities. 
 
In general, the lessons to be learned from South Africa in regard to cartel enforcement 
are: cartel enforcement should be dynamic, strategic and innovative. These involve: 
implementing appropriate approaches as cartel enforcement progresses in Malaysia – 
becoming stricter in time as society’s awareness of competition and cartel enforcement 
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experience develops; adoption of cartel enforcement tools which are less costly and 
simple to implement but would bear a marked impact on cartel detection; adopting 
strategic competition advocacy in engagements between the MyCC and other 
regulators, policy making agencies and the public in order to build competition 
awareness in the country; noting that accounting for non-competition consideration in 
cartel enforcement which require assessments that go beyond the economic 
considerations of efficiency and consumer welfare risks misallocation of resources and 
distortions in distribution of economic wealth; and the importance of establishing the 
independence of the competition authorities. 
 
In referring to the South African cartel experience, it ought to be noted that the 
Competition Act 1998, South Africa and the Competition Act 2010, Malaysia have 
development as one of their main aims. The South African competition law enforcement 
experience is indeed relevant to Malaysia because the elements for the two indicators 
of effective cartel enforcement in the Malaysian context as recommended by this work 
are present under the South African Competition regime. 
 
Most of the cartel enforcement tools and approaches which have been implemented by 
the South African competition authorities are not novel to the competition fraternity. 
However, what their cartel enforcement experience and competition law jurisprudence 
have pointed out is that limitations faced by developing countries and development 
concerns could be managed and accommodated without compromising competition 
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goals. This may be inferred not only through their gradual cartel enforcement approach 
(reactive to proactive); innovativeness in implementation commensurate with available 
resources; and the South African competition authorities’ attempts to accommodate 
public interest in the implementation of the Competition Act 1998.  
 
Malaysia should not solely refer to South Africa in regard to cartel enforcement but 
Malaysia and fellow middle income developing countries should not fail to refer to South 
Africa’s competition law enforcement and jurisprudence for insights.   
 
Exemptions are relevant not only to developing countries but also developed countries. 
The difference is that for developed countries or countries with mature competition 
regimes, exemptions granted may have been lessened over time due to regulatory 
reform655 or they may require more in depth and sophisticated form of assessment in 
line with their advanced development status, business innovations, maturity of 
competition agencies and stronger competition culture; 
 
                                            
655 Like in the case of Japan - In 1998, the number of exemptions granted in Japan was greatly reduced 
by 90 per cent from more than 1000 previously exempted from the provisions of the Anti-Monopoly Act 
1947 via various laws and administrative guidance cartels as authorised by the Japanese Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry. See Jacobs, S.H., Regulatory Reform in Japan, OECD (1999), p.216. 
From 2003, only three types of exemptions remain under the Anti-monopoly Act 1947 as a result of the 
revision of the law exercised in 1999-2000, namely: acts under intellectual property rights, acts of 
cooperatives and resale price maintenance contracts. See Takahashi, I., ‘Anti-Monopoly Act Exemptions 
in Japan’, the Specific Workshop between the Drafting Committee on Competition Law of Vietnam and 
the Japan Fair Trade Commission, JFTC (2003), p.1-2 and 8-9 available at 
http://www.jftc.go.jp/eacpf/05/hanoiTaka.pdf 
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The granting of exemptions does not weaken competition law provided they are based 
on sound economic justifications. Infact, exemptions may strengthen competition law by 
accommodating not only efficiency goals but also relevant broader public policy 
objectives which may result in efficiency outcomes or facilitate the acceptance of 
competition policy and law particularly in developing countries which lack competition 
culture. As such, exemption is a useful tool for ensuring the achievement of 
developmental objectives under competition law. 
 
The factors which influence proper implementation of exemptions in developing 
countries are: development oriented goals, transparency and institutional limitations. 
 
EU style exemption provisions may be made workable in Malaysia despite the 
difference in level of development and competition advancement between Malaysia and 
EU. However, in order to make the EU style legislative provisions become 
implementable in Malaysia, certain adjustments have been made in the exemption 
provisions under the Competition Act 2010 and these need to be complemented by the 
relevant regulatory tools; 
 
Malaysia ought to note of the fact that there is yet to be any suitable economic model 
which could be utilised in the weighing of non-competition considerations which are 
based on equity against competition considerations based on economic considerations 
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such as efficiency and consumer welfare656. Thus, it would be relevant for the Malaysian 
competition authorities to conduct an economic study on formulating such an economic 
model lest exemptions based on equity considerations such as significant and 
identifiable social benefit as stipulated under Section 5 (a), Competition Act 2010, 
Malaysia are not granted based on erroneous principles which in turn could lead to 
misallocation of resources and inefficiency; 
 
Tougher cartel enforcement in Malaysia could lead to cartels merging and tacitly 
colluding in markets which are better suited for coordination and abuse of collective 
dominance.  However, this probable outcome is dependent on the factors which would 
enable tacit collusion based on their response to change in market structure via 
mergers. Whilst the need to include competition dimension in Malaysia’s merger control 
regime is not only dependent on the existence of the said factors but also the limitations 
of the current provisions of the Competition Act 2010 in dealing with the “oligopoly gap” 
and the “cartel gap”. 
 
Adequacy of the current provisions under the Competition Act 2010 in dealing with tacit 
collusion cannot be answered with certainty at this point in time because it could only be 
                                            
656
 As identified by research on assessment of the public interest dimension under the South  African 
competition law which include: Hodge, J. et al, ‘Public Interest Provisions in The South African 
Competition Act- A Critical Review’, Competition Policy, Law and Economics Conference (2009); and 
Boshoff, W. et al, ‘The Economics Of Public Interest Provisions In South African Competition Policy’, Sixth 
Annual Competition Law, Economics and Policy Conference, South  Africa (2012) at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/events/SIxth-Annual-Competition-Law-Economics-and-Policy-
Conference-in-South-Africa-2012/NewFolder-3/The-economics-of-public-interest-provisions-in-South-
African-competition-policy.pdf   
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answered in time as competition law enforcement progresses in Malaysia and also 
based on supporting evidence from economic research. However, based on the current 
provisions in the Competition Act 2010 on concerted practice, joint collusion and market 
reviews; and with insights from EU jurisprudence on tacit collusion; there are limitations 
to the remedies available under the Competition Act 2010.  
 
Presently, there is insufficient empirical evidence to support inclusion of a competition 
dimension in Malaysia’s merger control regime. However, even if there is no supporting 
empirical evidence for the inclusion of a competition dimension in Malaysia’s merger 
control regime, it is appropriate for behavioural remedies to be complemented by the 
regulatory approach and advocacy. In the event that there is empirical findings in future 
and much warranted research on the state of market concentration in Malaysia, the 
possible alternatives in terms of the legal framework for merger control are: including a 
competition dimension in the Code of Take-overs and Mergers 2010 or including merger 
control under the Competition Act 2010 but excluding selective strategic industries, 
types of commercial activities or undertakings from the remit of the law.  
 
Comprehensive empirical studies need to be carried out on market concentration in 
Malaysia and also the significance of “oligopoly gap” and “cartel gap” in Malaysia. The 
study should include major industries with oligopolistic tendencies. The scope of the 
study should be not only the level of market concentration but also the driving factors for 
market concentration in the market and also the existence and magnitude of facilitating 
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factors for collusion in the market. The study should aim to capture an adequately 
accurate diagnosis of Malaysia’s level of market concentration; to find out whether 
market concentration is driven by economies of scale of supra-competition profit; and to 
identify markets or industries with likelihood for merger in light of tougher cartel 
enforcement. 
 
6.2. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In the effort to lessen the inconsistencies in international cartel enforcement via 
increased participation of developing and developed countries in international accords 
which facilitate cross border cartel enforcement such as regional TAs; competition 
jurisdictions in developing countries need to be able to implement competition law 
through effective cartel enforcement. This is because even if there is a competition law 
in place, the absence of a credible competition enforcement regime would not 
incentivise a developed country with an advanced competition jurisdiction to invoke the 
competition related provisions in the regional TA to address cross border competition 
infringements. Malaysia is a developing country with a young competition jurisdiction 
which is yet to formulate a formal cartel enforcement policy. Though the law is already 
in place, it has to be complemented by an implementation policy which is practical and 
workable in order to ensure effective cartel enforcement. Therefore, based on the 
findings of this thesis, it is recommended that Malaysia undertake the following actions: 
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i. formulate a cartel enforcement policy document. It is recommended that the 
policy is titled as “Roadmap for Effective Cartel Enforcement in Malaysia (the 
Roadmap). The purpose of the Roadmap is to provide clear guidance for the 
benefit of not only competition policy officials but also the industry and the 
public on how Malaysia’s cartel enforcement will be implemented, the goals it 
aims for and the elements which have been identified as pivotal for effective 
cartel enforcement in Malaysia. It would facilitate the MyCC in terms of being 
transparent and clear in carrying out its role and function; hence providing 
certainty and clarity to businesses and consumers alike – which in turn would 
encourage investment in the country’s economy; 
 
ii. draft the relevant tools and instruments to facilitate effective cartel 
enforcement in Malaysia, namely: the leniency programme; prioritisation 
framework for cartel enforcement; competition advocacy policy; guidelines 
which include: guidelines on international cooperation in cartel enforcement; 
exemptions guidelines; guidelines for collaborations among oligopolists; and 
guidelines on the implementation of tacit collusion and collective dominance 
under the Competition Act 2010. This is to facilitate businesses in the dos 
and don’ts of collusion which in turn would provide certainty in terms of 
competition law enforcement; and guidelines for international cooperation in 
competition enforcement. The drafting of these tools and instruments would 
have to be initiated from now; 
               YASMEEN YASIM  
PGR LAW 4363795 
UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA 
 
 
279 
 
iii. establish inter-agency consultation mechanism on the implementation of 
competition law;  
 
iv. conduct relevant studies on issues related to cartel enforcement and market 
concentration in Malaysia. These include studies: to determine an 
appropriate economic model to be applied in weighing out non-competition 
considerations against competition considerations, particularly in the 
assessment of exemptions; and on market concentration in Malaysia;  
 
v. adopt a regulatory approach to complement the Competition Act 2010 in 
addressing issues of market inefficiencies which adversely affect consumers; 
 
vi. establish capacity building and technical cooperation programmes with other 
supra-national competition organisations which advocates competition and 
also other competition jurisdictions such as the South African competition 
authorities, particularly the Competition Commission and Competition 
Tribunal; and 
 
vii. engaging in strategic competition advocacy and awareness programmes.  
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6.3. ROADMAP FOR EFFECTIVE CARTEL ENFORCEMENT IN MALAYSIA 
 
The Roadmap is essentially a policy document which clarifies effective cartel 
enforcement in Malaysia, maps out the aims, strategies and milestones which ought to 
be undertaken in Malaysia’s quest to implement effective cartel enforcement in 
Malaysia. This work suggests that Malaysia’s cartel enforcement policy should be based 
on Malaysia’s competition objectives as provided for under the Competition Act 2010; 
account for the limitations of the competition authorities; and the country’s 
developmental concerns without compromising competition. As such, the general 
principles which are relevant to Malaysia in formulating an appropriate cartel 
enforcement policy in the implementation of the Competition Act 2010 are: addressing 
the lack of competition culture; implementing cartel enforcement within the allowance of 
limited resources; clarification of the modality for gradual implementation of the 
Competition Act 2010; addressing legislation inadequacies; addressing disjunctions with 
other policies which are pertinent to Malaysia’s development objectives; and 
establishing and maintaining independence of the competition authorities. 
 
Malaysia’s cartel enforcement policy should aim for effective cartel enforcement. 
Effective cartel enforcement is the existence of credible competition authorities and 
competent competition law enforcement. Credible means the existence of a competition 
enforcement regime which is functioning, independent and adequately resourced. 
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Whilst competent competition law enforcement means the ability of the competition 
authorities to detect, investigate and prosecute cartels under the law.  
 
Thus, it is recommended that effective cartel enforcement be defined in a broad manner 
based on the aims of competition policy and law but accounting for the limitations as a 
developing country with a young competition jurisdiction and also its development 
concerns. Therefore, it is proposed that effective cartel enforcement in Malaysia be 
defined as : “The deterrence of anti-competitive collusion which leads to increased level 
of competitiveness in the market and improvements in consumer access to a wider 
choice of quality products at competitive prices through proper management of available 
resources by functioning, independent and adequately sourced competition authorities, 
guided by Malaysia’s development objectives”. The objective of cartel enforcement 
should be to contribute towards the achievement of the objectives of competition policy 
in Malaysia. The objectives of competition policy in Malaysia as translated via the 
Competition Act 2010 are promotion of economic development, promotion of 
competition and consumer welfare657. 
 
The Roadmap should outline Malaysia’s implementation approaches and strategies in 
terms of milestones and targets to be achieved, bearing in mind that Malaysia has 
decided to gradually implement its competition law. These elements provides coherence 
and clarity and are should be included to ensure cartel enforcement progresses 
                                            
657
 See: Preamble, Competition Act 2010, Malaysia 
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accordingly lest Malaysia ends up being stuck in the doldrums of nascent stage of 
competition law enforcement. As such, cartel enforcement in Malaysia should be 
gradually implemented based on three (3) stages of advancement – becoming stricter in 
time as society’s awareness of competition, cartel enforcement experience develops, 
and more resources are available for cartel enforcement.  
 
The stages are to be divided into, the nascent stage; the intermediate stage; and the 
advanced stage. There are also targets to be met in each stage. The strategy to be 
adopted throughout the stages is to commence with a soft approach with emphasis on 
remedial action, advocacy and awareness which shall become more proactive and 
deterrence based as the stages advance. This is to allow time for the competition 
agencies in Malaysia, i.e. the MyCC, the Competition Tribunal and the courts to develop 
their capacity and competency; also to provide businesses time to put their “houses in 
order” based on the requirements of the Competition Act 2010; and educate the public 
on the importance and benefits of competition and cartel enforcement.  
 
The targets for the nascent stage ought to be building the capacity and competency in 
addition to creating public awareness of competition law and the benefits of cartel 
enforcement. For the intermediate stage, the targets should be proactive enforcement 
and generating demand for cartel enforcement. The targets for the advanced stage are 
recommended to be adoption of more complex cartel enforcement tools and mechanism 
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such as criminalisation of cartel offences and greater involvement in the global 
competition agenda.  
 
In the nascent stage, the focus should be on building the capacity and competency of 
the competition authorities and making the public aware and understand the workings of 
competition policy in general and cartel enforcement and its benefits specifically. During 
the nascent stage, there would likely be low demand (if at all) for cartel enforcement due 
to the lack of awareness of cartel enforcement658. Hence, throughout this stage, the 
form of cartel enforcement carried out should be reactive and remedial approach in 
enforcement. The focus should be on building the competency and capacity of the 
competition authorities and establishing the competition authorities’ independence in 
carrying out their functions. Once the competition authorities possess the capacity and 
competency to enable tougher cartel enforcement, during the intermediate stage, then 
awareness programmes ought to be focussing on creating demand from the public for 
cartel enforcement. Upon reaching the advanced stage, something akin to the level 
where South Africa is now, then cartel enforcement ought to start focussing on more 
complex cartel enforcement mechanisms and tools whilst also increasing their 
involvement in advancing the global competition agenda. 
 
                                            
658
 See: Chowdhury, M.,’The Political Economy of Law Reform in Developing Countries’,  Sixth ASCOLA 
Conference – New Competition Jurisdictions: Shaping Policies and Building Institutions (July 2011), 
King’s College London 
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Throughout the stages, the elements of awareness and advocacy; credibility of 
competition authorities; and proper utilisation of resources would have to be 
continuously present. All these elements are relevant and related to effective cartel 
enforcement. However, in each of the stages, the focus and form of each element is 
different.  The explanation which follows shall be discussed based on the 
aforementioned stages. 
 
In the nascent stage, the priorities ought to be on setting up the MyCC for operation by 
getting the required funding, employing people with the right skills and expertise, 
training not only the MyCC officials but also members of the Competition Tribunal and 
the judiciary. In addition, the MyCC have to focus on awareness and advocacy 
programmes. This is important in order to educate the public and stakeholders on 
competition policy and law, the importance of cartel enforcement and the benefits not 
only to the consumers but also the country’s economy which come with effective cartel 
enforcement. Based on what has been undertaken so far, progress on awareness and 
advocacy programmes carried out by the MyCC is commendable. As at December 
2011, the MyCC have held or jointly held a number of public consultations659, training 
course660 and briefing or dialogue sessions with stakeholders661. It is also interesting to 
                                            
659
 Consultations have been conducted on the drafting of Guidelines on: Market Definition, Chapter 1 and 
Complaints Procedures. See MyCC website at 
http://www.mycc.gov.my/234_179_179/Web/WebEvent/Events/Upcoming-Events.html  accessed on 
28/12/2011 
660
 APEC Training Course on Competition Policy - Effective Mechanism Against Cartel Offences, 10-12 
October 2011, Penang, Malaysia; The Competition Act 2010 – Impact, Issues and Challenges, 13 
October 2011, Science University of Malaysia, Penang; Seminar on Competition Law and Consumer 
Welfare, 3 November 2011, Kuala Lumpur. See MyCC website at 
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note that the first training session jointly organised with APEC was on mechanisms 
against cartel offences. This may be viewed as a reflection of Malaysia’s concern on 
anti-competitive cartel activities.  
 
Credibility of the competition authorities is paramount because it is related to the 
perceived independence of the competition authorities in decision making and also their 
competency. The MyCC and the Competition Tribunal have been established as 
agencies under the Ministry of Domestic Trade, Co-operatives and Consumerism; and 
the responsible Minister has also been granted discretionary powers in regard to 
nomination of Competition Commissioners and also the power to amend the Schedule 
under the Competition Act 2010 pertaining to exclusions. Such discretionary powers 
could be abused or exercised based on inappropriate considerations. Therefore, there 
has to be check and balance mechanisms in place. This is particularly important for 
Malaysia due to the fact that there has been evidence of cronyism and political 
patronage in Malaysia and businesses enjoying close links with decision makers and 
those in the higher echelons of power would lobby against cartel enforcement in order 
to protect their interest of continued enjoyment of economic rent. Therefore, it needs to 
be ensured that the individuals appointed in key positions are not politicians or politically 
connected; the Malaysian competition authorities are able to function without any 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.mycc.gov.my/234_179_179/Web/WebEvent/Events/Upcoming-Events.html  accessed on 
28/12/2011 
661
 Until October 2011, 30 briefing/dialogue sessions have been held by the Malaysian Competition 
Commission. These involved stakeholders such as producers, professional bodies, policy makers, 
academicians, consumer associations and the Bank of Malaysia. See Malaysian Competition 
Commission website at http://www.mycc.gov.my/269_213_213/Web/WebPage/2011/2011.html accessed 
on 28/12/2011. 
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interference from the Minister and senior members of the ministry; and the exercise of 
discretionary powers by the responsible Minister pertaining to exclusions under the 
Competition Act 2010 are based on certain guiding principles. The guiding principles 
need to be incorporated into the Competition Act 2010 to ensure adherence by the 
responsible Minister. As such, it is recommended that the relevant amendments are 
made to the law.  It also has to be ensured that there are sufficient powers granted to 
the competition authorities to enable cartel enforcement662. Granted that the 
Competition Act 2010 has been enacted and enforced but checking and improving the 
legislation is an ongoing task based on the enforcement requirements which sometimes 
unfortunately may only be determined once cartel enforcement is undertaken.  
 
In terms of the types of cartel infringements to be pursued in the nascent stage, , the 
MyCC should start with glaring anti-competitive cartel offences such as hard core cartel 
offences which have been ongoing and widely known in sectors which directly impact 
consumers; and cases which are straight forward and not controversial – in view of the 
                                            
662
 Based on the present provisions in the Competition Act 2010, Malaysia, the MyCC is vested with 
strong powers of investigation and enforcement. Infact, in some aspects, the powers are wider and 
stronger than that of the South African Competition Commission as provided for by the Competition Act 
1998. Among others: i) in South Africa, searches without warrant may not be conducted on a private 
dwelling (see Section 47 (1) Competition Act 1998, South Africa) and searches with or without warrant 
may only be conducted during the day unless a night time search is necessary and justifiable (see 
Sections 46 (4) and 47 (3) Competition Act 1998, South Africa).  However, under the Malaysian 
Competition Act 2010, searches with or without warrant may be carried out at any reasonable time day or 
night and does not exclude private dwellings (see Sections 25 and 26 Competition Act 2010, Malaysia); ii) 
under Section 49 (9) Competition Act 1998, South Africa, the Competition Commission may also 
compensate those who suffered damage due to forced entry onto the premise when no one responsible 
for the premises was present. In contrast, under Section 28 Competition Act 2010, Malaysia, even if the 
search warrant is defective, it shall still be admissible and no cost or damages shall be recoverable in 
relation to the seizure of document or data unless it was executed without reasonable excuse (see 
Section 31 Competition Act 2010, Malaysia).   
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limited experience and available resources. Choosing to go after the right cases is 
important in order to demonstrate to the public and the market that the competition 
authorities are independent and competent enough to implement cartel enforcement as 
per the requirements of the Competition Act 2010. In this regard, cooperation with the 
media is useful and relevant and should be initiated in order to establish good 
networking with the media. As the saying goes “people will believe it when they see it”, 
so the MyCC would have to initiate a few cases of cartel infringements which could be 
highlighted by the media to demonstrate the harmful effects of cartels and the 
advantages of cartel enforcement.  However, in highlighting cartel investigation and 
prosecution, the MyCC should heed all legislative related provisions lest such publicity 
backfires. Such enforcement mistakes would not only be detrimental to the MyCC’s 
efforts in establishing their credibility but they also risk facing legal action by the alleged 
cartelist firms which are mostly well endowed firms which would not hesitate to institute 
legal action against the MyCC.     
 
Apart from this, during this stage, the MyCC should also be engaging in consultation 
and advisory programmes not only to facilitate undertakings to “put their house in order” 
as per the requirements of the Competition Act 2010 but also to engage with sectoral 
regulators and policy making agencies in coordination mechanisms.  
 
Another task which has to be prioritised during the nascent stage is the drafting or 
setting-up of tools, instruments and mechanisms which facilitate cartel enforcement. 
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This is not only for purposes of establishing credible risk of cartel detection but also to 
ensure appropriate utilisation of resources and provide coherence and clarity in cartel 
enforcement. In this regard, it is recommended that Malaysia emulates South Africa and 
many other countries in adopting a leniency programme and also a prioritisation 
framework and also the relevant guidelines which are explained in detail later in this 
chapter. 
 
Establishment of credible risk of detection has to be coupled with serious penalties. In 
terms of penalty, the Malaysian competition legislation provides for substantive fines to 
be imposed on infringement offences under Part II of the Competition Act 2010 cases 
which include prohibited cartel agreements. The MyCC may impose a fine not 
exceeding ten per cent of the worldwide turnover over the period of the infringement663. 
Other than the infringements under Part II, any person (natural and/or body corporate) 
who commits an offence under the Competition Act 2010 of which there are no specific 
penalty mentioned, may be subject to heavy fine and imprisonment664. Offences include 
those committed in relation to the investigation and enforcement of the Competition Act 
2010. Clearly, these reflect Malaysia’s seriousness in combating not only cartels but 
prohibited anti-competitive conducts in general. However, in the nascent stage, the soft 
                                            
663
 Section 41 (4) Competition Act 2010, Malaysia 
664
 See: Sections 61 and 63 Competition Act 2010, Malaysia. The imprisonment penalty in this regard 
relates to conducts which affect the investigation and enforcement of the Competition Act 2010 are 
considered as offences which are punishable by imprisonment of individuals even offending for the first 
time and/or substantive fines. This is different from the introduction of criminal sanctions for cartel 
offences in South Africa because cartel offences per se are not subject to criminal sanctions but failure to 
provide access to records to the Competition Commission in the investigation and enforcement of cases 
under the Act is an offence which may result in imprisonment of the individual involved. (see: Section 20 
Competition Act 2010, Malaysia). 
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approach requires focus on remedial measures and also enhancing of awareness. 
Therefore, any penalty should be imposed only after the infringing firms have been 
accorded with an opportunity to rectify the infringement; failing which, the penalty as 
provided for under the law shall be invoked. In this regard, the MyCC should also 
implement a compliance programme to encourage firms to comply with the 
requirements of the Competition Act 2010. 
 
Next, is the intermediate stage. In this stage, the capacity and competency of the 
competition agencies have reached the level which enables pro-active deterrence 
based cartel enforcement. This is when cartel enforcement becomes more focussed, for 
instance having a number of people in the MyCC whose job is to specifically deal with 
cartel enforcement; enforcement tools and mechanisms such as leniency programme 
and prioritisation framework are up and running; and increased budget being allocated 
specifically for cartel enforcement. As such, the enforcement strategy to be adopted 
ought to be pro-active. This is the supply side of cartel enforcement665. In so far as the 
demand side is concerned, awareness programmes ought to be continued to be 
prioritised, the difference with the nascent stage is that during the intermediate stage, 
the focus of the awareness programmes is more on enhancing public support for cartel 
enforcement and less on elementary education on the workings and benefits of 
competition law and cartel enforcement but more on the competency of the MyCC. This 
                                            
665
 For a discussion of the evolution of cartel enforcement in developing countries explained in terms of 
the concept of supply and demand, see Chowdhury, M.,’The Political Economy of Law Reform in 
Developing Countries’,  Sixth ASCOLA Conference – New Competition Jurisdictions: Shaping Policies 
and Building Institutions (July 2011), King’s College London 
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may include highlighting the complexity of cartel cases being investigated and 
prosecuted by the MyCC. 
 
It should be noted that the intermediate stage means tougher cartel enforcement via 
pro-active deterrence approach. Hence, it is also at the start of this stage that it is 
recommended Malaysia’s stance on excluding the competition dimension from the 
country’s merger control regime is reviewed. This is to facilitate effective cartel 
enforcement and promotion of competition because as discussed in Chapter 5, the lack 
of merger control without a competition dimension may seem as a logical; less 
cumbersome and less costly alternative for cartelists in oligopolistic markets in light of 
tougher cartel enforcement. This in turn, could lead to cartels merging and engaging in 
tacit collusion in a more concentrated market which is better suited for concerted 
practice and joint collusion –more complex forms of competition infringement. Tougher 
cartel enforcement calls for the full implementation of all the tools to facilitate effective 
cartel enforcement such as leniency programme, compliance programme, prioritisation 
framework. This should be coupled by the threat of serious penalties as provided under 
the law where the aim of cartel enforcement is for deterrence and the soft approach 
emphasising remedial action ceases.  
 
Legislative provisions have to be reviewed in order to overcome any limitations in the 
law which have been identified during the nascent stage. Improvements to tools for 
enforcement such as compliance programme, leniency programme, prioritisation 
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framework and guidelines related to the implementation of cartel enforcement under the 
Competition Act 2010 would also have to be made in order to keep them updated and 
also to remedy any loopholes and weaknesses in the said tools and instruments. 
Relevant studies would also need to be carried out and their findings would provide the 
evidence necessary to support any change to be made to the law and also enforcement 
approach of the MyCC. Additionally, in order to gauge the effectiveness of the 
competition agencies, Malaysia should also subject the MyCC to peer reviews by 
relevant bodies such as the ICN, UNCTAD and OECD. Such exercises may help 
provide independent analysis and highlight the shortcomings and strengths of the 
Malaysian cartel enforcement regime. Apart from such reviews, the MyCC should also 
start to actively engage in publishing its decisions and opinions in order to demonstrate 
transparency in their decision making which would contribute positively to the credibility 
of the MyCC. 
 
Lastly, comes the advanced stage in cartel enforcement which is similar to the level 
where the South African cartel enforcement competition authorities are at now. At this 
stage, the credibility of the competition authorities is established and there is sufficient 
level of awareness among the public and businesses to have an acceptable level of 
competition culture in place. In this stage, the competition authorities could now 
concentrate on more complex cartel enforcement issues. This may include the 
possibility of introducing criminal sanctions for cartel offences such as in South Africa, 
increased involvement in the furtherance of the competition agenda at the regional and 
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global level, lobbying for the inclusion of merger regulation under the competition law or 
inclusion of the competition dimension in the existing merger regulation framework. 
These are all aspects which should be looked into at this stage when the MyCC has 
gained enough clout and expertise to tackle complex and potentially controversial 
issues which however are relevant to effective cartel enforcement in Malaysia666. In this 
regard, the awareness programmes ought to now focus on garnering public support for 
such issues which are put forth by the competition agencies for the sake of furtherance 
of the competition agenda. The MyCC should also be involved in advocacy and capacity 
building programmes in the role of mentors for other young competition jurisdictions in 
developing countries. 
 
6.4. TOOLS AND INSTRUMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE CARTEL ENFORCEMENT 
 
The Roadmap should be complemented by tools and instruments which would facilitate 
effective cartel enforcement. These include: the leniency programme; prioritisation 
framework for cartel enforcement; competition advocacy policy; guidelines which 
include: guidelines on international cooperation in cartel enforcement; exemptions 
guidelines; guidelines for collaborations among oligopolists; and guidelines on the 
                                            
666
 For instance, criminalisation of cartel offences may not easy to enforce based on the experience of 
developed countries such as the United Kingdom and even the EU. Furthermore, it has been argued that 
criminalisation of cartels may jeopardise the effectiveness of leniency programmes and drive cartelists to 
be more secretive and illicit with their activities. Criminalisation is a strong deterrence but it is like a two 
pronged knife. At this early juncture for Malaysia, attempting to enforce criminal sanctions on cartels 
without much experience may prove to be disastrous and detrimental to their efforts to establish their 
credibility. South Africa only criminalised cartels after nearly ten years of experience with cartel 
enforcement. See Stephan, A., ‘How Dishonesty Killed the Cartel Offence’, Criminal Law Review, Vol.6 
(2011) 446-455; Lavoie, C., ‘South Africa’s Corporate Leniency Policy: A Five Year Review’, World 
Competition Vol. 33(1) (2010) 141-162, p.161.  
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implementation of tacit collusion. The implementation of the said tools and instruments 
in cartel enforcement ought to be documented and published for the sake of 
transparency and clarity in cartel enforcement.  
 
The Competition Act 2010, Malaysia specifically provides for a leniency regime667. The 
advantage of leniency being specifically provided for under the law is that there is legal 
certainty in the provision of immunity to co-operating cartel members. Nevertheless the 
legislative provision is generally worded and its implementation would have to be 
supported by policy instruments for the details. In this regard, Malaysia should look at 
South Africa’s CLP incorporating the latest amendments which are based on 
international best practices standards as those advocated by organisations such as the 
OECD and ICN. Therefore, the relevant guidelines or policy document ought to be 
formulated as soon as possible by Malaysia. The elements which should be present in 
the leniency instrument are not only those which would be incentives for cartelists to 
seek immunity from prosecution but also those which are necessary to ensure that 
immunity is not abused for example by ringleaders who purposely set up the cartel and 
rats out on their fellow cartelists simply to drive competitors out of the market.  
 
                                            
667
 Under the Malaysian competition legislation, different percentage of reduction of penalties are allowed 
depending on whether the applicant firm is the “first through the door” or the stages at which admission or 
cooperation was made or any other circumstances based on the discretion of the MyCC ( see Section 41 
Competition Act 2010, Malaysia). In contrast, although leniency is one of the main features of cartel 
enforcement in South Africa, it is not specifically provided for under the Competition Act 1998, instead, it 
is in the form of a policy. 
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In so far as prioritisation framework is concerned, Malaysia would have to determine the 
criteria for identifying sectors and cases which are to be prioritised in cartel 
enforcement, particularly markets with oligopolistic tendencies and industries prone to 
cartelisation. In this regard, the criteria for prioritisation should be determined. As 
guidance, South Africa’s criteria for its prioritisation framework are: impact on poor 
consumers; contribution to accelerated and shared growth in terms of national 
economic policy; and likelihood of substantial competition concerns668.  These in turn 
helped to identify four (4) priority sectors: namely; food and agro-processing, 
infrastructure and construction, intermediate industrial products and financial 
services669. It is recommended that Malaysia accounts for both structural and 
behavioural issues which may give rise to anti-competitive cartel agreements670. 
Granted that merger regulation is unavailable under the Malaysian Competition Act 
2010 to deal with structural issues but determining areas which ought to be focussed on 
under the prioritisation framework for cartel enforcement in Malaysia by identifying 
sectors and industries with high market concentration is within the ambit of the 
competition legislation. In identifying sectors and markets with known or suspected high 
                                            
668
 ‘Ten Years of Enforcement by the South African Competition Authorities – Unleashing Rivalries 1999-
2009’, Competition Commission, Competition Tribunal, South Africa (2009), Box 7, p.39  at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/10-year-review accessed on 20/10/2011. 
669
 ‘Ten Years of Enforcement by the South African Competition Authorities – Unleashing Rivalries 1999-
2009’, Competition Commission, Competition Tribunal, South Africa (2009), Box 7, p.39  at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/10-year-review accessed on 20/10/2011 
670
 For a detailed discussion on cartel detection see Harrington Jr., J.E., ‘Detecting Cartels’, John Hopkins 
University (2004-2005) at  http://econ.jhu.edu/wp-content/uploads/pdf/papers/wp526harrington.pdf 
accessed on 9/8/2012 
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incidents of anti-competitive cartel activities, the MyCC should refer to among others, 
consumer complaints and industry announcements671.  
 
As mentioned earlier, competition advocacy and awareness have to be implemented 
throughout the different stages of cartel enforcement development in Malaysia. 
However, advocacy and awareness programmes have to be strategically implemented 
in light of limitation of resources. The focus and form of competition advocacy in each 
stage of cartel enforcement development would have to be different and this has been 
explained in the previous section. The aim of Competition Advocacy Policy should be 
promotion of the competition agenda; instilling and enhancing awareness of the 
workings and merits of competition policy and law; and generating support and demand 
for enforcement. In this regard, the MyCC should not only act as an advocate for the 
furtherance of the competition agenda in Malaysia but also as an adviser. Therefore, the 
MyCC should pro-actively engage the media and the international competition fraternity 
in competition advocacy and awareness programmes; organise road shows; establish a 
one stop competition policy and law centre for training and consultation purposes; and 
implement a compliance programme to aid and facilitate businesses in complying with 
the requirements of competition law.  
 
The guidelines for international cooperation in competition enforcement are also 
necessary for effective cartel enforcement because Malaysia economy is significantly 
                                            
671
 Harrington Jr., J.E., ‘Detecting Cartels’, John Hopkins University (2004-2005), p.2  at  
http://econ.jhu.edu/wp-content/uploads/pdf/papers/wp526harrington.pdf accessed on 9/8/2012 
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dependent on trade, therefore, as discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the more 
liberalised the trade and the more significance trade is to a country’s economy, the 
more vulnerable it is to anti-competition international cartel activities. The guidelines are 
formulated to not only facilitate international cooperation in cross border cartel 
enforcement issues but also as guidance for competition officials in negotiations 
especially in regard to regional TAs. As such, the guidelines should encompass 
preliminary considerations, namely, the prerequisites for cooperation in international 
cartel enforcement via regional TAs; and the elements to be included as recommended 
in the discussion in Chapter 2 of this thesis.  The preliminary considerations should 
assess the following before a decision is made whether it is viable to pursue a 
competition chapter under the regional TA: the existence of credible competition 
enforcement regime; strength of trade relations or trade interests between the 
signatories; the level of commitment by the governments in curbing anti-competitive 
international cartel activities between the jurisdictions of the signatories; and whether 
the signatories are willing to account for the limitations of all the signatories involved. If 
any one of the prerequisites is missing or not strong enough to support the viability for 
Malaysia to include a competition chapter under the regional TA, then it should not be 
followed through.  
 
Under regional TAs where utilising the competition chapter for international cartel 
enforcement is viable, then the respective competition agencies should commence 
negotiation on the broad provisions to be included in the competition chapter and also 
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the detailed provisions under the implementation agreement. The implementing 
agreement should include the recommended elements (where possible) to enable 
cooperation in international cartel enforcement between the signatories via their 
respective competition agencies. The said elements are: the requirement to adopt and 
maintain competition law measures; cooperation in competition law enforcement; 
description of anti-competitive practices; information sharing; and comity; whether trade 
measures are allowed to be invoked for breach of any of the competition related 
provisions; anti-competitive mergers; dispute settlement mechanism; exemptions; and 
special and differential treatment. 
 
However, for the time being, since Malaysia has only recently implemented its 
competition law, it is suffice for Malaysia to only focus on cooperation in training and 
capacity building in regard to competition chapter under regional TA or bilateral 
cooperation agreement. Once Malaysia is ready to implement tougher cartel 
enforcement, the competition chapter in regional TAs could start including cooperation 
in international cartel enforcement.  
 
Formulating appropriate guidelines on exemption of anti-competitive horizontal 
agreement is also essential for effective cartel enforcement. This is because the 
mechanism adopted would have to be able to filter anti-competitive horizontal 
agreements which should be allowed despite their anti-competitive nature due to the 
pro-competitive benefits which outweighs its anti-competitive nature which theoretically 
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could include even hard core cartels. Furthermore guidelines which are transparent and 
clear would lessen uncertainty for businesses. Therefore, it should include; the 
appropriate test to be implemented in carrying out assessments to determine whether 
an agreement is restricting of competition and in assessing the pro and anti-competitive 
effect of the agreement in regard to the granting of exemptions; the de minimis rule to 
be applied in terms of agreements which significantly restrict, limit or prevent 
competition (if required); and the types of horizontal agreements to be allowed and 
prohibited particularly those which have been prohibited per se by virtue of Section 4 of 
the Competition Act 2010 based on their anti-competitive object but may have gains 
which could offset the anti-competitive effect. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis, tacit collusion is a more complex form of anti-
competitive infringement than cartels and it could be a possible outcome of tougher 
cartel enforcement in light of the lack of a competition dimension in Malaysia’s merger 
control regime. Tacit collusion is harder to detect and it cannot be said with adequate 
precision whether an anti-competitive outcome is due to coordination or joint collusion 
or because of purely parallel conduct. Hence, Malaysia should also issue guidelines for 
collaborations among oligopolists along the lines of the Antitrust Guidelines for 
Collaborations Among Competitors (AGCAC) issued by the US Federal Trade 
Commission and US Department of Justice. This is to facilitate businesses in the dos 
and don’ts of tacit collusion which in turn would provide certainty in terms of competition 
law enforcement. In addition, guidelines on the definition and enforcement of collective 
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dominance under Section 10, Competition Act Malaysia, should also be issued. In 
formulating the guidelines on collusion, Malaysia should refer to EU competition 
jurisprudence and enforcement experience on tacit collusion for insights because of the 
similarities in the respective legislative provisions. 
 
6.5. INTER-AGENCY CONSULTATION MECHANISM ON THE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF COMPETITION LAW 
 
Competition policy and law impact all industries. Thus, their implementation cannot be 
made in isolation without the involvement of other relevant agencies, regulators and 
also representatives from the business, consumer and academic sides. It is strongly 
recommended for a high level committee on the implementation of competition in 
Malaysia to be established in order to ensure commitment from all the agencies and 
parties involved and all relevant aspects and views are considered in the 
implementation of competition law. Perhaps what could be established is something 
akin to the Cabinet Committee on Supply and Price which is chaired by the Deputy 
Prime Minister. The high level committee could be supported by an inter-agency 
working level committee. Under such a formal consultation structure, the promotion of 
the competition agenda could be facilitated and impediments connected to issues of 
agency seniority and “turf” could be overcome. Additionally, the MyCC could also enter 
into formal Memorandums of Understanding with sectoral regulators to facilitate 
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consultations and cooperation between them, like what the South African Competition 
Commission has done. 
  
6.6. STUDIES AND RESEARCH 
 
As a competition agency, the MyCC should be dynamic in carrying out its role and 
functions. Therefore, for the sake of competition law development and ensuring that 
Malaysia’s competition law is implemented based on appropriate strategies, researches 
and studies on relevant enforcement issues need to be carried out from time to time. 
Based on the discussions in this thesis and the findings, the studies to be conducted 
include: 
i) a suitable economic model for the assessment in the granting of exemptions 
which could accommodate the weighing of non-competition considerations 
that are based on equity against competition considerations based on 
economic considerations such as efficiency and consumer welfare; 
 
ii) a comprehensive empirical study on market concentration in Malaysia. The 
study should include major industries with oligopolistic tendencies. The scope 
of the study should be not only the level of market concentration but also the 
driving factor/s for market concentration in the market and also the existence 
and magnitude of enabling factors for tacit collusion in the market and their 
response to changes in market structure. The study should aim to capture an 
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adequately accurate diagnosis of Malaysia’s level of market concentration; to 
find out whether market concentration is driven by economies of scale of 
supra-competition profit; and to identify markets or industries with likelihood 
for merger in light of tougher cartel enforcement. These studies may also be 
carried out severally based on industry. Such empirical studies are needed in 
order to determine whether there is a need to include a competition 
dimension in Malaysia’s merger control regime. If so, then the case for it 
should be supported by strong empirical evidence;  
 
iii) study on the viability for the Malaysian competition jurisdiction to continue to 
be enforced without merger control with a competition dimension. This would 
also include assessment of the “oligopoly gap” and “cartel gap” in Malaysia; 
and 
 
iv) research on jurisdictional issues in regard to implementation of regional TAs. 
For example in cases where more than one regional TA apply in a particular 
international cartel case. A possible answer may be dependent on having to 
do some sort of analysis on which regional TA would involve cheaper costs, 
less cumbersome procedures and higher probability of successfully 
uncovering and prosecuting the cartel. Such a question is indeed pertinent 
and warrants research in the future. This study would also be useful in 
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determining the markets and sectors which should be included in Malaysia’s 
prioritisation framework for cartel enforcement.  
 
The first two (2) studies is recommended to be carried out as soon as possible whilst 
the third and fourth suggested studies could be carried out on the cusp or in the early 
days of tougher competition law enforcement in Malaysia.  
 
6.7. REGULATORY APPROACH 
 
It is recommended that the MyCC also adopt a regulatory approach to complement the 
behavioural remedies for tacit collusion as provided for under the Competition Act 2010. 
The MyCC is empowered to conduct market review by virtue of Section 11, Competition 
Act 2010. However, the law only provides for the findings and recommendations of 
market reviews to be to be published and be made available to the public672. This work 
is suggesting that it should go beyond merely that by administratively resorting to 
remedial measures to address competition issues arising out of market inefficiencies 
which adversely affect consumers. This regulatory approach should be less formal, less 
cumbersome and emphasises on consultations, negotiations between the regulator and 
the industry and it should emphasise on remedial actions. A good benchmark for the 
MyCC to aspire to could be Bank Negara Malaysia (the Central Bank of Malaysia) which 
has been effective in regulating the Malaysian banking industry to ensure that 
                                            
672
 See: Section 12, Competition Act 2010 
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consumers are not adversely affected by the ongoing industrial consolidation exercise, 
as discussed in this thesis. 
 
6.8. CAPACITY BUILDING AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROGRAMMES 
 
Capacity building and technical cooperation programmes should be focused on by 
Malaysia particularly throughout the nascent stage of competition law implementation. 
As such, Malaysia should endeavour to establish links with not only supra-national 
organisations which advocate competition such as the ICN, UNCTAD and OECD but 
also with countries which can act as a mentor for Malaysia in cartel enforcement and 
also competition law implementation in general. Such programmes could be pursued 
under the auspices of the competition chapter in regional TAs and Malaysia should not 
fail to include South Africa and also the EU in this regard because the competition 
jurisprudence and competition law enforcement experience of the two jurisdictions are 
relevant to Malaysia, as discussed throughout this thesis. 
 
6.9. CONCLUSION 
 
This research has illustrated that it is pertinent for competition jurisdictions in developing 
countries whose economy is significantly dependent on international trade to implement 
effective cartel enforcement in order to overcome the adverse effects of international 
cartels on their domestic market and also their offensive trade interests. This answers 
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the first overarching research question which is “why should international trade reliant 
countries be concerned about international cartel enforcement?”.  The second 
overarching research question of this thesis is “what is an appropriate cartel 
enforcement policy for Malaysia?” In this regard, this work suggests the form and 
content of an appropriate cartel enforcement policy for Malaysia and its complementary 
tools and instruments and also the necessary studies which ought to be carried out to 
ensure that cartel enforcement in Malaysia is not based on erroneous implementation 
strategies. This work approached the second research question by discussing: 
appropriate cartel enforcement policy for Malaysia; exemptions of horizontal 
agreements; limitations of the Competition Act 2010 in light of tougher cartel 
enforcement.  
 
The findings indicate that Malaysia’s main competition concerns pertaining to cartels are 
mainly over market concentration, rent seeking activities which are facilitated by 
cronyism and political patronage, lack of competition culture, accommodating 
developmental interests in the implementation of competition law and limited resources. 
In formulating an appropriate cartel enforcement policy for Malaysia, reference to the 
South African cartel enforcement experience and competition jurisprudence should not 
be failed to be made not only because of their achievements in cartel enforcement but 
also the fact that its competition jurisprudence is sympathetic to inclusive development – 
a similar concern with Malaysia. However, references to other competition jurisdictions 
in warranted aspects should also be made. The discussion on the granting of 
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exemptions to anti-competitive horizontal agreements such as cartels found that 
exemptions implemented based on appropriate mechanisms not only could 
accommodate developmental concerns but also facilitate the acceptance of competition 
law in developing countries which lack competition culture. However, to date a suitable 
economic model to “marry” non-competition interests which are development oriented 
with competition considerations such as efficiency and consumer welfare is yet to be 
identified. The discussion on tacit collusion as one of the possible outcomes of tougher 
cartel enforcement in Malaysia found that there is insufficient empirical evidence to 
support the inclusion of competition dimension in Malaysia’s merger control regime at 
the moment. However, based on available literature, insights from EU competition 
jurisprudence and enforcement experience, it is likely that the legal provisions on 
prohibition of anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance under Sections 4 
and 10, Competition Act 2010 may be inadequate to address tacit collusion in light of 
tougher cartel enforcement in Malaysia. 
 
The fact that Malaysia’s market is liberalised and is an open economy at the time its 
competition law was adopted could be a double edged sword argument for tougher 
cartel enforcement and full implementation of competition law in Malaysia. By logical 
deduction, Malaysia should be able to implement stricter cartel enforcement within a 
shorter period than it took South Africa which was five (5) years after adoption of the 
law. On the other hand, the difference in terms of market openness between Malaysia 
and South Africa when their respective competition laws were adopted could be used as 
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an excuse veiled as a justification to delay tougher cartel enforcement or full 
implementation of the Competition Act 2010. Hence, the necessity for Malaysia to 
formulate an appropriate cartel enforcement policy. 
 
Malaysia is not the first developing country to implement competition law with 
anticipated impediments. The experiences of other competition jurisdictions, be they 
developed or developing countries are available as useful references and benchmarks 
for Malaysia. Additionally, the global competition fraternity including supra national 
agencies such as UNCTAD, ICN and the OECD are always willing to provide assistance 
to any competition jurisdiction which requires it. The policy recommendations put forth 
hopefully would be considered by the policy makers in Malaysia, including the MyCC in 
furthering the competition agenda in Malaysia. The only question now is the level of 
commitment from the government in enforcing competition law. If the commitment of the 
government is there, then, half the battle has been won. 
i 
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X 
 
 
√ 
 
 
√ 
 
 
X 
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(1 Dec 
2004) 
Parties 
undertake to 
apply their 
competition 
laws in a 
manner 
consistent with 
RTA Chapter 
Includes private 
and public 
enterprises’: 
 
Anticompetitive 
agreements 
 
Concerted 
practices 
 
Abuse of 
dominance 
 
Anticompetitive 
mergers 
 
Notification 
 
Consultation 
 
Exchange of 
information 
 
Coordination 
of 
enforcement 
activities 
 
 
 
 
But parties 
recognise 
that causes 
which lead 
to dumping 
may be 
addressed 
by effective 
implementati
on of 
competition 
rules  
Subject to 
respective 
laws 
regarding 
disclosure of 
information. 
 
If the laws 
provide, 
confidential 
information 
may be 
provided to 
the courts. 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
EFTA – 
COLOMBIA 
(1 July 
2011) 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
Horizontal/ 
vertical 
agreements 
 
Concerted 
practices or 
arrangements 
between 
enterprises 
 
Abuse of 
dominance 
 
 
√ 
 
Includes: 
 
Notification 
 
Consultation 
 
Exchange of 
information 
 
Technical 
assistance 
 
Colombia 
may 
implement its 
obligations 
via the 
Andean 
Community 
Competition 
Laws and the 
Andean 
Community 
Enforcement 
Authority 
 
To strengthen 
cooperation, 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
 
√ 
 
Shall be 
subject to 
rules and 
standards of 
confidentialit
y applicable. 
 
Information 
provided 
shall remain 
confidential. 
 
X 
 
X 
 
No 
specific 
provision 
on 
exemption 
in the 
Chapter 
BUT some 
CRPs on 
state 
enterprise 
and 
designate
d  
monopolie
s are not 
applicable 
to govt 
procurem
ent 
 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
 
X 
Annex 
 
MATRIX OF COMPETITION RELATED PROVISIONS IN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES BASED ON WTO’S REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENT DATABASE (AS OF MAY 2012) 
 
- 7 - 
 
parties may 
sign 
cooperation 
agreement 
 
 
11 
 
EFTA – 
EGYPT 
(1 Aug 
2007) 
 
√ 
 
Joint 
committee 
shall adopt the 
necessary 
rules for 
implementatio
n within 5 yrs 
of PTA’s entry 
into force 
 
√ 
 
Public and private 
undertakings: 
 
Agreements or 
concerted 
practices between 
undertakings and 
collective 
decisions by 
association of 
undertakings with 
object or effect 
prevents/restricts/
distorts 
competition  
 
Abuse of 
dominance 
 
INCOMPATIBLE 
WITH PROPER 
FUNCTIONING 
OF AGREEMENT 
 
 
√ 
 
Via a Joint 
Committee 
 
 
 
 
 
√ 
 
Subject to 
consultation 
in Joint 
Committee 
 
√ 
 
Subject to 
limitations 
imposed by 
the 
requirement
s of national 
secrecy laws 
such as 
rules of 
professional 
and 
business 
secrecy 
 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
12 
 
EFTA – FYR 
MACEDONI
A 
(1 Jan 2001) 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementatio
n via a Joint 
Committee 
 
√ 
 
Public and private 
undertakings: 
 
Agreements or 
concerted 
practices between 
undertakings and 
collective 
decisions by 
association of 
undertakings with 
object or effect 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementatio
n :  
 
Cooperation 
 
Consultation 
 
Information 
 
√ 
 
May invoke 
safeguard 
measures 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
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prevents/restricts/
distorts 
competition  
 
Abuse of 
dominance  
 
INCOMPATIBLE 
WITH PROPER 
FUNCTIONING 
OF AGREEMENT 
sharing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
EFTA – 
JORDAN 
(1 Jan 2002) 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementatio
n via a Joint 
Committee 
 
√ 
 
Public and private 
undertakings: 
 
Agreements or 
concerted 
practices between 
undertakings and 
collective 
decisions by 
association of 
undertakings with 
object or effect 
prevents/restricts/
distorts 
competition  
 
Abuse of 
dominance 
  
INCOMPATIBLE 
WITH PROPER 
FUNCTIONING 
OF AGREEMENT 
 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementatio
n :  
 
Cooperation 
 
Consultation 
 
Information 
sharing 
 
 
√ 
 
May invoke 
safeguard 
measures 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
Regarding 
the 
extension 
of time for 
allowance 
of 
safeguard 
measures, 
Taking into 
considerati
on 
Jordan’s 
economic 
situation 
by the 
Joint 
Committee 
 
14 
 
EFTA – 
LEBANON 
(1 Jan 2007) 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
Agreements or 
concerted 
practices between 
undertakings and 
 
√ 
 
Via Joint 
Committee 
 
Consultation 
 
√ 
 
Subject to 
consultation 
in Joint 
Committee 
 
√ 
 
Subject to 
limitations 
on 
confidentialit
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
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collective 
decisions by 
association of 
undertakings with 
object or effect 
prevents/restricts/
distorts 
competition  
 
Abuse of 
dominance 
  
INCOMPATIBLE 
WITH PROPER 
FUNCTIONING 
OF AGREEMENT 
 
 
 
y implementati
on 
 
15 
 
EFTA – 
MEXICO 
(1 July 
2001) 
 
√ 
 
 
√ 
 
Give particular 
attention to: 
 
Anticompetitive 
agreements 
 
Abuse of market 
power 
 
Anticompetitive 
M&As 
 
IN 
ACCORDANCE 
TO RESPECTIVE 
LAWS 
 
 
√ 
 
Notification 
 
Consultation 
 
Exchange  of 
information 
 
 
X 
 
 
√ 
 
Nothing 
contrary to 
laws 
including 
regarding 
disclosure of 
information, 
confidentialit
y or 
business 
secrecy 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
EFTA – 
MOROCCO 
(1 Dec 
1999) 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementatio
n via a Joint 
Committee 
 
√ 
 
Public and private 
undertakings: 
 
Agreements or 
concerted 
practices between 
undertakings and 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementatio
n :  
 
 
√ 
 
May invoke 
safeguard 
measures 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
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collective 
decisions by 
association of 
undertakings with 
object or effect 
prevents/restricts/
distorts 
competition  
 
Abuse of 
dominance 
  
INCOMPATIBLE 
WITH PROPER 
FUNCTIONING 
OF AGREEMENT 
 
Consultation 
 
Information 
sharing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
EFTA – 
PERU 
(1 July 
2011) 
 
√ 
 
To apply 
competition 
law and to 
cooperate in 
matters under 
the Chapter 
 
√ 
 
Horizontal/vertical 
agreements, 
Concerted 
practices/ 
decisions by 
associations of 
enterprises which 
have as their 
object or effect 
the prevention, 
restriction or 
distortion of 
competition 
 
Abuse of 
dominance 
 
 
√ 
 
Notification 
 
Consultation 
 
Technical 
assistance 
 
Exchange  of 
information 
 
Peru may 
implement its 
obligations 
via the 
Andean 
Community 
Competition 
Laws and the 
Andean 
Community 
Enforcement 
Authority 
 
To strengthen 
cooperation, 
parties may 
sign 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
 
√ 
 
Shall be 
subject to 
rules and 
standards of 
confidentialit
y applicable. 
 
Information 
provided 
shall remain 
confidential. 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
No 
specific 
provision 
on 
exemption 
in the 
Chapter 
BUT some 
CRPs on 
state 
enterprise 
and 
designate
d  
monopolie
s are not 
applicable 
to govt 
procurem
ent 
 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
 
X 
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cooperation 
agreement 
 
 
18 
 
EFTA – 
SACU 
(1 May 
2008) 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementatio
n via a Joint 
Committee 
 
Recognises 
certain : 
 
Anticompetitive 
agreements 
 
Concerted 
practices 
 
Abuse of 
dominant position 
 
MAY AFFECT 
TRADE AND 
HINDER THE 
OBJECTIVES OF 
RTA 
 
 
X 
 
Cooperation 
which  
include 
exchange of 
information  
 
X 
 
√ 
 
exchange of 
information 
to the extent 
allowed by 
domestic 
law 
 
√ 
 
Via 
consultation 
in the Joint 
Committee 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
19 
 
EFTA – 
TUNISIA 
(1 Jun 2005) 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementatio
n via a Joint 
Committee 
 
 
√ 
 
Public and private 
undertakings: 
 
Agreements or 
concerted 
practices between 
undertakings and 
collective 
decisions by 
association of 
undertakings with 
object or effect 
prevents/restricts/
distorts 
competition  
 
Abuse of 
dominance 
  
INCOMPATIBLE 
WITH PROPER 
FUNCTIONING 
 
√ 
 
Via 
consultations 
in Joint 
Committee 
 
X 
 
Does not 
explicitly 
mention 
trade related 
measures 
but could be 
invoked if it 
is deemed 
as a 
provisional 
measure 
which may 
be invoked 
to deal with 
breach of 
competition 
related 
provisions. 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
Via 
consultation
s in Joint 
Committee  
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 
 
MATRIX OF COMPETITION RELATED PROVISIONS IN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES BASED ON WTO’S REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENT DATABASE (AS OF MAY 2012) 
 
- 12 - 
 
OF AGREEMENT 
 
 
 
20 
 
EFTA – 
TURKEY 
(1 April 
1992) 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
Public and private 
undertakings: 
 
Agreements or 
concerted 
practices between 
undertakings and 
collective 
decisions by 
association of 
undertakings with 
object or effect 
prevents/restricts/
distorts 
competition  
 
Abuse of 
dominant position 
 
INCOMPATIBLE 
WITH PROPER 
FUNCTIONING 
OF AGREEMENT 
 T 
 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
May invoke 
safeguard 
measures 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
21 
 
EU - 
ALBANIA 
(1 Dec 2006 
–Goods) 
(1 Apr 2009 
– Services) 
 
 
√ 
 
Approximation 
of laws 
 
√ 
 
Agreements or 
concerted 
practices between 
undertakings and 
collective 
decisions by 
association of 
undertakings with 
object or effect 
prevents/restricts/
distorts 
competition  
 
Abuse of 
 
√ 
 
Via 
consultation 
in 
Stabilisation 
and 
Association 
Council 
 
√ 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
√ 
 
State aid 
in 
Agricultur
e and 
fisheries 
 
X 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
In relation 
to state aid 
but not in 
perpetuity 
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dominant position 
 
State aid which 
distorts/threatens 
to distort 
competition 
 
INCOMPATIBLE 
WITH PROPER 
FUNCTIONING 
OF AGREEMENT 
 
 
22 
 
EU – 
ALGERIA 
(1 Sept 
2005) 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementatio
n 
 
√ 
 
Agreements or 
concerted 
practices between 
undertakings and 
collective 
decisions by 
association of 
undertakings with 
object or effect 
prevents/restricts/
distorts 
competition  
 
Abuse of 
dominant position 
 
INCOMPATIBLE 
WITH PROPER 
FUNCTIONING 
OF AGREEMENT 
 
 
√ 
 
Administrativ
e cooperation 
 
√ 
 
Subject to 
consultation 
in 
Association 
Committee 
 
√ 
 
Subject to 
limitations 
imposed on 
professional 
and 
business 
confidentialit
y 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
EU – 
BOSNIA 
HERZEGOV
INA 
(1 July 
2008) 
 
√ 
 
Parties shall 
ensure that an 
operationally 
independent 
public 
authority is 
entrusted with 
powers to 
 
√ 
 
Agreements or 
concerted 
practices between 
undertakings and 
collective 
decisions by 
association of 
undertakings with 
 
X 
 
BUT 
anticompetitiv
e practices 
shall be 
assessed on 
criteria arising 
out of EU law 
and 
 
√ 
 
Subject to 
consultation 
in Interim 
Committee 
 
Nothing 
shall 
prejudice the 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
In relation 
to state aid 
but not in 
perpetuity 
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implement 
provisions 
anticompetitiv
e practices  
 
object or effect 
prevents/restricts/
distorts 
competition  
 
Abuse of 
dominant position 
 
State aid which 
distorts/threatens 
to distort 
competition 
 
INCOMPATIBLE 
WITH PROPER 
FUNCTIONING 
OF AGREEMENT 
 
regulations 
on 
competition 
right to 
antidumping 
and 
countervailin
g measures 
under 
WTO/GATT 
rules. 
 
 
 
24 
 
EU – 
CARIFORU
M STATES 
EPA 
(1 Nov 
2008) 
 
√ 
 
Within 5 years 
of entry into 
force of the 
agreement the 
Parties shall 
have laws and 
enforcement 
authorities to 
address 
anticompetitiv
e practices in 
their 
jurisdiction, 
 
 
 
√ 
 
Agreements or 
concerted 
practices between 
undertakings and 
collective 
decisions by 
association of 
undertakings with 
object or effect 
prevents/restricts/
distorts 
competition  
 
Abuse of 
dominant position 
 
INCOMPATIBLE 
WITH PROPER 
FUNCTIONING 
OF AGREEMENT 
 
 
√ 
 
Notification 
 
Exchange of 
information 
 
Technical 
assistance 
 
Capacity 
building 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
√ 
 
Non 
confidential 
information 
 
Subject to 
standards of 
confidentialit
y in each 
jurisdiction 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
25 
 
EU – CHILE 
(1 Feb 2003 
– G) 
 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
Give particular 
attention to : 
 
√ 
 
 
Notification 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
Non 
confidential 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
 
 
X 
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(1 Mar 2005 
– S) 
 
Anticompetitive 
agreements 
 
Concerted 
practices 
 
Abuse of 
dominance 
 
 
Consultation 
 
Exchange of 
information 
 
Technical 
assistance 
 
 
 
information 
 
Where the 
law 
provides, 
may provide 
confidential 
information 
to courts but 
confidentialit
y shall be 
maintained 
by the courts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
EU – 
EGYPT 
(1 Jun 2004) 
 
√ 
 
The 
Association 
Council shall 
adopt rules for 
implementatio
n within 5 
years of entry 
into force of 
RTA 
 
√ 
 
Agreements or 
concerted 
practices between 
undertakings and 
collective 
decisions by 
association of 
undertakings with 
object or effect 
prevents/restricts/
distorts 
competition  
 
Abuse of 
dominant position 
 
Public aid which 
distorts/threatens 
to distort 
competition 
 
INCOMPATIBLE 
WITH PROPER 
FUNCTIONING 
OF AGREEMENT 
 
 
√ 
 
Exchange of 
information 
 
Implementati
on rules to be 
adopted by 
Association 
Council until 
then WTO 
rules on 
subsidies 
applies on 
state aid  
 
 
 
√ 
 
Subject to 
consultation 
in 
Association 
Council but 
Nothing 
prejudices 
right to take 
countervailin
g measures 
under GATT 
and WTO   
 
 
√ 
 
Subject to 
limitations 
imposed on 
professional 
and 
business 
confidentialit
y 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
√ 
 
public aid 
in 
agriculture 
products 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Subject to 
implementati
on rules to 
be adopted 
by 
Association 
Council 
 
X 
 
27 
 
EU – FYR 
MACEDONI
A 
 
√ 
 
Approximation 
 
√ 
 
Public and private 
 
√ 
 
To be 
 
√ 
 
Subject to 
 
√ 
 
Subject to 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
public aid 
 
X 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
In relation 
Annex 
 
MATRIX OF COMPETITION RELATED PROVISIONS IN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES BASED ON WTO’S REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENT DATABASE (AS OF MAY 2012) 
 
- 16 - 
 
( 1 June 
2001 – G) 
 
(1 April 2004 
– S) 
of laws 
 
undertakings: 
 
Agreements or 
concerted 
practices between 
undertakings and 
collective 
decisions by 
association of 
undertakings with 
object or effect 
prevents/restricts/
distorts 
competition  
 
Abuse of 
dominant position 
 
Public aid which 
distorts 
competition 
 
INCOMPATIBLE 
WITH PROPER 
FUNCTIONING 
OF AGREEMENT 
 
 
 
gradually 
implemented 
as per agreed 
transition 
period. 
Modalities of 
enforcement 
to be decided 
as such. 
 
 
consultation 
in 
Stabilisation 
and 
Association 
Council 
limitations 
imposed on 
professional 
and 
business 
confidentialit
y 
in 
agriculture 
and 
fisheries 
to public 
aid but not 
in 
perpetuity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
EU - 
JORDAN 
(1 May 
2002) 
 
√ 
 
Approximation 
of laws 
 
√ 
 
Public and private 
undertakings: 
 
Agreements or 
concerted 
practices between 
undertakings and 
collective 
decisions by 
association of 
undertakings with 
object or effect 
prevents/restricts/
distorts 
competition  
 
√ 
 
Rules for 
implementatio
n shall be 
adopted 
within 5 years 
of the date of 
entry into 
force of 
agreement. 
Until then, 
rules of 
implementatio
n is as per 
the relevant 
EU laws shall 
 
√ 
 
Subject to 
consultation 
in 
Association 
Committee 
 
√ 
 
Subject to 
limitations 
imposed by 
the 
requirement
s of 
professional 
and 
business 
secrecy 
 
X 
 
 
 
√ 
 
State aid 
in 
Agricultur
al 
products  
 
X 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
In relation 
to state aid 
but not in 
perpetuity 
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Abuse of 
dominant position 
 
Public aid which 
distorts 
competition 
 
INCOMPATIBLE 
WITH PROPER 
FUNCTIONING 
OF AGREEMENT 
 
apply 
 
29 
 
 
EU – 
LEBANON 
(1 March 
2003) 
 
√ 
 
The 
Cooperation 
Council shall 
adopt rules for 
implementatio
n within 5 
years of entry 
into force of 
RTA 
 
√ 
 
Agreements or 
concerted 
practices between 
undertakings and 
collective 
decisions by 
association of 
undertakings with 
object or effect 
prevents/restricts/
distorts 
competition  
 
Abuse of 
dominant position 
 
INCOMPATIBLE 
WITH PROPER 
FUNCTIONING 
OF AGREEMENT 
 
 
√ 
 
Exchange of 
information 
 
Implementati
on rules to be 
adopted by 
Cooperation 
Council  
 
 
√ 
 
Subject to 
consultation 
in 
Cooperation 
Council 
 
√ 
 
Subject to 
limitations 
on 
confidentialit
y 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
BUT subject 
to 
implementati
on rules to 
be adopted 
by 
Cooperation 
Council 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
EU – 
MEXICO 
(1 July 2000 
– G) 
 
(1 Oct 2000 
– S) 
 
√ 
 
To be 
determined by 
Joint Council 
 
 
√ 
 
Joint Council shall 
decide in 
particular on the 
following matters: 
 
Agreements or 
concerted 
 
√ 
 
To be 
determined 
by Joint 
Council and 
include: 
 
Mutual legal 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
 
X 
 
X 
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practices between 
undertakings and 
collective 
decisions by 
association of 
undertakings with 
object or effect 
prevents/restricts/
distorts 
competition  
 
Abuse of 
dominant position 
 
Mergers 
 
State monopolies 
of commercial 
character 
 
 
Public and private 
undertakings 
which have been 
granted exclusive 
rights 
 
assistance 
 
Notification 
 
Consultation 
 
exchange of 
information 
 
 
31 
 
EU – 
MONTENE
GRO 
(1 Jan 2008 
– G) 
 
(1 May 2010 
– S) 
 
√ 
 
Approximation 
of laws  
 
Montenegro 
shall establish 
an authority to 
implement 
CRPs within 1 
year from the 
date of entry 
into force of 
the agreement 
 
√ 
 
Public and private 
undertakings: 
 
Agreements or 
concerted 
practices between 
undertakings and 
collective 
decisions by 
association of 
undertakings with 
object or effect 
prevents/restricts/
distorts 
competition  
 
Abuse of 
 
√ 
 
Based on 
criteria 
applied in EU 
rules on 
competition  
 
 
√ 
 
Subject to 
consultation 
in 
Stabilisation 
and 
Association 
Council but 
Nothing 
prejudices 
right to take 
countervailin
g measures 
under GATT 
and WTO   
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
√ 
 
public aid 
in 
agriculture 
and 
fisheries 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
In relation 
to state 
aids but 
not in 
perpetuity 
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dominant position 
 
State  aid which 
distorts 
competition 
 
INCOMPATIBLE 
WITH PROPER 
FUNCTIONING 
OF AGREEMENT 
 
 
32 
 
EU – 
MOROCCO 
(1 Mar 2000) 
 
√ 
 
Approximation 
of laws 
 
 
Rules for 
implementatio
n shall be 
adopted within 
5 years of the 
date of entry 
into force of 
agreement 
 
√ 
 
Agreements or 
concerted 
practices between 
undertakings and 
collective 
decisions by 
association of 
undertakings with 
object or effect 
prevents/restricts/
distorts 
competition  
 
Abuse of 
dominant position 
 
Official aid which 
distorts/threatens 
to distort 
competition 
 
INCOMPATIBLE 
WITH PROPER 
FUNCTIONING 
OF AGREEMENT 
 
√ 
 
Until rules for 
implementatio
n of 
anticompetitiv
e practices 
are adopted, 
rules of 
implementatio
n are as per 
the relevant 
EU laws. 
 
 
√ 
 
Subject to 
consultation 
in 
Stabilisation 
and 
Association 
Committee  
 
 
 
√ 
 
Subject to 
limitations 
imposed by 
the 
requirement
s of 
professional 
and 
business 
secrecy 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
 
√ 
 
state aid 
in 
agriculture 
and 
fisheries 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
In relation 
to official 
aids but 
not in 
perpetuity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
EU – 
SERBIA 
(1 Feb 2010) 
 
 
√ 
 
Serbia shall 
establish an 
authority to 
enforce the 
related CRPs  
 
√ 
 
Agreements or 
concerted 
practices between 
undertakings and 
collective 
 
√ 
 
Based on 
criteria 
applied in EU 
rules on 
competition  
 
√ 
 
Subject to 
consultation 
in Interim 
Committee 
but 
 
X 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
 
√ 
 
State aid 
in 
Agricultur
e and 
fisheries 
 
X 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
In relation 
to state aid 
but not in 
perpetuity 
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decisions by 
association of 
undertakings with 
object or effect 
prevents/restricts/
distorts 
competition  
 
Abuse of 
dominant position 
 
State aid which 
distorts 
competition 
 
INCOMPATIBLE 
WITH PROPER 
FUNCTIONING 
OF AGREEMENT 
 
 
 
Nothing 
prejudices 
right to take 
countervailin
g measures 
under GATT 
and WTO   
 
on 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
EU – 
SOUTH 
AFRICA 
(1 Jan 2000) 
 
√ 
 
Shall adopt 
laws within a 
period of 3 
years after 
entry into force 
of RTA 
 
 
 
√ 
 
Horizontal 
agreements/ 
collective 
decisions by 
association of 
firms/  
vertical 
agreements 
which have the 
effect of 
substantially 
preventing or 
lessening 
competition 
UNLESS 
anticompetitive 
effects are 
outweighed by 
pro-competitive 
ones 
 
Abuse of market 
power 
 
 
√ 
 
Consultation 
 
Technical 
assistance 
 
√ 
 
May take 
measures 
consistent 
with 
domestic 
laws and 
subject to 
consultation 
in 
Cooperation 
Council with 
respect to 
powers of 
the 
competition 
authority 
concerned 
 
 
 
√ 
 
Subject to 
limitations 
imposed by 
the 
requirement
s of 
professional 
and 
business 
secrecy 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
X 
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INCOMPATIBLE 
WITH PROPER 
FUNCTIONING 
OF AGREEMENT 
 
 
35 
 
EU – 
TUNISIA 
(1 Mar 1998) 
 
√ 
 
Association 
Council shall 
within 5 years 
of the date of 
entry into force 
of agreement 
adopt rules for 
implementatio
n for 
anticompetitiv
e practices  
 
√ 
 
Agreements or 
concerted 
practices between 
undertakings and 
collective 
decisions by 
association of 
undertakings with 
object or effect 
prevents/restricts/
distorts 
competition  
 
Abuse of 
dominant position 
 
Official aid which 
distorts 
competition 
 
INCOMPATIBLE 
WITH PROPER 
FUNCTIONING 
OF AGREEMENT 
 
 
√ 
 
Based on 
criteria 
applied in EU 
rules on 
competition  
and until 
Association 
Committee 
adopt rules 
on 
implementatio
n fo the 
agreement 
GATT  rules 
on subsidies 
applies to 
state aid 
 
√ 
 
Subject to 
consultation 
in 
Association 
Committee  
and GATT 
rules on 
subsidies 
 
 
√ 
 
Subject to 
limitations 
imposed by 
the 
requirement
s of 
professional 
and 
business 
secrecy 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
 
√ 
 
State aid 
in 
Agricultur
e and 
fisheries 
 
X 
  
X 
 
√ 
 
In relation 
to state aid 
but not in 
perpetuity 
 
36 
 
EU – 
TURKEY 
(1 Jan 1996) 
 
√ 
 
Approximation 
of laws 
 
Before entry 
into force of 
agreement 
Turkey shall: 
 
Adopt 
competition 
law based on 
 
√ 
 
Agreements or 
concerted 
practices between 
undertakings and 
collective 
decisions by 
association of 
undertakings with 
object or effect 
prevents/restricts/
distorts 
 
√ 
 
Notification 
 
Exchange of 
information 
 
Rules of 
implementatio
n to be 
adopted by 
association 
Council within 
 
√ 
 
Subject to 
consultation 
in 
Association 
Committee  
and GATT 
rules on 
subsidies 
 
 
√ 
 
Subject to 
limitations 
imposed by 
the 
requirement
s of 
professional 
and 
business 
secrecy 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
 
√ 
 
Economic 
developm
ent 
 
Project of 
common 
European 
interest 
 
Remedy 
serious 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
 
 
X 
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EU 
competition 
law 
 
Establish 
competition 
authority 
competition  
 
Abuse of 
dominant position 
 
Official aid which 
distorts 
competition 
 
INCOMPATIBLE 
WITH PROPER 
FUNCTIONING 
OF AGREEMENT 
 
2 years of 
entry into 
force of the 
agreement. 
The rules are 
to be based 
on existing 
EU rules. 
 
Until such 
rules are 
adopted, 
each 
competition 
authority shall 
implement 
the CRP 
disturbanc
e in the 
economy 
of any of 
the 
signatorie
s 
 
Aid for 
structural 
adjustmen
ts 
necessitat
ed by the 
establish
ment of 
the 
customs 
union but 
subject to 
review 
 
Aid to 
facilitate 
developm
ent of 
certain 
economic 
activities 
or certain 
economic 
areas so 
long as 
does not 
adversely 
affect 
trade 
between 
EU and 
Turkey 
 
Aid to 
promote 
cultural 
and 
heritage 
conservati
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on so long 
as does 
not 
adversely 
affect 
trade 
between 
EU and 
Turkey 
 
Other aid 
which may 
be 
specified 
by 
Associatio
n Council 
 
 
37 
 
ISRAEL – 
MEXICO 
(1 July 
2000) 
 
 
√ 
 
Signatories 
undertake to 
enforce 
respective 
laws which 
may adversely 
affect bilateral 
trade 
 
√ 
 
As stated under 
each party’s 
respective 
competition law 
 
√ 
 
Consultation 
 
Notification 
 
Exchange of 
information 
 
ON 
MATTERS 
THAT 
AFFECT 
BILATERAL 
TRADE 
 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
X 
 
where 
judicial 
challenge 
procedures 
are provided 
by the other 
party  under 
its law 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Not 
explicitly 
provided 
in RTA  
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
JAPAN – 
INDONESIA 
(1 July 
2008) 
 
√ 
 
In accordance 
with each 
country’s laws 
 
Subject to 
respective 
available 
resources. 
 
 
X 
 
Not explicitly 
described under 
RTA but subject 
to the domestic 
laws  
 
√ 
 
The details  
and 
procedure to 
be provided 
in the 
Implementing 
Agreement 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
√ 
 
Confidentiali
ty of 
information 
provided to 
be 
maintained 
by the other 
party 
 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
X 
 
Not 
explicitly 
provided 
under 
RTA but 
subject to 
the 
domestic 
laws  
 
X 
 
Not 
provided 
in RTA 
but 
subject to 
the 
domestic 
laws 
 
 
X 
 
Not provided 
in RTA but 
may be 
included in  
implementin
g agreement 
 
X 
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39 
 
 
 
JAPAN – 
MALAYSIA 
(13 July 
2006) 
 
√ 
 
In accordance 
with each 
country’s laws 
 
Parties 
endeavour to 
review, 
improve and 
adopt law and 
regulations 
when 
necessary 
 
 
X 
 
Not explicitly 
described under 
RTA but subject 
to the domestic 
laws 
 
√ 
 
In 
accordance 
with each 
country’s 
laws 
 
Subject to 
respective 
available 
resources. 
 
The details 
shall be 
provided 
under the 
implementing 
agreement 
 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on  
 
X 
 
Not provided 
in RTA but 
may be 
included in  
implementin
g agreement 
and 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Not 
explicitly 
provided 
under 
RTA but 
subject to 
the 
domestic 
laws 
 
X 
 
Not 
explicitly 
provided 
under 
RTA but 
subject to 
the 
domestic 
laws 
 
 
X 
 
Not provided 
in RTA but 
may be 
included in  
implementin
g agreement 
 
 
X 
 
40 
 
JAPAN – 
MEXICO 
(1 Apr 2005) 
 
√ 
 
In accordance 
with each 
country’s laws 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
Not explicitly 
described under 
RTA but subject 
to the domestic 
laws 
 
√ 
 
In 
accordance 
with each 
country’s 
laws 
 
The details 
shall be 
provided 
under the 
implementing 
agreement 
 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
X 
 
Not provided 
in RTA but 
may be 
included in  
implementin
g agreement 
and 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Not 
explicitly 
provided 
under 
RTA but 
subject to 
the 
domestic 
laws 
 
X 
 
Not 
explicitly 
provided 
under 
RTA but 
subject to 
the 
domestic 
laws 
 
X 
 
Not provided 
in RTA but 
may be 
included in  
implementin
g agreement 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
41 
 
JAPAN – 
PERU 
(1 March 
2012) * 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Not explicitly 
stated in RTA or 
Implementing 
Agreement but 
implicitly as per 
the relevant laws 
of the parties 
 
√ 
 
Include; 
 
Notification 
 
Exchange of 
information 
 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
 
√ 
 
Information 
other than 
publicly 
available 
information 
shall remain 
confidential 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
X 
 
Not 
explicitly 
stated in 
RTA or 
Implement
ing 
Agreemen
 
√ 
 
 
√ 
 
 
X 
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Coordination 
of 
enforcement 
 
Technical 
cooperation 
 
Consultations 
 
BUT does 
not include: 
 
The review of 
business 
conducts and 
routine filings 
 
Research, 
studies or 
surveys with 
the objective 
of examining 
the general 
economic 
situation or 
general 
conditions in 
specific 
sectors. 
 
 and can only 
be disclosed 
to a 3
rd
 party 
with the 
consent of 
the party 
which 
provided the 
information. 
 
Confidentiali
ty of 
information 
is to be 
maintained 
subject to 
the laws of 
each party. 
 
Information 
provided 
shall not be 
used for 
criminal 
proceedings. 
 
t but 
implicitly 
as per the 
relevant 
laws of 
the parties 
 
42 
 
JAPAN – 
PHILIPPINE
S 
(11 Dec 
2008) 
 
√ 
 
In accordance 
with each 
country’s laws 
based on 
principles of 
transparency, 
procedural 
fairness and 
non-
discrimination. 
 
Parties 
endeavour to 
review, 
 
X 
 
Not explicitly 
described under 
RTA but subject 
to the domestic 
laws 
 
√ 
 
In 
accordance 
with each 
country’s 
laws 
 
Subject to 
respective 
available 
resources. 
 
The details 
shall be 
provided 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
X 
 
Not provided 
in RTA but 
may be 
included in  
implementin
g agreement 
and 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Not 
explicitly 
provided 
under 
RTA but 
subject to 
the 
domestic 
laws 
 
X 
 
Not 
explicitly 
provided 
under 
RTA but 
subject to 
the 
domestic 
laws 
 
X 
 
Not provided 
in RTA but 
may be 
included in  
implementin
g agreement 
 
 
X 
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improve and 
adopt law and 
regulations 
when 
necessary 
 
under the 
implementing 
agreement 
 
 
43 
 
JAPAN – 
THAILAND 
(1 Nov 
2007) 
 
√ 
 
In accordance 
with each 
country’s laws 
 
 
X 
 
Not explicitly 
described under 
RTA but subject 
to the domestic 
laws 
 
 
√ 
 
In 
accordance 
with each 
country’s 
laws 
 
Subject to 
respective 
available 
resources. 
 
The details 
shall be 
provided 
under the 
implementing 
agreement 
 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
X 
 
Not provided 
in RTA but 
may be 
included in  
implementin
g agreement 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Not 
explicitly 
provided 
under 
RTA but 
subject to 
the 
domestic 
laws 
 
X 
 
Not 
explicitly 
provided 
under 
RTA but 
subject to 
the 
domestic 
laws 
 
X 
 
Not provided 
in RTA but 
may be 
included in  
implementin
g agreement 
 
 
X 
 
44 
 
JAPAN – 
VIETNAM 
(1 Oct 2009) 
 
√ 
 
In accordance 
with each 
country’s laws 
based on 
principles of 
transparency, 
procedural 
fairness and 
non-
discrimination 
 
√ 
 
As per the 
described 
domestic laws on 
competition 
 
√ 
 
In 
accordance 
with each 
country’s 
laws 
 
May take the 
form of; 
 
Exchange of 
information 
 
Notification 
 
Coordination 
of 
enforcement 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
 
√ 
 
Each party 
shall 
maintain the 
confidentialit
y of 
information 
provided by 
the other 
party in 
accordance 
to its laws 
and 
regulations 
 
Information 
may be 
transmitted 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Not 
explicitly 
provided 
under 
RTA but 
subject to 
the 
domestic 
laws 
 
X 
 
Not 
explicitly 
provided 
under 
RTA but 
subject to 
the 
domestic 
laws 
 
X 
 
Not provided 
in RTA but 
may be 
included in  
implementin
g agreement 
 
 
X 
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activities 
 
Consultation 
 
Technical 
assistance 
 
 
to a 3
rd
 party 
with the 
consent of 
the party 
which 
provided the 
information 
  
 
 
45 
 
REP. 
KOREA – 
CHILE 
(1 April 
2004) 
 
X 
 
 
√ 
 
Shall give 
particular 
attention to: 
 
Anticompetitive 
agreements 
 
Concerted 
practices 
 
Abusive  
behaviour 
 
√ 
 
Includes: 
 
Notification 
 
Consultation 
 
Exchange of 
non 
confidential 
information 
 
Technical 
assistance 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
 
√ 
 
May 
exchange 
non 
confidential 
information 
 
Confidential 
information 
shall not be 
disclosed to 
unauthorise
d entity 
 
Confidential 
information 
may be 
provided to 
the courts if 
it is provided 
by the law 
so long as 
its 
confidentialit
y is 
maintained 
by the courts 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
REP. 
KOREA – 
INDIA 
(1 Jan 2010) 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Not explicitly 
described in RTA 
but implicitly as 
per the described 
domestic laws on 
competition 
 
√ 
 
Consultations 
on 
enforcement 
cooperation 
to commence 
after full 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
√ 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Not 
explicitly 
described 
in RTA 
but 
subject to 
 
√ 
 
 
X 
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 enforcement 
of India’s 
Competition 
Act. 
 
Shall include: 
 
Capacity 
building 
 
Exchange of 
information 
 
Notification 
 
Comity 
 
 the 
described 
domestic 
laws on 
competitio
n 
 
 
47 
 
NEW 
ZEALAND – 
MALAYSIA 
(1 Aug 
2010) 
 
X 
 
Parties are not 
obliged to 
adopt or 
withdraw 
specific 
measures to 
address 
anticompetitiv
e practices. 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
Exchange of 
information  
 
Technical 
cooperation 
 
Discussions 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
Shall be 
transpare
nt and 
undertake
n on the 
grounds of 
public 
policy or 
public 
interest. 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
48 
 
NAFTA 
(1 Jan 1994) 
 
 
√ 
 
Parties shall 
consult from 
time to time on 
the 
effectiveness 
of the 
measures 
adopted 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
Including: 
 
Mutual legal 
assistance 
 
Notification 
 
Consultation 
 
Exchange of 
information 
 
 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
 
√ 
 
X 
 
No dispute 
settlement 
for matters 
concerning 
adoption of 
measures 
and 
cooperation 
and 
coordination 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
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49 
 
PANAMA – 
SINGAPOR
E 
(24 Jul 
2006) 
 
√ 
 
Adopt and 
maintain 
competition 
laws 
 
Based on 
principles of 
non 
discrimination, 
transparency 
and due 
process 
 
 
√ 
 
Includes 
: 
 anticompetitive 
horizontal 
arrangements 
 
abuse of market 
power 
 
anticompetitive 
vertical 
arrangements 
 
anticompetitive 
M&As 
 
 
√ 
 
Establishing 
consultation 
mechanisms  
 
Exchange of 
information 
 
 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
 
√ 
 
Except 
information 
deemed as 
confidential 
 
X 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
X 
 
X 
 
50 
 
PERU – 
REP. 
KOREA 
(1 Aug 
2011) 
 
√ 
 
Parties shall 
maintain and 
enforce 
competition 
laws and 
maintain 
enforcement 
authorities. 
 
Enforcement 
shall be 
consistent with 
principles of 
transparency, 
non 
discrimination, 
timeliness and 
procedural 
fairness.  
 
√ 
 
Agreements 
between 
enterprises and 
decisions by 
associations of 
enterprises which 
have the purpose 
of impeding, 
restricting or 
distorting 
competition as 
specified in the 
parties’ 
competition laws 
 
Abuse of 
dominant position 
as specified in the 
parties’ 
competition laws 
 
Market 
concentrations 
which significantly 
impede 
 
√ 
 
Including: 
 
Notification 
 
Consultation 
 
Technical 
assistance 
 
Exchange of 
non 
confidential 
information 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
√ 
 
Confidentiali
ty standards 
to be 
maintained. 
No 
disclosure 
without 
approval 
from the 
party which 
provided the 
information. 
 
Parties shall 
endeavour 
to provide 
information 
requested 
as long as it 
does not 
affect 
ongoing 
investigation
s and 
compatible 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Subject to 
the 
domestic 
laws 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
Not 
explicitly 
provided 
under 
RTA but 
subject to 
the 
domestic 
laws 
 
X 
 
X 
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competition as 
specified in the 
parties’ 
competition laws   
with 
standards of 
confidentialit
y which 
apply. 
 
 
 
51 
 
PERU – 
SINGAPOR
E 
(1 Aug 
2009) 
 
√ 
 
Adopt and 
maintain 
competition 
laws and 
national 
authorities for 
enforcement. 
 
Based on 
principles of 
timeliness,  
non 
discrimination, 
transparency 
and due 
process 
 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
Including: 
 
Notification 
 
Consultation 
 
Exchange of 
information 
 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
√ 
 
Subject to 
laws on 
confidentialit
y and 
competition 
laws 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Not 
explicitly 
provided 
under 
RTA but 
subject to 
the 
domestic 
laws 
 
√ 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
THAILAND 
– 
AUSTRALIA 
(1 Jan 2005) 
 
 
√ 
 
Address 
anticompetitiv
e practices 
 
Adopt and 
enforce 
appropriate 
measures to 
counter such 
practices 
 
 
 
√ 
 
Anti- 
competitive 
horizontal 
arrangements 
 
misuse of market 
power 
 
anti-competitive 
vertical 
arrangements 
 
anti-competitive 
M&As 
 
 
√ 
 
Notification 
 
Consultation 
 
Exchange of 
information 
 
Coordination 
of cross 
border 
enforcement 
matters 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
√ 
 
Information 
shall be kept 
confidential 
except when 
disclosure is 
required 
under 
domestic 
laws. 
 
BUT before 
disclosure, 
the party 
who 
provided the 
information 
must be 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
May 
exempt 
but must 
be 
transpare
nt and 
based on 
public 
policy and 
public 
interests 
 
√ 
 
X 
 
X 
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informed 
 
 
53 
 
THAILAND 
– NEW 
ZEALAND 
(1 July 
2005) 
 
√ 
 
Ensure all 
commercial 
activities are 
subject to 
competition 
law 
 
Shall be 
consistent with 
principles of 
timeliness,  
non 
discrimination, 
transparency, 
comprehensiv
eness and 
procedural 
fairness 
 
 
√ 
 
Anti- 
competitive 
horizontal 
arrangements 
 
misuse of market 
power 
 
anti-competitive 
vertical 
arrangements 
 
anti-competitive 
M&As 
 
 
√ 
 
Notification 
 
Consultation 
 
Exchange of 
information 
 
Coordination 
of cross 
border 
enforcement 
matters 
 
Technical 
cooperation 
subject to 
available 
resources 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
√ 
 
Information 
shall be kept 
confidential 
except when 
disclosure is 
required 
under 
domestic 
laws. 
 
BUT before 
disclosure, 
the party 
who 
provided the 
information 
must be 
informed 
 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
May 
exempt 
but must 
be 
transpare
nt and 
based on 
public 
policy and 
public 
interests 
 
√ 
 
X 
 
X 
 
54 
 
TRANSPACI
FIC 
STRATEGIC 
ECONOMIC 
PARTNERS
HIP 
(28 May 
2006) 
 
√ 
 
Shall adopt or 
maintain 
competition 
laws that 
proscribe 
anticompetitiv
e business 
conducts 
 
Shall maintain 
enforcement 
authority for 
competition 
law 
 
With the 
objective of 
promoting 
economic 
efficiency and 
 
√ 
 
Will give particular 
attention to: 
 
Anticompetitive 
agreements 
 
Concerted 
practices/ 
arrangement by 
competitors 
 
Abuse of 
dominance 
 
 
 
√ 
 
Notification 
 
Consultation 
 
Exchange of 
information 
 
Implemented 
via 
Cooperation 
Agreement 
between 
competition 
authorities 
after entry 
into force of 
RTA 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
√ 
 
Information 
shall be kept 
confidential 
except when 
disclosure is 
required 
under 
domestic 
laws. 
 
BUT before 
disclosure, 
the party 
who 
provided the 
information 
must be 
informed 
 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
May 
exempt 
but must 
be 
transpare
nt and 
based on 
public 
policy and 
public 
interests 
 
Shall not 
have the 
objective 
of 
negatively 
affecting 
trade 
between 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
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consumer 
welfare 
 
 
the parties 
 
Any 
additions 
to 
exemption 
list which 
shall 
affect 
trade with 
other 
parties 
shall be 
informed 
and the 
affected 
party may 
request 
consultati
on 
 
Additions 
and 
removals 
from 
exemption 
list shall 
be via 
Implement
ing 
Arrangem
ent 
 
EXEMPTI
ONS AS 
AT 
ENTRY 
INTO 
FORCE 
OF THE 
AGREEM
ENT ARE: 
 
NZ 
 
Pharmace
utical 
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subsidies 
 
Export 
arrangem
ents 
 
Agricultur
al 
producer 
boards 
 
S’PORE 
 
Provision 
of ordinary 
letters and 
postcard 
services 
by 
licensed 
and 
regulated 
entities 
 
Supply of 
piped 
potable 
water 
 
Supply of 
wastewate
r 
managem
ent 
services, 
including 
collection, 
treatment 
and 
disposal 
of 
wastewate
r 
 
Public 
transport 
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55 
 
TURKEY – 
CROATIA 
(1 July 
2003) 
 
√ 
 
Adopt 
measures in 
conformity 
with 
procedures 
and under the 
conditions laid 
down in their 
respective 
agreements 
with the EU 
 
√ 
 
Agreements or 
concerted 
practices between 
undertakings and 
collective 
decisions by 
association of 
undertakings with 
object or effect 
prevents/restricts/
distorts 
competition  
 
Abuse of 
dominant position 
 
State aid which 
distorts 
competition 
 
INCOMPATIBLE 
WITH PROPER 
FUNCTIONING 
OF AGREEMENT 
 
 
√ 
 
subject to the 
respective 
agreements 
with the EU 
 
√ 
 
Subject to 
consultation 
in Joint 
Committee 
and 
GATT/WTO 
rules on 
subsidies   
 
√ 
 
Subject to 
limitations 
imposed by 
the 
requirement
s of 
professional 
and 
business 
secrecy 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
X 
 
But may 
be subject 
to the 
respective 
agreemen
ts with the 
EU 
 
X 
 
X 
 
But may be 
subject to 
the 
respective 
agreements 
with the EU 
 
X 
 
But may 
be subject 
to the 
respective 
agreement
s with the 
EU 
 
56 
 
TURKEY – 
ISRAEL 
(1 May 
1997) 
 
√ 
 
The Joint 
Committee 
shall within 3 
years of entry 
into force of 
agreement 
decide on the 
rules of 
implementatio
n of CRPs in 
RTA 
 
√ 
 
Agreements or 
concerted 
practices between 
undertakings and 
collective 
decisions by 
association of 
undertakings with 
object or effect 
prevents/restricts/
distorts 
competition  
 
Abuse of 
dominant position 
 
 
√ 
 
To be 
decided by 
Joint 
Committee 
until then, 
GATT 
subsidies 
rules applies 
on state aid 
which distorts 
competition. 
 
√ 
 
Subject to 
consultation 
in Joint 
Committee 
and GATT 
rules on 
subsidies   
 
√ 
 
Subject to 
limitations 
imposed by 
the 
requirement
s of 
professional 
and 
business 
secrecy 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
BUT subject 
to rules of 
implementati
on to be 
decided by 
Joint 
Committee 
 
X 
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State aid which 
distorts 
competition 
 
INCOMPATIBLE 
WITH PROPER 
FUNCTIONING 
OF AGREEMENT 
 
 
57 
 
US – CHILE 
(1 Jan 2004) 
 
 
√ 
 
Shall adopt or 
maintain 
competition 
laws that 
proscribe 
anticompetitiv
e business 
conducts 
 
Shall maintain 
enforcement 
authority for 
competition 
law 
 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
Including: 
 
Notification 
 
Consultation 
 
Exchange of 
information 
 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
√ 
 
Public 
information 
 
 
X 
 
ONLY FOR 
monopolies, 
state 
enterprises, 
pricing 
differences 
and 
information 
requests 
 
 
√ 
 
Designate
d 
monopolie
s in 
procurem
ent 
 
X 
 
Not 
explicitly 
provided 
under 
RTA but 
subject to 
the 
domestic 
laws 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 
 
US – PERU 
(1 Feb 2009) 
 
√ 
 
Shall adopt or 
maintain 
competition 
laws that 
proscribe 
anticompetitiv
e business 
conducts 
 
Shall maintain 
enforcement 
authority for 
competition 
law 
 
 
X 
 
 
√ 
 
Including: 
 
Notification 
 
Consultation 
 
Exchange of 
information 
 
Establish a 
Working 
Group for 
implementatio
n of Chapter 
on 
Competition 
 
 
X 
 
BUT may be 
subject to 
provision on 
general 
implementati
on 
 
√ 
 
Public 
information 
 
 
X 
 
ONLY FOR 
monopolies, 
state 
enterprises 
and 
information 
requests 
 
√ 
 
Designate
d 
monopolie
s in 
procurem
ent 
 
X 
 
Not 
explicitly 
provided 
under 
RTA but 
subject to 
the 
domestic 
laws 
 
X 
 
X 
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59 
 
 
 
NAFTA 
(1 Jan 1994) 
  
 
 
 
√ 
 
 
X 
 
 
√ 
 
Including: 
 
Mutual legal 
assistance 
 
Notification 
 
Consultation 
 
Exchange of 
information 
 
 
X 
 
 
√ 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
*  Competition Related Provisions are provided in Implementing Agreement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN 
DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AS 
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REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AS LISTED ON WTO 
WEBSITE (AS OF MAY 2012) 
 
1. ASEAN – AUSTRALIA – NEW ZEALAND FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
2. ASEAN – CHINA 
3. ASEAN – INDIA 
4. ASEAN – JAPAN 
5. ASEAN – REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
6. ASEAN FREE TRADE AREA (AFTA) 
7. ASIA PACIFIC TRADE AGREEMENT (APTA) 
8. ASIA PACIFIC TRADE AGREEMENT (APTA) – ACCESSION OF CHINA 
9. AUSTRALIA – CHILE 
10. AUSTRALIA – PAPUA NEW GUINEA (PATCRA) 
11. CANADA – CHILE 
12. CANADA – COLOMBIA 
13. CANADA – COSTA RICA 
14. CANADA – PERU 
15. CARRIBEAN COMMUNITY AND COMMON MARKET (CARICOM) 
16. CENTRAL EUROPAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (CEFTA) 2006 
17. CHILE – JAPAN 
18. CHINA – HONG KONG, CHINA 
19. CHINA – MACAO, CHINA 
20. CHINA – NEW ZEALAND 
21. CHINA – SINGAPORE 
22. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC – CENTRAL AMERICA – UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (CAFTA – 
DR) 
23. EC (25) ENLARGEMENT 
Annex 
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24. EC (27) ENLARGEMENT 
25. EFTA – ALBANIA 
26. EFTA – CHILE 
27. EFTA – COLOMBIA 
28. EFTA – EGYPT 
29. EFTA – FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA 
30. EFTA – JORDAN 
31. EFTA – LEBANON 
32. EFTA – MEXICO 
33. EFTA – MOROCCO 
34. EFTA – PERU 
35. EFTA – SACU 
36. EFTA – TUNISIA 
37. EFTA – TURKEY 
38. EU – ALBANIA 
39. EU – ALGERIA 
40. EU – BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
41. EU – CAMEROON 
42. EU – CARIFORUM STATES EPA 
43. EU – CHILE 
44. EU – IVORY COAST 
45. EU – EGYPT 
46. EU – FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA 
47. EU – JORDAN 
48. EU – LEBANON 
49. EU – MEXICO 
50. EU – MONTENEGRO 
51. EU – MOROCCO 
52. EU – OVERSEAS COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES (OCT) 
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53. EU – PAPUA NEW GUINEA/FIJI 
54. EU – SERBIA 
55. EU – SOUTH AFRICA 
56. EU – SYRIA 
57. EU – TUNISIA  
58. EU – TURKEY 
59. GLOBAL SYSTEM OF TRADE PREFERENCES AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (GSTP) 
60. INDIA – JAPAN 
61. INDIA – SINGAPORE 
62. ISRAEL – MEXICO 
63. JAPAN – INDONESIA 
64. JAPAN – MALAYSIA 
65. JAPAN – MEXICO 
66. JAPAN – PERU 
67. JAPAN – PHILIPPINES 
68. JAPAN – THAILAND 
69. JAPAN – VIETNAM 
70. JORDAN – SINGAPORE 
71. REPUBLIC OF KOREA – CHILE 
72. REPUBLIC OF KOREA – INDIA 
73. NEW ZEALAND – MALAYSIA 
74. NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA) 
75. PANAMA – SINGAPORE 
76. PAN - ARAB FREE TRADE AREA (PAFTA) 
77. PERU – REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
78. PERU – SINGAPORE 
79. PROTOCAL ON TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (PTN) 
80. SOUTH PACIFIC REGIONAL TRADE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT (SPARTECA) 
81. THAILAND – AUSTRALIA 
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82. THAILAND – NEW ZEALAND 
83. TRANS-PACIFIC STRATEGIC ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP  
84. TURKEY – CROATIA 
85. TURKEY – ISRAEL 
86. US – CHILE 
87. US – JORDAN 
88. US – MOROCCO 
89. US – PERU 
 
 
NOTE: Regional Trade Agreements involving Palestinian Authority and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, 
Kinmen and Matsu have been excluded because their level of development based on income as per the World Bank’s 
classification cannot be ascertained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMPETITION ACT 2010, MALAYSIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
